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ABSTRACT
RECONCILING UNIVERSAL SALVATION AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE
IN ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA

Lee W. Sytsma, B.A., M.T.S.
Marquette University, 2018

Origen has traditionally been famous for his universalism, but many scholars now
express doubt that Origen believed in a universal and permanent apocatastasis. This is
because many scholars are convinced that Origen’s teaching on moral autonomy (or
freedom of choice) is logically incompatible with the notion that God foreordains every
soul’s future destiny. Those few scholars who do argue that Origen believed in both
moral autonomy and universal salvation either do not know how to reconcile these two
views in Origen’s theology, or their proposed “solutions” are not convincing.
In this dissertation I make two preliminary arguments which allow the question of
logical compatibility to come into focus. First, I argue that vague phrases such as “free
will” or “freedom of the will” are not helpful descriptions of Origen’s thought, but
instead we must understand the careful and technical way Origen defined moral
autonomy. Second, I make the argument that Origen did, in fact, believe in a universal
and permanent restoration of all fallen souls (the apocatastasis), and that this restoration
was predetermined and foreordained by God. These two arguments introduce the followup question: how does Origen think it is possible for God to achieve this predetermined
outcome of cosmic history, an outcome completely facilitated through the free and
contingent decisions of creatures, without God somehow coercing those who might
choose to consistently resist him?
My aim is to demonstrate that Origen reconciled his belief in universal salvation
and moral autonomy by drawing upon his multi-layered understanding of God’s
foreknowledge in order to show how God uses his foreknowledge in the planning of
salvation-history. Careful analysis of key passages reveals Origen’s belief that God not
only foreknows our future choices, but that God also knows what free choices creatures
would make in any hypothetical situation. Therefore, I argue, Origen believed that God
preselects and arranges into a future timeline only those free choices of creatures which
God foresees would eventually result in a universal restoration. In this way God is able to
infallibly bring about the foreordained apocatastasis without violating moral autonomy
as Origen defined it.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of Christian universalism is complicated by the fact that the label does
not refer to a specific doctrine in the abstract.1 Rather, individual authors who teach this
concept understand universal salvation to entail distinctive features and requirements.
Despite the diversity found within this term, however, objections to “universalism” have
often been one-dimensional. In modern times, one of the most common objections to
universal salvation is that it is somehow incompatible with the idea of free will, in the
sense that a divinely foreordained universal salvation must deny people the autonomy to
choose their own destiny.2 This charge stems from the common intuition that salvation is
something that must be willingly entered into, without force or compulsion, and therefore
any foreordained and infallible plan by God which insists upon this telos would not
respect a person’s hypothetical choice to refrain from salvation. This common intuition
recognizes that God may universally desire all to be saved without any subsequent threat
to free will, but any sense in which this destiny is predetermined and unchangeable

1

The term universalism is frequently used in discussions regarding how open and accessible a
religion is to wider segments of the world’s population – i.e. the extent to which certain religions are
inclusive of all people groups, or whether participation in a religion requires membership to a particular
ethnicity or sociological group. For a helpful orientation on the (often ill-defined) terminology used in such
discussions, see Anders Runesson, "Particularistic Judaism and Universalistic Christianity? Some critical
remarks on Terminology and Theology," Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism 1 (2000). I am
not using the term “universalism” in this sense. Instead, I am referring to the eschatological belief found
among some Christian theologians that all people who have ever lived will eventually enjoy God’s
salvation (however they might construe that final state). On the distinction between universalism as
universal mission/conversion and universal salvation, cf. Alan F. Segal, "Conversion and Universalism:
Opposites that Attract," in Origins and Method: Towards A New Understanding of Judaism and
Christianity: Essays in Honour of John C. Hurd, ed. Bradley H. McLean, JSNTSup (Sheffield: JSOT Press,
1993), 175, passim.
Of course, when speaking of universal salvation there are also universalist theologies which do not
rest upon a foundation of the Christian understanding of God – the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus
Christ (e.g. Buddhist or Islamic universalism). Here and throughout I use the term “universalism” (and its
synonyms) to refer to Christian understandings of universal salvation. Unique features of Origen’s
universalism will be detailed in Chapter 4.
2
Another major criticism often levied against the idea of universal salvation is that it is not the
best interpretation of Scripture. While important, outlining this criticism is outside the scope of this study.
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appears to undercut moral autonomy; the common intuition insists that morally free
creatures must possess the right (at least in principle) to decide for themselves that they
do not want to be saved.3
Given the popularity of this critique, it is unsurprising that modern scholarship
has also levied this objection against the most famous universalist in Christian history,
the 3rd century teacher and theologian Origen of Alexandria. In one sense, charging
3

The roots of this common intuition can be traced back at least as early as Greco-Roman debates
on various forms of fatalism. Some philosophers took issue with the idea of fixed future events and
believed this would undercut any sense of moral responsibility. The most famous example of this argument
is often called the “Idle (or lazy) Argument” (ἀργὸς λόγος), which has been preserved in Cicero's On Fate
28-9, and Origen’s Contra Celsum II.20 (this argument will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2).
Some philosophers disavowed the possibility of God having foreknowledge of future events because it was
thought that any sense of a fixed future eliminates moral responsibility in the present. Cf. Susanne Bobzien,
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 180-233. The
common intuition that the fixed event of universal salvation contradicts moral freedom can be found in
modern times as well. In the 19th century universalists were regularly on the defensive against this critique.
See, for example, the comments made by Rev. G. H. Emerson in 1872: “Now here is the gross injustice
which is made to tell with serious effect to the prejudice of the Universalist faith: everywhere orthodoxy
makes Universalism obnoxious to an objection which, if it has any force, tells with equal pertinence against
itself . . . That principle, as we have seen, is this: Certainty of salvation implies a lack of power to refuse it.
That principle is a specious absurdity” – G. H. Emerson, "A Popular Objection to Universalism Reviewed,"
in The Universalist Quarterly and General Review, ed. Thomas B. Thayer (Boston: Universalist Publishing
House, 1872), 443-44 (emphasis added). Today, many writers continue to rely on this common intuition as
a way to discredit universalism – e.g. John Sanders, "A Freewill Theist's Response to Talbott's
Universalism," in Universal Salvation? The Current Debate, ed. Robin Parry and Christopher H. Partridge
(Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster Press, 2003). Even theologians who do not wish to attack the idea of
universal salvation, in that they admit to being attracted to the notion, nevertheless also articulate this same
intuition. Notable examples include Hans Urs von Balthasar (Roman Catholic) and Kallistos Ware (Eastern
Orthodox). Bishop Ware, for example, calls the argument from free will the strongest argument against
universal salvation. He writes: “If the strongest argument in favor of universal salvation is the appeal to
divine love, and if the strongest argument on the opposite side is the appeal to human freedom, then we are
brought back to the dilemma with which we started: how are we to bring into concord the two principles
God is love and Human beings are free? . . . Our belief in human freedom means that we have no right to
categorically affirm, ‘All must be saved.’ But our faith in God’s love makes us dare to hope that all will be
saved” – Kallistos Ware, "Dare We Hope for the Salvation of All?," in The Inner Kingdom (Crestwood,
New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2000), 214-15. Balthasar reflects a similar attitude in: Hans Urs
von Balthasar, Dare We Hope "That All Men Be Saved"? with a short Discourse on Hell [original title:
Was durfen wir hoffen?] (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988). This common intuition is not relegated to
one branch of Christianity but can be found among Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant writers.
Additionally, it should be noted that there is another trajectory of universalism which shares the
common intuition and admits the incompatibility between freedom of choice and universal salvation, yet at
the same time this tradition upholds the truth of a fixed universal salvation. Friedrich Schleiermacher is
probably the most famous example of this category. Schleiermacher linked predestination with universal
salvation, and taught that the entire human race has been predestined for salvation through Christ – cf.
Anette I. Hagan, Eternal Blessedness for All? A Historical-Systematic Examination of Schleiermacher's
Understanding of Predestination, ed. K. C. Hanson, et al., Princeton Theological Monograph Series
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013).
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Origen with undercutting moral freedom may seem surprising given Origen’s constant
insistence on the reality of free choice. After all, throughout his entire life the great
teacher of Alexandria fought against fatalistic theologies which he described as
dangerous threats to human moral responsibility and utterly incompatible with the
Christian faith. It is not without cause that Henri Crouzel once called Origen the
“theologian par excellence of free will.”4 Origen insisted that the doctrine of moral
responsibility was a foundational and crucial feature of the Church’s Regula. To
compromise on this point would destroy Christianity itself given that the truth of moral
autonomy safeguards the two foundational pillars of Christian theology – the justice and
the love of the one God. Yet, despite widespread agreement among scholars today that
Origen ranks among the greatest upholders of free will, many continue to question the
logic of his thought, either by suggesting that Origen contradicts himself by believing in
universal salvation, or by concluding that despite appearances, he must not have been a
universalist after all, given his firm belief in free will.5 This dissertation will examine
Origen’s doctrines of moral autonomy and universal salvation in order to demonstrate
that Origen upheld the integrity of both in a logically consistent manner. As such, this
dissertation might also be described as a critique of the modern critique of Origen.

4

Henri Crouzel, Origen, trans. A.S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Publishers, 1989), 195.
The variety of scholarly interpretations regarding Origen’s universalism will be outlined in
Chapter 1 and Chapter 4.
5

4

Scope
Origen’s doctrines of moral autonomy and divine providence cannot be easily
summarized as they permeate nearly every facet of Origen’s theology.6 For Origen, the
entirety of the moral quest is the constant interplay between divine providence and moral
autonomy. Therefore, it is important to note at the outset that the scope of this study will
be tightly focused in the following ways: First, numerous aspects of Origen’s theology
continue to be debated today, and this is especially true regarding certain features of
Origen’s eschatology. I will note controversial topics in footnotes as they arise, but I will
reserve detailed textual examination only for those topics which directly pertain to my
central argument.
Second, I will note possible background sources for Origen’s doctrines of moral
autonomy and divine providence, but only insofar as this allows us to better understand
Origen on his own terms. I do not intend to undertake the monumental task of tracing the
development of the “freedom of the will” up through the third century AD, nor do I
intend to give a detailed accounting for the large diversity of views regarding divine
providence in Jewish and Greco-Roman literature. Such examinations would take several
volumes. Where applicable, I make note of work that has already been done on these
topics.
Finally, it is outside the scope of this study to pronounce judgment on the
orthodoxy or heterodoxy of Origen’s views on the aspects of his theology under question.
The matter of historical ecclesial condemnation of Origen has been complicated by false

6

In his magisterial book Hal Koch demonstrated that the two threads which are imbedded in all of
Origen’s thought are pronoia and paideusis, or divine providence as God’s educational strategy for
restoration – Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum
Platonismus (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1932).
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trails, hostile witnesses, unfair characterizations, unnamed anathemas (as in the case of
the Fifth Ecumenical Council), and perhaps most importantly, the question of the extant
texts and the reliability of their translations (see below). Suffice to say, it should be
remembered that Origen himself expressed a firm and uncompromising desire to stay
within the bounds of the Church’s Rule of Faith.7 Origen was convinced that any topics
which had not yet been settled by the larger Church were open subjects for discussion.8 It
was for such as these that Origen was later condemned, and many of his works
destroyed.9

7

E.g. In his preface to First Principles Origen writes: “…and yet the teaching of the church,
handed down in unbroken succession from the apostles, is still preserved and continues to exist in the
churches up to the present day, we maintain that that only is to be believed as the truth which in no way
conflicts with the tradition of the church and the apostles” – PArch preface 2 (Butterworth 2; SC 252, 78).
Citations from Peri Archon are from the most recent critical edition by Henri Crouzel and Manlio
Simonetti, Origèn: Traité des Principes, 4 vols., Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf, 1978-84). Citations will
list SC volume and page (for additional information see the bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all
English translations are from G. W. Butterworth, Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the
De principiis (Cloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith Pub., 1973). The critical editions of Origen’s other writings
(predominately from Sources Chrétiennes) will be listed in footnotes as they are cited. To aid the reader, I
relist the critical edition information once per chapter as each work is cited. I follow the same pattern for
those modern works which appear in multiple chapters.
8
Origen frequently contrasts doctrinal absolutes with proposals, suggestions, and speculation.
While Origen insists upon doctrines that are part of the Church’s Rule of Faith, he exercises more modesty
on other subjects. The following is a typical example of the way Origen speaks when he moves beyond
established dogma: PArch 2.6.7 – “In the meantime, these are the thoughts which occur to us at the moment
in our discussion of such very difficult subjects as the incarnation and deity of Christ. If there be anyone
who can discover something better and prove what he says by clearer statements out of the holy scriptures,
let his opinion be accepted in preference to mine” (Butterworth 115; SC 252, 324).
9
For a helpful overview of the condemnations of Origen through the first Origenist controversy,
see Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an early Christian Debate
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). The condemnations of Origen are further complicated by
the messy interpersonal disagreements between several “big” personalities such as Jerome and Rufinus who
in today’s colloquial vernacular might fairly be described as “frenemies”. One big issue is that the main
participants in the debate over Origen’s orthodoxy could not even agree on what Origen himself had taught.
Disagreements over translation methodology played a central role in the controversy. On the different
translation philosophies of Jerome and Rufinus, see Catherine Chin, "Translation as Origenism," Journal of
Early Christian Studies 18, no. 4 (2010). The reliability of Rufinus as translator will be discussed below.

6

Methodology
All discussions pertaining to the logic of Origen’s beliefs and theology raise
important methodological concerns. First, I am working under the assumption that
Origen’s writings may be viewed synthetically. Some have argued otherwise. For
example, in an appendix to his Origène et la philosophie Henri Crouzel writes that it is
utterly wrong to speak of a “system,” and that Origen never developed his theology to the
point of systematic coherence. Thus, we should expect contradictions to be found
throughout Origen’s writings.10 To some degree I am sympathetic with this concern. For
instance, in his homilies and commentaries Origen frequently lists several possible
interpretations for a passage of Scripture, any of which could be valid and perhaps even
be valid at the same time, so long as they do not contradict the Church’s Rule of Faith.
However, despite Origen’s tendency to be generous in his exegetical explorations, I do
not believe that Origen’s views concerning divine providence and human moral
autonomy fit this category. Nor do I believe that attempting to understand how they fit
together is somehow imposing a foreign “system” on something never intended for it. In
this, I am following other scholars who also recognize the validity of a synthetic
treatment of Origen by finding key concepts in his theology which appear to organize his
thought.11 Of course, Origen’s consistency on these topics will need to be demonstrated
10

Henri Crouzel, "Origène est il un systematique?," in Origène et la philosophie (Paris: Aubier,
1962), 179-215. Cf. Herbert Musurillo, "The Recent Revival of Origen Studies," Theological Studies 24,
no. 2 (1963): 256-57. Musurillo agrees with Crouzel’s assessment. J. Chênevert also argues that Origen’s
scattered comments should not be forced into a ‘systematic’ mold – Jacques Chênevert, L’ Église dans le
commentaire d’Origène sur le Cantique des Cantiques, Studia: travaux de recherches (Bruxelles: Desclee
de Brouwer, 1969), 141.
11
E.g. David Balas synthesized Origen’s thought using the concept of participation – David L.
Balas, "The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme
of the Platonic Tradition," in Origeniana. Premier colloque international des études origéniennes, ed.
Henri Crouzel, G. Lomiento, and J. Rius-Camps (Bari: Istituto di letteratura cristiana antica, Università di
Bari, 1975), 274. John Clark Smith synthesized Origen’s thought on the subject of conversion – John Clark
Smith, "Conversion in Origen," Scottish Journal of Theology 32, no. 3 (1979): passim, especially 219.
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by careful analysis of the relevant texts, rather than merely assumed. This dissertation
will reveal that Origen’s theology of divine providence and moral autonomy fit together
with logical (and theological) consistently.
A second point of concern pertains to how the modern scholar should approach
the surviving texts by Origen. Origen was one of the most prolific writers of the early
Church. Referring to a work by Eusebius of Caesarea, Jerome mentions that Eusebius
knew 2000 treatises written by Origen, while Jerome drew up his own list of 800 titles.12
Epiphanius estimated that there were 6000 works written by Origen.13 Unfortunately,
because of later condemnations most of Origen’s writings are lost to history. Of those
that survive, the majority of texts have only been preserved in the Latin translations of
Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411 AD).14 Distrust of Rufinus’ abilities as a translator go all
the way back to the arguments between Rufinus and another (in)famous translator of
Origen, Jerome. Indeed, there are good reasons to suspect the accuracy of Rufinus’
translations. First, Rufinus himself invites comparison of his work by admitting that he
took a number of liberties when translating Origen’s Greek for a Western audience. For
example, in his preface to his translation of Origen’s First Principles Rufinus writes:
…in my translation I would follow as far as possible the rule observed by
my predecessors and especially by the man whom I mentioned above. For
Crouzel himself seems to have softened his stance on this debate a few years later when he stated that
Origen’s theology supports synthetic approaches – Henri Crouzel, "Qu’a voulu faire Origène en composant
le Traité des Principes?," Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 76 (1975): 258.
12
Eusebius’ list is now lost. Jerome mentions this in Adv. Rufinum 2.22.
13
Epiphanius, Adv. haer. 64.63. Cf. John A. McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 26.
14
For a list of Origen’s works as they survive in either Greek or Latin, as well as their modern
editions, see Maurits Geerard and Friedhelm Winkelmann, Clavis patrum graecorum: Patres antenicaeni,
Clavis patrum graecorum (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1983), 141-86. For a helpful guide and listing of
Origen’s critical editions (PG, GCS, SC), see McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen: 41-44. On
the dating of Origen’s works see R.P.C. Hanson, Origen's doctrine of tradition (London: SPCK, 1954), 130; Pierre Nautin, Origène : sa vie et son oeuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), especially ch. 10
"Chronologie", 363-412; Johannes Quasten, The Ante-Nicene Literature After Irenaeus, Volume 2,
Patrology (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1983), 37-43.

8

he, when translating into Latin more than seventy treatises of Origen,
called Homilies, and also a number of his commentaries on St. Paul’s
epistles, both of which are known to contain in the original a good many
statements likely to cause offense, so smoothed over and emended these in
his translation, that a Latin reader would find in them nothing out of
harmony with our faith. His example, therefore, I am following to the best
of my ability; if not with an equal degree of eloquence, yet at least
observing the same rules, and taking care not to reproduce such passages
from the books of Origen as are found to be inconsistent with and contrary
to his true teaching.15
It is important to appreciate why Rufinus altered and smoothed over certain
“problematic” passages. Rufinus was convinced that heretics had altered some of the
Greek copies of Origen in order to give greater authority to their heretical views, and he
also believed that disingenuous persons had intentionally corrupted Origen’s texts in
various places in order to malign Origen’s good name.16 So, for example, Rufinus notes
the following about his translation of First Principles:
Wherever, therefore, I have found in his books anything contrary to the
reverent statements made by him about the Trinity in other places, I have
either omitted it as a corrupt and interpolated passage, or reproduced it in a
form that agrees with the doctrine I have found him affirming elsewhere.
If, however, speaking as he does to men of knowledge and discernment,
he has occasionally expressed himself obscurely in the effort to be brief, I
have, to make the passage clearer, added such remarks on the same subject
as I have read in a fuller form in his other books, bearing in mind the need

15

PArch Preface of Rufinus 2 (SC 252, 70; Butterworth lxii-lxiii).
PArch Preface of Rufinus 3 (SC 252, 70; Butterworth lxiii): “The cause of these variations I
have explained to you more fully in the Apologeticus, a work written by Pamphilus in defence of Origen’s
books, to which I added a very brief tract, showing, as I think, by clear proofs that these have been
corrupted in many places by heretics and evilly disposed persons. This is especially the case with the books
which you are now pressing me to translate, namely those entitled Peri Archon…” Rufinus gives a similar
complaint of foreign interpolations (interpolare) in the preface to his translation of Origen’s Commentary
on Romans. Even in his own lifetime, Origen wrote that one heretic corrupted a debate they had together
while another heretic wrote something in Origen’s name. This is found in Origen’s letter To Friends in
Alexandria which is preserved by both Jerome and Rufinus: Jerome, Apologia adversus libros Rufini 2.18
and Rufinus, De adulteratione librorum Origenis 7.1-67. Both Jerome and Rufinus report Origen's words
in nearly the same way, and therefore it is safe to assume its authenticity. Discussion and translation of this
letter may be found in Henri Crouzel, "A Letter from Origen to 'Friends in Alexandria,'" in The Heritage of
the Early Church: Essays in Honor of George Vasilievich Florovsky ed. D. Neiman and M. Schatkin
(Rome: Pontificio Istituo Orientale, 1973), 135-50.
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of explanation. But I have said nothing of my own, simply giving back to
him his own statements found in other places.17
Many scholars acknowledge that Rufinus supplied certain post-Nicene glosses in his
translation work.18 Rufinus not only admits to altering certain passages in his translation
for the sake of orthodoxy, but he also admits to frequently abbreviating the original
Greek. The best example of this is Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Commentary on
Romans. In his preface to this work Rufinus states that he attempted to compress the
original fifteen Greek books in half.19
For these reasons, it is understandable that the scholarly consensus once held
Rufinus to be an unreliable translator. Hal Koch, for example, insisted that Rufinus’
translation of First Principles could not be trusted.20 A turning point on scholarly opinion
of Rufinus’ abilities and integrity came about in 1941 with the discovery of new Greek
fragments of Origen, called the Tura papyri.21 These fragments have allowed scholars to
compare passages from the Latin translations against the Greek originals, and the results
of this analysis have largely exonerated Rufinus. While it is true that Rufinus does alter

17

PArch Preface of Rufinus 3 (Butterworth lxiii; SC 252, 72).
For a helpful discussion on Rufinus’ general reliability, see the Introduction in Ronald E. Heine,
Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1982), 27-39.
19
ComRm Preface of Rufinus lines 16-19 (Bammel 36; Scheck 1.51-52). Rufinus translated this
work at the request of a monk named Heraclius, and it was Heraclius who requested that Rufinus abridge
the commentary so drastically, given the great length of the original. Citations from Origen’s Commentary
on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical edition by Caroline P. Hammond Bammel, Der
Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 3 vols., vol. 1, 2, 3, Aus
der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel (Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany: Herder, 1990-1998). Unless
otherwise noted, all English translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-volume work:
Thomas P. Scheck, Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5, FOTC (Washington
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001); Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans
Books 6-10, FOTC (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002).
20
Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus:
322.
21
For the publication and analysis of the Greek papyrus fragments see Jean Scherer, Le
commentaire d’Origène sur Rom. III.5-V.7 d’après les extraits du papyrus Nᵒ 88748 du Musée du Caire et
les fragments de la Philocalie et du Vaticanus Gr. 762 (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale,
1957).
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some of Origen’s Trinitarian remarks (as he admits to doing), he appears to be a reliable
interpreter on most other subjects. This is especially true regarding the subjects examined
in this dissertation. J. M. Rist’s study of Origen’s free will arguments in First Principles
reveal Rufinus’ faithfulness in translating Origen on the concept of free will or moral
autonomy.22 On the topic of Origen’s universalism, there are passages in both the Greek
and Latin translations which attest to Origen’s belief in the concept. Moreover, if Rufinus
had thought to alter such passages, he would not have strengthened Origen’s discussion
of the apocatastasis but rather would have tempered or downplayed it. Given that certain
features of Origen’s teaching on the apocatastasis were already under attack by Jerome
and others, Rufinus certainly felt pressure to modulate Origen’s remarks in First
Principles and the Commentary on Romans.23 There would be no good reason for
Rufinus to have manufactured such teachings. As we will see in Chapter 4, many of these
teachings are clearly preserved in his translations, and therefore it is safe to conclude that
Rufinus is presenting Origen’s own voice on this topic. Thus, the prevailing consensus
today among Origen scholars is that Rufinus is an important source for Origen’s thought,
despite his occasional emendation on certain issues such as the subordination of the Son.
I am likewise proceeding on the basis that Rufinus’ translations are largely trustworthy
on the topics most relevant to this dissertation – Origen’s teachings on moral autonomy

22
John M. Rist, "The Greek and Latin Texts of the Discussion on Free Will in De principiis, Book
III," in Origeniana: Premier colloque international des etudes origéniennes, ed. Henri Crouzel, G.
Lomiento, and J. Ruis-Camps (Bari: Istituto di letteratura cristiana antica, Università di Bari, 1975), 111.
23
E.g. when translating the Greek of PArch 2.10.8, Koetschau believes that Rufinus omits the
following line: “There is a resurrection of the dead, and there is punishment, but not everlasting”
(Butterworth 146; SC 252, 392-394).
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and universal salvation. Thus, although I use the original Greek whenever possible, I also
make use of Rufinus’ translations for understanding Origen’s thought.24

Chapter Overviews
Chapter 1 outlines the current state of the question regarding the compatibility of
Origen’s theology of universal salvation and freedom of choice in matters of faith and
repentance. This chapter will highlight the wide confusion among scholars surrounding
this topic. Some scholars have called Origen logically inconsistent or paradoxical, while
other scholars have essentially redefined his universalism in order to erase or smooth
over the supposed incompatibility with freedom of choice. I make note of a few scholars
who have recently defended Origen from such charges, but I argue that their explanations
lack sufficient explanatory power or textual evidence. This chapter poses the central
question of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 analyzes Origen’s understanding of moral autonomy or freedom of
choice. Any question of Origen’s inconsistency between freedom of choice and God’s
sovereign decision to save all people necessarily hinges upon correctly understanding
what Origen means by freedom of choice, given that this phrase means very little in the
abstract. Different authors stipulated different requirements for a choice to be considered
free and unforced. Origen was one of many participants in this philosophical and
theological conversation, a conversation which was an ongoing feature of the intellectual
landscape in the 3rd century. Origen’s discussions on moral autonomy were frequently
reactionary arguments to opposing viewpoints, and so Chapter 2 also surveys the

24

Studying Rufinus’ translations has an additional benefit in that it is useful for understanding the
“Western Origen”, for it is the Latin Origen who had the greatest influence on the Western Church.
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viewpoints that Origen sought to correct. I make note of Origen’s well-known reliance on
Stoic categories of the mechanics of choice, but I also highlight key differences.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on Origen’s theology of divine providence, with the goal
of demonstrating the role universal salvation plays in Origen’s theological system (or
salvation-history). My argument in this dissertation relies on specific features of Origen’s
concept of cosmic / salvation-history and how divine providence directs and unfolds that
history. Therefore, Chapter 3 provides an overview of Origen’s vision of salvationhistory by looking at the chronological stages that lead up to the last stage – the final
restoration of all rational souls, or the apocatastasis. The importance of Chapter 3 is in
establishing the contours of God’s salvation-history and showing that all things within the
historical timeline are directed towards a specific end. Origen’s vision of cosmic history
is idiosyncratic, and so Chapter 3 will provide a helpful foundation from which to
establish the arguments of the remaining chapters.
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of Origen’s vision of salvation-history, but it
focuses exclusively on the final stage – the apocatastasis. Specifically, in this chapter I
defend three claims: First, I argue that although Origen appears to give conflicting
statements regarding universal salvation, he nevertheless holds a belief in a final and
permanent restoration of all rational souls. Second, I argue that Origen’s universalism
constitutes a soteriology which can be described as a form of divine predeterminism and
foreordination. Third, I argue that Origen’s universalism amplifies his theology of God’s
grace.
Chapter 5 answers the principle question of the dissertation: how does Origen
uphold the permanency of freedom of choice when he believes in a predetermined and
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unavoidable soteriological end? In other words, how does Origen escape the charge of
fatalism? The structure of Chapter 5 is organized around a series of different passages
from Origen’s corpus, which are scrutinized in light of the conclusions of the previous
chapters (and in light of each other). When read together, these key texts reveal that
Origen was, in fact, aware that universalism appears to stand in conflict with freedom of
choice, but that Origen believed there was a way to uphold the integrity of both. He is
able to do so by appealing to a nuanced type of divine (fore)knowledge. Origen believed
that God’s intimate knowledge of each person’s soul not only gives God the ability to
foreknow how each person will choose in the future, but that it also gives God the ability
to know how each person would freely choose in any hypothetical situation, whether or
not such a situation is ever realized in history. Even before God ever creates souls, and
thus before the start of temporal history, God foreknows what critical situations each
fallen soul will need to find itself in, such that each soul will freely make the choices
necessary to arrive at a final restoration. On the basis of this knowledge God then creates
a historical timeline which actuates his plan of salvation and induces his creatures to
freely arrive at a final restoration. The chief role of divine providence is in creating this
plan and then actuating it in history. While providence exercises absolute control over the
telos of history, which includes the destiny of each soul, at no point in time does divine
providence undercut or threaten individual freedom of choice, as Origen defines the
concept.
Finally, the conclusion first summarizes the main arguments made in the
dissertation, and then looks ahead by suggesting several important implications of this
research for contemporary scholarship.
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CHAPTER ONE
STATE OF THE QUESTION
Introduction
One of the most discussed features of Origen’s theology is his view of universal
salvation, a final restoration of all rational souls called the apocatastasis. Origen is
similarly well-known for his teachings on moral autonomy and moral responsibility. The
attempt to integrate Origen’s views on moral autonomy with his views on universal
salvation has resulted in uncertainty in modern scholarship. At question is not the
cooperation between divine providence and moral autonomy in general. After all, the
entirety of Origen’s cosmic drama is concerned with how divine providence acts and
reacts with respect to creaturely moral decisions. The constant cooperation between
God’s choices and the choices of creatures is relatively straightforward most of the time;
Origen understands that virtually everything that happens regarding rational beings
during their lives may be traced to divine providence.25 But two specific intersection
points have troubled scholars. These may be posed as two related questions: first, how
does Origen think that God will infallibly and necessarily save all rational souls in the
final restoration without violating the exercise of their moral autonomy? Second, how can
Origen be confident that the final restoration will be permanent if creatures retain their
moral autonomy in the apocatastasis?

25

E.g. PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404-406). The most recent critical edition of Peri
Archon is by Crouzel and Simonetti, Origèn: Traité des Principes. Unless otherwise noted, all English
translations from Peri Archon are from Butterworth, Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of
the De principiis.
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Partly because of the confusion on these topics, the typical view – that Origen
believed in universal salvation – has been questioned in recent years. This has taken place
alongside a general reexamination of Origen’s theology by scholars in the past century.26
Many of the old anathemas against Origen are now considered dubious claims originating
from unfriendly witnesses.27 However, despite their acknowledgment of the unfair
criticism that has been directed at Origen, many scholars continue to reaffirm the
traditional view regarding Origen’s universalism.28 Those scholars who uphold the
traditional view – that Origen held a firm belief in universal salvation – find themselves
faced with questions regarding Origen’s theological consistency: how does God’s
foreordination of universal salvation not undercut the integrity of creaturely moral
autonomy and self-determination? On the surface, the combination of moral autonomy
and universalism may seem paradoxical, for how can creaturely free choice be upheld in
the context of a foreordained universal salvation? How, precisely, does Origen uphold the
integrity of moral autonomy if no creature may choose to rebel against God forever? Did
Origen lapse into incoherence or inconsistency on these points?
It is important to note that these questions cannot be sidestepped as if they are
merely modern concerns which have been unfairly hoisted back in time upon Origen’s

26
This reexamination has frequently been called a ‘reappraisal and rehabilitation’ of Origen, and
is largely attributed to efforts by Henri de Lubac. For an overview of de Lubac’s project and the
reexamination of Origen in general, see A. Edward Siecienski, "(Re)defining the Boundaries of Orthodoxy:
The Rule of Faith and the Twentieth-Century Rehabilitation of Origen," in Tradition & The Rule of Faith in
the Early Church ed. Ronnie Rombs and Alexander Hwang (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2010). There are good reasons to be suspicious of those who call the recent reexamination
of Origen a “recovery.” Twentieth century scholarship on Origen has, for some reason, ignored scholarship
from the 18th and 19th centuries. For more on this point, and specific examples of Origen’s influence in the
18th and 19th centuries, see Michel Barnes, "May I Return to the Beginning? The Western Doctrine of
Universal Salvation in English Language Protestant Theology, 1690-1889," (forthcoming 2018).
27
For a helpful overview on the condemnations of Origen, as well as Origen’s attempts to defend
his orthodoxy, see Cyril Richardson, "The Condemnation of Origen," Church History 6, no. 1 (1937).
28
For a list and discussion of scholars who continue to understand Origen to be a universalist, see
Chapter 4.
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theology.29 On the contrary, such questions were neither foreign nor irrelevant to
Origen’s own project, and Origen’s writings reveal his own concern regarding this
issue.30 I will show that this is the primary reason, after all, why Origen hid this feature of
his theology from most Christians. He believed this teaching would be misunderstood in
dangerous ways, and that many Christians would naturally presume that any form of
teleological foreordination ruled out moral responsibility in the present life.31 Thus, it is
appropriate to investigate whether Origen was theologically consistent on this point, and
how he understood moral autonomy to cooperate with divine foreordination at precisely
these two points in the economy of salvation.

29

I am not suggesting that modern concerns and modern philosophical debates have not
contributed to the degree of interest or concern over these questions, for I do believe modern
presuppositions are at work in the scholarly discussion – often subconsciously so. The point is, rather, that
this concern is not wholly a modern imposition, given that Origen was aware that the two views might
appear contradictory. Modern philosophers continue to debate whether the idea of a predetermined
universalism (universal salvation) is compatible with moral autonomy. Or, to be more precise, the debate
concerns which versions of moral autonomy are compatible with such a concept and which ones are not.
Cf. Michael Murray, "Three Versions of Universalism," Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 58-59.
30
E.g. Phil 23.10.21-28 (Lewis 183; SC 226, 162-164): “Thus it is good that God Who ordereth
[οἰκονομῶν, referring to God’s οἰκονομία] all things for the best, with good reason hides the future from
our eyes. For the knowledge of the future makes us relax in the struggle against wickedness, and the
apparent certainty of wickedness enervates us, and the result is that because we do not wrestle against sin
we soon become subject to it. And at the same time it would be an obstacle in the way of a man’s becoming
good and upright, if the knowledge that he will certainly some day be good reached him beforehand”
(emphasis added). Citations from the Philocalia 21-27 are from the critical edition by Junod (listed by
chapter, section, and line): Éric Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre, Sources Chrétiennes
(Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1976). English translations are by George Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen: A
compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of
Caesarea (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911).
31
Not only did he refrain from teaching this doctrine to most Christians, but at times when Origen
does teach it he immediately appears defensive. When he alludes to the final salvation of all, he takes care
to supplement his view with an insistence that all of this will be done without coercion. Origen is aware
that any discussion of universal salvation is close enough to notions of fate and fatalism that the two can be
easily confused. He seems aware of the implied awkwardness and tension that surrounds any concept of a
predetermined end. See the discussion on Origen’s pedagogical strategy and his role as “a wise steward of
the word” in Chapter 4.
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Status Quaestionis and Literature Review
Scholarly treatment on this issue has often operated (perhaps unknowingly) with a
scholar’s presupposition that teleological foreordination (events which have been
predetermined by God) and moral autonomy are prima facie opposite claims.32 One early
example of this pattern is Charles Bigg. As part of his Bampton Lectures in 1886 Charles
Bigg framed Origen’s teachings of human moral freedom and his teachings on
universalism as beliefs in tension. Bigg writes: “Indeed the Alexandrine doctrine of
Volition is such, that it is hard to reconcile with the hope of final unity.”33 Bigg further
argued that Origen held to a ‘qualified universalism’ – which is to say, while God would
eventually restore all sinners in a final restoration, not everyone would experience the
final state in the same way. Some, for example, would be excluded from the Beatific
Vision.34 Bigg notes,
The purified spirit will be brought home; it will no longer rebel; it will
acquiesce in its lot; but it may never be admitted within that holy circle
where the pure in heart see face to face . . . Man tramples on God’s
goodness here; he may scorn and defy it for ever.35
Bigg is motivated to qualify Origen’s universalism in this way because by doing so he
feels he can reconcile the foreordained end with human moral autonomy:
Neither Clement nor Origen is properly speaking a Universalist. Nor is
Universalism the logical result of their principles. For if the goodness of

32

By way of contrast, anyone open to compatibilism would not assume any tension in advance.
Charles Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year
1886 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913), 232.
34
Bigg notes that after the final restoration “there is no further change, but the soul remains secure
in the fulness of intellectual fruition. Yet not all alike. To the Beatific Vision none can be admitted save the
pure in heart. Though all other chastisements ease, when their object is fulfilled, the poena damni may still
endure. Star differeth from star in glory. There are many mansions, many degrees . . . If we do not
misinterpret these expressions, they appear to mean, that the soul by sin may lose capacities, which can
never be wholly regained, and in this sense at least Origen teaches the eternity of punishment” – ibid., 23334.
35
Ibid., 293.
33
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God drew them in one direction, the Freedom of the Will, their negative
pole, drove them with equal force in the other.36
By categorizing moral autonomy and foreordination as opposites, Bigg must ultimately
sacrifice one of Origen’s theological doctrines in order to maintain the other; he preserves
moral autonomy, while universalism gets sacrificed through redefinition.37
Writing in 1938, the Norwegian theologian Einar Molland expressed a similar
concern regarding the consistency of Origen’s theology. Specifically, Molland
maintained that Origen’s teachings on universalism and free will constituted separate and
competing lines of thought:
Origen’s Christian philosophy required that history should one day have
an end, and that this end should be ἀποκατάστασις πάντων. This is one
line of thought in his theology. But there is also another line of thought in
it which makes the attainment of perfection an aim which can scarcely
ever be realized. That is a line starting from the idea of free-will. When
carried to its most extreme consequences, this line of thought must lead to
a denial of the possibility of eternal, imperishable perfection . . . Free-will
can never fall away. But then the restitution of all things to primeval
perfection becomes doubtful.38
Molland argued that in First Principles Origen developed these two competing lines of
thought with “audacity” and “sincerity”, but when taken to their logical conclusions, they
are revealed to be contradictory.39 Molland did not offer any definitive explanation for
the questions he raised, and so it is unclear whether he viewed Origen as a universalist

36

Ibid., 292.
Sebastian Guly has recently promoted an argument similar to that of Bigg, in that souls
supposedly experience different levels of beatitude in the final restoration – Sebastian Guly, "The Salvation
of the Devil and the Kingdom of God in Origen's Letter to Certain Close Friends in Alexandria," in
Origeniana Decima: Origen as Writer, ed. Sylwia and Henryk Pietras Kaczmarek, Bibliotheca
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2011). My critique of Guly’s
argument may be found below in Chapter 4 (note 500).
38
Einar Molland, The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology (Oslo: I kommisjon
hos J. Dybwad, 1938), 161.
39
“In the De principiis he follows his two lines of thought to their utmost consequences, one
leading to the idea of an absolute end, the other denying the possibility of an absolute end” – ibid., 162.
37
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who was inconsistent about free will, or whether the tension led him to doubt Origen’s
universalism altogether.40
Following the examples of the two previous scholars, Jean Daniélou framed
Origen’s theology as a theology in tension. Thus, in 1948 Daniélou posed the troubling
question: “But how is this re-establishment to be reconciled with freedom?”41 In his
discussion on this point Daniélou claimed that any firm insistence on universal salvation
acts as a kind of physical necessity upon moral agents.42 He also recognized that Origen
himself was aware of this potential awkwardness.43 Unlike Bigg, Daniélou did not take
the further step of redefining Origen’s universalism in order to alleviate the tension, but
instead he chose to let the tension remain. Although he praised Origen and insisted that
Origen’s doctrine of apocatastasis differed from that which was later condemned by the
Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople, Daniélou admitted that Origen’s theology
reveals an inner inconsistency on this point:
Origen saw clearly enough, then, that there were two things involved –
God’s love and man’s freedom. But his attempts to reconcile them led him
to put forward two theses, one of which – the metaphysical necessity of
the ultimate elimination of evil – safeguards God’s love but destroys

40

On the related question as to whether the apocatastasis (once reached) can be permanent, given
the ongoing reality of moral autonomy, Molland suggested that Origen may have changed his mind on this
issue between the writing of his earlier First Principles and his later Commentary on Romans. In First
Principles Origen appears to believe that after the apocatastasis is reached, additional falls are possible
(perhaps even necessary) because creatures continue to have free will. In the Romans commentary,
however, Origen explicitly rejects the possibility of further falls despite a similar insistence on the ongoing
permanence of free will – ibid., 162-64. The question of whether Origen viewed the apocatastasis as a onetime event or a repeating event will be explored in Chapter 4.
41
Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955 [French
1948]), 289.
42
“The point that appears questionable in the present instance is the philosophical principle that
evil must eventually disappear altogether. If that is the case, universal salvation becomes a matter of purely
physical necessity, and the long duration of the process in no way diminishes the necessity. But that makes
nonsense of the tragic part of man's lot, the terrible power he has, through freewill, of refusing God…” –
ibid., 288.
43
Ibid.
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man’s freedom, while the other – the perpetual instability of the free –
safeguards man’s freedom but destroys God’s love.44
Daniélou concluded by noting that Origen’s attempts to safeguard both moral freedom’s
and divine providence’s roles in the apocatastasis resulted in a “certain incoherence” in
Origen’s theology.45 Like Bigg, Daniélou understood Origen’s view of moral autonomy
to be incompatible with a doctrine of a certain and infallible universalism. Unlike Bigg,
Daniélou was willing to let the inconsistency remain.
Other scholars have followed Daniélou’s example in describing Origen as
inconsistent on this point. John Sachs (1993) recognized that Origen taught both
universalism and creaturely moral autonomy, and Sachs argued that of the two, divine
love seems more powerful.46 Sachs did not know how to make the two beliefs fit together
without contradiction, and so he concluded that “In the end Origen's statements on this
matter cannot be brought into a coherent, systematic harmony,”47 and it “cannot be said
that Origen presents a coherent, systematic doctrine of apocatastasis.”48 Similarly,
Graham Keith (1999) understood Origen to believe that God would save all souls, yet
Keith did not know how to reconcile this with Origen’s belief in free choice. Given that
God must not coerce repentance, Keith remarked,
It was difficult to square this with the idea that correction would invariably
be successful; for in the nature of things correction can either be rejected
or accepted . . . Hence it is not surprising to find some uncertainty and
even inconsistency in Origen's statements from different contexts.49
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Ibid.
Ibid., 313.
46
John R. Sachs, "Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology," Theological Studies 54 (1993): 627-28.
47
Ibid., 628.
48
Ibid., 629.
49
Graham Keith, "Patristic Views on Hell - Part 1," The Evangelical Quarterly 71, no. 3 (1999):
45

230.
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While some scholars questioned the logic of Origen’s thought, other scholars have not
been comfortable with the idea that Origen was logically inconsistent in his theological
beliefs. Therefore, in order to relieve Origen’s theology of the assumed tension, some
scholars have insisted on softening Origen’s views on universalism by calling it merely a
hypothetical or hopeful universalism. Such scholars often define Origen’s universalism as
a universal offer of salvation, or a pious hope for the restoration of all – that is, a
“universalism” without any of universalism’s typical certainty or deterministic
characteristics. What is noteworthy about such scholarly redefinitions of Origen’s
universalism is that they do not appear to be grounded upon any direct, textual evidence,
but rather they are conclusions arrived at based upon a certain understanding of Origen’s
view of moral autonomy. Writing in 1966, Henry Chadwick was one of the first to adopt
this approach. Regarding Origen’s view of final salvation, he writes:
The steps to heaven are a staircase to be climbed, not an escalator; and
predestination is always interpreted by Origen (as by most of the Greek
Fathers) in terms of foreseen merits. Therefore, Origen does not affirm
universal salvation as something we can all comfortably take for granted,
and it is more his hope than his assured certitude.50
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Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Christian Tradition (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1966), 119. Writing in 1901, William Fairweather may be another (earlier) example of
this same approach. In some respects, Fairweather is not very clear on this point, and so I mention him here
only in passing. In one place he insinuates that Origen’s universalism is something Origen hoped for: “Thus
did Origen cling to the larger hope, although He regarded this as an esoteric doctrine” – William
Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006; reprint
from 1901 edition), 206. Fairweather had greater interest, however, in scrutinizing how Origen handled
moral autonomy once the apocatastasis had already been achieved. Thus, regarding the permanency of the
apocatastasis, Fairweather writes: “Another criticism to which, ever since Jerome’s day, this part of
Origen’s system has been exposed, is that the hope of final harmony is irreconcilable with the doctrine of
free will. If in the future life the will is still entirely free, what security is there that this ‘final restoration’
will be final?” (210-211). Confusingly, Fairweather rejects this criticism while at the same time affirming
that it is logically sound: “This objection may be logically sound, yet it is unfair to Origen, and
misrepresents his meaning. Without in the slightest degree infringing upon the inalienable liberty of
rational creatures, and granting that the soul is free to rebel as long as it chooses, we may yet surely with
reason decline to infer from our observation of this short life that it will be eternally obdurate” (211). Given
that he has no actual reasons (that is, textual evidence) by which to make such a claim, it seems fair to
conclude that Fairweather interprets Origen’s universalism as a matter of hope and optimism.
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Chadwick recognized universalism’s deterministic character. He took this a step further
by suggesting that this sort of teleological determinism essentially entails predestination.
Consequently, by categorizing universalism as a kind of predestination, Chadwick is led
to deny that Origen was a universalist, given the fact that Origen disavowed the notion of
deterministic predestination.51 Thus, while Chadwick did not specifically state that
universalism was incompatible with moral autonomy, he implied as much. Chadwick’s
logical steps can be mapped in the following way: 1) Origen rejects the interpretation of
deterministic predestination because he finds it incompatible with moral autonomy. 2)
Chadwick defines infallible universalism to be a form of deterministic predestination. 3)
Therefore, Chadwick argues Origen must not believe in a certain universalism. Like other
scholars already surveyed, Chadwick assumed that any statements by Origen that seem to
point to an infallible universal salvation cannot be reconciled with Origen’s views on
moral freedom, and thus his universalism must be redefined as simply a matter of hope.
In 1983 Harold Babcock analyzed Origen’s universalism and was similarly led to
Chadwick’s conclusion (who he cites favorably). Babcock declares:
There is an unavoidable paradox here, in that eventually the all-powerful
God would, of necessity as it were, triumph over even the most intractable
doer. This would appear to place limits on the freedom of the creatures to
persist in evil.52
Like others, Babcock is convinced that the teleological certainty embedded in the idea of
Origen’s universalism is inherently at odds with Origen’s teachings on moral autonomy.
Although he first labels it a paradox, it becomes clear that Babcock is not altogether
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comfortable with the tension, for he seems to vacillate between calling Origen’s theology
inconsistent, and redefining Origen’s universalism in order to maintain consistency.
Thus, at one point he writes: “It is worth noting, as Benjamin Drewery does, that
Origen’s universalism really extends only to the offer of salvation.”53 But a few lines later
Babcock asserts:
Because of the paradoxes which this view created, it might be maintained
that Origen’s doctrine of free will and universal salvation were produced
as part of an admirable but not wholly successful attempt to keep together
a good and loving God, and an unpleasant and imperfect world.54
Although it is not entirely clear what Babcock’s final answer is (whether inconsistency or
redefinition), his work is nevertheless another illuminating example as to how troubling
this issue has been for Origen scholars.
I would suggest that Babcock’s analysis is a helpful illustration in showing how
many scholars feel pulled in two directions: first, they recognize that the best reading of
Origen’s writings upholds his belief in a universalism that is infallible and certain (what
has been the traditional view regarding Origen’s eschatology). And yet, scholars often
seem to approach Origen’s writings from an anti-compatibilist framework, which
prompts them to believe that they must, somehow, be reading Origen incorrectly.
Subsequently, this often results in a rather awkward attempt to try to reinterpret Origen’s
view in order to mitigate any tension. We may appreciate that such scholars are reticent
to judge Origen as an inconsistent or incoherent theologian, but frequently the result is
that Origen’s eschatology gets reimagined into an entirely different theology – a theology
53
Ibid. Drewery does mention, almost in passing, that Origen’s universalism is merely the
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Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace (London: Epworth Press, 1960), 169.
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which not only lacks direct textual support, but which stands in contrast to Origen’s clear
affirmations of a certain apocatastasis.
Henri Crouzel is a further example of this trend. In 1985 Crouzel surmised that
Origen’s teaching on creaturely freedom of choice renders any judgment of universalism
problematic. Crouzel notes:
In any case, if the affirmations of the universality of the apocatastasis
which some find in his work must be taken in this sense and regarded as
propositions with dogmatic status, they would be in contradiction with a
point of capital importance in the synthesis presented by the Treatise on
First Principles, free will . . . If the free will of man, accepting or refusing
God’s advances, plays such a role in Origen’s thought, how could he
become certain that all human and demonic beings, in their freedom would
allow themselves to be touched and would adhere to God in the
apocatastasis? If Origen added anything to what Paul said in 1 Cor. 15, 2328, it could only be a great hope. Certainty about a universal apocatastasis
would be in contradiction to the authenticity of the free will with which
God had endowed mankind.55
Crouzel understands the very notion of “free will” to stand opposed to any sort of
determinism or future necessity.56 The specific feature of Origen’s view of moral
autonomy he appeals to is that in any situation, a person must be able to accept or refuse
God’s advances. Crouzel understands the logical corollary of this to entail at least a
hypothetical possibility that some wicked souls might choose to resist God forever. This
is not the only reason Crouzel hesitates from endorsing Origen’s universalism, but it is an
important one.57 Crouzel is unaware of any answer to the question: ‘If free will is so
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In the same year, Crouzel also made this argument at the fourth Origeniana conference. There
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(Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 288-89.
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important for Origen, how can Origen be sure that all will freely make this choice?’
Unable to answer this question, Crouzel decides that Origen must not have held such a
belief.
In a recent book published in 2012, Benjamin Blosser follows Crouzel’s analysis
and asserts that for Origen, the apocatastasis was more a matter of Christian hope than a
settled dogma.58 Blosser lists several possible criticisms or controversies regarding
Origen’s doctrine of the final state, two of which are relevant here: “1) that the final
apokatastasis is metaphysically necessary, a fait accompli, and 2) that, due to free will,
the final apokatastasis will never be reached, since there will always be successive “falls”
from God.”59 Blosser calls these objections “mutually exclusive opposites.” That opposite
charges are used against Origen in this regard suggests to Blosser a lack of evidence for
either of them.60
It is important to note that Blosser dismisses Daniélou’s claim that universal
salvation makes nonsense of the idea of human free will: He writes, “This complaint,
however, seems to underestimate the profundity of Origen’s doctrine of human
freedom.”61 Although Blosser understands that Origen’s two teachings appear to be in
conflict, he wishes to affirm both. He does not seem to know how the two fit together, but
262-64. The most important textual evidence for Crouzel are Origen’s statements about the devil in
Origen’s letter To Friends in Alexandria. In 2011 Sebastian Guly argued that Crouzel has misread this
letter – Guly, "The Salvation of the Devil and the Kingdom of God in Origen's Letter to Certain Close
Friends in Alexandria."
58
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Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 254.
59
Ibid., 259.
60
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metaphysically necessary – reveals an underlying concern that moral autonomy is threatened or destroyed
by such necessity. The second objection – that successive “falls” threaten a permanent apocatastasis –
reveals an underlying concern that moral autonomy cannot be reconciled to the idea of a fixed final end, for
freedom of choice must allow for the possibility of future falls. Both criticisms, therefore, are posed from a
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he thinks they can do so. His discomfort with this conclusion, however, can be seen in the
following remarks:
If Origen sounds more confident in this end than his theology would seem
to allow, this is not because of some cosmic, mechanistic law of necessity
that would require it, but perhaps Origen’s vision of hope is far grander
than our own.62
Despite Blosser’s attempts to uphold both Origenistic teachings, he cannot help but to
soften the finality and surety of Origen’s universalism into something merely hoped for,
in order to safeguard moral autonomy.63
Mark Scott published an insightful monograph on Origen the same year as
Blosser (2012). Scott’s detailed analysis confirms the traditional view of Origen’s
universalism and is a thorough and valuable piece of scholarship.64 From my perspective,
Scott is among a new wave of Origen scholarship that defends the traditional view
regarding Origen’s universalism. At the same time, Scott does acknowledge tension
between Origen’s universalism and his doctrine of moral autonomy. This can be seen
most clearly in his conclusion, where Scott advances the (now standard) argument that
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The Orthodox theologian Bishop Kallistos Ware also interprets Origen in this way. Ware
recognizes Origen’s teachings on the temporary nature of punishment and the final restoration of all souls,
and yet he concludes that because Origen believed in liberty of choice we must understand Origen’s
apocatastasis as only a hope – Ware, "Dare We Hope for the Salvation of All?," 201. Later in his text, it
becomes apparent that Ware’s reading of Origen is informed by Ware’s own philosophical assumptions on
this point. At one point Ware asks whether or not modern Christians should believe in universal salvation
today. He writes: “If the strongest argument in favor of universal salvation is the appeal to divine love, and
if the strongest argument on the opposite side is the appeal to human freedom, then we are brought back to
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Human beings are free? . . . Our belief in human freedom means that we have no right to categorically
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ibid., 214-15. Ware is an important example because he is open in his desire for universalism to be true.
The only reason he refrains from adopting the view is because he is convinced that it is logically
incompatible with free choice. It is unsurprising, then, that Ware inevitably finds himself softening and
redefining Origen’s universalism, even after correctly demonstrating Origen’s belief in the cessation of all
punishment and the restoration of all souls.
64
Mark S. M. Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 129-60.
63

27

the relationship between freedom and providence in Origen’s system is contradictory,
paradoxical, and raises unresolved questions. Scott writes:
On the one hand, [Origen] posits our ability to determine our spiritual
destiny without divine interference. In this sense, he seems to privilege
freedom over providence. On the other hand, God intervenes to assist the
fallen souls and designs the universe to facilitate our amelioration. In this
sense, he seems to privilege providence over freedom . . . He vacillates,
then, between emphasizing freedom over providence and vice versa . . . In
the end, his parsing of the relationship between freedom and providence
can be criticized as paradoxical . . . his doctrine of universalism radically
alters the biblical conception of hell and undercuts his conception of
freedom, since it implies that no creature – not even the Devil – can finally
choose against God. Providence, through its patient, persistent, persuasive
power, seems to override freedom in the end.65
While Scott affirms Origen’s view of an infallible universalism, he struggles to reconcile
how it can logically fit with Origen’s view of moral autonomy. The reason for his
struggle can be traced to an earlier, and very significant claim made by Scott. He writes
that Origen consistently maintains in his writings the freedom of every rational being,
including the Devil, “to choose its eternal destiny.”66 When moral autonomy includes the
power to choose one’s destiny, it appears to compete with God’s providential plans
regarding the end of all things. This leads Scott to follow Daniélou in suggesting that
Origen was inconsistent; Scott suggests that Origen must have undercut or overridden his
own conception of freedom. Moral freedom cannot ultimately be maintained in
establishing the apocatastasis – rather, providence overrides it. Like many others, Scott
65
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understands moral freedom and divine providence to exist in a competitive relationship.
If one side wins, it must be at the expense of the other.
Scott also addresses the secondary issue concerning freedom of choice once the
apocatastasis has been achieved. On this point Scott affirms (contra Daniélou) that no
further falls will take place even though moral autonomy will be retained. The
permanence of the final state is not threatened by freedom of choice, because the soul’s
union with the Logos will forge an “unbreakable bond” of love.67 When God is all in all,
souls will permanently, and freely, choose to remain with God. Scott writes:
“Divinization does not undermine freedom. On the contrary, it is the ultimate expression
of the soul’s free will to unite itself with God eternally.”68 Scott’s position is an
interesting one in that he believes that God’s foreordination of universal salvation (and its
subsequent fruition) undercuts Origen’s view of moral autonomy, but once the final state
is achieved by God it will necessarily be maintained without a similar threat to moral
autonomy. As such, Scott’s position serves as a midpoint position to the next group of
scholars I will survey.
Not all scholars have concluded that Origen’s universalism destabilizes Origen’s
view of moral responsibility. For example, there is a commonplace tradition in modern
scholarship, found at least as early as the 19th century, which asserts that Origen indeed
held both views, but the scholars do not venture to explain how Origen might have linked
them together.69 Only recently a few scholars have ventured specific explanations as to
67
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how moral autonomy fits with Origen’s predetermined end of salvation-history. One such
scholar is P. Tzamalikos. In his 2007 monograph Tzamalikos insists that Origen
maintained a definite belief in universalism, and he takes issue with those who have
redefined Origen’s universalism as simply a matter of hope.70 At the same time, he is
careful to say that Origen’s universalism does not constitute any sort of fatalism.71
Although it is not fatalistic, Tzamalikos notes that salvation history is nevertheless
dramatic:
…a certain end is anticipated and yet any next moment is unpredictable . .
. History is directed according to the dialectical relation between
unrestricted creaturely freedom and divine will, with providence
expressing this will, but not coercing any historical eventuality.72
So how does God achieve universal salvation when God also upholds “unrestricted
creaturely freedom”, and when God will not coerce “any historical eventuality”?
Tzamalikos believes the answer lies in the nature of evil, which he elaborates as part of

his wisdom and goodness: “Is it so difficult to believe, indeed, that every soul may yet learn that perfect
obedience is the most perfect liberty? . . . Toward this grand result, we believe, the whole force of the
gospel is trending, and sure we are that it will never rest, never cease to operate, till this object is fully
attained . . . And this is precisely what Origen believed and taught” – T. J. Sawyer, "Was Origen a
Universalist?," in The Universalist Quarterly and General Review, ed. Thomas B. Thayer (Boston:
Universalist Publishing House, 1875), 184-85. Similar descriptions of Origen can easily be found in
scholarship today, especially by those who only mention Origen’s universalism in passing. This viewpoint
does not pretend to know how Origen solves the issue, but simply asserts that Origen is confident that God
will find a way to do it without violating moral freedom if given enough time. For example, Richard
Bauckham describes Origen this way: “Logically it might seem that Origen's conviction of the inalienable
freedom of the soul ought to prevent him from teaching both Universalism (for any soul is free to remain
obstinate for ever) and the final secure happiness of the saved (who remain free to fall again at any time). In
fact Origin seems to have drawn neither conclusion. Given unlimited time, God's purpose will eventually
prevail and all souls will be finally, united to Him, never to sin again – Richard Bauckham, "Universalism:
A Historical Survey," Themelios 4, no. 2 (1978): 48.
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an Aristotelian argument.73 According to Origen, evil is not a substance, but is merely an
action of a substance; evil is an accident, not an οὐσία. Since God did not create evil, evil
is non-being: “corruption falls short of existence proper.”74 Tzamalikos then claims that
this understanding of evil necessarily entails that evil must eventually be extinguished:
What is ‘non-being’ cannot prevail over ‘being’ forever. Evil is ‘nonexistent’, it is a kind of absence; it is no part of creation. The fact that
depravity prevails for the time being is an anomaly in the world. Eventual
extinction of evil is asserted on account of reasons which are ontological,
not historical or moral.75
Thus, Tzamalikos’ argument hinges on the argument that the non-being of evil somehow
requires that evil cannot continue indefinitely into the future.76
Tzamalikos similarly sees the non-ontological finitude of evil as the answer to our
second difficult question, for when evil is finally absolved there will not be any
opportunity to fall away from God again, and all free beings will become what they were
in the beginning.77 Thus, universal salvation will not only be achieved by logical
necessity, but it will also be maintained by logically necessity – a necessity which is
based on the ontological inferiority of evil; the ontological non-existence of evil will
inevitably lead to its historical non-existence.78
In 2013 Ilaria Ramelli wrote a substantial monograph on the doctrine of
apocatastasis in the early Church, and Origen’s eschatology features prominently
throughout. In various places Ramelli stresses the point made by Tzamalikos that
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Origen’s dual emphasis on moral autonomy and universal restoration are not
contradictory, but are in harmony. For example, she writes:
Moreover, according to both Bardaisan and Origen, Providence does not
force rational creatures’ free will, but it acts in harmony with it, and yet
does not fail to achieve the ultimate telos, apokatastasis.79
Or again, Ramelli insists that universal salvation for Origen and Bardaisan “is respectful
of each rational creature’s freewill, but it infallibly leads all to salvation, as a
consequence of the final eviction of evil and as a gift of divine grace.”80
As far as I can tell, Ramelli utilizes three separate arguments to bolster her claim
that God upholds moral autonomy in the context of Origen’s infallible and predetermined
universal salvation.81 The first argument Ramelli introduces follows logic similar to the
argument of Tzamalikos. Ramelli insists that Origen’s conception of evil as non-being
and as non-eternal necessitates the eventual destruction of all evil at some point in the
future, a destruction which includes the evil free choices of creatures.82 She calls this one
of the main metaphysical foundations for a voluntary apocatastasis.83 Her argument
seems to be that since evil is not eternal, it must also not be everlasting – that is to say,
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there is no condition or circumstance by which evil could be allowed to exist indefinitely.
Like Tzamalikos, Ramelli does not state why this is so, only that it must be so.84
Ramelli’s second explanation for why universal salvation can be assured without
threat to free will is based on her description of Origen’s psychology as “ethical
intellectualism.”85 On this view, argues Ramelli, all sins are committed because of a lack
of knowledge. Therefore, once people have correct knowledge of the truth they will
always choose the good voluntarily. Indeed, once creatures are given the correct
knowledge (which God promises to do in this life or the next), sin will become an
impossibility.86 Ramelli takes the notion of ethical intellectualism even further by
claiming that in Origen’s view evil choices are not actually free at all, but that freedom of
choice requires “purified intellectual sight.”87 Given this definition of moral autonomy,
there is no tension with a predetermined universal salvation, for God needs only to supply
the missing knowledge to sinners and they will no longer be able to sin, for they will have
no desire to sin. In the same way, this explanation would also demonstrate how the
permanency of the apocatastasis does not threaten moral autonomy, for no rational
84
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creature would (or could) voluntarily choose to fall away once they enjoyed perfect
knowledge.
Ramelli’s third explanation for how God achieves a necessary, yet voluntary
universal salvation is based on God’s grace generally, and Christ’s work on the cross
more specifically:
Origen – faithful to his notion of reconciliation of providence and human
free will – forcefully asserts that all logika, including demons, will indeed
keep their free will forever, but this shall not impede their ultimate
salvation, because of the universal and eternal effectiveness of Christ’s
death . . . they will be saved because the force of Christ’s cross is so great
as to be sufficient to save even them. This salvation will take place, not
automatically or necessarily, but through conversion, through a healing
performed by Christ in his capacity as the supreme Physician…88
Of the three reasons Ramelli uses to insist on the compatibility of moral autonomy and a
preordained universalism, this last one is the least developed. Ramelli discusses a widerange of soteriological concepts in Origen’s writings, and rightly demonstrates that
Origen believed that Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection were necessary for the
apocatastasis, and that the saving work of Christ was intended for the entire world (no
rational creature being totally incurable). But Ramelli never explains how the work of
Christ (or God’s grace in general) is able to infallibly succeed in bringing all people back
to God voluntarily.
Despite giving three reasons why universal salvation does not threaten moral
autonomy, Ramelli concedes that it a mystery as to how the two work together:
For Origen, the reconciliation between providence (and its outcome,
apokatastasis) and free will is a weighty philosophical issue; at the same
88
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time he is also aware of the divine mystery: thus, he is certain that these
two poles are in harmony, but God only knows how this reconciliation
takes place in each single case.89
Most recently, in 2015 Anders-Christian Jacobsen published a work on Origen’s
Christology and soteriology. Jacobsen is another example of the recent trend to defend
the traditional view of Origen’s universalism, and Jacobsen argues against scholars who
have attempted to re-categorize Origen’s universalism as hypothetical, or simply a matter
of hope. Instead, Jacobsen strongly argues that Origen believed in a necessary and
infallible universal restoration.90 Jacobsen then addresses the relevant issue:
This theology raises another question which we cannot discuss in much
detail here: If all rational beings are finally to be saved, what will then
become of the freedom of human beings, of the free will? Is salvation not
then determined?91
Jacobsen does not specify whether he is referring to the role of moral autonomy in the
soul’s successful ascent to God, or to the role of moral autonomy in maintaining that final
state, but his comment is probably referring to both. Jacobsen acknowledges that Origen
was aware of the problem, and that Origen tried to solve it by “introducing the idea that
through a very long process God will manage to convince all that they should choose
salvation voluntarily.”92 However, Jacobsen gives no explanation for how God is
infallibly able to convince everyone, given freedom of choice.93
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Turning from the role of human autonomy in the ascent to salvation, Jacobsen
then explicitly mentions the second issue regarding moral autonomy’s role in maintaining
one’s final salvation. Jacobsen acknowledges that Origen’s answer to the first problem
“is not yet the entire answer to the question of what will keep the rational beings from
sinning again.”94 Jacobsen believes the answer to this second point of tension is displayed
in the power of love:
If the rational beings love God and their neighbours with all their heart,
they will not sin again. The salvation of all will thus be final, and this final
position will not be forced upon the rational beings; they will choose it
themselves, because love has convinced them.95
Jacobson does not explain how love of neighbor ensures that free choice will always
choose correctly, only that it will do so.
This survey reveals a few important trends within the secondary scholarship.
First, many scholars who study Origen’s universalism and his views on moral autonomy
believe that these two teachings are logically incompatible. This assumption appears to
stem from an anti-compatibilist definition of moral autonomy or free choice. As such,
arguments for Origen’s supposed inconsistency or incompatibility are usually not based
on any textual evidence from Origen (other than a generic appeal to Origen’s teachings
on ‘free will’), but rather are inferences made by scholars who a priori believe that the
very notion of moral autonomy prohibits any foreordained future.96 I did not find a single
example among the scholars who called Origen inconsistent or contradictory who
implanted in us; perhaps it is just common sense. We could choose to be eternally separated from God –
but why in the name of heaven would we?” – Jennifer L. Heckart, "Sympathy for the Devil? Origen and the
end," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 60, no. 3 (2007): 59-60.
94
Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher of Salvation: A Study on Origen's Christology and Soteriology:
174.
95
Ibid.
96
Such a definition of moral autonomy is aligned with certain modern notions of libertarian free
will. Various compatibilist notions of moral autonomy do not exclude the possibility of foreordained or
predetermined events.
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explained how they were defining the controversial term “free will,” nor did they
demonstrate that Origen defined it in a way that contradicted his universalism.97
A second trend this survey illustrates is a tendency among scholars who find the
concepts of determinism and free will contradictory to recast Origen’s universalism in
order to escape any threat of logical inconsistency. While a few scholars boldly declare
that Origen’s theology is internally contradictory or inconsistent, many other scholars
have reinterpreted Origen’s universalism in such a way so as to erase the perceived
tension. Scholars like Crouzel acknowledge that Origen seems to be teaching universal
salvation, but then they back-pedal and say that he must not really have done so. The
most common way has been to recast Origen’s universalism as something that Origen
merely hoped for, rather than as something Origen believed as a point of fact, or
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Two more scholars are important for my project, but I did not discover them until after the final
stages of my dissertation were complete. The first is the work of H.S. Benjamins: H.S. Benjamins,
Eingeordnete Freiheit: Freiheit und Vorsehung bei Origenes, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae (Leiden:
Brill, 1994). Although I discovered this monograph too late to offer substantial interaction with it here, it is
important to mention it at this point because as I begin to work through the book, Benjamins appears to
make an argument that is somewhat similar to the one I develop (especially in my Chapter 5). Benjamins
also recognizes that one idiosyncratic feature of Origen’s theology is that God possesses a peculiar type of
divine foreknowledge which allows God to pre-select and pre-arrange the free choices of his creatures,
even while ensuring that such choices stay free – e.g. Ibid., 116-20; 206-08. In one place, however,
Benjamins appears to back away from the strongest formulation of this claim (a formulation which I will go
on to argue for in Chapter 5) when he says: “Origenes erläutert jedoch nicht … ob Gott während er das
Zukünftige durchdenkt zugleich auch weiß, was alles noch möglich sei; oder ob Gott erst alle möglichen
Welten durchdenkt, daraufhin eine Welt erschafft und dann weiß, was sich ereignen wird. Ersteres liegt der
Argumentation des Origenes näher, denn nach GK 8 durchdenkt Gott alles Zukünftige und sieht er, was
sich (tatsächlich) ereignen wird” – ibid., 117n35 (emphasis added). Interestingly, none of the post-1994
scholarship on this topic that I am familiar with (apart from the exception of Kathleen Gibbons below) even
mentions Benjamins’ book!
The second scholar is Kathleen Gibbons whose recent article (December 2016) relates to several
of the themes in this dissertation wherein she makes a number of insightful points. Again, unfortunately her
article was published after my dissertation was in its final stage and already under review. I include a quote
from the article here, however, to illustrate an area of overlap: “On [Origen’s] account of moral
development, God arranges events so that human beings will end up in precisely those circumstances which
will eventually render their previously defeated spiritual desires necessitating motivations in the
circumstances in which they are necessitating. In the absence of such divine intervention, one might never
find oneself in the circumstances necessary to provoke the required reflection” – Kathleen Gibbons,
"Human Autonomy and its limits in the Thought of Origen of Alexandria," The Classical Quarterly 66, no.
2 (2016): 687. Gibbons does not develop this argument, however, and she appears to rely directly on
Benjamins’ book for this point – see ibid., 673n3.
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something that Origen believed was foreordained.98 The problem with this approach is
that it is a serious misreading of Origen. In fact, it discredits the exegetical arguments
Origen used as the basis for his discussions of universal salvation.99 Often the only
evidence offered to defend this redefinition is that Origen’s views on freedom of choice
cannot allow for a predetermined end, and thus Origen cannot mean what he appears to
mean. In other words, the evidence is the assumption that philosophically and
definitionally, the presence of genuine moral autonomy cannot ever guarantee a universal
salvation.
There is much to admire in scholars who allow Origen’s teachings on
universalism and moral autonomy to stand without judging him of inconsistency.
Furthermore, the recent trend by scholars who uphold Origen’s belief in a certain and
foreordained universal salvation rather than softening it into merely an eschatological
hope is an appreciated movement.100 However, few of these authors discuss how
universalism and freedom of choice fit together in Origen’s theology. While Tzamalikos
and Ramelli do offer “solutions,” their arguments are problematic.
For instance, both Tzamalikos and Ramelli insist that despite a preordained
universal salvation, moral freedom is safeguarded given that evil must logically be
98

Often these scholars will keep the word “universalism” in their description of Origen’s theology
in order to retain continuity with older Origen scholarship, but qualify it with an adjective (like “hopeful”
or “potential”) that radically alters its traditional meaning.
99
This is especially true for Origen’s understanding of 1 Cor. 15:22-28, which features
prominently in most of Origen’s assertions of universal salvation. Origen understood Paul’s statements to
be prophecy, and therefore an event God would infallibly fulfill.
100
This trend will be discussed in Chapter 4. The words of R.P.C. Hanson remain relevant here:
“The fact is that universalism in Origen’s thought is a necessary conclusion from his basic premises, and
not, as it is in most modern thought, a ‘larger hope’ grounded in a strong belief in God’s love and a kindly
feeling toward all humanity, however degraded. In Origen’s view for God to fail in reconciling into their
original state as pure spirits wholly obedient to his will any beings at all, even only one or two, would be
for God, the single, simple, primal, unalterable One, to compromise himself with change and becoming and
corruption. This is inconceivable, and therefore all must be saved” – R.P.C. Hanson, Allegory and Event: a
Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture (London: SCM Press LTD,
1959), 335.
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exterminated in the future. If evil must disappear because of its very nature, God needs
only to ensure that the sufficient amount of time passes within his plan of salvation in
order to achieve universal salvation without violating moral autonomy. But such a view
suffers from a couple weak points. First, it fails to appreciate that Origen speaks about
evil in a variety of ways. It is true that sometimes Origen describes evil as non-being,101
but other times he understands evil to simply be the opposite of the good. Tzamalikos and
Ramelli appear to interpret Origen’s view of evil as similar to that of Augustine, who
defined evil as a privation or lack, but as Bostock has demonstrated, Origen’s view does
not neatly fit into this category.102 Tzamalikos and Ramelli’s “metaphysical argument”
about the non-being of evil relies too heavily on defining Origen’s views of evil into an
ontological category.
The second weakness in this solution is that even if evil is defined in this way, it
is unclear why evil must be eliminated (logically speaking) at some point in the future.
The fact that evil is ontologically inferior does not seem to logically entail evil’s eventual
disappearance. Evil exists throughout salvation-history precisely because God permits it
to exist, as a necessary corollary to the exercise of morally autonomous creatures. So long
as God’s permissive attitude toward moral autonomy is maintained, it is unclear why evil
must necessarily be extinguished. Granted, one may say (as Origen does) that evil must
be extinguished because Scripture prophesies that it will be so. But Tzamalikos’
101

E.g. ComJn 2.13 – cf. Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical assessment
from the New Testament to Eriugena: 141.
102
Gerald Bostock, "Satan – Origen’s Forgotten Doctrine," in Origeniana decima, ed. H. and
Kaczmarek Pietras, S. (Leuven: Peeters, 2011). “Origen’s understanding of evil is in marked contrast to
that of Augustine with his fateful defence of the privation boni theory. For Origen evil, in all its forms, is
not an absence of the good but its opposite . . . It should be carefully distinguished from the non-existent –
a distinction which appears in the Pseudepigrapha. For Origen evil exists even though, as the opposite of
the good which is identical with true being, it participates in non-being. Origen has a clear recognition and
understanding of non-being (μὴ ὄν), which does not simply apply to ‘evil’ considered as an abstraction”
(116-117).
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argument is not simply that evil will be extinguished as a matter of prophecy, but that by
its very nature evil cannot not be extinguished.103 This conclusion reaches too far. We can
make this point clear by substituting “sinful choices” for the term “evil”. To say that
moral autonomy is upheld in the apocatastasis because sinful choices must eventually
disappear does not explain why all sinful choices must disappear. Tzamalikos and
Ramelli appear to be arguing on the basis of a tautology, given that the absence of sinful
choices is a defining feature of the apocatastasis. The extinction of evil does not explain
how the apocatastasis can be achieved without violating autonomy, because the question
is how God can eliminate all evil choices without violating autonomy.
Ramelli also believes that God can ensure a voluntary apocatastasis in Origen’s
system because Origen is an ethical intellectualist.104 But Origen’s descriptions of moral
autonomy do not fit precisely into the Socratic mold. For instance, Ramelli does not
mention some of the idiosyncrasies of Origen’s views on moral psychology, such as how
a person who enjoys the correct knowledge of the truth, which is mediated through the
rational impressions (desires) of the spirit, can choose to align instead with the rational
103

Harnack also spoke about evil in Origen’s system in this manner, if not as strongly as
Tzamalikos and Ramelli. Harnack stated: “Evil, however, and it is in this idea that Origen’s great optimism
consists, cannot conquer in the end. As it is nothing eternal, so also is it at bottom nothing real . . . For this
very reason the estrangement of the spirits from God must finally cease” – Adolph Harnack, History of
Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, 6 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 311.
104
Ramelli may be following Hal Koch on this point. In his seminal monograph published in 1932
Koch affirmed Origen’s belief in universal salvation, and he also stated that human freedom of choice put
limits on God’s providence so that God’s only recourse was through education: “Daher beschränkt sich die
Vorsehung im eigentlichen Sinne nur auf das Verhältnis Gottes zu den freien Vernunftwesen; insoweit Gott
alles andere schafft und sich dessen annimmt, tut er dies nur mit Hinblick auf den Nutzen, den es für das
Geschöpf κατ᾿ ἐξοχήν haben kann. Wenn aber die Vorsehungslenkung Gottes in erster Linie darauf
ausgeht, die Seelen zurückzuführen, und wenn diese gleichzeitig als eine Art character indelebilis die
Freiheit haben, selbst zu wählen, dann gibt es nur einen Weg nämlich den der Erziehung” – Koch, Pronoia
und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus: 30-31. Koch wrote as if
Origen’s only confidence in universal salvation (his “optimism”) stems from the idea that the creature is
entirely rational: “Dass die Erziehung wirklich gelingen wird, dass die Menschen - und dasselbe gilt den
übrigen λογικὰ ζῷα - nicht beharren werden, Gott zu trotzen und sich fortzuwenden, sondern dass sie aus
eigenem, freiem Willen zuletzt das Gute wählen werden, davon ist Origenes überzeugt. Er ist entschieden
Optimist. Dies hängt damit zusammen, dass das Geschöpf nicht nur frei, sondern zugleich vernünftig,
λογικόν ist, dass es am Logos Anteil hat” (32).
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desires coming from the body.105 Ramelli is correct that the soul makes its choice on the
basis of intellectual impressions or desires. But there is never a singular intellectual desire
that states “this is the good and true choice.” Instead, there are two competing rational
desires from spirit and body, both of which say, “This is the good and true choice.”106
Rational creatures have a soul which stands mid-way between competing rational
inclinations.
Nor does Ramelli seem to acknowledge the central role of habits in Origen’s view
of moral psychology. For instance, Origen writes:
We affirm that every rational soul is of the same nature, and deny that any
wicked nature has been made by the Creator of the universe; but we think
that many men have become evil by upbringing and by perversion and by
environment, so that in some people evil has become second nature. We
are convinced that for the divine Logos to change evil which has become
second nature is not only not impossible, but is not even very difficult, if
only a man admits that he must trust himself to the supreme God and do
every action by reference to His good pleasure . . . And if for some it is
very hard to change, we must say that the cause lies in their will [τὴν
συγκατάθεσιν αὐτῶν], which refuses to accept the fact that the supreme
God is to each man a righteous Judge of every past action done in this life.
Determination and application can achieve much even with problems
which appear very difficult, and, if I may exaggerate, which are all but
impossible.107
105

Origen’s lengthy discussion of Romans 7 is particularly relevant here. Origen interprets Paul to
be speaking in the persona of a weak Christian when he says that he ‘does not do what he wants to do and
he does do what he does not want to do’ – ComRm VI.9 (Scheck 2.35-43; Bammel 506-518). The entire
point of Origen’s discussion here is, contra Ramelli, that knowing the right choice to make does not
guarantee our performance of that choice. E.g. “[Paul teaches that dying to sin is arduous work for,] He
seems to teach that it is not realized immediately in one’s actions, as soon as one wills this and purposes to
do good. On the contrary, the force of habit is so great and the enticement of the vices is so strong that
when the mind is already aiming for virtue and has determined to serve the law of God, nevertheless the
desires of the flesh may persuade it to serve sin and submit to its laws” – ComRm VI.10 (Scheck 2.44;
Bammel 519). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the
critical edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung
Rufins, 1, 2, 3. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations (listed by volume and page) are from
Scheck’s 2-volume work: Scheck, Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen:
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 6-10.
106
This will be demonstrated in Chapter 2.
107
Cels 3.69 (Chadwick 174; SC 136, 158.16). Cf. ComRm VI.9 (Scheck 39; Bammel 511): “For
the weakness in those who receive the beginnings of a conversion is of such a nature that when anyone
wants to do all at once everything that is good, the accomplishment of this may not immediately follow the
will. To be sure he both reflects to himself and decides, for example, that he should not become angry, and
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The project of moral progress requires knowledge of the truth, to be sure, but Origen
writes that moral change often requires a great deal more for sinful creatures. It is not
enough for creatures who have been habituated to sin to learn the truth, and it often takes
effort, striving, determination, and forceful action in order to counteract the effects of
previous sins on the mechanism of choice.108 Ramelli’s description of Origen’s moral
psychology as simply “ethical intellectualism” is incomplete, and does not encompass his
wide-ranging remarks on the subject. One more example may be mentioned: Ramelli’s
model would not explain why Origen viewed moral descent to be a common occurrence.
Demons may progress upwards, and angels may progress downwards. This type of evershifting moral movement along an ontological spectrum does not fit into a strict mold of
“ethical intellectualism,” for why would rational creatures keep gaining knowledge and
then lose it again? Is moral degeneration to be blamed on faulty memory?
Ramelli is right that Origen emphasizes rational pedagogy as necessary for the
soul’s ascent back to God, as well as the fact that correct choices are based in wisdom:
“for in no other way can the soul reach the perfection of knowledge [scientiae
perfectionem] except by being inspired with the truth of the divine wisdom.”109 But
Ramelli overstates the case. A remark by Hans Jonas is helpful here:
he resolves this in his will; but since the vice of wrath has been dominant in him due to continuous practice
and long-standing habit, it opposes even the will and purpose…”
Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Marcel Borret, Origène:
Contre Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes, 4 vols., Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Cerf,
1967-69). Unless otherwise noted, any English translations of Contra Celsum are from Henry Chadwick,
Origen: Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953; repr.,
1965).
108
Tom Greggs correctly notes that “Salvation is necessary, according to Origen, because while
souls have the capacity for reason, they may or may not engage actively in the pursuit of it” – Tom Greggs,
"Apokatastasis: Particularist Universalism in Origen," in All Shall Be Well: Explorations in Universalism
and Christian Theology, from Origen to Moltmann, ed. Gregory MacDonald (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,
2011), 32.
109
PArch 4.2.7 (Butterworth 283; SC 268, 328).
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Ultimately, “good” and “evil” are for Origen the only primary categories
of mental action – a thoroughly different picture from that drawn by
ancient philosophy with its main stress on the polarity of ignorance and
knowledge . . . The gnostic speculation that flourished before Origen had
interpreted the fall and rise underlying the cosmic drama in terms of the
loss and recovery of knowledge, in this respect staying closer to the
classical tradition. In its place Origen puts corruption and correction of the
will, and the responsibility of each subject for its place on the cosmic
scale. Secondarily, it is true, the fallen orders are, for Origen too, as many
limitations of knowledge, and the rise to a higher order brings with it also
a rise in knowledge. But the rise is not achieved through knowledge: it is
sanctity of will that leads to the higher order and thereby also to the
knowledge coordinate with it.110
Knowledge alone does not ensure holiness and ascent in Origen’s view, and for this
reason even wise men must guard themselves against temptations and practice active
resistance to them. Similarly, not all ignorance stems from lack of instruction.111 On the
other hand, Ramelli’s view of ethical intellectualism is more promising when one looks at
the final state and how rational creatures voluntarily persevere in the final apocatastasis
without the possibility of future falls. In the final union with God, when all thoughts are
of the Good (God), Origen understands sin to be impossible since every desire is focused
on the Good. At that time, rational souls will have perfect knowledge, and Origen
understands this to be the key reason as to how moral autonomy is upheld within a
permanent apocatastasis. However, this cannot explain the ascent of the soul before it
reaches its final end, because every moment prior to the final state the soul does not enjoy
perfect knowledge.
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Hans Jonas, "Origen’s Metaphysics of Free Will, Fall, and Salvation: A ‘Divine Comedy’ of
the Universe," in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
PrenticeHall, 1974), 313-14.
111
Quoting Crouzel, H.-J. Horn contrasts Origen’s view with that of the strict ethical
intellectualist: “Cette ignorance du pécheur n’est pas le manque d’instruction. C’est un refus conscient de la
vérité, laquelle consiste en connaissance de soi. Celui qui n’est pas prêt à se connaître ne verra pas en luimême la participation à l’image de Dieu” – H.-J. Horn, "Ignis Aeternus. Une interprétation morale du feu
éternel chez Origéne," Revue des Études Grecques 82 (1969): 88.
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Conclusion
I have demonstrated that there is a great deal of scholarly uncertainty over
Origen’s universalism given Origen’s emphasis on moral autonomy. Some scholars have
accused Origen of being inconsistent or paradoxical. Other scholars have offered a
distorted presentation of Origen’s teachings on universal salvation so that his eschatology
better aligns with a broad (and frustratingly ill-defined) concept of human “free will.” A
few scholars have attempted to make the case that both prongs of Origen’s theology fit
together within his system in a logical way. However, the proposed solutions suffer from
a variety of errors, and remain unconvincing.
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CHAPTER TWO
ORIGEN’S UNDERSTANDING OF MORAL AUTONOMY
Introduction
Origen’s view of universal salvation does not undercut his view of moral
autonomy, and this is due in large part to how Origen defines moral autonomy – the
subject of this chapter. The next chapter will provide an overview of Origen's doctrine of
providence, and Chapter 4 will highlight Origen’s universalism as the central feature of
divine providence. Chapter 5 will then explain how moral autonomy and universal
salvation fit together in Origen’s theology. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Part
1 will consider the context of Origen's arguments for moral autonomy by reviewing his
main opponents. Part 2 will present Origen's own anthropological views as they relate to
moral choices, first by analyzing his tripartite biblical model, and second by analyzing
the vocabulary and models which he borrows from Greek philosophy. Here I also note
where Origen modifies the terminology and categories he inherits from his sources.

Part 1 – Origen’s Theological Opponents
Origen's “Gnostic” Opponents
Debate on the topic of moral autonomy had been taking place for centuries before
Origen’s time.112 However, the old debate took on new intensity among Christian circles
112

Many scholars have attempted to trace the development of moral autonomy, including the
development of the notion of a (free) will: Neal Ward Gilbert, "The Concept of Will in Early Latin
Philosophy," Journal of the History of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (1963); Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of Will in
Classical Antiquity (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982); Charles H. Kahn,
"Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine," in The Question of "Eclecticism": Studies in Later
Greek Philosophy, ed. John M. Dillon and A. A. Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988);
Susanne Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem," Phronesis 43,
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in the 2nd and 3rd centuries AD due in large part to the growing popularity of various
gnostic theologies. The gnostic threat to the Church's Rule of Faith prompted Origen to
describe this question as a problem of the “utmost possible urgency” at the beginning of
his treatise on moral freedom in First Principles.113 Unsurprisingly then, Origen's
arguments for human moral autonomy were often polemical arguments and so to help us
understand Origen's view of free choice it will be valuable to understand the views which
so alarmed him. Because of the scarcity and fragmentary nature of surviving texts by
“gnostics,” as well as the polemical nature of the writings in which these fragments are
contained, it is difficult to ascertain a clear picture of the beliefs of the various groups
who were labeled gnostics.114 Contemporary re-evaluations of all things labeled “gnostic”
is a necessary and ongoing project.115 For this study’s purposes, however, it is less

no. 2 (1998); Richard Sorabji, "The concept of the will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor," in The Will
and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day, ed. Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone (London and
New York: Routledge, 2003); Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
113
Origen begins Book 3 by writing that the Church’s teaching on God’s judgment “assumes that
they acknowledge that deeds worthy of praise or blame lie within our own power [τὸ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν] – let us now
discuss separately a few points on the subject of free will [αὐτεξουσίου], a problem of the utmost possible
urgency [ἀναγχαιοτάτου ὠς ἔνι μάλιστα προβλήματος]” – PArch 3.1.1 Greek (Butterworth 157; SC 268, 1618). Citations from Peri Archon are from the most recent critical edition by Crouzel and Simonetti, Origèn:
Traité des Principes. Citations will list SC volume and page (for additional information see the
bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are from Butterworth, Origen: On first
principles: being Koetschau's text of the De principiis. Critical editions of Origen’s other works will be
noted throughout as they are cited. For a helpful guide and listing of Origen’s critical editions (PG, GCS,
SC), see McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen: 41-44. For other (non-Origen) works that I cite
only in passing, I do not give full bibliographic information but only standard section citations.
114
For a survey of evidence on our sources and fragments for Valentinus, see Einar Thomassen,
The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians' (Leiden: Brill, 2008). 417-90. For a similar survey for
the followers of Valentinus, see ibid., 491-508. For overviews of various other factions which have been
linked with a gnostic label, see the helpful introductory essays in Marvin Meyer, ed. The Nag Hammadi
Scriptures (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
115
Michael A. Williams, Rethinking "Gnosticism" : an argument for dismantling a dubious
category (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism?
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003); Antti Marjanen, "Gnosticism," in
The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, ed. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians';
David Brakke, The Gnostics : myth, ritual, and diversity in early Christianity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2010).
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important to reconstruct what various “gnostics” actually believed about moral autonomy
than it is to note what Origen understood them to believe. Origen interacted with a wide
swath of issues pertaining to gnostic theologies, most of which need not concern us
here;116 it was the gnostic understanding of soteriology and human anthropology that
prompted Origen's urgent arguments for moral freedom.117
Origen singles out certain leaders of gnostic factions by name, and he sometimes
lumps together and condemns a trio of names – Marcion, Valentinus, and Basilides.118
Valentinus was probably the most influential of the trio. According to Irenaeus he was
active in Rome from the 130s to about 160, and his ideas continued to spread after his
death.119 Scholars generally recognize two main branches or trajectories of his school,
one located in the east and one in the west.120 Origen also critiques the views of a student

A similar re-examination of Marcion and his teachings is underway: John Barton, "Marcion
Revisited," in The Canon Debate, ed. Lee Martin McDonald and James A. Sanders (Peabody: Hendrickson
Publishers, 2002); Christoph Markschies, "Die valentinianische Gnosis und Marcion - einige neue
Perspektiven," in Marcion und seine kirchengeschichtliche Wirkung/ Marcion and His Impact on Church
History, ed. Gerhard May and Katharine Greschat (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002); Sebastian Moll, The
Arch-heretic Marcion, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2010).
116
There is a significant amount of debate among scholars as to how to categorize Origen’s
relationship to gnosticism – whether Origen was deeply influenced by a gnostic structure of thinking,
whether he developed a Christian model of gnosticism, or whether Origen was not significantly influenced
by gnostic models in his own theology. For orientation on this debate, see Christoph Markschies,
"Gnostics," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John McGuckin (Louisville, KY: Westminster
John Knox Press, 2004).
117
While Origen elevates and prioritizes the “gnostic” threat to moral autonomy, he also criticizes
a variety of other threats to moral autonomy, which will be mentioned below.
118
E.g. PArch 2.9.5 (SC 252, 360-362); HomEzek 7.4.30-32 (SC 352, 260; Scheck 103). This trio
of names sometimes functioned as Origen’s common parlance for all gnostic deterministic systems. Origen
does not seem to display a significant amount of familiarity regarding specific details of many gnostics.
Christoph Markschies remarks that “the only gnostic teacher whom Origen cited in any detail, and with
whom he disputed systematically, was Heracleon” – Markschies, "Gnostics," 104. Citations from Origen’s
Ezekiel homilies are from the most recent critical edition (by homily, section, and line): Marcel Borret,
Origène: Homélies sur Ézéchiel, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1989). All English
translations are by Thomas P. Scheck, Origen: Homilies 1-14 on Ezekiel, Ancient Christian Writers
(Mahwah, NJ: The Newman Press / Paulist Press, 2010).
119
Irenaeus, Haer. 3.4.3. Cf. Einar Thomassen, "The Valentinian School of Gnostic Thought," in
The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, ed. Marvin Meyer (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 790.
120
Only a few fragments from Valentinus remain, and these are difficult to interpret given their
brevity and lack of context. Cf. The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians': 488-90.
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of Valentinus named Heracleon, with whom he appears to be the most familiar.121
Throughout his commentary on the Gospel of John, Origen quotes Heracleon's exegesis
at length before offering his counter-interpretation of the Gospel (or his occasional
agreement with Heracleon on a point of interpretation).122 In particular, in a number of
places Origen takes issue with Heracleon's grouping of humans into a tripartite humanity
of three distinct natures.123 This anthropological belief appears to be a feature of the
Valentinian School in particular, although current research into the original fragments of
Valentinus suggest that Valentinus himself may not have taught a doctrine of “fixed
natures.”124 Regardless, later western Valentinians would do so (including Heracleon).125
This anthropological doctrine of fixed natures prompted a forceful backlash from
orthodox Christians and was a major catalyst for the explosion of late 2nd century
Christian proclamations on free moral choice in matters of ethics and faith.

121

Origen calls Heracleon a disciple of Valentinus in ComJn 2.100 (SC 120, 270). Cf. Clement,
Strom. 4.9.71.1. Citations from Origen’s Commentary on John (by book and section) are from the most
recent critical edition: Cécile Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean., 5 vols., Sources Chrétiennes
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1966-1992). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations from ComJn are
from Heine’s 2 volume set: Ronald E. Heine, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 1-10,
FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989); Commentary on the Gospel
According to John, Books 13-32, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
1993).
122
Virtually all we have of Heracleon's gospel commentary are the fragments preserved by Origen
in ComJn. For an analysis of these fragments, see A.E. Brooke, The Fragments of Heracleon (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1891).
123
ComJn 20.168-170 (SC 290, 238-240); 20.198-219 (SC 290, 254-264). For a discussion of the
exegetical arguments Origen used against Heracleon on this point, see Jeffrey A. Trumbower, "Origen's
Exegesis of John 8:19-53: The Struggle with Heracleon over the idea of Fixed Natures," Vigiliae
Christianae 43, no. 2 (1989).
124
Cf. Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the 'Valentinians': 489.
125
ComJn 13.64: “We too would agree, then, if he were admitting that she had free choice and not
hinting that her nature was more excellent. But if he is referring the cause of her consent to her natural state
[φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ], as something not present in all people, his argument must be refuted” (Heine 82; SC
222, 64). Cf. Tripartite Tractate 118.14-36. For an opposing view regarding Heracleon, see Harold
Attridge, "Heracleon and John: Reassessment of an Early Christian Hermeneutical Debate," in Biblical
Interpretation: History, Context, and Reality, ed. Christine Helmer and Taylor Petrey (Atlanta: Society of
Biblical Literature, 2005). Attridge argues that Origen misrepresented Heracleon's views as being statically
deterministic (67-71).
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We may briefly summarize the heresiologist understanding of the gnostic view.
This belief held that humanity is divided into three classes: the spiritual, the psychic, and
the material or fleshly, and that these classes refer to fixed states of human nature.126 The
spiritual are those who are “born from above”, and as such are predestined for ultimate
salvation because of the spiritual seed that resides within them. On the other hand, the
material are “born from below” and are thus incapable of salvation; their nature precludes
it. The psychic class of humanity alone is capable of choice, and therefore is capable of
either salvation or damnation.127 Alongside other heresiologists of the day such as
Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, Origen found this idea to be deeply
troubling and squarely at odds with the Church’s Rule of Faith.128 He believed that such
an anthropology would prima facie render senseless moral accountability: why praise the
spiritual since they cannot do otherwise than they do, and why blame the material, who
also are incapable to do otherwise than they do? Clement had earlier claimed that the
gnostic view destroyed προαίρεσις (“choosing,” or “free decision”),129 and Origen

126
Spiritual (πνευματικοί), psychical (ψυκικοί), and fleshly or hylic (σαρκικοί / ὑλικοί). Perhaps
the most well-known text which divides humanity into these three classes is the Tripartite Tractate
(118.14-119.27). Cf. Irenaeus Haer. 1.6.2; Clement of Alexandria Strom. 4.13.89.4.
127
E.g. Tripartite Tractate 119: “Now, the spiritual kind will receive complete salvation in every
respect. The material kind will perish in every respect, as happens to an enemy. The psychical kind,
however, since it is in the middle by virtue of the way it was brought forth as well as by virtue of its
constitution, is double, being disposed to good as well as to evil, and the issue that is reserved for it is
uncertain…” – English translation by Einar Thomassen in Meyer, The Nag Hammadi Scriptures, 93-94.
128
Lohr points out that the “cliché of gnostic determinism”, or the belief that some people are
saved by their nature is first found in Irenaeus, but then is picked up by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and
others: Winrich Alfried Löhr, "Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered," Vigiliae Christianae 46, no. 4 (1992):
381.
129
Clement, Strom 2.10.1-2; 2.11.2. Cf. Strom 2.7.36.2-4; 2.20.115.2; 4.13.89.1-90.4; 5.3.3-4.
Peter Karavites notes that Clement employs a wide variety of expressions in his discussions on matters of
moral autonomy and free choice, including τὸ αὐτεξούσιον – Peter Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road
to Perfection in Clement of Alexandria, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 109-38.
Cf. Matyáš Havrda, "Grace and Free Will According to Clement of Alexandria," Journal of Early Christian
Studies 19, no. 1 (2011).
Aristotle had already distinguished between “willing” (βούλεσθαι) and “choosing” (προαίρεσις).
According to Aristotle “Willing” is more general, and “choosing” is a special type of willing. We may will
to do something that is not in our power to do. For instance, we may will to win a game. Choosing,
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similarly claimed that it destroyed τὸ αὐτἐξούσιον (“autonomous action”).130 In short,
along with other Christian voices Origen denounced such views as unbiblical and
squarely at odds with the idea of a just God.131 To describe this phenomenon in modern
terms, we might say that these Christian authors were wary of any deterministic-sounding
anthropology132 (i.e. something outside of one’s choice or decision which predetermines
one’s outcome, such that no amount of one’s effort or difference in one’s choices can
alter it).133
It is questionable whether the other two names of Origen's trio rightfully earned
their place next to Valentinus as the targets of Origen's ire concerning “deterministic”
anthropology.134 Basilides was another early gnostic, but less is known about him, and
however, is a special type of willing which is entirely up to us (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) and in our own power – Frede, A
Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 26-27. Cf. EN 1113a10-12.
130
PArch 3.1.8 Greek: “Now these passages are used by some of the heretics [τῶν ἑτεροδόξων],
who practically destroy free will [τὸ αὐτεξούσιον] by bringing in lost natures [τὸ φύσεις εἰσάγειν
ἀπολλυμένας], which cannot receive salvation, and on the other hand saved natures, which are incapable of
being lost [ἀνεπιδέκτους τοῦ σῴζεσθαι, και ἑτέρας σῳζομένας, ἀδυνάτως ἐχούσας πρὸς τὸ ἀπολέσθαι]”
(Butterworth 169; SC 268, 48). Cf. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity: 152. Origen also uses
the traditional term τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν but he appears to favor τὸ αὐτεξούσιον. Origen’s usage of these terms will be
discussed in greater detail below.
131
The question of what trajectory in 2nd century Christianity best “deserves” the title Christian is
argued by numerous scholars. For my purposes, the Tradition that flows through Irenaeus, Tertullian, and
Origen – all these sharing a strong emphasis on the Rule of Faith – is “Christian”.
132
The term “determinism” is a recent label; the OED traces the first occurrence to a work in 1846
– "determinism, n.," in Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, March 2017).
However, it is generally accepted by scholars today that deterministic thought interested philosophers in
early antiquity even if it was not labeled as such – Dorothea Frede, "Stoic Determinism," in The Cambridge
Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 180. Frede
identifies the most common “determinisms” as “physical determinism,” “ethical determinism,” “logical
determinism,” and “teleological determinism” (180). I will use the term “determinism” and “deterministic”
throughout, but I am sensitive to the ambiguity of the modern term and so I will try to highlight the
differences between ancient views which are often described with the label of determinism.
133
This is also why Origen was against the causal determinism of the Stoics (along with their
corresponding view of identical repeating world-cycles), for he was convinced that this left no room for
moral autonomy. E.g. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260). Cf. Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early
Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic
Philosophy; Frede, "Stoic Determinism."; Ricardo Salles, The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2005); Richard Taylor, "Determinism, A Historical Survey," in
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Donald M. Borchert (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006). The
Stoic view, including Stoic “character determinism”, will be discussed below.
134
By the late 240s when he responds to Celsus, Origen appears to be more precise in attributing
the view of spiritual and natural constitutions to simply the Valentinians – see Cels V.61 (SC 147, 166).
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only a few fragments of his writings survive today. In book 3 of Stromata, Clement
writes that Basilides' views on faith are a danger to free choice given Basilides' belief that
faith accompanied human nature.135 Clement insists that such a view means that faith is
no longer the direct result of free choice since there is a natural advantage for it. He goes
on to give an analogy of an inanimate thing being pulled on the puppet strings of one's
natural powers. Yet, at the same time, Clement concedes that followers of Basilides also
regarded faith as a choice even while regarding it as natural.136 It is not clear how the
mechanics of this were supposed to work, nor is it clear how this view might be different
from valentinian views like that of Heracleon.
The third person grouped together in Origen's trio of names is Marcion.137
Marcion was no “gnostic”, although it is easy to see why he was often lumped together
with them by mainstream “Rule of Faith” Christians.138 His belief in two Gods was seen
as the worst type of heresy and it would have sounded gnostic to monotheistic
Christians.139 Despite similarities with some gnostics, however, Sebastian Moll has
argued that Marcion refused any notion of predestination, including the idea of fixed
Interestingly, in that text there is also no mention of the middle category, the ψυκικοί. Citations of Contra
Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre Celse - Introduction, Texte
Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations of Contra Celsum are from:
Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum.
135
Clement, Strom 3.2.
136
Clement, Strom 3.2. Cf. Strom 2.8.36.1; 2.10.1-11.2; 5.1.3.3-4.
137
Clement, Strom 2.8.39.1; 3.2.12.1-13.1; 3.3.21.2; 3.4.25.1-2; 4.8.66.4; 5.1.4.2-4.
138
Moll argues that given the paucity of evidence, it is an open question whether Marcion was
influenced by early gnosticism, or whether gnosticism developed from Marcion's ideas. See discussion in:
Moll, The Arch-heretic Marcion. Moll writes that “there is hardly any real evidence for an elaborate dualist
Gnostic system before the time of Marcion” (75).
139
“Marcion, like the Gnostics, preached more than one God, and to his orthodox opponents this
was the greatest heresy of all, making any further differentiation marginal” – ibid., 74. Moll also corrects
older scholarship on Marcion which ever since Harnack had taken for granted that Marcion believed in a
just God and a good God. Moll demonstrates that there were actually two stages in the development of
marcionite doctrine. First, Marcion himself believed in an evil God and a good God, while later followers
of Marcion adapted this dualistic model into a tripartite model composed of a just God, a good God, and
evil matter – see ibid., 47-76. Origen does not appear to be familiar with the later stage of marcionite
doctrine, for Origen only debates the heretical view of a just God and a good God, e.g. PArch 2.5.1-4 (SC
252, 290-306).
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natures, or that of a divine seed living in only a certain group of people.140 Marcion is
nevertheless important for our purposes because of the radical way he changed the nature
of early Christian reflection on God's sovereignty. Before Marcion, the claim that God
was the creator was not a contentious claim. However, given Marcion’s teaching that the
Old Testament God was an evil deity,141 all morally questionable acts by God in the Old
Testament came under new scrutiny. Thus, W.J.P. Boyd rightly notes that “whereas for
St. Paul, as well as his Jewish readers, an appeal to the sovereignty of God was an
unanswerable argument, it was no longer so in Origen’s day...”142 God became more
vulnerable to criticism than ever before, and so Christians became increasingly focused
on apologetics; they went to greater lengths attempting to explain God's more confusing
and disquieting actions such as the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. It may have been
sufficient for Paul to say simply “Has the potter no right over the clay?”; by Origen’s
time, however, it became necessary to give a fuller answer to how God could harden
Pharaoh’s heart and yet remain just and good. Consequently, by Marcion’s time
predestinarian passages in Paul became relevant in a new way. They could not be set
aside as mysterious passages of uncertain meaning, but rather had to be reckoned with
and quickly neutered of their potential ability to threaten God's justice, for this potential
was pounced upon by marcionite preachers in their attempt to win converts from the
Church.143
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ibid., 74.
Cf. above footnote 139.
142
W.J.P. Boyd, "Origen on Pharaoh's hardened heart: a study of Justification and Election in St.
Paul and Origen," in Studia Patristica 7, ed. F. L. Cross, Texte und Untersuchungen 92 (Berlin: AkademieVerlag, 1966), 436.
143
It is worth mentioning again that there is not sufficient evidence to state whether
Valentinianism was directed against Marcion, or the other way around. But there is scant evidence for any
dualist gnostic system before Marcion, cf. Moll, The Arch-heretic Marcion: 74-75. It appears safe to say,
however, that Marcionism was more of an immediate threat to orthodox Christianity compared to various
141
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Recently, the predestinarian character of other forms of gnosticism has been
challenged by contemporary scholarship as well. There is reason to believe that some
gnostics did not think that salvation by nature necessarily excluded free decision.144
While investigating the history of these groups constitutes a necessary and ongoing
project, as noted above, what is relevant here are Origen's arguments against any form of
predestinarian or fixed-nature anthropology, and how this affected his own understanding
of free choice in the matters of ethics and faith. Origen and other heresiologists
understood that any conception of God's salvation which was dictated by (or prevented
by) one's own created nature was a clear denial of human moral autonomy. The presence
of gnostic-leaning churches prompted almost continual arguments from Origen on moral
autonomy which spanned his entire writing career.145 Around 218 Origen began work on
his Commentary on Genesis, in which he discussed human free choice in the context of
fate, astral determinism, and God's foreknowledge;146 in the early 220s Origen wrote his
gnostic groups. After all, while gnostics were forming schools, Marcion was forming a church, a church
which won its converts directly from Christian churches – cf. E.C. Blackman, Marcion and his Influence
(London: SPCK, 1948), 1. Justin Martyr states that Marcion made converts from every nation (1 Apol.
26.5). Tertullian notes (with typical rhetorical flourish) that Marcionites make churches like wasps make
combs (Adv. Marc. 4.5).
144
E.H. Pagels is probably the most famous scholar to argue this point, see E.H. Pagels, "The
Valentinian Claim to Esoteric Exegesis of Romans as Basis for Anthropological Theory," Vigiliae
Christianae 26, no. 4 (1972). On the other hand, Dihle disagrees with Pagels and insists that orthodox
Christians were correct in their understanding of gnostic teaching on this point – see Dihle, The Theory of
Will in Classical Antiquity: Appendix II: 150-57.
145
On the dating of Origen’s works see Hanson, Origen's doctrine of tradition: 1-30; Nautin,
Origène : sa vie et son oeuvre: see ch. 10 "Chronologie", 363-412; Quasten, The Ante-Nicene Literature
After Irenaeus, Volume 2: 37-43.
146
While gnostic determinism was the most immediate threat, Origen was concerned with any
deterministic framework which he believed contradicted moral autonomy. He argues against astral
determinism in his Commentary on Genesis – e.g. Phil 23.1.7-15: “…many who are supposed to have
embraced the Faith are distracted at the thought that human affairs may be governed by necessity, and
cannot possibly be otherwise than is ruled by the stars in their different groupings. And a consequence of
this opinion is the complete destruction of Free Will [ἐφ ἡμῖν]; and a further result is that praise and blame
are unmeaning…” (Lewis 173; SC 226, 132). The only portions of Origen’s Commentary on Genesis to
survive are those preserved in the Philocalia. Citations from the Philocalia 21-27 are from the critical
edition by Junod (listed by chapter, section, and line): Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre
arbitre. English translations are by Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages
from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea.
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famous defense of moral freedom in First Principles Book III;147 in the 230s Origen
further nuanced his position on human autonomy in his treatise On Prayer, and in the
240s Origen liberally discussed the issue all throughout his Commentary on the Epistle to
the Romans.

Early Christian Predestinarians
While most of Origen's energy on the topics of moral autonomy was directed to
those he deemed to be outside of the church catholic, Origen also developed arguments
for moral autonomy which were directed at people within the church – these were
Christians who took a literalist approach to predestinarian passages in Scripture.148 My
argument is that a careful analysis of Origen's anti-deterministic exegesis produces
evidence of an early tradition of predestination within the Church catholic.149 It is
necessary to investigate the nature of this group for at least two reasons. First, this
exegetical tradition serves as an important counterexample to the opinion of some
scholars today that the early church was unanimous in upholding free will in the matters
of faith.150 The pre-Augustinian church was more diverse on this topic than contemporary
authors often realize.151 Second, it is important to realize that Origen defends free choice
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Nautin argues for a later date, around 229 – Nautin, Origène : sa vie et son oeuvre: 368-71.
I am setting aside the modern debate over whether various gnostic groups or schools should
also be called “Christian” (Origen clearly did not think they should be). Regardless of one's leaning on that
question, Origen knows of a predestinarian view within the Church that he views as misguided rather than
heretical.
149
An earlier version of this section was read as a paper at the Pappas Patristic Conference in
Boston (March 2011). I wish to say thank you to the participants who discussed the paper with me,
especially Jesse Hoover who delivered a helpful response paper.
150
E.g. Alister McGrath writes: “The pre-Augustinian theological tradition is practically of one
voice in asserting the freedom of the human will” – Alister E. McGrath, Iustitia Dei (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34.
151
Origen himself serves as another counterexample to this prevailing opinion, given that he
formulated a view of human faith and divine providence that might be described as a type of compatibilism
(in the sense of moral autonomy operating towards a predetermined telos) – see below chapters 4-5. In any
148
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in more than one way, for Origen’s arguments against the predestinarians differ from the
arguments he uses against the gnostics. Each type of argument that Origen employs helps
to illuminate characteristics of his own doctrine of moral autonomy.
As far as I can tell, the first time Origen alludes to an incorrect Christian
deterministic reading occurs in First Principles Book III, where Origen offers a robust
defense of moral autonomy as a central teaching of Scripture. Scripture consistently
teaches that freedom of choice is true, Origen argues, despite the fact that several
passages appear to suggest otherwise. Unsurprisingly, Origen uses this as an opportunity
to oppose the gnostic doctrine of fixed natures, and throughout Book III his preferred
label for those who hold such a view is “heretics” (τῶν ἑτεροδόξων).152 However, there
are also several places where Origen refers to an alternate deterministic reading of
Scripture, and here he uses the milder term “opponents” (ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας) instead of
“heretics.”153 In another place, after introducing Romans 9 Origen remarks that “these
passages are in themselves sufficient to disturb ordinary people [τοὺς πολλοὺς] with the
thought that man is not a free agent, but that it is God who saves and destroys whom he
will.”154 Origen’s language here suggests that he is aware of a belief held by some within
the Church which viewed soteriology in predestinarian terms because of passages like
Romans 9. Throughout his discussion, Origen is careful not to conflate this view with the
gnostic view of fixed natures. In fact, for almost every challenging passage that Origen
case, McGrath’s expression “freedom of the human will” (see preceding footnote) suffers both from
anachronism (given that most authors before Augustine did not believe in the separate mental capacity
called “will”), and from ambiguity. That is to say, while it is true that practically everyone was concerned
with moral autonomy, authors understood the concept of moral autonomy to mean different things and
require different features. They did not speak with one voice.
152
E.g. PArch 3.1.8 Greek (SC 268, 48; Butterworth 169).
153
PArch 3.1.16: “Now our opponent will say…” (Butterworth 188; SC 268, 94).
154
PArch 3.1.7: “Ταῦτα γὰρ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὰ ἱκανά ἐστι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκταράξαι ὡς οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου αὐτεξουσίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σῴζοντος καὶ ἀπολλύντος οὓς ἐὰν αὐτος βούληται” (Butterworth 168;
SC 268, 46).
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introduces throughout this section of Book III he responds to each deterministic group
with a different counter-argument. For example, when Origen brings up Romans 9:16-21
and Philippians 2:13 (“to will and to work are of God”), his opening statements introduce
both of the false interpretations which he plans to address:
Now the objectors say: If it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that
runneth, but of God that hath mercy, then salvation does not come from
what lies in our power but from the constitution we have received from
him who constituted us what we are or from the will of him who has
mercy when he pleases.155
The “or” in this passage distinguishes two different deterministic interpretations of the
same passage – one by the “fixed natures” group and the other by a group I’ll simply call
the predestinarians. These are not complementary deterministic readings; in fact, they are
competing interpretations of the same text. One reading locates the predetermining cause
of salvation in one's prior nature (κατασκευῆς), and thus people are saved on account of
who they were/are. However, the other reading locates the predetermining cause of
salvation not in the people themselves, but in the inscrutable and seemingly-arbitrary will
of God, given that God chooses to bestow mercy on only a subset of a singular mass of
people who stand in need of salvation. The chosen people are not saved on account of
anything inside of them or on account of their constitution, which is precisely what
makes God’s decision to give mercy inscrutable. Nevertheless, Origen addresses these
groups together because their divergent viewpoints, if true, have in common the
implication that one’s moral choices do not contribute to salvation. Thus, Origen finds
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PArch 3.1.18: “Οἱ γὰρ ἐπιλαμβανόμενοί φασιν εἰ μὴ τοῦ θέλοντος μηδὲ τοῦ τρέχοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
ἐλεοῦντος θεοῦ, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν τὸ σῴζεσθαι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ κατασκευῆς τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τοιούσδε
κατασκευάσαντος γεγενημένης ἢ ἐκ προαιρέσεως τοῦ ὅτε βούλεται ἐλεοῦντος” (Butterworth 195-196
emphasis mine; SC 268, 112).

56

both groups guilty of impugning God's fairness, and he believes that his own exegesis of
the passage will be sufficient to negate both competing views.
However, we should note that Origen understands that each group impugns God's
fairness in a different way. The “fixed-nature” view portrays God as being an unfair
Creator, given that he created certain people with an advantage (or disadvantage) from
the outset. On the other hand, the predestinarian view portrays God as being an unfair
distributor of mercy (an unfair Savior) by only directing it to a subset of all of the people
who are in need of it.
After his introductory statements, Origen then turns to Philippians 2:13 and first
engages the predestinarians:
Now some say . . . since to will and to work are from God it is not we who
have done the excellent deeds; we seemed to do them (ἀλλ᾿ ἡμεῖς μὲν
ἐδόξαμεν), but it was God who bestowed them on us, and so even in this
we have no free will (αὐτεξούσιοι). In reply to this we must say...156
Origen critiques this view by saying it is based on an incorrect interpretation of Paul;
Paul is not trying to say that God is responsible for the specific choices we make, but
rather that God is the one who grants us the ability to “will in general and to work
general.”157 Origen then critiques the predestinarian interpretation of Romans 9:16-21 by
suggesting that prior choices by the soul are responsible for a person’s designation as a
vessel of honor or dishonor, rather than some arbitrary and unfair decision by God.158 It is
only at the end of this discussion, however, that Origen mentions that Paul is talking
about a single lump of clay that the potter forms in different ways, and that this implies
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PArch 3.1.20 Greek (Butterworth 200-201 emphasis added; SC 268, 124).
PArch 3.1.20 Greek: “Ἀλλὰ τὸ καθόλου θέλειν τὰ καθόλου ἐνεργεῖν” (Butterworth 201; SC 268,

126).
158

PArch 3.1.21-22 Greek (SC 268, 128-140).
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that “every soul in God’s hands is of one nature [μιᾶς φύσεως].”159 This signals a shift in
the logic and structure of Origen’s counter-argument regarding the biblical passages in
question. This is made clear a few lines later when we see Origen pivot to address the
fixed-nature view. Having dismantled the predestinarian view, Origen continues: “To
those, however, who bring in diverse natures and use this passage in support we must
answer as follows.”160 He then proceeds to analyze the troublesome Pauline passages, but
this time with the intention of attacking the view of fixed-nature determinism. The type
of counter-arguments Origen produces here differ from those he used against the
predestinarians. Here he focuses on demonstrating that moral progress and moral regress
are possible for everyone – that is, people who are currently vessels of dishonor can
become vessels of honor, and vice-versa, which means that no one is trapped into a
certain state because of their constitution.161
All of this indicates that Origen is aware of a group of Christians who are distinct
in his mind from the gnostics; they are Christians who nevertheless advocate a
deterministic (predestinarian) theology of God’s grace in matters of final salvation.162
While the deterministic schema of the gnostics was based on the presence of a certain
159

PArch 3.1.22 Greek (Butterworth 205; SC 268, 138).
PArch 3.1.23 Greek: “Τοῖς δὲ φύσεις εἰσάγουσι καὶ χρωμένοις τῷ ῥητῷ ταῦτα λεκτέον”
(Butterworth 206; SC 268, 140).
161
PArch 3.1.23-24 Greek (Butterworth 206-210; SC 268, 140-150).
162
Another place in First Principles where Origen appears to be addressing a predestinarian
exegetical tradition is PArch 3.1.15: Speaking of Ezek. 11:19-20, Origen offers the predestinarian
viewpoint which insisted that “if we ourselves do nothing to implant within us the ‘heart of flesh’, but it is
the work of God, then to live a virtuous life will not be our work, but something due entirely to the divine
grace [θεία χάρις]…Now this is what will be said by the man who, arguing from bare words, would destroy
our free will [τὸ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἀναιρῶν]...” (Butterworth 186-87; SC 268, 90). Origen is not addressing the
“fixed-nature” determinists here, but is instead arguing against those who link a predestined final salvation
with God’s gift of grace. This group presumes that people are a homogenous group of sinners who are not
already pre-categorized by different fundamental natures – that is to say, all people are alike in that they
have ‘stony hearts.’ Salvation requires a change in status to a ‘heart of flesh’, but this is something that is
granted to certain people by God’s mercy. Thus, Origen understands that on the gnostic view the elect were
already born different from the rest, while the predestined elect are transformed at some point in life in
order to become different.
160
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essence or substance in the individual (πνεῦμα), the deterministic schema of the
predestinarians was based on the arbitrary-sounding decision by God to have mercy on
only some persons out of the singular mass of humanity.163
Origen was already aware of this current predestinarian reading of biblical texts in
the 220s given his careful responses in First Principles. By itself this conclusion is
admittedly tentative.164 But by the time Origen wrote the treatise On Prayer a decade
later, we see Origen interacting with this predestinarian tradition more directly. Origen
wrote this treatise to answer troubling questions which had been posed to him by his
sponsor and promoter Ambrose, along with Ambrose’s sister (or possibly wife) Tatiana
(PEuch 2.1).165 When Origen quotes from their initial letter it is clear that Ambrose and
Tatiana were bothered by a popular Christian belief about prayer which stated, in
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Some might wonder if the second group Origen was addressing here were Marcionites. After
all, Origen was very concerned to defend the Christian God against the marcionite view that the Creator
God is capricious. However, we know Origen does not have Marcionites in mind here for several reasons.
The Marcionites believed the Old Testament God to be bad and capricious, while the New Testament God
alone is good, but many of the deterministic passages Origen is discussing in this section come from the
New Testament. In fact, Origen takes care to distinguish the Marcionite view from the predestinarian view
in PArch 3.1.16, even if he does not mention Marcion by name. He states: “In the first place we must note
the passage as an argument against the heretics, who hunt out similar passages from the Old Testament, in
which there is revealed, as they are bold enough to say, the cruelty of the Creator or his revengeful and
punitive attitude . . . their sole purpose being to deny that there is goodness in him who formed the world.
With the New Testament, however, they do not deal in a similar way, nor even candidly, but pass over
statements closely resembling these which they consider open to criticism in the Old Testament”
(Butterworth 189; SC 268, 96-68). The Marcionites interpreted these NT passages (if they included them at
all) in such a way that neutered them of any deterministic force in order to prevent any charges of
capriciousness to the NT God. Conversely, the group Origen addresses in this section emphasizes New
Testament determinism. We may also recall Moll’s assertion that Marcion refused any notion of
predestination – Moll, The Arch-heretic Marcion: 74.
164
After all, Origen is well-known for approaching difficult biblical texts by first suggesting a
variety of possible meanings before arguing for a particular interpretation. If our evidence was limited to
First Principles it would be difficult to rule out the possibility that Origen was simply using a rhetorical
technique.
165
PEuch 2.1 (GCS II, 298.18-19). Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the Berlin-Leipzig
critical edition (GCS), and are listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II), page number and line
number: Paul Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet, Die griechischen christlichen
Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1899). Unless otherwise
noted, English translations are from Rowan Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First
Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers, The
Classics of Western Spirituality (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1979).
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essence, that prayer was unnecessary because God foreknows everything that will come
to be; what God foreknows must therefore happen by necessity.166 Origen demonstrates
his own familiarity with this belief, because before moving to critique it he first offers an
expanded outline of the view. Origen’s expanded description includes many corollary
arguments that appear to have been used as further evidence for that position: “Well then,
here are the arguments of those who set prayers aside – obviously, I mean those who
establish God over the universe and say that providence [πρόνοιαν] exists…”167
Throughout this discussion there is no mention of fixed-nature determinism, nor any
mention of Marcion, Valentinus or Basilides. In fact, in the above quote Origen makes
sure that Ambrose realizes he is not presenting gnostic arguments by carefully
mentioning he is only referring to those who actually uphold the one God's sovereignty
over all creation – that is to say, he is speaking about a view found within the Church.
Origen's expanded outline and description of this exegetical tradition features a
double-predestination reading of Romans 9.168 Divine election plays a central role in this
schema in that it is impossible for the elect to fall away, and it is impossible for the nonelect to become elect.169 We may gather from this presentation that Origen, Ambrose, and
Tatiana were all aware of a belief held by some Christians (probably at a popular level as
166

PEuch 5.6 (GCS II, 311.8-13; Greer 92): “Let the argument I have been stating in the preceding
discussion be stated in the words of the letter you have written me. ‘First, if God foreknows what will come
to be and if it must happen [εἰ προγνώστης ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς τῶν μελλόντων, καὶ δεῖ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι], then prayer
is vain. Second, if everything happens according to God’s will [βούλησιν θεοῦ] and if what He wills is fixed
and no one of the things He wills can be changed, then prayer is vain.’”
167
PEuch 5.2 (GCS II, 308.23-26; Greer 91). Origen’s full presentation of the predestinarian view
is found in 5.2-5 (GCS II, 308-311; Greer 91-92).
168
PEuch 5.4 (GCS II, 309.29-310.6; Greer 91-92): If all people are categorized like Jacob and
Esau, then all people are either set apart or estranged from the womb. If so, then “it is in vain that we ask
for forgiveness of sins . . . For if we are sinners, we have been estranged from the womb. And if we have
been set apart from our mother’s womb, the noblest things will come our way even if we do not pray.”
169
PEuch 5.5 (GCS II, 310.16-20; Greer 92): “Well then, any one of them has been chosen ‘before
the foundation of the world,’ and it is impossible that he should fall away from his election [τῆς ἐκλογῆς].
Therefore, he needs no prayer. Or if he has not been chosen or predestined [ἢ οὐκ ἐξείλεκται οὐδὲ
προώρισται], he prays in vain; and even if he prays ten thousand times, he will not be heard.”
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it does not seem to be associated with any school or personality), which held a strict
predestinarian interpretation of divine grace. On some level Ambrose and Tatiana may
have found such arguments compelling, even if troubling, which would explain the
reason for their letter in the first place. Julia Konstantinovsky writes that the people
Origen refers to in this passage belong to a gnostic faction.170 But there is no textual
evidence to support this claim. Rather, Origen appears to treat them as Christians (albeit
misguided ones), for they view both the Old and New Testaments as Scripture, they
believe in the one God who is the main actor in both Testaments, and that belief plays a
central role in their argument for God’s deterministic grace of election. Their
deterministic soteriology is of a different category from one that centers on a fixed
constitution; this determinism is instead linked with the grace of election given arbitrarily
to some people within a singular class of fallen humanity.171

170

Julia Konstantinovsky, "Prayer," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John McGuckin
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 2004), 175.
171
Ronald Heine is correct to point out similarities in the arguments reproduced by Ambrose and
Tatiana with those found among Greek philosophers – Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service
of the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 161. By the 2nd century there were standard
arguments and counter-arguments relating to God's providence, foreknowledge, and fatalism. However, it
would be a mistake to miss the uniquely Christian character of the arguments here (especially the argument
as expanded by Origen). While Origen’s arguments are similar to those he uses elsewhere when defending
God’s foreknowledge from the charge of fatalism, Origen is not specifically confronting Greek
philosophers or Greek arguments here. The determinism advocated by the faction referred to in On Prayer
is thoroughly biblical in nature (or at least insists that it is), and it stems directly from specific exegetical
arguments. Heine does admit that it is possible Origen, Ambrose and Tatiana “may have known these
arguments from Christian sources”, and then he offers as a possibility the gnostic Prodicus, who was
known to Clement (Strom. 7.7.41) – ibid. It is true that Strom. 7.7 says that followers of Prodicus objected
to the necessity of prayer, but Clement does not tell us why they objected. Despite this modest similarity to
the argument in On Prayer, there is reason to believe that Heine's suggestion is probably wrong. Tertullian
knows Prodicus as a follower of Valentinus who believed in a multiplicity of gods (Scorpiace 15; adv.
Prax. 3), which does not fit the character of the predestinarian group described in this passage. In addition,
when Clement mentions the group of Prodicus he describes them as believing they are by nature children of
the first God (Strom. 3.4). This would put them closer to the camp of the “fixed-nature” determinists rather
the predestinarian determinists who only believed in one God.
Ph. J. Van Der Eijk is the only scholar I have found who calls the faction referred to in PEuch
“Christian”: “Aus dieser Tatsache, sowie aus der typisch christlichen Zergliederung der göttlichen Pronoia
in, einerseits, Vorherwissen und Vorsorge und, andererseits, Vorherbestimmung, geht deutlich hervor, dass
Origenes’ Argumentation sich primär gegen eine christliche Gruppe richtet” – P.J. Van Der Eijk,
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A final passage from the Philocalia is helpful in understanding this exegetical
tradition. Speaking of the famous episode where God hardens Pharaoh's heart, Origen
writes:
And to ordinary believers [Τοῖς δὲ πιστεύειν νομιζομένοις] it sounds very
harsh to say, “The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh.” For readers who
are convinced that there is no other God but the Creator, think that God
arbitrarily [ἀποκλήρωσιν], as it were, has mercy on whom He will have
mercy, and hardens whom He will, when there is no reason why one man
should have mercy shown him by God, and another be hardened by Him.
And others, better advised than these, say they look upon Scripture as
containing many secrets [πολλὰ κεκρύφθαι], and that they do not on that
account turn aside from the sound faith; and one of the secrets
[ἀποκεκρυμμένων] they hold to be the true account of this portion of
Scripture. Others, alleging that there is a God other than the Creator, will
have Him to be just but not good...172
Here Origen reflects a greater familiarity of Christian predestinarians than in the previous
texts given that he now knows of two different arguments used by two different groups.
The first group of readers are those we have seen Origen speak of in First Principles and
On Prayer. They are ordinary and uninformed believers who reluctantly feel led to
believe that the Bible teaches “random” (ἀποκλήρωσιν) predestination. Origen makes it
clear that these interpreters believe in only one God. The reason he makes note of that
here (when he does not always do so) is because the passage in question is from the Old
Testament instead of the New, and Origen does not want his readers to think he is
referring to the gnostics or to Marcionites who frequently pointed to such passages in the
Old Testament as evidence of a second (and perhaps capricious) deity. Origen's
clarification lets us know that we are not dealing with regular heretics here, but simply
misinformed Christians. The second group of predestinarian Christians Origen refers to

"Origenes' Verteidigung des freien Willens in de Oratione 6, 1-2," Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 4 (1988):
340. See also ibid., 342.
172
Phil 27.1.15-27 (Lewis 225 emphasis added; SC 226, 270).
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are better educated, and yet they nevertheless continue to believe in God's predestination
as if it were a secret doctrine hidden in the Bible.173 Again, we know Origen is not
speaking of gnostic heretics when he admits that these people desired to stay within the
boundaries of the Church's Rule of Faith (“sound faith” – “ὑγιοῦς πίστεως”).174
To summarize, I am arguing that Origen is a witness (albeit hostile) to the
existence of a non-gnostic deterministic form of Christianity that stretches over thirty
years of his career.175 Origen is convinced that this tradition holds a view which
contradicts moral autonomy and moral responsibility. From Origen’s descriptions, this
group differs from gnostic determinists in that the determining factor of salvation is based
in the arbitrary will of God and not on a created substance found within a subset of
people. What the predestinarians and the gnostics do have in common, however, is that
both of their views result in a kind of moral fatalism.176 The view of the predestinarians is
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Interestingly, this attitude is reminiscent to Origen’s own attitudes regarding certain doctrines
which he felt were too dangerous to be taught to ordinary Christians – most notably Origen’s beliefs
regarding the non-eternality of divine punishment. This will be discussed below in chapter 4 in the context
of Origen's belief in a foreordained and infallible final restoration (the apocatastasis), and Origen’s selfidentification as a “wise steward of the word” who regularly conceals such a doctrine. Cf. Tom Greggs,
"Exclusivist or Universalist? Origen the 'Wise Steward of the Word' (CommRom. V.1.7) and the Issue of
Genre," International Journal of Systematic Theology 9, no. 3 (2007).
174
Junod interprets this second, “better educated” group to be gnostics: Cette divergence
importante conduit à deux attitudes qu'Origène réprouve avec la même énergie : celle des gnostiques qui
croient comprendre et celle des «simples» qui ne cherchent pas à comprendre parce qu'ils voient des
mystères insondables partout – Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre: 271n2. However,
Origen’s language suggests otherwise. First, Origen begins by describing people who fall under the
category of only believing in one God, and only then moves to describing those who believe in an
additional God when he begins to talk about the followers of Marcion (a “just” God as well as a “good”
God). The “better educated” group is grouped with those who believe in only one God. Second, Origen
does not link fixed-nature determinism to this group, but rather implies that it is specifically the “arbitrary
mercy” which constitutes a secret biblical doctrine. Therefore, it seems that the main point of distinction
between the lesser and better educated predestinarians (besides education) is simply the degree to which
they were bothered by the doctrine. Ordinary Christians believed the doctrine to be true but also “harsh,”
while the better educated Christians simply viewed it as mysterious.
175
With the possible exception of Van Der Eijk, I am not aware of any other scholar who makes
this argument. Van Der Eijk calls this group “Christian” based on their use of Christian terms such as
“predestination” – see above n171.
176
The fatalistic arguments of the predestinarians (at least in the way that Origen represents them)
highlights a certain naiveté in regards to the current philosophical arguments about God's foreknowledge.
From Origen's description, the predestinarians concluded that any instance of God's infallible
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also distinct from Stoic causal determinism, different from Marcion's capricious and
arbitrary Old Testament God, and different from astral determinism.177 Origen felt a need
to confront this exegetical tradition within the Church as early as the 220s in First
Principles, and again in the 230s with his treatise On Prayer, and in the 240s Origen
continued to allude to it in places throughout his Commentary on the Epistle to the
Romans.178

foreknowledge logically leads to fatalism. This type of approach was discussed at least as early as the 2 nd
century BC with Carneades, and became known as the idle argument (ἀργὸς λόγος), an argument which has
its own history and trajectory. Chrysippus (along with Origen and others) considered the argument a
sophism and gave a famous rebuttal to it which is preserved in Cicero's On Fate 28-9, and Origen’s Contra
Celsum II.20 (Chadwick 86; SC 132, 338). Bobzien believes that Origen’s refutation of the idle argument is
indebted to the Stoics – Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 180-81. The
predestinarians do not engage with any of the (by this time standard) counterarguments to the idle
argument, but seem to take its fatalistic conclusions for granted. For more information on the history of the
idle argument and its rebuttals, see ibid., chapter 5: 180-233. Cf. below Chapter 5 for Origen’s discussion
of foreknowledge, and the distinction he makes between future events which happen by “necessity” and
future events which will “certainly happen”, but not by necessity.
177
Origen speaks in similar ways about “simple” Christians who are persuaded by or bothered by
astral determinism – e.g. Phil 23.1.7-15 (SC 226, 132). Cf. Junod’s helpful description at the beginning of
Phil 23: “L’astrologie avait fait de si nombreux adeptes à l’intérieur même de la communauté chrêtienne
d’Alexandrie qu’Origêne estime indispensable de consacrer de longs développements à sa refutation. Le
théologien alexandrin précise plus loin qu’il destine ses explications aux hommes «ébranlés» (§ 20, li. 3)
par les astrologues, quoique lecteurs de l’Écriture. Ces chrétiens qui subissent l’influence de doctrines
étrangères ou opposées à la pure foi sont souvent désignés sous le nom de «simples» – Junod, Origène:
Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre: 132n2.
Astral determinism shares certain features with predestinarian determinism – most notably that
those Christians who were persuaded by such views tended towards a kind of fatalism. The viewpoints
differ in the cause of the predetermination, and perhaps also in the degree or scope of the predetermination;
that is, the predestinarians seemed more concerned with the inability of people to choose their ultimate fate
(salvation or damnation), while the astral determinists believed that all events everywhere (even the
behavior of animals) were fixed in advance by the stars. For example, in First Principles Origen sometimes
describes the argument of his “opponents” as saying only that “salvation does not lie in their power; and if
this is so, we are not free as regards salvation and destruction” – PArch. 3.1.16 (Butterworth 188,
emphasis added; SC 268, 96). The opponents referred to in Origen’s treatise on prayer, however, do appear
to be drawing deterministic inferences which go beyond matters of final salvation (e.g. at least in regards to
the efficacy of petitionary prayer).
178
The Romans references may be found in ComRm VII.6.1-133 during Origen’s discussion of the
predestination found in Romans 8:30 (Bammel 587-593; Scheck 2.87-92). E.g. “…if to this popular
understanding [of foreknowledge] is applied that which says that ‘those whom he called, these he also
justified,’ we shall be opening a huge window to those who deny that it lies within man’s power to be
saved. For they say: If it is those whom God has foreknown that he has also predestined…” – VII.6.17-21
(Scheck 2.87-88; Bammel 588). And a short while later Origen again alludes to this Christian reading of
predestination when he says: “We can still say the following in answer to those who raise questions of this
sort against us...” – VII.6.105-107 (Scheck 2.91; Bammel 592). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on
Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar
des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 1, 2, 3. Unless otherwise noted, all English
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Origen's Hermeneutic: God's Fairness and Goodness
I have outlined Origen’s main theological opponents on the topic of moral
autonomy for two reasons. First, it is important to see that pre-Augustinian views on
grace and moral autonomy were not as homogenous inside the Church as some scholars
have claimed. Second and more importantly, it is helpful to recognize that Origen did not
utilize only one type of argument against deterministic theologies, as if determinism in
general was a single category which he found problematic. Instead, he employed different
arguments against various viewpoints which modern scholars often describe as
“deterministic.”179 It is helpful to compare Origen's reactions to these different views
because it highlights what Origen viewed to be of primary importance on the topic of
moral autonomy. The above analysis reveals that Origen’s defense of moral autonomy
was not born out of any discomfort Origen may have had with fixed or foreordained
events (even foreordained events concerning salvation).180 Instead, Origen's defense of
moral autonomy derives from his desire to safeguard two specific principles: the justice
and the goodness of God. The details of fixed-nature determinism differ from those of
Christian predestinarianism, but Origen insists that at their root they both suffer from the
same fatal flaw: they both lead to moral fatalism, which destroys any possibility for
translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-volume work: Scheck, Origen: Commentary
on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 6-10.
179
As mentioned earlier, here we must remember that the word “determinism” is a modern label.
Using the term anachronistically has both a benefit and a weakness. It is helpful insofar as it allows modern
authors to identify a common-denominator feature of many different views in antiquity which early
Christians found problematic: each of these views was thought to undercut moral autonomy and moral
culpability precisely because events were unalterable and foreordained by some external force or causal
chain of necessity. The weakness in labeling an ancient view “determinist” is that it tends to overshadow
the unique features of the view in question, as well as the different exegetical arguments Christians used to
combat each one. Cf. above n132 on my usage of the term “determinism.”
180
On the other hand, someone like Alexander of Aphrodisias was motivated to defend moral
autonomy because of his discomfort regarding fixed future events (see discussion below). It is necessary to
emphasize this point now given my argument in Chapter 4 that Origen himself maintains his own unique
species of deterministic eschatology (in the sense of a fixed and foreordained destiny) through his belief in
an infallible universalism.
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moral responsibility. If moral responsibility is not real, then God can be neither good nor
just, given that God commands people to be morally responsible. God commands people
throughout the Scriptures to do or not to do certain things, and then God rewards or
punishes people accordingly. To suggest that God rewards or punishes people for
commands which they are powerless to perform or not perform is to sabotage beyond
repair any notion of God's fairness.181 Origen includes this as part of the Church's Rule of
Faith:
This also is laid down in the Church's teaching, that every rational soul is
possessed of free will and choice [liberi arbitrii et uoluntatis]...There
follows from this the conviction that we are not subject to necessity
[necessitati esse subiectos], so as to be compelled by every means, even
against our will [etiamsi nolimus], to do either good or evil.182
This dual emphasis on God’s justice and God’s goodness permeates Origen's thought. It
is not simply a recurring theme throughout all of Origen's writings, but it serves as a
hermeneutical lens Origen uses to judge between possible interpretations of biblical texts.
We must keep this point in mind as we discuss Origen's own views concerning freedom
of choice and divine providence. Whatever description we give to Origen's theology, we
must test it for accuracy against these two principles. In the remainder of this chapter we
will see that these principles act as the cornerstone for Origen's doctrine of free moral
choice, and in the next chapter we will see that they also serve as the cornerstone for his
doctrine of God’s providence.

181

This fact by itself – that God has issued such commands – constituted sufficient proof for
Origen that humans had moral responsibility – cf. PArch 3.1.6 (SC 268, 32-40).
182
PArch praef 5 (Butterworth 4; SC 252, 82-84).
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Part 2 – Origen’s View of Moral Autonomy
Revelation and Philosophy: Origen's Dual Supports for Moral Autonomy
Origen’s acumen with a wide variety of philosophical traditions has been welldocumented.183 Origen believed that reason strengthens what can be known from divine
revelation,184 but Origen distinguished himself from both Platonists and Stoics by
insisting that reason alone was insufficient; revelation was needed.185 Origen stressed the
point that Scripture affirms moral autonomy on almost every page. At the same time, we
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E.g. Henri Crouzel, Origene et la philosophie (Paris: Aubier, 1962), 179-215.; Origen: 156-63.;
Daniélou, Origen: 250 ff.; Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Christian Tradition: 95-123.; Gilles
Dorival, "L'apport d'Origène pour la connaissance de la philosophie grecque," in Origeniana Quinta, ed.
R.J. Daly (Louvain: 1992), 198-216.
184
Origen viewed reason and divine revelation to be mutually supportive, e.g. PArch 4.1.1: “Now
in our investigation of these important matters we do not rest satisfied with common opinions and the
evidence of things that are seen, but we use in addition . . . testimonies drawn from the scriptures which we
believe to be divine…” (Butterworth 256; SC 268, 256-258). Origen's attitude regarding the relationship
between Scripture and philosophy is perhaps best seen in his letter to his student Gregory Thaumaturgus (or
Gregory the Miracle-Worker), which is preserved in the Philocalia (and cited as EpistGreg). Crouzel
produced a critical edition of EpistGreg in the Sources Chrétiennes, and all citations are from his text –
Henri Crouzel, Grégoire le Thaumaturge: Remerciement a Origène suivi de La Lettre d'Origène a
Grégoire, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1969). English translations are from Lewis, The
Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of
Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea. In this letter Origen calls philosophy the handmaiden to Christianity,
just as philosophers call music, grammar, and rhetoric the handmaidens (auxiliaires) to philosophy (Lewis
57; SC 148, 188). Origen urges Gregory to plunder the riches of the philosophers for his own use, just as
God told the Israelites to plunder the riches of the Egyptians to produce the holy ark of the covenant (Lewis
57-58; SC 148, 188-190). At the same time, Origen urges Gregory to be careful and to remember that
Gregory's goal or object should be Christianity and not philosophy, given that philosophy can be used
incorrectly or for heretical ends (Lewis 58-59; SC 148, 188-192).
185
A central tenant in both Platonism and Stoicism was the belief that the cosmos was a
completely rationally structured system which could not be otherwise, and therefore it was able to be
understood through rational inquiry. George Boys-Stones helpfully demonstrates how such a view is at
odds with Origen's Christianity: “The problem starts from the fact that this kind of approach to the world
has built into it the assumption that the world is regular, everlasting (if not eternal), and that it could not
have been otherwise in any significant manner...For, in Origen's view, a world so narrowly circumscribed
by its causal principles that it could not have been otherwise is a world in which there is no room for moral
autonomy; and if so, then it is a world which has no purpose, no reason to exist, at all” – George BoysStones, "Human Autonomy and Divine Revelation in Origen," in Severan Culture, ed. Stephen Harrison
Simon Swain, Jaś Elsner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 490-91. Origen insisted that the
current world did not have to be as it is – it could have been different, or it might not have been at all. This
means that human reason has limits. The holy Scriptures were a necessary secondary revelation which were
given directly by God in order for people to learn truths they would not have otherwise been able to.
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may note at least three reasons why Origen used philosophy to enhance Scripture's
teaching on this topic.186
First, Origen thinks that contemporary philosophy does not simply agree with the
Bible's message, but that it strengthens the Bible's message. Whereas the Bible implies

186
When I speak of Origen using “Scripture’s teaching” as the primary source for his theology I
do not mean to suggest that Origen used Scripture in a vacuum, for Origen inherited an exegetical tradition,
with significant roots in 2nd Temple Judaism. Origen was exposed to a great diversity of views from 2 nd
Temple texts. Importantly, this diversity included Jewish views on fate, providence, and moral autonomy.
In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the topic of moral autonomy was one of the defining elements or
points of demarcation among various Jewish groups. For example, Josephus summarized the main Jewish
factions according to their opinions regarding fate (by which he was probably referring to divine
providence but using Roman nomenclature). There are four places where Josephus used beliefs on fate
(providence) to distinguish between the Pharisees, Sadducees, and the Essenes: Wars of the Jews ii.119-66;
Antiquities xiii.171-3; Antiquities xiii.288-98; and Antiquities xviii.11-25. D.A. Carson has written a
helpful study on the various tensions between moral autonomy and divine providence found in the Old
Testament and 2nd Temple texts, and his study highlights the wide spectrum of views – D. A. Carson,
Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension (Atlanta: John Knox Press,
1981). More recently Gabriele Boccaccini has likewise emphasized the diversity of views in 2 nd Temple
Judaism, or what he calls “genealogies of subjects” – Gabriele Boccaccini, "Inner-Jewish Debate on the
Tension between Divine and Human Agency in Second Temple Judaism," in Divine and Human Agency in
Paul and his Cultural Environment, ed. John M. G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (New York: T&T
Clark, 2006), 10. Boccaccini discusses the “Zadokite worldview” which emphasized human accountability
and appeared to limit the scope of divine providence, Enochic Judaism, which stressed that evil came from
fallen angels, and so humans are more victims than they are perpetrators, Sapiential Judaism, which
stressed that all human beings have the capacity to do good and that God is never the cause of falling away
(13), and finally the theology of the Essenes which, to a large degree, was deterministic in character (1821). Cf. Francis Watson, "Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and
Human Agency," in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment, ed. John M. G.
Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (New York: T&T Clark, 2006).
In his technical discussions on the topic Origen prefers to use Greek terminology and categories
when explaining moral autonomy, and so it is not always clear which aspects of the Scriptural tradition he
is most indebted to (one exception, however, is Origen’s rather explicit use of “Two Ways” theology,
which will be discussed below). The boundary between Jewish and Greek thought is blurred, and Philo’s
influence on Origen’s theology is the best illustration of this. For a specific example of Philo’s influence on
Origen, see the discussion below in Chapter 3 on the pre-existence of souls. On Philo’s influence on Origen
in general, see David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey, Compendia Rerum
Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum: Jewish Traditions in Early Christian Literature (Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1993); Annewies Van den Hoek, "Philo and Origen: a Descriptive Catalogue of their Relationship,"
The Studia Philonica Annual 12(2000); Hans Georg Thümmel, "Philon und Origenes," in Origeniana
Octava, ed. Lorenzo Perrone (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003); Justin M. Rogers, Didymus the
Blind and the Alexandrian Christian Reception of Philo, ed. Thomas H. Tobin, Studia Philonica
Monographs (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature Press, 2017), 31-34; 166-71. For an examination of
Origen’s relationship with the Judaism of his time, including his sources and contacts, see N.R.M. De
Lange, Origen and the Jews: Studies in Jewish-Christian Relations in Third-Century Palestine (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 15-28; Paul Blowers, "Origen, the Rabbis, and the Bible: Toward a
Picture of Judaism and Christianity in Third-Century Caesarea," in Origen of Alexandria: His World and
His Legacy, ed. Charles Kannengiesser and William L. Petersen (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988); Michael G. Azar, Exegeting the Jews: The Early Reception of the Johannine "Jews",
The Bible in Ancient Christianity (Boston: Brill, 2016), 55-100.
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moral accountability, philosophy has the power to demonstrate its workings in detail.
Origen wants to marshal as much evidence as he can to buttress his attack against the
gnostics, for he felt the urgency of their threat could not be ignored.
The second reason Origen employs philosophy in his explanation of moral
autonomy is related to the first. Although Origen implies that the Bible should be
sufficient for teaching the reality of moral responsibility, he also admits that there are
some places in Scripture which appear to suggest otherwise (e.g. Romans 9).187 Since at
times Scripture appears to speak with two voices on this topic (at least on a superficial
level), Origen often finds himself trying to convince Christians that one interpretation is
more valid than the other. As such, arguments from philosophy can help adjudicate one
reading of Scripture over another; external evidence helps solve the internal exegetical
debate.
The third reason Origen underscores the agreement between revelation and
philosophy on this topic is for an apologetic purpose. It is a signal to non-Christian
philosophers that Christianity is true and should be respected. It is Origen's way of
saying: “our divine revelation from God teaches the very same thing that your
philosophers have recently figured out; Christianity is legitimate!” Contra Celsum may
be the best example of this strategy. Origen's message there boils down to the following:
not only is it wrong to believe that Christians are irrational, but in fact Christians often
know Greek philosophy better than their pagan counterparts (certainly better than

187

PArch 3.1.6-7: “Indeed, there are in the scriptures ten thousand passages which with the utmost
clearness prove the existence of free will. But since certain sayings from both the Old and the New
Testaments incline us to the opposite conclusion…” (Butterworth 166; SC 268, 40-41).
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Celsus).188 At the same time, it is important to remember that Origen does not feel
constrained by the philosophical arguments he borrows. As we will see, Origen is not
afraid to alter standardized expressions and arguments from Greek philosophy to support
his own Christian ends.

Origen's General Anthropology: the “Tripartite Person” and the “Dual Nature”
Origen derives his belief in moral autonomy from the scriptures, and he also
emphasizes his willingness to plunder Greek philosophy to strengthen his belief
whenever possible. Now we may begin to outline his anthropology. First, I will discuss
Origen’s view of the human person in general (he derives this from Scripture), and then
in the next section I will examine how Origen understands the mechanics of choice to
operate within that anthropology. Here Origen largely inherits his view from Stoicism,
yet he also adapts it in significant ways.
To understand Origen’s tripartite anthropology we must start at the beginning of
cosmic history as Origen understands it.189 In the primordial state of existence190 Origen
188

This is why Origen does not merely call Celsus wrong, but he calls him a “bad philosopher”
(ἀφιλόσοφον) – e.g. Cels II.40 (Chadwick 98; SC 132, 378). In this Origen is merely following the example
of earlier apologists such as Quadratus, Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Athenagoras. On the writings
of the Apologists see Quasten, The Beginnings of Patristic Literature, Volume 1: 186-253. For a helpful
summary of Contra Celsum see E. Barnikol, "Celsus und Origenes," Texte und Untersuchungen 77 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 124-27.
Origen frequently defends Christianity from Celsus’ accusation that Christians stole ideas from the
Greek philosophers. For example, on the subject of “holy land”, Origen writes: “It has been our object to
show that we did not take the idea of the holy land from the Greeks or from Plato. But since the Greeks
were more recent, not only than Moses who was of the greatest antiquity…” – Cels VII.30 (Chadwick 418419; SC 150, 80-82). On the priority of Moses over Greek philosophy, cf. Cels IV.21 (Chadwick 197-198;
SC 136, 232-234).
189
Origen gets the tripartite schema from Paul in 1 Thess. 5:23 – see ComRm I.12.14-18 (Bammel
69). Origen's discussion of the tripartite person may also be found in PArch 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348); 3.4.2 (SC
268, 204-206); ComJn 32.218 (SC 385, 278-280); ComRm I.21.40-52 (Bammel 88); VI.1.53-61 (Bammel
458); Dial 6.23-7.8 (SC 67, 68-70). For more on Origen's general anthropology, see Henri Crouzel,
"L'anthropologie d'Origène dans la perspective du combat spirituel," Revue d'ascètique et de mystique
31(1955); Jacques Dupiuis, L'esprit de l'homme" : etude sur l'anthropologie religieuse d'origene, Museum
Lessianum, section théologique (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1967). Citations of Dialogue with
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believes that God created rational and incorporeal beings called Minds or Intelligences
(νοῦς);191 while the νοῦς is incorporeal, properly speaking, it nevertheless cannot exist
without being attached to a corporeal body, for only the Trinity can exist as fully
immaterial.192 Thus, even in the soul’s pre-earthly life it had a body (albeit not an earthly
body).193 God also created rational beings with a spiritual element (the πνεῦμα). Origen
Heraclides are from the critical edition (by volume and page): Jean Scherer, Entretien D'Origène avec
Héraclide, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1960). All English translations are from
Robert Daly, Origen: Treatise on the Passover ; And, Dialogue of Origen with Heraclides and His Fellow
Bishops on the Father, the Son, and the Soul, ACW (New York: Paulist Press, 1992).
190
In a recent book Mark Edwards tries to overturn the long-standing view in Origen scholarship
that Origen believed in the pre-existence of souls (Edwards allows pre-existence only in a sort of technical
in utero sense): Mark J. Edwards, Origen Against Plato (Aldershot/Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 91f.
Marguerite Harl had also suggested that the pre-existence Origen refers to is simply the existence of beings
in God's foreknowledge, but before their actual creation – Marguerite Harl, "La préexistence des âmes dans
l'œuvre d'Origène," in Origeniana Quarta: Internationalen Origenskongresses, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck:
Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 253. Most scholars, however, continue to hold the position that Origen did
understand souls to exist before the creation of the material world. Origen explicitly affirms this position in
the following places: PArch 2.1.3 (SC 252, 240); 2.8.3 (SC 252, 344-346); 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348); 3.3.5 (SC
268, 194); Cels V.29 (SC 147, 86-88). For orientation on the current state of this debate, see Blosser,
Become Like the Angels: 158f. I will discuss Origen’s views regarding the pre-existent state of souls in
Chapter 3.
191
Rufinus translates this in various ways – e.g. PArch 2.9.1: “We must suppose, therefore, that in
the beginning God made as large a number of rational and intelligent beings [rationabilium creaturarum
uel intellectualium], or whatever the before-mentioned minds [mentes] ought to be called, as he foresaw
would be sufficient” (Butterworth 129; SC 252, 352).
192
PArch 1.6.4: “…we believe that to exist without material substance and apart from any
association with a bodily element [subsistere sine corporibus] is a thing that belongs only to the nature of
God, that is, of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit” (Butterworth 58; SC 252, 206); PArch 2.2.2: “But
if it is impossible by any means to maintain this proposition, namely, that any being, with the exception of
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, can live apart from a body, then logical reasoning compels us to believe
that, while the original creation was of rational beings [rationabiles naturas], it is only in idea and thought
that a material substance [materialem substantiam] is separable from them, and that though this substance
seems to have been produced for them or after them, yet never have they lived or do they live without it;
for we shall be right in believing that life without a body is found in the Trinity alone” (Butterworth 81; SC
252, 246-248). Some scholars doubt the authenticity of these passages and attribute them to Rufinus’
attempts to adjust Origen’s view into a more orthodox presentation. For more on this debate see below,
n193.
193
This continues to be one of the most contested claims in Origen scholarship, for many scholars
believe that Origen understood pre-existent souls to be completely incorporeal, with bodies only being
added later at the time when souls were placed into the material cosmos. Additionally, this debate typically
goes hand-in-hand with a parallel debate over whether Origen believed souls would retain their bodies after
the resurrection or within the future apocatastasis (cf. below n201). Crouzel has been the most famous
advocate of the position that souls were always joined to corporeal bodies. Through his many publications
Crouzel forcefully argued that Origen affirmed the continuity of embodied souls in both his protology and
his eschatology, and as a result this has been the dominant view among scholars ever since – see, for
example, Crouzel, "L'Apocatastase chez Origène." Nevertheless, a few significant scholars continue to
advance the argument that Origen believed souls were initially created without any corporeal bodies, and
some similarly argue that in the apocatastasis souls will eventually give up any sense of corporeality in the
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does not always differentiate clearly between the spirit and soul, but he links the spirit
aspect with a person’s conscience; it is where positive motivations towards the good are
found.194 Not to be confused with the Holy Spirit, the spirit is the divine element within
rational creatures, and it is rightly called an aspect of the person.195

final moment when God is all in all – e.g. Róbert Somos, "Origenian apocatastasis revisited?,"
Cristianesimo nella storia 23, no. 1 (2002); Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil:
126; Peter W. Martens, "A Fitting Portrait of God: Origen's Interpretations of the "Garments of Skin" (Gen
3:21)," in Hidden Truths from Eden: Esoteric Readings of Genesis 1-3, ed. Caroline Vander Stichele and
Susanne Scholz, Society of Biblican Literature (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014); Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher
of Salvation: A Study on Origen's Christology and Soteriology: 263-65. Jacobsen, for example, argues that
Origen's insistence on the equality or lack of diversity in the original creation necessitates “asomatic”
existence. Without going into too much detail on this point, I would point out that Origen's argument for
equality during the initial state is meant to be a counterargument to the gnostic teaching of diverse natures,
and does not seem to be intended as an argument for bodiless existence. I am convinced by Crouzel’s
position on the basis of several strong arguments, such as the fact that Origen admits that occasionally
when he talks about incorporeal existence he is merely using a colloquial or common definition of
“incorporeal” (ἀσώματος, Rufinus – incorporeum) in the sense of invisible or ethereal, and he states that he
does not mean absolutely or philosophically immaterial – e.g. PArch praef 8 (Butterworth 5-6; SC 252, 86).
Crouzel covers this particular point in: Henri Crouzel, "La doctrine origénienne du corps ressuscité,"
Bulletin de litterature Ecclésiastique 81 (1980). Another common theme in Origen is that God originally
created all creatures by “number and measure.” Origen links the idea of number to rational minds and he
links measure to bodily matter, “for to God there is nothing either without end or without measure” –
PArch 4.4.8 (Butterworth 323-325; SC 268 420-422). The fact that nothing apart from God can exist
without measure (without bodily existence of some kind) is further reinforced by the fact that Origen links
“number and measure” to an allegorical interpretation of God’s original creation of “heaven and earth.”
Thus, in PArch 2.9.1 Origen interprets “heaven and earth” to refer to God’s first creation of pre-existent
souls and matter, for he says that the firmament and dry land (that is, the secondary and earthly “heaven
and earth”) borrow their names from the heaven and earth that were before. Thus, Origen insinuates that
bodies were created simultaneously with souls in the original pre-existent creation (Butterworth 129-130;
SC 352-354). Origen similarly affirms that souls will always retain bodies post-resurrection. In PArch
2.10.3 (Butterworth 141; SC 252, 380-382) Origen states that implanted within our bodies is a “lifeprinciple” (ratio) which contains the “essence” (subsantiam) of the body. This life-principle is what God
uses to reconfigure the various stages of the soul’s embodiment, and so it is this life-principle which links
our earthly body with our resurrection body. This discussion is preserved in Rufinus’ Latin and so may fall
under suspicion. Therefore, it is significant that a parallel passage is preserved in the Greek in Origen’s
Contra Celsus. There Origen specifies that although resurrection bodies will be different, nevertheless the
soul always resides in a tabernacle (the body), a tabernacle which possesses a “seminal principle” (λόγος
σπέρματος), and “in this tabernacle those who are righteous groan, being weighed down, and desiring not to
put it off but to be clothed on top of it…” – Cels VII.32 (Chadwick 420, emphasis added; SC 150, 84-86).
Edwards has written a forceful article where he argues that many of the quotations which insinuate fully
disembodied souls and which were later ascribed to Origen by his unfriendly critics (e.g. Jerome and
Justinian) do not logically fit alongside passages we know to be authentically Origen’s – Mark J. Edwards,
"Origen no Gnostic; or, on the Corporeality of Man," Journal of Theological Studies 43 (1992).
194
ComRm II.7.48-52: “In my opinion the conscience [conscientiae] is identical with the spirit,
which the Apostle says is with the soul as we have taught above. The conscience functions like a
pedagogue to the soul, a guide and companion, as it were, so that it might admonish it concerning better
things or correct and convict it of faults” (Scheck 2.133; Bammel 137).
195
Dial 6.23-7.8 (Daly 62; SC 67, 68-70): “We have learned from the holy Scriptures that the
human being is a composite. For the Apostle says: May God sanctify your spirit and your soul and your
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A subset of these tripartite rational beings fell to the earth to become embodied
souls (ψυχή) – that is to say, human beings.196 Though still attached to a material body,
the earthly body is not identical with its primordial form and will one day be restored to
its glorious and heavenly form in the resurrection.197 Humans on earth remain tripartite:
body, spirit and soul (σῶμα/corpus, πνεῦμα/spiritus, and ψυχή/anima).198 These are three
aspects (esse) of the composite individual.199 Crouzel concluded that Origen held this
tripartite feature to be true of rational creatures at every stage of their existence;200 the

body…This spirit is not the Holy Spirit, but a part of the human composite.” Crouzel’s remarks about the
spirit are helpful here: “Distinguished from the Holy Spirit, it is nonetheless a kind of created participation
in the latter and the latter’s seat when He is present in a man. It is one of the many expressions used by
Origen approximating to what would later be called sanctifying grace; but it differs from the scholastic
conception, first in that it is found in every man and not simply in the baptized, second in that it does not
quit a man when he sins here below: it stays with him in a state of inertia, but as a possibility of
conversion” – Crouzel, Origen: 88.
196
Origen is usually consistent in using νοῦς for individuals both in the prelapsarian past and the
final future and using ψυχή for the postlapsarian embodied state. But see PArch 2.11.5: “He knew when he
had gone back to Christ he would learn more clearly the reasons for all things that happen on earth, that is,
the reasons which account for man, for his soul [anima] or his mind [mente], or whichever of these
constitutes man...” (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404). Origen also views the transition of “minds” to “souls”
to take place along a sliding scale – PArch 2.8.4: “it seems to me that the departure and downward course
of the mind must not be thought of as equal in all cases, but as a greater or less degree of change into soul,
and that some minds retain a portion of their original vigour, while others retain none or only a very little”
(Butterworth 127; SC 252, 348).
197
In the ascent towards God after death the person’s body remains, but it develops into a
“spiritual body” (spiritalis corporis) – PArch 3.6.6 (Butterworth 252; SC 268, 246). Cf. PArch 2.10.1-3
(SC 252, 374-382); PArch 3.6.7 (SC 268, 250).
198
Origen also links the three aspects of the person to his threefold interpretation of Scripture: e.g.
in PArch 4.2.4 Greek (Butterworth 275-276; SC 268, 310-312) Origen explains that in thinking about
Scripture’s threefold meaning, the flesh corresponds to the obvious meaning (literal and historical) and is
designed for the simple man, the soul corresponds to the moral meaning and is for those who are making
some progress, and the spirit corresponds to the mystical and allegorical meaning and is meant for those
who can understand God’s mysteries. He concludes in this passage by saying, “For just as man consists of
body, soul, and spirit, so in the same way does the scripture, which has been prepared by God to be given
for man’s salvation.”
199
ComRm I.12.14-18: “Accordingly the Apostle serves God not in the body [corpus] or in the
soul [anima] but in his best part, in the spirit [spiritus]. For when he writes to the Thessalonians he makes
known that these three aspects [esse] are in man when he says, ‘May your whole body, soul, and spirit be
preserved on the day of our Lord Jesus Christ’” (Scheck 1.79; Bammel 69).
200
Crouzel, Origen: 91. For an opposing view, see Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the
Problem of Evil: 126. While I am persuaded by Crouzel, I would suggest that there are two points at which
Origen appears to make an exception to his general rule of permanent embodiment. First, before souls were
created they eternally existed in a figurative form within God’s wisdom and foreknowledge (what we might
call a pre-pre-existence) – see discussion on this point in Chapter 3. A second possible exception is the
state of souls within the final apocatastasis. It is possible that Origen left as an open question to be explored
whether souls would one day shed their bodies completely and be wholly subsumed into God. I do not
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end will be like the beginning, and Origen affirms the three aspects of rational beings will
be present in the final restoration as well.201 The entire tripartite person needs saving,
which is made possible because the savior Jesus Christ assumed our tripartite nature as
well.202
Origen defines a soul as an existence capable of feeling and movement,203 which
is located midway (or as a medium) between the person's body and spirit.204 And it is in

believe this is the best possible reading of Origen, but I grant that it is a possibility – cf. Gerard Watson,
"Souls and bodies in Origen's Peri Archon," Irish Theological Quarterly 55, no. 3 (1989): 187-88. The state
of bodies and souls in the final apocatastasis also raises interesting questions regarding the operation of
creaturely moral autonomy in the final state. If souls retain bodies in the apocatastasis, why does Origen
believe they will not use moral autonomy to fall away a second time? Or, if souls and bodies are both
subsumed into God in the apocatastasis, then in what sense could moral autonomy exist anymore, given
that independent existence seems to evolve into something different? These questions and the challenges
they pose for articulating Origen’s view of moral autonomy will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
201
As mentioned above, there is lively debate among scholars whether or not Origen envisioned
souls to retain their spiritual bodies after their final reunion with God. From my perspective, Origen
appears to hold the permanence of the spiritual bodies even in this final state, although he stresses their
non-earthly quality – e.g. PArch 2.10.1-2: “For it is from the natural body that the very power and grace of
the resurrection evokes the spiritual body, when it transforms from dishonour to glory . . . We indeed
understand the matter thus: the apostle, when he wished to describe how great were the differences among
those who rise in glory, that is, the saints, drew a comparison from the heavenly bodies…” (Butterworth
139-140; SC 252, 376-378). Hennessey has explored Origen’s understanding of the luminous body after
death, and he concludes that Origen always envisions the soul to be joined to a body of some kind –
Lawrence R. Hennessey, "Origen of Alexandria: The Fate of the Soul and the Body after Death," The
Second Century: A Journal of Early Christian Studies 8, no. 3 (1991). Cf. Watson’s Watson, "Souls and
bodies in Origen's Peri Archon," especially 184-91.
202
Dial 7.1-30 (SC 67, 70-72). Origen notes here that the three parts of Jesus (body, soul, and
spirit) were separated in the passion, but were reunited at the time of the resurrection. Origen’s claim here
that even the spirit aspect of a person needs to be saved appears to be at odds with Origen’s teaching
elsewhere that a person’s spirit remains untainted and never convicted of bad deeds (on this point, see
discussion below on ComRm II.7.48-52). I would suggest that one way to understand Origen’s comments
here is to remember that Origen’s view of salvation is the successful ascent and restoration of the person to
God. Thus, even if the spirit aspect is untainted in a moral sense, it nevertheless also remains apart from
God given its connection to the soul, and therefore along with body and soul it, too, requires ascent and
restoration.
203
Rufinus struggles to make Origen understandable here – PArch 2.8.1: “For soul is defined thus,
as an existence possessing imagination and desire, which qualities can be expressed in Latin, though the
rendering is not so apt as the original, by the phrase, capable of feeling and movement [Definitur namque
anima hoc modo, quia sit substantia φανταστικὴ et ὁρμητική, quod latine, licet non tam proprie
explanetur, dicit amen potest sensibilis et mobilis]” (Butterworth 120; SC 252, 338).
204
PArch 2.8.4: “…it appears as if the soul were some kind of medium [medium] between the
weak flesh [carnem infirmam] and the willing spirit [spiritum promptum]” (Butterworth 127-128; SC 242,
348).
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the relationship of these three aspects that the tripartite human205 experiences spiritual
battle.206 Both the spirit and the body have certain inclinations: the spirit desires, and the
body lusts.207 These inclinations are not to be confused with Platonic passions, for Origen
thinks of them as rational urges, or cognitive thoughts.208 Body and spirit always have

205
Although the tripartite language is suggestive, Origen does not see his tripartite view as the
same as Plato's view; in PArch 3.4.1 Origen introduces Plato's theory of a tripartite soul (rational, appetite,
and passion) and states that he does “not observe [it] to be strongly confirmed by the authority of divine
scripture” (Butterworth 230-231; SC 268, 200). Blosser believes that the view Origen dismisses in this
passage is not so-much that of Plato's, but rather a view from later in the Platonic tradition (he calls it
“Middle Platonic”) – Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 26-29, especially n34. An interesting exception
where Origen entertains the Platonic tripartite model can be found when he discusses the four visages of the
cherubim in Ezekiel: HomEzek 1.16.9-25 (SC 352, 94-96; Scheck 44-45). Here Origen suggests that the
first three faces might represent a tripartite soul in the Platonic sense (man – rational, lion –
anger/spiritedness, calf – concupiscent), with the fourth face of the eagle denoting the governing spirit of
the soul which rules over the other three. Origen does not appear to have used this alternate model beyond
this particular instance. Cf. Angela Russell Christman, "What did Ezekiel See?": Christian Exegesis of
Ezekiel's Vision of the Chariot from Irenaeus to Gregory the Great (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 104.
206
Cf. ComRm V.3 (Scheck 1.338; Bammel 404): [Origen says that currently God is not yet “all in
all” and so the present time] seems not so much a time of reigning as of war. Through this war the future
kingdom is being striven for.”
207
ComRm I.21.40-52 (Scheck 1.94; Bammel 88): “Either [the soul] gives assent to the desires of
the spirit or it is inclined toward the lusts of the flesh.”
208
This is a contested point. Blosser, for example, appears to understand the desires of the flesh to
be irrational only – Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 32-33; 114. However, in PArch 3.3.4 Origen writes
that the soul can be influenced by either good or bad spirits, which implies rational and cognitive
influences (good spirits operate from within the arena of the person’s spirit, while bad spirits operate from
within the arena of the person’s body). Evil spirits, for example, “deprave the soul, while it still thinks and
understands, through harmful suggestion by means of different kinds of thoughts and evil inducements [uel
cum sentientem quidem et intellegentem animum cogitationibus uariis et sinistris persuasionibus inimica
suggestione deprauant]” (Butterworth 227; SC 268, 192). PArch 3.4.1 describes temptations as coming
from the “wisdom of flesh and blood [prudentia carnis et sanguinis]” (Butterworth 230; SC 268, 198).
Origen does speak at times of sin as a type of irrationality – e.g. PArch 2.10.8: The “outer darkness” is “a
description of those who through their immersion in the darkness of deep ignorance have become separated
from every gleam of reason and intelligence [rationis et intellegentiae]” (Butterworth 145; SC 252, 392).
However, Origen understands irrationality in such contexts to be understood as failure to act in accordance
with true reason, rather than an assertion that some impulses are nonrational in general. As will be
demonstrated below, Origen follows the standard Stoic model of psychology as well as Stoic technical
vocabulary when he describes the mechanics of choice, and this further suggests that he, like the Stoics,
recognizes the passions (or emotions) to be rational impulsive-impressions. According to the Stoic model
these impulsive-impressions are rational in the technical sense that they are not nonrational (i.e. they reflect
rational beliefs, because in rational animals all impressions and impulses carry propositional content and
cognitive character). Julia Annas helpfully distinguishes between the two senses of the word 'irrational' in:
Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Los Angelos: University of California Press, 1994), 78-81,
103f. She writes: “Our normal talk of 'irrational' impulses suggests that they are not rational at all; but for
the Stoics ordinary language is just wrong here, for there can be no such thing as a totally nonrational
impulse” (106). Passions may be disobedient to the dictates of reason, and therefore may be called
irrational but this must only be taken in a normative sense – that is to say, the impulse went against right
reason. But even in such cases the impulses are reasoned since impulses just are the reasoning that leads to
action (105), and in this sense all impulses, including the passions, are rational. Even every perception
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desires which are at odds with one another, one to vice and the other to virtue. The soul,
on the other hand, is indifferent in character and is therefore receptive of either virtue or
vice.209 The soul feels the persuasive tug of both spirit and body, and must make the
choice of whether to join (iungere) with the spirit and become one with the spirit, or to
join with the body and become one with the body.210 Thus, the source of a person's moral
judgment (choice) resides only in the soul which is stationed between the other two
aspects (esse) – it is the soul which must finally choose between the competing
inclinations.
Origen further distinguishes between the desires and the actions of the spirit and
body. As mentioned above, the desires of the spirit and body are always at odds with one
another; they are never in alignment. However, the actions of the spirit and body are not
necessarily at odds. This seems to work in the following way: once the soul chooses to
align with the spirit we might call it the spirit's action, and once the soul aligns with the
body we can call it the body's action. Some actions taken by the spirit extend to the body.
Origen uses the example of chastity: if chastity begins in the “inner man” (spirit), then it
will by necessity follow in the “outer man” (body), for a man who chooses chastity
according to his heart cannot then commit adultery with his body. On the other hand, if
chastity begins in the outer man, it does not necessarily follow that the man will be pure
entails an assent (though not always a conscious one) because all perceptions are in the language of thought
(78). Perceptions necessarily will be the product of the rational character, habits, and one's experiences up
to that point (81). Perhaps it might be better expressed in English by saying that while all impulses are
reasoned, not all are therefore reasonable.
209
ComJn 32.218 (Heine 383; SC 385, 278-280): “I have noticed a distinction between soul and
spirit in all Scripture. I observe that the soul is something intermediate and capable of both virtue and
evil…”
210
ComRm I.7.41-60 (Scheck 1.71; Bammel 58); ComRm I.21.40-52 (Scheck 1.94; Bammel 88).
Cf. ComRm VIIII.25.5-11 (Scheck 2.222; Bammel 748): “…sometimes a man is identified through the
soul, sometimes through the flesh, sometimes through the spirit. And when man needs to be identified by
the better aspect, as one who ought to be understood as spiritual, he is called spirit; when, by his inferior
aspect he is identified, he is called soul; and when his lowest aspect is being identified, he is called flesh.”
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in heart, even if he remains physically chaste.211 Thus, Origen notes that it is possible to
be good externally and bad internally, but it is not possible to be good internally and bad
externally.
At times Origen departs from this tripartite model to speak of individuals
possessing a dual aspect. When Origen does so he is not contradicting his tripartite
anthropology, but rather he is focusing on the two tendencies within the soul. The upper
and better tendency of the soul refers to the intellect or the governing power of the soul.
The lower and worse tendency of the soul refers to something that was added to the νοῦς
after the primordial fall, and it is the source of passions and other temptations from the
body.212 This is what Origen is referring to when he uses the more pejorative word σάρξ /
carnis, as in desires or incentives of the flesh.213 This term denotes the unhealthy
attraction of the soul towards fleshly desires, and should be distinguished from the body
itself which has its own natural desires and functions that are not evil in and of
themselves. The competing tendencies of the soul toward the spirit and body may be
thought of as the inner man and outer man within each person.214 The two creation
accounts in Genesis symbolize this dual nature of the person: our inward person (or soul
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ComRm II.9.579-592 (Bammel 175; Scheck 1.163-164).
Crouzel, Origen: 88-89. Cf. Stephen Bagby, "Volitional Sin in Origen's Commentary on
Romans," Harvard Theological Review 107, no. 3 (2014).
213
E.g. PArch 3.4.1-2 (SC 268, 198-206); ComRm II.9.371 (Bammel 164). Cf. Bagby’s discussion
on Origen’s distinction of the body qua body, and the body qua flesh: "Volitional Sin in Origen's
Commentary on Romans," 351-55.
214
ComRm II.9.569-575: “Often it is discussed by the Apostle where he points out through
specific examples that men are of dual aspects [esse]; the one he usually calls the outer man and the other,
the inner man. He says that the one is according to the flesh [carnem] and the other is according to the
Spirit [spiritum]” (Scheck 1.163; Bammel 174). Cf. ComRm I.7.42-60 (Bammel 58-59). Origen also uses
this distinction between “inner man” and “outer man” in his interpretation of Romans 7. When Paul adopts
the persona of a weak Christian and says that “I do not do the good I want to do”, the “I” is referring to the
inner man – that aspect of the person (the soul’s alignment with the spirit) which knows the good and
desires the good. Origen is not suggesting that the person is not responsible for the evil that they do.
Instead, there is a divided self, given the two inclinations of the soul – ComRm VI.9 (Scheck 37-43;
Bammel 506-518).
212
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and spirit) is made in the image of God, while our external person (or body) is made from
the dust of the earth.215 Origen also connects Paul's comments in Romans 2 about two
types of Jews with this idea: the external person is linked with an outward Jew while the
internal person is linked with being a Jew in secret.216
One way Origen benefits from occasionally framing his tripartite anthropology as
a dualistic struggle within the soul is that it allows him to draw upon the Jewish “Two
Ways” tradition; the “Two Ways” are linked to the flesh/spirit dynamic.217 The two
choices set before the soul are choices of life or death, Christ or the devil.218 Related to
this, it is important to note that Origen envisions the struggle of the soul to be more than a
mere intra-person phenomenon; he is explicit that the struggle of the “Two Ways” has a
cosmic dimension.219 If a person's soul is sitting on the center of a seesaw with the
opposite seats holding the person's spiritual desires and fleshly desires, then cosmic
powers of good and evil are helping to support each opposing side in the battle to win the
soul's choice. The devil and his cohorts support the desires of the flesh against the spirit,
and patron angels (as well as God himself) support the spirit's struggle.220 The human
215

ComRm II.9.565-578 (Scheck 1.163; Bammel 174-175). Cf. Dial 16.11 where Origen reiterates
the dual creation story of the inner man and outer man in Genesis, and then remarks, “There are, therefore,
two human beings in each of us” (Daly 69-70; SC 67, 88). This interpretation of the text also serves as an
anti-gnostic polemic, for certain gnostic groups would explain the two creation stories as the creation of
two different classes of people. It should be noted that Origen interpreted Genesis 1-2 in a variety of ways,
and the above example is simply one among many. Origen also used Genesis 1-2, for example, to defend
his view of the pre-existence of souls – cf. Peter W. Martens, "Origen's Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the
Opening Chapters of Genesis," Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 16, no. 3 (2013).
216
ComRm II.9.565-578 (Scheck 1.163; Bammel 174-175).
217
Cf. Matt. 7:13-14; Didache 1.
218
ComRm I.21.72-74: “The soul therefore makes its own decision [arbitrio] whether it wants to
choose life, that is Christ, or to turn aside to death, the devil” (Scheck 1.95, Bammel 89).
219
Origen links “Two Ways” with the idea of 2 angels by mentioning where the Epistle of
Barnabas teaches that “there are two ways, one of light and the other of darkness, over which preside
certain angels, the angels of God over the way of light and Satan's angels over the way of darkness” –
PArch 3.2.4 (Butterworth 217; SC 268, 170). cf. Barn 18.1.
220
PArch 3.2.1-3 (SC 268, 152-168); 3.3.4-5 (SC 268, 192-196). On patron (guardian) angels in
particular, PArch 2.10.2 (SC 252, 376-378; 3.2.4 (SC 268, 168-174). For a similar view in Clement, see
Strom 2.20.110.1-3.
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soul remains intermediate and must choose between the summons of either side.221
Origen is careful to note that despite the intimidating spiritual battleground that is arrayed
both for and against us, the duty of choice remains up to the soul.222 No matter how great
the force on each end of the seesaw, the soul is able to sway the balance by taking a step
either forward or backward. In fact, Origen grants the soul certain powers of dissuasion
against the cosmic forces by asserting that it is possible for the soul to cause these powers
to leave. For instance, if the soul repeatedly spurns the help of the good angels in favor of
the bad, the good powers will abandon the soul (at least for a time) and hand it over to the
desires of its flesh.223
All throughout Origen’s discussions on moral autonomy – whether in the context
of the tripartite person, or in the context of the dual nature – Origen insists upon one
unmistakable idea: in order for moral autonomy to be genuine, the soul requires a binary
moral power. It can choose life or death, spiritual desire or fleshly desire, improvement or
regression, the way of Christ or the way of the devil. According to Origen, the soul’s
rational power over binary differentiation is precisely the condition which establishes
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ComRm I.21.58-60: “…all the good angels support the spirit as it struggles against the flesh and
attempt to summon the human soul, which is intermediate, to itself” (Scheck 1.94-95; Bammel 89).
222
ComRm I.21.65-67: “But out of both sides’ support, the duty of choice is preserved. For the
matter is not done by force [ui] nor is the soul moved in either of the two directions by compulsion
[necessitate]” (Scheck 1.95; Bammel 89). Cf. PArch 3.2.4: “We must bear in mind, however, that nothing
else happens to us as a result of these good or evil thoughts which are suggested to our heart but a mere
agitation and excitement [incitamentum provocans] which urges us on to deeds either of good or of evil. It
is possible for us, when an evil power has begun to urge us on to a deed of evil, to cast away the wicked
suggestions and to resist the low enticements and to do absolutely nothing worthy of blame; and it is
possible on the other hand when a divine power has urged us on to better things not to follow its guidance,
since our faculty of free will [liberi arbitrii] is preserved to us in either case” (Butterworth 217; SC 268,
170).
223
ComRm I.21.79-82: If the soul continues to turn away from the spirit and towards the desires of
the flesh, and to those beings which support the desires of the flesh, “it shall doubtless be forsaken and
abandoned by those beings which, by their support, were encouraging it to be joined with the spirit. They
withdraw from it or hand it over to the desires of its own heart, by which it is united and joined to the flesh”
(Scheck 1.95-96; Bammel 90).
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genuine moral autonomy and genuine moral responsibility.224 This ability of
differentiation (movement towards and away from the good) is the condition which
derives directly from Origen’s dual hermeneutic of God’s fairness and goodness.

Greek Vocabulary and Expressions of Moral Autonomy
Scripture may be sufficient for establishing the reality of moral autonomy, but
Origen also borrows Greek philosophical terms and concepts in order to give greater
detail to the inner workings of freedom of choice. The issue of moral responsibility and
personal agency had long been discussed under the Greek phrase τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or “what
depends on us”. I.M. Bugár has noted that by Origen's time, however, τὸ αὐτεξούσιον, or
“autonomy” appears to emerge as the technical term for this issue, although τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
continues to be used as well.225 Along with τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν Origen uses the term τὸ
αὐτεξούσιον frequently, probably influenced in part by Epictetus226, and perhaps also by
Alexander of Aphrodisias.227 It is used by other Christian authors familiar to Origen as
well, such as Justin Martyr,228 Irenaeus,229 and Clement of Alexandria.230 According to
224

Thus, the following formula is a common-place in Origen: “There is therefore no nature which
may not admit good or evil, except the nature of God, which is the source of all good, and that of Christ; for
Christ is wisdom, and wisdom certainly cannot admit folly – PArch 1.8.3 (Butterworth 70; SC 252, 226).
Cf. PArch 1.3.8: “God the Father bestows on all the gift of existence; and a participation in Christ, in virtue
of his being the word or reason, makes them rational. From this it follows that they are worthy of praise or
blame, because they are capable alike of virtue and wickedness” (Butterworth 38; SC 252, 162).
225
I. M. Bugár, "Where does Free Will come from? Some Remarks Concerning the Development
of the Concept of Human Autonomy before Origen," in Origeniana Nona: Origen and the Religious
Practice of his time, ed. G. Heidl and R. Somos, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
(Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 626; Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 166-67. The heading for First
Principles Book III in Greek begins “Περί αὐτεξουσίου...”
226
Dissertationes II, 2, 3; IV, 1, 56; 62; 68; 100. Cited in Bugár, "Where does Free Will come
from?," 626. Bugár believes that the Stoic Epictetus appears to be one of the first to use τὸ αὐτεξούσιον as a
technical term. On Origen’s familiarity with Epictetus, see below n237.
227
De fato 14: 182, 24; 18: 188, 21; 19: 189, 10. Cited in ibid. On Origen’s familiarity with
Alexander, see below n238.
228
Apologia II, 7, 5; Dialogus 88; 102; 141. Cited in ibid., 627.
229
Haer. I, 6, 1; IV, 37, 2 (fr. 21); IV, 39, 3 (fr. 26); V, 4, 1 (fr. 4 Pap. Jena); V, 28, 2 (fr. 22); V,
29, 1 (fr. 22). Cited in ibid.
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Susanne Bobzien, the shift in popularity from τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν to τὸ αὐτεξούσιον denotes a
strengthening of the concept. An action that is in my own power (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) is not
merely an action that is done through me with my consent, but it is an action that depends
on my decision whether to do or not to do.231 English translations commonly render the
term as “free will”, but this can be misleading, since τὸ αὐτεξούσιον does not imply an
independent mental faculty called the “will.”232 I have avoided using expressions such as
“free will” and “freedom of the will”, opting instead for “freedom of choice,” “free
choice,” or simply “moral autonomy” when referring to Origen’s discussions of τὸ
ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τὸ αὐτεξούσιον.233
Bobzien has also demonstrated that although 3rd century authors often used the
same vocabulary and expressions when discussing moral autonomy, they did not always
agree on their meaning.234 Virtually everyone who disavowed fatalism in Origen's day
would have been comfortable with the notion of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τὸ αὐτεξούσιον in the
general sense that moral responsibility requires that an action be up to us to do or not to
do. But precisely what was meant by the expression “able to do or not to do” differed
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Stromata I 17.83, 2; II 19, 99, 3; V 1, 3, 2; 13, 83, 1; 5; 14, 133, 8; Paedagogus I, 6, 33; I, 9,
76, 3; II, 5, 31, 2. Cited in ibid.
231
Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 166-67.
232
When these terms were used in the 2nd-3rd centuries, the rational mind was always the subject of
the free choice; there was never mention of a special faculty of the mind which stands distinct from one's
rational center and which somehow has the freedom to make choices independently from one's rationality
and emotions (Alexander of Aphrodisias is an exceptional case as we will see below).
233
The comparable concept of liberum arbitrium (“free choice” or “free will”) was used around
the same time by Latin speakers and is similar in meaning to τὸ αὐτἐξούσιον. It can be found in various
Christian writers such as Tertullian (e.g. De anima 20-24). Rufinus will often use liberum arbitrium when
translating Origen. Throughout this dissertation I will similarly transpose liberum arbitrium into “free
choice” or “moral autonomy.”
234
“The historical treatment of the question of freedom and determinism is exacerbated by the fact
that all key terms and phrases used to describe the problems involved are hopelessly vague or ambiguous.
This is no different in Greek and Latin than in English” – Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 136-37.
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among various schools and authors.235 This means that different authors understood
genuine moral responsibility to require different sets of conditions. By necessity236
Origen was drawn into this larger discussion the moment he sought to ground moral
responsibility in anything more than the bare declarations of Scripture. Origen was wellversed with many models of moral psychology which had already been articulated by
various Stoics, Peripatetics, and Middle Platonists. I do not intend to undertake the
enormous task of surveying all of the possible sources that may have influenced Origen,
but instead I will outline two starkly opposing formulations of moral autonomy that
Origen knew – those of Epictetus the Stoic (1st century AD)237 and of Alexander of
Aphrodisias the Peripatetic (fl. 200 AD).238 I offer the following presentations as useful
foils for better understanding Origen’s own views on moral autonomy.239
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Bobzien has convincingly demonstrated that the meaning of the expression τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν is
notoriously tricky to nail down. It can be used in what she calls a “one-sided, causative” meaning, in that it
is up to me if something happens, but the not-happening of the thing was never up to me. And it can also be
used as a “two-sided, causative” meaning, in that it depends on me whether something happens or does not
happen. To further complicate matters, both the one-sided and the two-sided causative meanings can each
entail either determinism or indeterminism, depending on the author, and the problem is that authors are
often not clear on how they are using it – ibid., 139-42.
236
Pardon the pun.
237
Origen mentions reading Epictetus in Cels 6.2 (SC 147, 180) and he notes that Epictetus had
been more popular in his day than Plato in his. Origen also uses many of the terms and concepts Epictetus
had written about throughout his discussions on moral autonomy. For example, Frede notes that Origen's
discussion of moral freedom in book III of First Principles “could have been taken straight from a late Stoic
handbook” and that “some of Origen's explications of scriptural texts become intelligible only against the
background [of Epictetus],” Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 113. Bobzien
remarks that Epictetus had a large influence on many 3rd century Christian and Platonist writers: Bobzien,
"The Inadvertent Conception," 161. Origen also mentions having read Chrysippus in Cels 1.64 (SC 132,
254); 5.57 (SC 147, 156); 8.51 (SC 150, 286).
238
On Origen's familiarity with Alexander, see Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre
arbitre: 84. In the context of Origen's remarks on Judas the betrayer and Judas' “possible” future choices,
Junod remarks: “On trouve une doctrine assez similaire chez Alexandre d'Aphrodisias, et il est
vraisemblable qu'Origène s'en est inspire” (84). B. Darrell Jackson has noted that Origen appears to follow
Alexander in the use of certain technical prepositions when describing the classification of plants, animals,
and humans: B. Darrell Jackson, "Sources of Origen's Doctrine of Freedom," Church History 35, no. 1
(1966): 21. Others who have found a connection between Origen and Alexander are: Beatrice Motta, Il
Contra Fatum di Gregorio di Nissa nel dibattito tardo-antico sul fatalismo e sul determinismo, Studi sulla
tardoantichità (Pisa and Rome: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2008), 118; Ilaria Ramelli, "Alexander of
Aphrodisias: A Source of Origen's Philosophy?," Philosophie Antique 13 (2013). In a recent book Mark
Elliot states (as an aside and without documentation), that “one may want to note that in De Principiis
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Epictetus vs. Alexander of Aphrodisias
Epictetus followed standard Stoic reasoning which claimed that we have moral
responsibility for our choices if we are the ones who make them.240 Our choices stem
from our intellect and our disposition. People experience sensations (αἴσθησει) which
produce in us mental impressions or representations (φαντασία). These impressions do
not get transmitted to the mind in a neutral way; rather, the φαντασία are filtered through
a person’s disposition and character and so appear before the intellect as a rational
impression. That is to say, many times the impressions already predispose the mind
towards a certain course of action.241 It is then up to our intellect or reason (λόγος) to
judge the impressions and either assent to them (συγκατάθεσις) or decline to give our
assent. When a person assents to the impression, an impulse to action (ὁρμή) is

III.1.10-11 where God's 'act' that leads to Pharaoh's hardening of heart is mentioned, Origen's argument is
directed against Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom any divine entities were completely blind” – Mark
Elliot, Providence Perceived: Divine Action from a Human Point of View, vol. 124, Arbeiten zur
Kirchengeschichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), 15.
239
Origen was also familiar with a wide variety of philosophical options among the so-called
Middle Platonists, and his views reveal varying degrees of similarity depending on the author. The reason I
do not include them here is not that they are irrelevant or unimportant, but because there is such a wide
diversity among the syncretistic views of Platonist authors. I have chosen to use Epictetus and Alexander as
representative models of moral psychology that stand near the “poles”, so to speak, within the spectrum of
1st-3rd century views of moral psychology (and because Origen was familiar with both). Thus, I must stress
again that the following presentations of Epictetus and Alexander are meant as foils to better highlight
those issues Origen found most important. I do not mean to suggest that Origen was faced with something
as simple as an “either-or” option. I recommend to the reader Benjamin Blosser’s helpful monograph which
attempts to trace the (complicated) continuity and discontinuity between Origen’s views of the body and
soul and that of various Middle-Platonist writers – Blosser, Become Like the Angels.
240
The standard compilation of Epictetus’ teaching is found in the 4-volume work called the
Discourses, which claims to be transcribed copies of Epictetus’ words by one Arrian of Nicomedia. The
standard Greek edition of the Discourses is: Epictetus, Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano Digestae (Greek
text) (Leipzig: Teubner, 1916). A number of English translations have been made; an important translation
is the Loeb edition: Epictetus: The Discourses as reported by Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, trans.
W. A. Oldfather, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1925–1928).
Cf. A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
241
A. A. Long notes that these are called hormetic impressions, in that they are “a prima facie
stimulus to action” – "Stoic pyschology," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe
Algra, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 579.
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generated.242 According to A. A. Long, it is probably more accurate to describe the Stoic
view of reason as being the mind in its entirely, because reason actually transforms the
other faculties: for humans, impressions become rational impressions, assent is rational
assent, and impulses become rational impulses.243
Epictetus believed the principal task of humans was in learning how to use one’s
impressions correctly.244 Thus, moral autonomy for Epictetus is to be found in the
process of assent, broadly construed.245 Michael Frede remarks that in Epictetus’ writings
we see the notion of a will made more explicit than it had been in previous philosophers,
in that Epictetus narrows the idea of what is “up to us.” Centuries earlier, the Stoic
Chrysippus had defined an action as “up to us” if assenting to the impulse which
produces that action was in our power.246 Epictetus, however, argued that the action itself
was never in our power, because even if we assented to the impression that was linked to
a particular action, our action might be thwarted in some way by an outside force. Indeed,
any action that is not part of God’s providential plan will be thwarted according to
Stoicism. Therefore, the only thing that is truly up to us is the internal mental event where
we give our assent to the impression.247 According to Frede, it is precisely this narrowing
of what is up to us (from physical action to mental event) that appears to have led
Epictetus to strengthen and broaden the mental event of assent compared to earlier
242

This can be a confusing point, given that both hormetic impressions and impulses pertain to an
intention or predisposition to action. Impulses, however, are the outcomes of assent. If the mind declines to
assent, the faculty of impulse remains inactive – ibid.
243
Ibid., 574. “Reason is not something over and above the other three. It is the mind in its
entirety” – ibid., 575.
244
Epictetus, Diss. I.1.7, II.1.4, II.22.29, IV.6.34, as cited in ibid., 577.
245
Epictetus links assent with προαίρεσις in Diss. I.17.21-3.
246
Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 45.
247
Epictetus, Diss. I.1.7. Origen not only follows Epictetus in insisting that human freedom is
found in the reaction to the external impressions, but in PArch 3.1.4 (SC 268; 26-28) he even uses the same
example of the chaste man and the seductive woman to illustrate this principle. Cf. Jackson, "Sources of
Origen's Doctrine of Freedom," 20.

84

Stoics.248 Epictetus goes beyond describing choice as merely a person's reason giving
assent to an impression. Instead, Epictetus insists that reason can interact with the
impressions – it can judge them, dwell on them, try to weaken them, and of course,
finally give assent to them.
Despite reason’s power over the impressions, it is nevertheless true that in the
Stoic view our choices are constrained by something within us – namely, our character or
disposition. As such, the choices we make are predetermined by our current attitudes,
beliefs, and intellect. Our mind does not judge outside stimuli directly, but only after the
stimuli have first filtered through our character and have been received in us as a rational
impression. The current state of our mind (including our experiences, memories, and
beliefs) is the determining factor for the choice we make. This entails that the choice
made by the agent would always be exactly the same provided it was made in exactly the
same circumstances by the same agent with the same disposition and state of mind. The
fact that choices are predetermined by one's character does not take away one’s moral
autonomy in the moment of choice, nor does it take away one’s moral responsibility for
having made that choice. And this is because our choices come from us and not from
another. It is our own self and the current state of our own character which causes the
choice. Our dispositions are attributed to us because they are formed through the
composite result of a lifetime's worth of our own choices.
In the company of other academic philosophers, Alexander of Aphrodisias
insisted that the Stoic depiction of human choice was not sufficient to establish moral
responsibility. One purported weak spot in the Stoic view which was often targeted was
the following: The Stoics believed that we are responsible for our choices in that they are
248

Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought: 44-48.
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up to us, we are the ones doing them (they occur through us), and they stem from our
intellect and disposition. However, our dispositions are the cumulative effect of a lifetime
of decisions and experiences, and so at any given point we do not seem to have control
over the initial makeup of our disposition itself. This raises the question: are we free at
the beginning of the process?249 Who or what is responsible for our initial disposition? If
we did not have causal control over the beginning state of our disposition, then how does
it make sense to hold us responsible for any choice that occurs further down the line,
since all such choices are caused by that disposition? Their critics would concede that the
Stoics are correct to say that autonomous choices must be made through us and not
through another, but they argued that moral responsibility requires more than this; if we
have no control over our own constitution (the thing which causes the choice), then how
is it reasonable to assign praise or blame?250 It appears that the Stoics never had a clear
answer to this question.251
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This vulnerability of Stoicism on this point is addressed by: Bobzien, Determinism and
Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 290-301; Frede, "Stoic Determinism," 192-200; Bugár, "Where does Free
Will come from?," 632-33.
250
Alexander targets the Stoics on this point in De Fato 181.7-182.20 (Sharples 58-60) and
199.12-24 (Sharples 79). Alexander writes: “...For, doing away with men’s possession of the power of
choosing and doing opposites [τὸ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς αἱρέσεώς τε καὶ πράξεως τῶν
ἀντικειμένων], they say that what depends on us is what comes about through us. For since, they say, the
natures of the things that are and come to be are various and different…, and the things that are brought
about by each thing come about in accordance with its proper nature – those by a stone in accordance with
that of a stone…and those by a living creature in accordance with that of a living creature – nothing of the
things which are brought about by each thing in accordance with its proper nature, they say, can be
otherwise, but each of the things brought about by them comes about compulsorily, in accordance not with
the necessity that results from force but with that resulting from its being impossible for that which has a
nature of that sort to be moved at that time in some other way and not this, when the circumstances are such
as could not possibly have been present to it” (181.13-26; English – Sharples 58-59, Greek – Sharples 190).
The standard treatment of Alexander’s De Fato is by R. W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate:
Text, translation and commentary (London: Duckworth, 1983). Citations of both the original Greek as well
as the English translations are page numbers from Sharples. The Greek texts reproduced by Sharples are
facsimiles from the edition by I. Bruns in Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.1-2 (Berlin, 1887 and 1892) – see
Sharples 29-32 for further information on the manuscript tradition and Bruns’ text.
251
Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 291; 96.
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Alexander articulated a different view of free choice and moral responsibility.
Alexander argued that praise and blame further required one’s choice to not be
predetermined or constrained by a person's disposition, character or even intellect. He
agreed with Epictetus that a choice can only be “up to us” (ἐφ' ἡμῖν) if it is done through
us, but Alexander added two additional conditions for human moral freedom. First, a
person's choice must not have any predetermining causes (such as fate, or infallible
divine foreknowledge), and second, the agent must have the power to choose other than
his choice, even if the agent has the exact same disposition and desires in that moment of
choice.252 Thus, Alexander appears to be the first to insist that choices are only “up to us”
when the very same intellect, with identical beliefs and motivations might have chosen
the opposite. That is to say, our choices are not only separable from our character and
disposition, but they are even separable from our reason – we can decide against what
appears to us to be the most reasonable course of action.253 Bobzien concludes that here,
apparently for the first time, we see an implied volitional center which is distinct from
and can operate wholly independently from a person’s own beliefs and rationality.254
We might expect Origen to be attracted to Alexander's notion of moral
responsibility given how neatly it could be used in his own anti-gnostic polemics. After
all, it must be admitted that there is some similarity between the Stoic idea that one's
disposition (which one has no control over at one's birth) necessarily determines one's
future choices, and the valentinian idea that one's constitution (which one has no control
252

Fat. 180.26-8, 181.5-6, 13-14, 184.18-19, from "The Inadvertent Conception," 159n44.
Unfortunately, Alexander never systematically presents his view of free choice, but rather it must be
cobbled together from a variety of passages, each of which on its own is not sufficient to demonstrate his
view (his most important work on the subject being De Fato). Bobzien has undertaken the confusing task
of synthesizing Alexander's thoughts on the subject (which do not always appear to be consistent), in ibid.,
133-75. I am thankful for Bobzien’s analysis and I rely on her conclusions here.
253
ibid., 171.
254
ibid., 172.
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over at one's birth) necessarily determines one's future choices. At their root, both
Stoicism and Valentinianism appear to employ an internal determinism,255 whose origins
could only, it seemed, be traced back to an external power. In some ways Alexander had
developed a notion of moral responsibility that seemed tailor-fit to counteract the fixednature determinism of the Valentinians, given that he used it against Stoic character
determinism. And yet, as we will see, Origen does not align with Alexander, but instead
he articulates a view of moral responsibility that is much closer to that of Epictetus.256 It
is possible that Origen may have simply been uncomfortable with the inherent
awkwardness of Alexander’s notion of indeterminist choice. When choice is unlinked
from internal causation altogether (whether beliefs, character, or disposition), it is unclear
how a choice arises in the first place.257 Essentially, what Alexander suggests is that our
choices do not even have to be tied to our own motivations, and this would appear to
make human choice random, inexplicable, and completely non-rational.258 In any case,
255

I use the term “internal determinism” in the sense that each person’s choices are predetermined
and unchangeable on the basis of a causal principle inside of them (whether nature or character), and not
from any outside force or external causal chain in the moment of choice.
256
It is worth noting that Kathleen Gibbons argues that Clement of Alexander also did not believe
in indeterminist choice: “It might be tempting to interpret Clement as an incompatibilist – that is, as
someone who understands autonomy to require indeterminacy in human choice . . . Yet the idea that human
action must be caused indeterministically in order to ascribe to human beings responsibility for their actions
is not itself a view that Clement seems to be aware of” – Kathleen Gibbons, The Moral Psychology of
Clement of Alexandria: Mosaic Philosophy, ed. Mark Edwards and Lewis Ayres, Studies in Philosophy and
Theology in Late Antiquity (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 141. On this point see
also ibid., 131-32. On Clement’s somewhat confusing stance on freedom of choice, especially as it relates
to how a person initially comes to faith, see Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection in
Clement of Alexandria: 143.
257
Origen views sin as a breakdown or failure of reason. Making choices based on the correct
goals laid down by reason is to advance towards the good. Abusing our reason by departing from what we
know to be right is sin. Thus, moral autonomy is inherently connected to one's beliefs. Cf. PArch 1.5.2
(Butterworth 44; SC 252, 176). Although Origen requires binary possibilities for moral autonomy to be
genuine, this is not the same as Alexander’s requirement for the power to do otherwise (in the form of
indeterminate choice).
258
Bobzien states: “It remains unclear what the independent decision making faculty would be
which has the power over choosing opposites: it can hardly be one of the non-rational parts of the soul. But
if it is a, or the, rational part, the difficulty arises how it can - as Alexander suggests - decide against the
course of action that appears as the most reasonable to the agent” – Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception,"
172. This might explain why Alexander's formulation of indeterminist choice seems to be unique. Bobzien
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Origen was almost certainly motivated to reject Alexander’s model because Origen’s
robust view of divine providence, and especially Origen’s affirmation of divine
foreknowledge, was incompatible with it. That discussion must be set aside for the
moment, but when we return to it in the following chapters we will see that Origen's
understanding of God's providential and infallible plan of universal salvation would not
work with an indeterminist notion of choice.

Origen Adopts the Stoic Model of Impression and Assent
Origen describes the mechanics of human choice using the typical late Stoic
model found in Epictetus. He does so in First Principles Book 3,259 and he also gives a
slightly altered version in his treatise On Prayer.260 While not identical, his treatments of
the topic in both writings are consistent, and even complementary.261 In First Principles

says in another place: “There are several points that suggest that at this time Alexander is almost an isolated
case, and that concepts of freedom to do otherwise are a rather marginal phenomenon without a clear
philosophical context”, ibid., 167.
Peter van Inwagen has highlighted the inherent awkwardness of indeterminist choice by posing the
following thought experiment: “[Suppose someone named Jane is about to make a choice.] Let us suppose
that a certain current-pulse is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane’s brain and that it is
about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes left, she will make [choice A], and that if it goes
to the right, she will [make choice B]. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse will
go when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane’s
brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calculation could say no
more than…it might go to the left, and it might go to the right…Now let us ask: Is it up to Jane whether the
pulse goes to the left or to the right? If we think about this question for a moment, we shall see that it is
very hard to see how this could be up to her…If it goes to the left, that just happens. If it goes to the right,
that just happens. There is no way for Jane to influence the pulse. There is no way for her to make it go one
way rather than the other…And it seems to follow that if, when one is trying to decide what to do, it is truly
undetermined what the outcome of one’s deliberations will be, it cannot be up to one what the outcome of
one’s deliberations will be. It is, therefore, far from clear that incompatibilism is a tenable position” – Peter
van Inwagen, Metaphysics (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 264.
259
PArch 3.1.2-3 (SC 268, 18-24).
260
PEuch 6.1 (GCS II, 311.16-312-10). In both places Origen discusses the different principles of
motion in irrational and rational beings. Cf. Cels IV.81-87 (Chadwick 248-253; SC 136, 384-402) where
Origen also speaks about differences between rational and irrational creatures.
261
P.J. Van Der Eijk investigates the argument made by some that that On Prayer contains a more
elaborate presentation of “free will” than First Principles: Van Der Eijk, "Origenes' Verteidigung des freien
Willens in de Oratione 6, 1-2," 341. Van Der Eijk concludes that the texts correspond to one another to a
considerable extent and even complement each other at various points. He also finds no inconsistencies
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Origen describes how external impressions or sensations (τῶν ἔξωθεν or αἴσθησις) give
rise to images or mental impressions in the mind (φαντασίαι).262 In non-rational animals
these images immediately call forth impulses to act (ὁρμαι).263 For example, if a hungry
animal sees a piece of meat, then the mental impression would essentially be: “That is
tasty meat that I should go eat right now”, which then produces an impulse the animal
immediately follows. Rational animals, however, do not automatically perform what our
impressions tell us to. Origen states that reason must first judge the impressions and
choose those which lead to good impulses, while rejecting those that lead to bad
impulses.264 Reason is able to examine the impressions we receive, judge them, and then
finally approve or reject them. Origen's order of impression – judgment – assent –
impulse is the typical late Stoic formula for human choice. It is also clear that Origen is
indebted to Epictetus' broadening of the earlier Stoic concept of assent (συγκατάθεσις);
thus, we see Origen describing rational beings as not merely assenting to the impression
or not, but also interacting with the impression by judging it, dwelling on it, trying to
weaken it, and finally giving or withholding assent to it.265 Origen notes that while it is
outside our power to control the external impressions (ἔξωθεν οὐκ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἐστι) which
produce in us impressions, it is precisely in our interaction with these internal
between the accounts, merely elaborations on certain points (347-348). For another analysis of the
similarities and differences of the two treatments, see David Hahm, "A Neglected Stoic Argument for
Human Responsibility," Illinois Classical Studies 17, no. 1 (1992).
262
PArch 3.1.3 Greek (Butterworth 160, SC 268, 24): “Τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑποπεσεῖν τόδε τι τῶν ἔξωθεν,
φαντασίαν ἡμῖν κινοῦν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ὁμολογουμένως οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν.”
263
PArch 3.1.2 Greek: “Now living things are moved from within themselves when there arises
within them an image [φαντασίας] which calls forth an impulse [ὁρμὲν]” (Butterworth 159; SC 268, 20).
264
PArch 3.1.3: After saying that the mental impression and impulse is not in our power, Origen
says that “to decide to use what has happened either in this way or in that is the work of nothing else but the
reason [λόγου] within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards the impulses that
incite to what is good and seemly or else turns us aside to the reverse” (Butterworth 160; SC 268, 24). Cf.
Clement, Strom 2.20.110.4-111.2.
265
For example, Origen believes that a chaste man who has undergone a great amount of
instruction will have stronger reason, and this reason will allow him to gradually weaken the desire to sin
with a seductive woman – PArch 3.1.4 (SC 268, 26-28).
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impressions (that is, 'assent' broadly construed) that our moral autonomy (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν) is
upheld.266
Origen also follows Stoic lines of thought in his acknowledgment that even bad
moral choices are the product of one's reason.267 The Stoics had long insisted that the
non-rational desires described by Aristotle were actually rational, for all desires
(including inappropriate ones) represent a belief. Aristotle did not view the mind as
making a choice between competing motivations (i.e. a choice between rational and nonrational motivations). Instead, the mind either chooses to act according to its rational
motivation (and so a choice has taken place), or sometimes the non-rational motivations
override the rational ones with the result that the mind acts against its choice. Although
the action is still ours in such cases (Aristotle calls it voluntary), it is not a choice. Reason
was overrun; it was an akrasia action.268 Origen, on the other hand, follows the Stoics by
insisting that even passions are judgments assented to by the reasoning faculty.269

266
E.g. PArch 3.1.5 Greek: “Reason therefore shows that external things do not lie within our
power [ἔξωθεν οὐκ ἐφ ἡμῖν ἐστι]; but to use them in this way or the other, since we have received reason as
a judge and investigator of the way in which we ought to deal with each of them, that is our task”
(Butterworth 163; SC 268, 32).
267
Origen also makes it clear that even when an outside impression felt like it was impossible to
resist, that there was no external coercion and one's choice was never overridden, but rather an internal
assent must have been involved – a subtle, rational assent to the impression which may have happened too
quickly for the person to realize: “But if anyone should say that the impression from without is of such a
sort that it is impossible to resist it whatever it may be, let him turn his attention to his own feeling and
movements and see whether there not an approval, assent and inclination of the controlling faculty towards
a particular action on account of some specious action” – PArch 3.1.4 (Butterworth 161; SC 268, 26).
268
Aristotle, EN 7, 1145b21-1146b5. For a fuller discussion of the two main types of akrasia
(weakness and precipitancy) in Aristotle and later Greek philosophers, see Christopher Bobonich and Pierre
Destrée, eds., Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
269
On the Stoic understanding of passions as cognitive judgments, see Michael Frede, "The Stoic
Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul," in The Norms of Nature, ed. Malcolm Schofield and G. Striker
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 93-110; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind: 103-20.
Passions are described in a variety of ways in the Stoic sources. Sometimes they are described as a
mistaken opinion, and sometimes they are described as irrational motions of the soul which are directly
caused by mistaken opinions. In either case, passions are the result of the reasoning faculty. Cf. Brad
Inwood, "Stoic Ethics," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra and
Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 699-700.
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Finally, Origen also follows late Stoicism in giving a dual role to human reason.
The first role of reason pertains to the impressions, for unlike in those non-rational
animals human impressions are rational impressions – that is, they have been filtered
through and colored by our dispositions and intellects and are therefore products of our
reason (albeit almost spontaneously or unconsciously so). For human beings, impressions
constitute personalized mini-judgments about how we should act. They are thoughts with
propositional content, and as such constitute the first movement of one's reason.270
Origen also shares with Stoicism a second role for reason which takes place in the
moment of assent or choice. This is when the intellect judges the rational impressions and
decides whether to assent to them or not. Reason is involved throughout the entire
process, but the agent's assent is the primary motion for the rational choice.
The above analysis demonstrates that Origen's debt to late Stoicism in the matter
of human psychology is significant.271 At the same time, however, it is just as important
to recognize that Origen felt free to alter and expand upon the model of choice which he
had appropriated from the Stoics. First, Origen altered the Stoic impression-assent model
by envisioning it taking place within the confines of his own tripartite anthropology.
This, in turn, allowed him to make an additional change to the Stoic view regarding the
potential for moral progress. That is to say, Origen's insistence upon the consistent
motivating impressions from the spirit aspect of the individual injected optimism into the
moral project – an optimism not found in Stoic thought. We will look at each of these two
alterations in turn.
270

On reason’s role in the impressions, see above n208.
Chadwick has noted several areas where Origen reveals significant dependency on Stoicism –
Henry Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," The Journal of Theological Studies 48, no. 189-190
(1947). Chadwick’s goal was to correct for some of the more sweeping claims that Origen was
predominantly influenced by Platonism, and he demonstrated that Origen has strong affinities with
Stoicism in matters of ethics and theodicy (48).
271
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Origen's Alterations to the Stoic Model: 1) Tripartite Anthropology
Origen first alters the Stoic conception of moral choice when he combines it with
his biblical tripartite anthropology of spirit, soul, and body. By doing so, Origen
implicitly identifies the rational impressions (φαντασίαι) of the Stoic model with the
rational desires of the spirit and the body as they seek to influence the soul. We may
illustrate this using Origen's own example of a man who sees a beautiful woman and is
then immediately filled with a strong urge to sin.272 First, we may interpret this
illustration from Origen's Stoic perspective: the urge to sin might feel to the man like an
external force acting upon him from the outside, but it is actually the man's very own
reasoned judgment (albeit a nearly spontaneous and subconscious judgment) which
produces the mental push or impetus in his mind towards the sinful action. It is simply
the man's own disposition in its current state, based on the man's overall habits, beliefs,
and past experiences, which has produced this hormetic impression. This impression is
the initial or low-level movement of reason; it is the outside image which immediately
becomes colored by the man’s own character when it presents itself to the man’s reason
for judgment. The second role that reason plays in Origen's Stoic model is in the man's
interaction with the rational impression that is inclining him to sin. Specifically, the man's
intellect may dwell on it, judge it, and decide to assent to it or not. This is reason's
leading role, and if the man assents to the impression, the impulse moves to fruition and
is the cause of the man's action.
We can also look at this same illustration of the beautiful woman from Origen’s
tripartite model. The impression/desire to sin with the beautiful woman turns out to be the

272

PArch 3.1.4 (Butterworth 161-62; SC 268, 26-28).
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rational inclination of the person's body or flesh.273 But this means that at the very same
time there must also be an opposing rational inclination coming from the man's spirit, for
the spirit always opposes the desires of the body. Collectively, these are the first or lowlevel movements of reason, and they come from two directions on either side of the soul.
Standing in between, the soul must judge the merits of the body's rational inclination to
sin while comparing it to the counter-inclination coming from the spirit not to sin, and
then finally the man's soul must make a final choice between the two. This choice is the
second or high-level movement of reason.274 In both Origen’s Stoic model and in his
tripartite model, reason is involved throughout the entire process.275 Just as in Epictetus,

273

Although the impressions are rational in character (and therefore they are ours), this is not to
deny that external powers such as demons can make our own impressions even stronger, cf. PArch 3.2.1-3
(SC 268, 153-168); 3.3.4-5 (SC 268, 192-196).
274
PArch 3.1.3 Greek: Deciding to use the impressions “in this way or in that is the work of
nothing else but the reason [λόγου] within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards
the impulses that incite to what is good and seemly or else turns us aside to the reverse” (Butterworth 160;
SC 268, 24).
275
There is one exception to this general rule, however, and that concerns the Stoic notion of
preliminary passions or pre-passions (propatheia). In Stoic thought pre-passions were involuntary affective
responses of the body which were to be distinguished from actual emotions. They were involuntary
reactions such as turning pale or trembling at an unexpected shock. Pre-passions are not impulses – in fact,
they take place prior to any impulses. If we turn pale, for example, we have the ability to refuse to give
assent to the proposition that something frightening has occurred, but we did not have the ability to prevent
turning pale in the first place – see Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism: 176. Pre-passions
are therefore pre-rational, and thus not passions at all; they are independent of judgment and emotion, and
because they are involuntary they may happen to even the wise – Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of
Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67. Origen
and other early Christian writers borrowed this concept, but they altered or developed it in certain ways.
Sorabji argues that Origen makes a major shift by connecting the Stoic idea of pre-passions with “bad
thoughts” which may come from demons or simply from our own bodies. As with pre-passions, Origen
views such thoughts as merely “agitation and excitement” (commotio sola et incitamentum), and so if we
resist them we will have done nothing worthy of blame – ibid., 346-51. One of the most important texts on
this point is PArch 3.2.4 (Butterworth 217; SC 268, 168-172): “We must bear in mind, however, that
nothing else happens to us as a result of these good or evil thoughts which are suggested to our heart but a
mere agitation and excitement [incitamentum provocans] which urges us on to deeds either of good or of
evil. It is possible for us, when an evil power has begun to urge us on to a deed of evil, to cast away the
wicked suggestions and to resist the low enticements and to do absolutely nothing worthy of blame; and it
is possible on the other hand when a divine power has urged us on to better things not to follow its
guidance, since our faculty of free will [liberi arbitrii] is preserved to us in either case.”
My sense is that Origen is sometimes confused where pre-passions end and rational impressions
begin. He is aware of the distinction in general, for he finds the distinction useful for navigating tricky
exegetical questions in a few places. As Richard Layton has shown, Origen uses the distinction between
pre-passions and impulses to explain Psalm 4's usage of “anger.” Origen believes that when Psalm 4 speaks
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then, here in Origen we have something at least resembling the notion of a “free will”, in
that reason is given a dual role – reason (the soul) has the ability to operate distinctly
from the rational impressions of spirit and body and judge between them. Yet, this
second movement of reason in the soul is still caused by the man's own intellect and
disposition; he cannot make his final choice from a vantage point outside of the
constraints of his rationality (as is the case in some notions of an independent will).
Unlike Alexander, Origen never speaks of choice in an indeterminist sense where choice
is freed from the constrictions of a person's intellect and character.
Now, apart from his rejection of the Stoic notion of a material soul there does not
seem to be any logical inconsistency between Origen’s use of the Stoic model and his use
of the tripartite schema when they are viewed side-by-side. But it is also true that Origen
has altered Stoicism in significant ways by claiming that rational impressions do not

of anger, it conflates both the involuntary aspect (the originating propatheia) as well as the voluntary
impulse – Richard Layton, "Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions," Vigiliae Christianae 54,
no. 3 (2000): 266. However, when discussing the various impulses and “first movements” in First
Principles Origen does not ever instruct the reader how to tell these apart (even though he assures us we are
not to blame for the first movements or pre-passions). My hunch is that this becomes an ambiguous point
for Origen precisely because he links together two separate ideas: first, Origen understands that either
external or internal influences may initially cause a pre-passion (e.g. a demon, or our own body). Second,
external forces may strengthen the impulsive-impressions which were originally generated by our own
body. The combination of these two beliefs means that when a soul feels an impulsive temptation, there is
no way to know whether this was merely a pre-passion caused by a demon (and thus not part of our
disposition proper), or a fully formed rational impression originating from our own body (and thus more
accurately described as caused by our disposition proper).
Sorabji mentions that Jerome will later add the idea that some fault attaches to pre-passions, even
though it is not a matter for accusation (in other words, there are degrees of sin) – Jerome, Comm. on Matt.
5.28; cited in Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: 353. Sorabji may be correct that Jerome is the first to
explicitly ascribe some fault to a person's pre-passions. However, I think Origen may implicitly hold a
similar view given his blurring of pre-passions with “bad thoughts.” Bad thoughts seem to necessitate a
movement of the intellect, for thoughts have cognitive properties and they are a product of our own
disposition. If so, then people retain some measure of culpability for their pre-passions but probably only
insofar as these are the understandable outgrowths of the set of moral choices that preceded them – that is
to say, only insofar as these thoughts possess an element of cognition. The viewpoint that we are in some
sense culpable for our pre-passions would not have made any sense to the Stoics, given that they viewed
pre-passions as involuntary bodily reactions only. But once Origen began to broaden the idea of prepassions into “bad thoughts,” it began to allow for at least a degree of culpability, for it is difficult to
envision how bad thoughts could be entirely pre-rational. On Origen's discussion of Jesus and pre-passions
see Layton, "Origen and Didymus on the Origin of the Passions," 267-71.
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come from the same place within the agent (the individual's singular disposition). Instead,
they come from different originating points (spirit or body); they come from the same
agent, but not from the same place within that agent. In fact, Origen does not envision the
impressions coming from the soul at all but rather they come from the other two aspects
of the person, leaving the soul to be merely the investigator and judge of the impressions.
Thus, we may say that the “soul” in Origen's model is actually more like the assenting
power in the Stoic model, rather than like the entire Stoic “soul.” From the Stoic point of
view, the danger of Origen’s alterations is that it would seem to threaten the unity of the
person.276 Nevertheless, Origen felt comfortable with the more elastic tripartite
anthropology he inherited from Scripture, and he even went so far as to entertain the idea
held by some Christians that the individual had two different souls (one heavenly and one
lower),277 or the idea that the individual was composed of a unified soul attached to a
body that had its own sinful desires.278 Although he discusses the merits of both
possibilities, Origen refrains from endorsing either view.279

276
Origen's view of the spirit and body warring against one another (with the help of outside
powers, no less) would almost certainly have sounded too much like an internal war going on between the
parts of a person. The Stoics were more arduous than Origen in emphasizing the unity of reason within the
person, such that the single rational element operates in different directions so quickly that it goes
unnoticed by the agent – see Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic
Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 383-84. Stephen Bagby notes, following Crouzel,
that Origen viewed the soul has having an upper element (the governing part) and a lower element (a sinful
inclination or attraction towards the desires of the body). These are not “parts” of the soul in a technical
sense but do seem to be alternating aspects of the same soul. As Bagby recognizes, Origen himself is not
entirely clear on this point and that makes it difficult to conclude with any great confidence how Origen
viewed these two elements of the soul relating to one another. See Bagby, "Volitional Sin in Origen's
Commentary on Romans," 340-62. Blosser comes to a similar conclusion and notes that when Origen
speaks of the upper and lower parts of the soul that he is speaking of moral tendencies, or “a single soul
with two possible lifestyles open to it” Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 35. Cf. the discussion above on a
person’s “dual nature”.
277
Origen’s discussion of the belief in two souls is found in PArch 3.4.1-3 (SC 268, 198-210).
Origen does not immediately dismiss this possible view out of hand as he does with the Platonic model of a
tripartite soul. Cf. Clement, Strom. 6.134.1.
278
PArch 3.4.4-5 (SC 268, 210-216). “Let us now see what answer is given to the above
arguments by those who maintain that there is in us a single movement and a single life of one and the
same soul, whose salvation or loss is properly to be attributed to itself as the result of its own actions” –
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Origen’s tripartite model is a modification of the Stoic view, even though Origen
uses many of the same concepts and technical vocabulary. This adaptation allowed
Origen to include things in his moral psychology that a strict Stoic model would not
appear to allow. For example, Origen had a decidedly non-Stoic view of how impressions
could be affected by the outside world. Origen envisioned a person's impression
generators to be, in a sense, like sponges in that they serve as open conduits to the outside
world of fantastic forces. Not only do the spirit and body generate rational impressions
based on their own disposition and desires, but they are also constantly soaking up and
relaying additional impulsive information from angels, demons, and even God himself.
Presumably this would have made Stoic philosophers uncomfortable, for Origen was
granting angels and demons the ability to insert rational impressions (that is,
propositional statements with an impulsive direction) directly into the governing power
for its consideration. Stoic authors spoke of impressions as highly personal movements of
the soul, for they were generated by nothing more than the agent's own disposition, habits
and past experiences. In effect, by inviting additional outside agents to partake in the
cognitive process by which an agent receives impulsive-information from the sensory
world, Origen appears to compress the identity of self into a smaller space. By making
this move, moral autonomy is tightly focused solely on the assenting power of the soul
alone. Judging and assenting to impulses becomes the only psychological feature of
moral choices which an agent can consistently claim as one's own, for Origen does not
PArch 3.4.4 (Butterworth 234; SC 268, 210). Blosser believes this view to be a “Middle Platonic” version
(he mentions Antiochus of Ascalon) of the Stoic belief in a unified soul: Blosser, Become Like the Angels:
29-31.
279
PArch 3.4.5: “We have brought forward...the arguments that can be used in discussion
concerning each opinion in turn. It is for the reader to choose which of them deserves the preference”
(Butterworth 236; SC 268, 216).
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offer any suggestions for how a person is able to tell whether a rational impression comes
from the person’s own beliefs and disposition, or whether this rational impression is a
belief implanted by a foreign power.280 This feature of Origen’s moral psychology
appears to be the result of synthesizing his tripartite model with the Stoic mechanism of
choice.

Origen's Alterations to the Stoic Model: 2) Greater Potential for Moral Progress
The second way Origen distinguishes himself from late Stoicism was made
possible by the first. Origen found a benefit in distinguishing between two species of
impressions: those coming from the spirit and those coming from the body. By dividing
impulsive-impressions into two categories, Origen promoted a greater optimism
regarding the potential for moral progress inside every person. This is because Origen is
able to claim that the (relatively independent) positive motivating impressions of the
spirit will always be a real and viable option for the soul. For the Stoic, on the other hand,
it is difficult to see how a damaged and corrupt disposition could ever begin to produce
positive impressions instead of negative ones, given that the impressions are always
formed by a singular, corrupt disposition; hence, moral progress on the Stoic system is
difficult, and the Stoic sage is practically unheard of. On Origen's view, however, moral
progress is always a real possibility no matter how corrupt a character might become,
precisely because the spirit always gets a chance to present its perfect desires to the soul.
Kathleen Gibbons describes this point:

280

While the view that foreign powers have the ability to exert this type of influence directly into
the mind might sound unsettling, it should be noted that Origen believes that it is precisely the same
mechanism that allows God's grace to work upon the agent, from directly within the agent's own
personality.
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In his own constructive thought, we actually find [Origen] taking a much
stronger position on what self-determination requires than what we find in,
for instance, the Stoics – that is, that regardless of one's established
character, one always has available to one the motivations necessary to
cause one to change one's character for either the better or worse . . . in the
case of the Stoics, the claim that inherited natural constitution plays a role
in shaping or even determining one's character does not necessarily
preclude change or moral progress. In the Stoics, however, the fact that we
find few, if any, sages among human beings reveals that there is in general
a causal limitation on the kind of bootstrapping that reason is capable of
once it has been misdirected by human education or the nature of things.
Origen, however, stakes out a stronger position in his view that human
beings, whatever their previous decisions, are capable of revising their
characters. Neither natural constitution, nor education, nor even one's past
choices will prevent such revision.281
I think Gibbons is exactly right here. According to Origen, the soul always draws upon
two types of impressions from the spirit and the body. The spirit (often strengthened by
helping angels) continually attempts to guide the soul with rational impressions towards
the good. In fact, Origen calls the spiritual impressions a person's conscience
(conscientiae).282 Origen describes the spirit or conscience as “free” in that it constantly
rejoices in good works but is itself never convicted of bad deeds.283 It is true that the
influence of the spirit can be weakened through neglect, but it can never be lost
entirely.284 Thus, no matter how depraved a soul might become, and no matter how
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Gibbons, The Moral Psychology of Clement of Alexandria: 140. Gibbons makes the remark
about Origen almost in passing, as her main emphasis on the article is Clement of Alexandria. However, in
a more recent article she gives an expanded treatment on this theme – see her "Human Autonomy and its
limits in the Thought of Origen of Alexandria."
282
Commenting on Romans 2:14 Origen says that a person's conscience (or the law written on our
hearts) should be identified with the spirit rather than the soul – ComRm II.7.48-52 (Scheck 2.132-133;
Bammel 137).
283
ComRm II.7.48-52: “And so I perceive here such great freedom [of conscience] that indeed it is
constantly rejoicing and exulting in good works but is never convicted of evil deeds [Quia ergo tantam eius
uideo libertatem quae in bonis quidem gestis gaudeat semper et exultet, in malis uero non]” (Scheck 2.133;
Bammel 137).
284
Patron angels may abandon the spirit if too often scorned – ComRm I.21.74-101 (Bammel 8991). In addition, at times God may “abandon” sinners by withdrawing from them his remedial punishment,
but this is only a temporary and strategic withdrawal in order to bring about a fuller healing later, once they
have recognized their situation – PArch 3.1.12-13 (SC 268, 68-80). But even in these situations the person's
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tainted a person's character may become due to continual destructive choices, the soul
will nevertheless always have at its disposal positive rational impressions coming from
the spirit element. It is hard to overstate how significant this is, for it implies that fallen
individuals will always contain within themselves one “unfallen,” untainted, never
convictable, always available element in which positive impressions will be generated.285
Even when the agent's disposition has descended into an evil and corrupt state, it retains
one aspect which can produce positive impressions – impressions which are not isolated
from the rest of the agent's disposition (indeed, it remains part of the agent’s collective
disposition) but which must remain untainted by it.286 This appears to me to be a

spirit continues to wage war against the body (however weakly) by producing positive impressions for the
soul, for only in this way does the soul retain free choice.
285
In a recent article Kathleen Gibbons acknowledges this point but raises the question as to how a
“superlatively vicious person” could be the determining factor for his own moral improvement – Gibbons,
"Human Autonomy and its limits in the Thought of Origen of Alexandria," see especially 686-90. That is to
say, even if a wicked person has positive motivating impulses coming from the spirit, how will these ever
defeat the much stronger negative impulses experienced by those who have become habituated to sin.
Gibbons never defines what she means by a “superlatively vicious person” (she uses Judas as an example,
but I disagree that Origen would label Judas in this way). It is not clear to me, for example, that Origen
believes that God, through his providence, would ever allow such a worst-case scenario for a sinner (not
even the devil). However, for the sake of argument if we grant that Origen would allow such a possibility, I
believe there is an answer to Gibbons’ question. It is true that a wicked person’s negative impulsiveimpressions are much stronger than the competing positive impulsive-impressions from the spirit (because
of habit, etc.). However, this is only true if we isolate the person’s impressions from the influence of
outside powers. But there is no reason to do this, for Origen stresses that the soul is bombarded by
impressions which have been strengthened or influenced from the outside (by either good or evil powers).
This is what warrants Origen’s repeated emphasis that God’s contributions to our own sanctification are
always greater than our own; a person’s spirit aspect rarely works independently in its fight to persuade the
soul. Most of the time guardian angels and even the Holy Spirit himself strengthen the spirit’s desires.
Thus, even if we grant that a superlatively vicious person might only generate anemic positive desires to
compete against the more robust negative desires, God can certainly choose to make up the difference, so to
speak, and level the playing field. And Origen frequently alludes to such events: e.g. PArch 3.5.8: speaking
about the various ways God leads people to salvation without violating their moral autonomy, whether
through instruction or punishment, Origen also suggests that some are “pressed into salvation and whose
conversion is as it were compelled and extorted; who they are for whom God even provides special
occasions for salvation…” (Butterworth 244; SC 268, 234). I would argue that this explanation
demonstrates that Origen believes grace can persuade even “superlatively vicious” sinners, if God chooses
to strengthen the person’s spirit with overwhelming evidence or some other form of motivation.
286
This is what allows Origen to say about all rational natures (including the devil), “There is
therefore no nature which may not admit good or evil, except the nature of God...” – PArch 1.8.3
(Butterworth 69; SC 252, 200-202).
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remarkable conceptual step to make by someone who is comfortable using Stoic
categories.
We must recall that Origen, like the Stoics, believed that choices were tied to a
person's character and intellect. Both believed (unlike Alexander) that people could not
make decisions independent of their character and intellect. One's character, at any given
moment, dictated the types of choices that one could make. This view resulted in a
difficulty for Stoics. On the one hand, the Stoics tried to affirm the possibility of moral
improvement. But on the other hand, it is difficult to see how moral improvement is
possible for someone with a vicious disposition since all choices must be predetermined
by the person's disposition at the moment of choice. Bobzien notes that Chrysippus did
not seem to be worried about this potential problem, and we do not have any evidence for
a Stoic solution to it.287 However, Origen's conceptual move allows him to bear fruit on
precisely this point. No matter what the rest of a person's character and disposition might
look like, a God-given divine element always persists inside the person and can stimulate
moral improvement.288 This is no external force. Rather, the spiritual element is itself a
feature of one's own personality and character. The disposition of every person will
always have this feature, and thus all people will permanently retain the possibility to
make moral improvement (even significant improvement), for at least one aspect of their
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“There is no evidence at all that Chrysippus or any other early Stoic grappled with the problem
of character determination and moral responsibility, let alone the problem of character determination and
free will” Bobzien, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy: 291.
288
Cf. PArch 1.3.6: “That the activity of the Father and the Son is to be found both in saints and in
sinners is clear from the fact that all rational beings are partakers of the word of God, that is, of reason, and
so have implanted within them some seeds [semina], as it were, of wisdom and righteousness, which is
Christ” (Butterworth 34-35; SC 252, 154). ComRm III.3 (Scheck 1.204; Bammel 223): “Over and above
the power of reason God has ensured that man should know what he ought to do and what he ought to
avoid. One finds then that God has supplied these things universally to all men” (emphasis added).
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own character serves as the intellectual and rational warrant for such a move.289 The
possibility for good or evil choices, made possible by the person’s own good and bad
rational desires, is a principle condition which establishes moral autonomy in Origen's
theology.290 And moral autonomy establishes moral responsibility – that is, meaningful
praise and blame.291
For this reason, Origen’s model of the moral quest is more optimistic when
compared to the typical Stoic anthropological model.292 It allows Origen to assert:

289
Henri de Lubac states this principle very well. He writes that the fundamental idea expressed
by the spirit is that: “the pneuma that is 'in man', in every man, assures a certain hidden transcendence of
man over himself, a certain opening, a certain received continuity between man and God. Not that there is
the least identity of essence between the one and the other . . . Would man, therefore, be after all
impeccable? No. But the center of moral freedom and choice is not the pneuma” Henri De Lubac, Theology
in History, trans. Anne Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 141-42. At the same time, however,
I wonder if de Lubac goes too far by saying that the spirit element is not part of the individual's personality
(142). While it is true that the soul is responsible for moral autonomy, I am not convinced that moral
autonomy should be conflated with one's personality. Instead, all of a person's intellect, disposition and
impulsive impressions should be considered part of one’s personality and identity, for Origen would insist
that a person's choice is causally linked to one’s personality in total. Suppose I desperately want to eat an
extra piece of cake, even to the point of distraction, and yet somehow my soul chooses to align with my
competing spiritual desire to exercise restraint. In such a case, it would seem artificial to dismiss my robust
desire for cake as something not truly part of personality or disposition. Rather, it would seem to be an
integral part of the whole.
290
To be more precise, the condition which makes moral autonomy genuine is the soul’s power
over binary differentiation (movement towards and away from the good). If souls are always embodied (as
I have argued in this chapter), then this binary differentiation is preserved and actuated through the
competing desires of spirit and body. However, if Origen does allow for a wholly incorporeal existence for
creatures at either the very beginning or the very end (as some scholars believe), then the principle needs to
be understood as simply the power of binary differentiation towards and away from the good – a power
which much of the time, but not necessarily all the time, manifests itself through the competing desires of
spirit and body. In such hypothetical cases of disembodied existence, presumably the binary options would
be better articulated as persevering in the good versus failing to persevere in the good (whether through
sloth, satiety, inattentiveness, etc.). In either case, the most important aspect is the soul’s rational power
over binary differentiation. This principle also contains the presupposition that the power of choice (assent)
is not caused by an external agent but is caused by the soul alone (i.e. moral autonomy requires that the
choice not be somehow forced or performed under compulsion, presumably by God or some other foreign
power) – cf. ComRm I.21.65-67: “But out of both sides’ support, the duty of choice is preserved. For the
matter is not done by force [ui] nor is the soul moved in either of the two directions by compulsion
[necessitate]” (Scheck 1.95; Bammel 89). It must wait until Chapter 5 to outline Origen’s interpretation of
“force” and “compulsion”.
291
Cf. PArch 1.3.8: “God the Father bestows on all the gift of existence; and a participation in
Christ, in virtue of his being the word or reason, makes them rational. From this it follows that they are
worthy of praise or blame, because they are capable alike of virtue and wickedness” (Butterworth 38; SC
252, 162).
292
The end goal for Stoicism was to become a perfect sage, and only in this way achieve true
freedom, but they also admitted this was extremely rare to achieve. All of those who do not make it to sage
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Again, to throw the blame simply on our constitution is absurd, for
education can take the most intemperate and savage of men and, if they
will follow her exhortation, can change them, so that the alteration and
change for the better is very great, the most licentious men often becoming
better than those who formerly seemed not to be by their very nature, and
the most savage changing to such a degree of gentleness...293
Nevertheless, this robust moral potential should not be taken as an endorsement of the
inherent goodness of human beings. While the net result of Origen's innovation to
Stoicism was a greater confidence in moral potential, Origen credited this ongoing
influence of the spirit upon the soul to God as unmerited grace, rather than a
pronouncement on raw human potential as such.294
And here we arrive at a crucial point which relates this discussion to Origen’s
universalism: despite enabling greater potential in the moral quest, the ongoing and

status (which is basically everyone) are in the category of the impious, the mad, and the foolish. Cf. John
Sellars, Stoicism (New York: Routledge, 2014), 35-41.
293
PArch 3.1.5 (Butterworth 162-63; SC 268, 30). It should be noted that the same logic that
allows Origen to be more optimistic about the ongoing possibility of moral progress, despite one's nature,
also allows him to assert that moral degeneration will always remain a real possibility despite one's nature.
The Stoics envisioned the perfect sage as one who can no longer fail to make the correct moral judgment
given that he fully understands the will of nature (or God) to perfection. Origen describes the descent of
morally wise people into licentiousness in this same passage: PArch 3.1.5 (Butterworth 163; SC 268, 3031).
294
The biggest gift that God gives to strengthen our spiritual impulse is the Holy Spirit himself.
The gift of the Father is existence; the gift of the Son is rationality; but the grace of the Holy Spirit (saved
just for believers) is one of the primary forces in our moral progress of sanctification – PArch 1.3.8
(Butterworth 38; SC 252, 162). Origen summarizes this idea at the end of Book 1, Chapter 3: “That this
may come to pass, and that those who were made by God may be unceasingly and inseparably present with
him who really exists, it is the work of wisdom to instruct and train them, and lead them on to perfection,
by the strengthening and unceasing sanctification of the Holy Spirit, through which alone they can receive
God. In this way, then, through the ceaseless work on our behalf of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
renewed at every stage of our progress, we may perchance just succeed at last in beholding the holy and
blessed life [sanctam et beatam uitam]” (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164). Cf. PArch 1.8.3: “But if any other
nature is holy [apart from God, Christ and the Holy Spirit], it is so because it is made holy by the reception
or inspiration [assumptione uel inspiratione] of the Holy Spirit; the possession of this quality does not arise
from its own nature, but is an accidental addition to it...” (Butterworth 70-71; SC 252, 228). N.B.: the
reception of the Holy Spirit as God's gift is not to be conflated or confused with God's gift of spirit (or
conscience) – the one is an external gift (accidental), while the other is a creational gift and a necessary part
of the person's own identity: “The Spirit of God, even when it is present in us, is one thing, and the pneuma
proper to every man, that which is in him, is something else . . . The Apostle clearly affirms that this spirit
(this pneuma) is different from the Spirit of God, even when the Holy Spirit is present in us, over and above
the spirit of man that is in him” – ComMatt 13.2 (PG13:1093, translation by De Lubac, Theology in
History: 138.
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untainted impulsive-impressions from the spirit are not by themselves sufficient to
account for Origen’s belief that everyone will voluntarily choose to be restored to God at
some point in their future. After all, Origen believes that the further one aligns with the
bodily aspect, the harder it becomes to resist it in the future, even if the spirit’s untainted
impulses are present.295 Thus, even though Origen insists that there will never be a time
when the soul loses all positive motivations towards the good, it becomes difficult to see
how a soul which has been steeped in vice (e.g. the soul of the devil) might ever respond
favorably to the relatively weak motivations originating from the spirit in the presence of
the competing powerful ones from the body?296 Part of the answer to this question is that
God's providential-grace knows, in advance, precisely which situations the soul must find
295

E.g. PArch 3.1.4: Even though one man might sin with a licentious woman because he has less
instruction and inclines towards pleasure, “on the other hand the same experiences may happen to one who
has undergone more instruction and discipline; that is, the sensations and incitements are there, but his
reason, having been strengthened to a higher degree and trained by practice and confirmed towards the
good by right doctrines...repels the incitements and gradually weakens the desire” (Butterworth 162; SC
268, 28).
296
This seems to be the argument made by: Lisa R. Holliday, "Will Satan Be Saved?
Reconsidering Origen's Theory of Volition in Peri Archon," Vigiliae Christianae 63, no. 1 (2009). Holliday
concludes that Origen appears to have a contradiction in First Principles. On the one hand, Origen insists
that all rational creatures will retain the capability to choose the good. But on the other hand, given Origen's
view that continual sin leads to strong habit, it is unclear what could ever prompt the devil to desire the
good even if he was capable of it. Holliday overstates her case when she says that the devil's habitual
sinning means that the devil can no longer have any desires for the good (23), for as we have seen above,
the spirit component constitutes a consistent source of internal positive desires. Thus, even the devil must
retain at least some desire for the good. Despite this flaw, Holliday's argument does raise a relevant
question. Even if we suppose that the devil could choose the good based on certain low-level desires which
persist, there does not seem to be a compelling reason to believe that the devil would ever act upon his
good desires, given how weak they are compared to his strong and habituated desires to do evil. If the devil
will always follow his strongest desires (for that will seem the most reasonable to him), then it seems
extremely unlikely that the devil will ever find himself in a situation where the spirit's desires seem more
reasonable. While still theoretically possible, the odds would be astronomically low. This logic leads
Holliday to conclude that Origen believes that the devil will probably not be saved in the apocatastasis.
Holliday's argument is understandable, but incorrect, because it does not take into account three features of
Origen’s thought: first, Origen believes that patron angels as well as God Himself can step in at any time to
strengthen the weakened desires of the person’s spirit and so presumably tip the balance; second, Origen
understands that one of the central roles for divine punishment is to make it so that the soul begins to hate
what it used to crave (on this point see below, Chapter 3); and third, Holliday does not consider the role of
God's providence in ordering the universe in such a way that every soul (including the soul of the devil)
finds itself in the precise existential moment (even if the odds of such a moment are astronomically low)
where the soul chooses to follow the spirit's desires and turn towards God. This argument will be defended
in Chapter 5. Cf. above n285 for a similar argument by Kathleen Gibbons.
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itself in so that it will freely respond to the correct motivating impressions instead of the
wrong ones.297 But the demonstration of that claim must wait until Chapter 5.298

Conclusion
Origen's doctrine of moral responsibility first stems from his understanding of
Scripture, and then is given greater detail and nuance through his use of Stoic models and
technical vocabulary. Origen uses philosophy to expand Scripture's teaching on this point
for its additional utility in his polemics against various fatalistic soteriologies. According
to Origen, the largest threats came from gnostic fixed-nature determinism and Christian
predestinarians.
Origen's presentation of moral autonomy is largely Stoic in nature, and it is
noteworthy that he elects not to use the indeterminist notion of choice taught by
Alexander of Aphrodisias. But neither does Origen feel compelled to stay within the
bounds of Stoic thought. In order to protect the goodness and justice of God, Origen
modifies the typical late Stoic paradigm of impression and assent. First, Origen
superimposes his tripartite anthropology of spirit, soul and body over top the Stoic model
of impression and assent. The resulting picture is that the soul receives competing rational
impressions (desires) from the body and the spirit to entice the soul to either virtue or

297

E.g. PArch 3.5.8: “But how, consistently with the preservation of free will in all rational
creatures, each person ought to be dealt with, that is, who they are whom the Word of God...instructs; who
they are whom he puts off for a time...who they are for whom God even provides special occasions for
salvation...from what causes or on what occasions these things happen, or what the divine wisdom sees as it
looks into these men or what movements of theirs will lead God to arrange all these things thus, is known
to God alone…” (Butterworth 244; SC 268, 234). A more extensive treatment of Origen’s view of divine
foreknowledge is found below in Chapter 5.
298
In Chapter 5 I will argue that Origen believes that there is at least one possible arrangement of
salvation-history which will result in the salvation of all rational souls. His belief on that point appears to
depend on his view here – that even the most stubborn of sinners will always possess within themselves
positive motivating desires which God may draw upon.
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vice. The soul must then judge the competing impressions to see which is worthy of the
soul’s assent (choice).299 Origen's tripartite anthropology is not Platonic, for he upholds
the unity of the person. Thus, Origen held to a dual role for a person's rational capacities.
First, the agent's body and spirit continually produce rational and cognitive impressions
for the soul to peruse. Second, the soul retains the ability to judge the various rational
impulses to see which ones are true and worth pursuing.300 With this model we have
something that resembles later notions of a will, and yet to call it a will is to wrongly
suggest that Origen envisions some center of pure volition that stands outside of or
independent of one's faculties of reason.301 His view resists any such description because
for Origen, moral choices are the direct products of one's current rational activities in
total. The combination of the biblical and Stoic models allows us to describe the
conditions Origen sets for genuine moral autonomy: first, the choice must originate from
within the agent (the soul) and not from outside of the agent. And second, the choice
must be made in the presence of competing rational inclinations; which is to say, moral
autonomy requires that the soul possesses rational power over binary differentiation.
The second way that Origen’s view stands apart from the Stoic view is that
Origen’s view allows greater optimism within the moral quest. Although Origen upholds

299
Origen’s view is reminiscent of the ever-popular “good angel / bad angel” trope in modern
media. One recalls, for example, Donald Duck’s perpetual struggle between good and evil as illustrated by
an angel and a demon sitting on each of his shoulders. These were not technically angels, but were instead
two miniature versions of himself – both of which looked and talked like Donald, though one had a halo
while the other held a pitchfork. Each whispered competing suggestions into Donald’s ears as to what he
should do, but Donald ultimately had to decide which of his internal voices to align with.
300
In an interesting way Origen actually envisions a triple role for reason, give that there are two
competing rational impressions presented to the rational soul. There are two stages or movements of
reason, but at least three rational judgments taking place (albeit only one appears to take place
consciously).
301
Thus, Charles Bigg was wrong to conclude that the Alexandrines [Clement and Origen] were
driven by their determinist opponents “to make Will an independent faculty, knowing both good and evil
and choosing between them, selecting and in fact creating its own motive” – Bigg, The Christian Platonists
of Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 1886: 79-80.
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the Stoic view that our choices arise from our character, Origen also insists that every
human character, no matter how tainted, retains at least some degree of positive rational
motivation which originates from the spirit aspect. Remarkably, these cognitive
motivations are permanently untainted, and thus preserve a permanent potential for moral
progress. By itself, however, this universal potential for moral renewal does not
guarantee universal actual moral progress. Thus, Origen’s belief in universal salvation
requires an additional theological move in order to turn the potential into an actual.
Origen’s answer will be demonstrated in the following chapters (especially in Chapter 5).
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CHAPTER THREE
STAGES OF SALVATION-HISTORY
Introduction:
The two elements that create and shape all existence in Origen's thought are God's
providence (πρόνοια / providentia) and creaturely free choice.302 In the previous chapter I
outlined Origen's understanding of free choice. In the next two chapters I will discuss
Origen's view of God's providential power; this is the power that enables, guides, directs,
arranges, and even places certain constraints upon the exercise of individual moral
autonomy. This chapter will examine the role of God's providence in general, by looking
at the stages of cosmic, salvation-history in Origen’s theology. The next chapter will
focus specifically on Origen’s final stage, the apocatastasis. These two chapters lead to
my argument in Chapter 5 which recounts the way that divine providence directs the
moral freedom of creatures in pursuit of the apocatastasis.
Origen understands God's providence to be the force which sustains and
actualizes the unfolding of history through a series of subsequent stages of salvationhistory.303 Before this unfolding happens in time, God's providence is also responsible for
setting the overall goal of cosmic history. God first selects, in advance, the goal of history
302

This was one of the main arguments Koch affirmed throughout his influential study, Koch,
Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus. Daniélou also
identified these as the two essential tenants of Origen’s theology: Daniélou, Origen: 211.
303
The cosmic history of redemption is the divine οἰκονομία (Latin – dispensatio). Origen
understands the divine economy as a sort of metanarrative or overarching plan of redemption and
restoration – it is the way the Triune God acts externally. Origen does not use the word “soteriology”, yet
his understanding of οἰκονομία functions as his soteriology in that it comprises his system of salvation. For
a discussion of Origen’s conception of οἰκονομία see Paul Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy:
Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology and Piety (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9099. Cf. Joseph Trigg, Origen (New York: Routledge, 2002), 25-32; John A. McGuckin, The Westminster
Handbook to Patristic Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 112-14 on
"Economy".
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and then God designs the shape history will take to reach that goal. This planning is an
atemporal and primordial feature of God's providence which takes place in the mind of
God. Once God creates and history begins, God’s providence is responsible for the
unfolding of the design into various epochs which actualize the telos God designed for
history. While a comprehensive treatment of God’s providential role in salvation-history
is beyond the scope of this study, an overview is necessary in order to set the context for
our later discussion of the apocatastasis.304

An Overview of Cosmic History: A Drama of 6 Acts
Origen is famous for depicting the biblical themes of creation, fall and redemption
as occurring in various ages or epochs of cosmic history. While it is common (and not
necessarily wrong) in scholarship to describe three stages – the life of the pre-existent
soul, the soul's earthly life, and the soul's resurrected life after death – I find it more
helpful to expand this outline into six distinct stages in Origen's thought. These are: 1)
God's initial creation of rational minds and their union with him, 2) The falling of the
Intelligences away from God through failure to persevere in goodness, 3) God's creation
of a new, material ecosystem called “heavens and earth” and his subsequent placement of
fallen souls into it according to merit, 4) The moral quest of each rational soul as it seeks
to turn away from sin and back towards God through progress in the virtues, a quest
aided by God through various means, 5) The death, resurrection, and purification of
humans as the continuation of the moral quest in the afterlife, and finally 6) The last stage
304
Many aspects of Origen’s cosmic history continue to be debated by scholars today. While I
note these debates in passing, I do not intend to give an exhaustive treatment of those which do not factor
into my central argument. The primary reason for this overview is to set the appropriate background and
context for Origen’s final stage – the apocatastasis. Scholarly debates pertaining to this final stage of
Origen’s providential plan of cosmic history will be analyzed in much greater detail, given that my
argument hinges upon a certain understanding of Origen’s universalism.
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where each individual soul is ultimately restored to God, becoming like him so that God
is finally “all in all.” Given that God's providence or οἰκονομία is responsible for the
organizing and the unfolding of each stage in cosmic history, each stage leading up to the
final one will be briefly outlined below.305

1) Creation
The initial creation of contingent (non-eternal) creatures poses a difficulty for
Origen. Because God is eternal, God's providential power is not simply a power that is in
God but this power is God, and as such there could never be a time when this power was
not actualized: Origen describes it this way: “We can therefore imagine no moment
whatever when that power was not engaged in acts of well-doing”, which is to say that
Origen understands that God has “always [been] dispensing his blessings among them by
doing them good in accordance with their condition and deserts.”306 This leads Origen to
conclude that there must always have been existing creatures who were the subject of
God's providential goodness, since there could be no time that God was not “Creator, nor
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Most of Origen’s discussions of salvation-history are, unsurprisingly, found in his most
systematic work: First Principles. The most recent critical edition of this text is by Crouzel and Simonetti,
Origèn: Traité des Principes. Citations will list SC volume and page (for additional information see the
bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations from Peri Archon are from Butterworth,
Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the De principiis. Critical editions of Origen’s other
works will be noted throughout as they are cited. For a helpful guide and listing of Origen’s critical editions
(PG, GCS, SC), see McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Origen: 41-44. For other works that I cite
only in passing, I do not give full bibliographic information but only standard section citations.
306
PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). Rufinus uses a variety of Greek and Latin
terminology when speaking about God’s “power” at this point in his translation: “Hanc ergo beatam et
ἀρχικήν, id est principatum omnium gerentem <δύναμιν> dicimus trinitatem. Hic est bonus deus et
benignus omnium pater, simul et εὐεργετικὴ δύναμις et δημιουργική, id est bene faciendi uirtus et creandi ac
prouidendi” (SC 252, 168). Interestingly, after talking about God’s creating power and sustaining power,
Rufinus uses the plural form “uirtutes” when he states that these “virtues” (Butterworth – “powers”) are
never inactive (Butterworth 41; SC 252, 168).
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Benefactor, nor Providence.”307 But how can creatures both be created yet be without a
beginning? Origen finds an answer in the Son of God, or God's Wisdom:
In this Wisdom, therefore, who ever existed with the Father, the Creation
was always present in form and outline, and there was never a time when
the pre-figuration of those things which hereafter were to be did not exist
in Wisdom.308
Although Origen does not use the term here, we may note that this is a form of God's
foreknowledge (or at least includes God’s foreknowledge). But this goes beyond a simple
foreknowledge, (or the type of foreknowledge where God knows what will happen in the
future), something Origen often affirms elsewhere. Instead, this foreknowledge involves
God's providential care being fully actualized within God's own mind. The creaturely
minds have not yet been created, and so this implies that God's “dispensing of blessings
among them” is not happening in history but only through God's pre-planning.309 This is
a providential, grace-filled and beneficent type of foreknowledge. It is an active and
strategic foreknowledge, of which we will have more to say in the Chapter 5.310
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PArch 1.4.3-4 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170).
PArch 1.4.4 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170): “In hac igitur sapientia, quae semper erat cum
patre, descripta semper inerat ac formata conditio, et numquam erat quando eorum, quae futura errant,
praefiguratio apud sapientiam non erat.” Origen gives a similar answer in PArch 1.2.2-3 (SC 252, 114). At
PArch 3.5.3 (SC 268, 222), however, Origen addresses the same question but offers a different answer. He
similarly claims that God's nature could never have been at ease and so God must have always exercised
power and displayed goodness. But when trying to reconcile this view with the fact that this world had a
beginning in time, Origen suggests that there were other worlds before this one, just as there will be other
worlds after this one. We may note that this answer seems less satisfactory than his first answer, given that
this is sidestepping the question rather than answering it. After all, the same question regarding the
beginning of this world can be posed to the previous one, or to the one before that. Unless Origen affirms
that there have been an infinite number of worlds in the past (which he does not ever do), the question
remains as to how God's providence could be fully actualized before the first moment of creation. The
question is tentatively resolved, however, in PArch 1.4.4 (SC 252, 170).
309
PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170). Origen criticizes the idea held by some that souls
could be unbegotten “in whom they would have it that God implanted not so much the principle of
existence [subsistendi] as the quality and rank of their life [uitae qualitatem atque ordinem]” – PArch 1.3.3
(Butterworth 30; SC 252, 146). Thus, the “existence” of these souls must reside simply in God's
foreknowledge of them.
310
In Chapter 5 we will see that Origen speaks about three types of divine foreknowledge: simple
foreknowledge (knowledge of what will happen in the future), foreknowledge of future possibilities (what
could have happened differently in the future), and foreknowledge concerning the counterfactuals of
308
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When God created the intelligent Minds (νοῦς / mens) that he had eternally
foreseen, chronological history begins.311 God created beings with no initial diversity
among them (aequales…ac similes), for since God created solely out of his goodness, and
since there is no variation or change in God himself, there could be nothing in God which
could account for creating diversity.312 The goodness in the newly created Minds was not
a necessary feature but was an accidental property (accidentem), and the created Minds
enjoyed having it only so long as they were partakers of God's essential goodness.313
Therefore, God also made these beings rational, so that by preserving the goodness God
had given them through their own free choices, such goodness might become their
own.314 However, for moral autonomy to choose the good, it must also be possible to
choose the bad, for in every being except God rationality requires the possibility of
both.315 Thus, because rational beings were created with the ability of differentiation
(movement towards and away from the good), it was required that their incorporeal
creaturely freedom (what any creature would freely do if placed in any hypothetical state of affairs). In this
chapter I simply use the umbrella term “foreknowledge”.
311
PArch 4.4.1: “...the statements we make about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit must
be understood as transcending all time and all ages and all eternity […supra omne autem tempus et supra
omnia saecula et supra omnem aeternitatem intellegenda sunt ea, quae de patre et filio et spiritu sancto
dicuntur]” (Butterworth 316; SC 268, 402). On Origen's beliefs regarding God's timelessness and
transcendence of time, see Panayiotis Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time, Supplements
to Vigiliae Christianae (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 21-38.
312
PArch 2.9.6 (SC 252, 364).
313
PArch 1.6.2 (SC 252, 198); 1.8.3 (SC 252, 228); 4.4.8 (SC 268, 422).
314
PArch 2.9.2 (SC 252, 354).
315
PArch 1.8.3: “There is therefore no nature which may not admit good or evil, except the nature
of God, which is the source of all good, and that of Christ; for Christ is wisdom, and wisdom certainly
cannot admit folly” (Butterworth 70; SC 252, 226). Chapter 2 brought to light that Origen required two
conditions for choices to be free (i.e. two requirements for genuine moral autonomy): first, the choice must
be made by the agent alone and not from something outside of the agent. And second, the soul must have
the possibility to choose otherwise – not in an absolute sense like that of Alexander, but rather in the sense
that the soul must be able to choose between the competing inclinations of the spirit and the body. If the
soul chooses to move towards the good, it must be the case that the soul had the capability to choose the
bad instead. Similarly, if the soul chooses to move towards the bad, it must be the case that the soul also
had the capability to choose the good instead. This binary condition does not require that the soul have
power over an unlimited number of choices, nor does it require that the choice be made independent of the
soul’s desires or intellect. It merely requires that the soul have power over two types of choices (a choice
that facilitates ascent, or a choice that facilitates descent).
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minds be linked with something that could reflect such movement. In this way Origen
understands moral autonomy to require a corporeal body, even though moral autonomy
itself operates from an incorporeal intelligence.316 God does not require a body, for only
God is pure goodness and not capable of a movement away from it;317 only the Triune
God is fully incorporeal.318 Even in their pre-earthly lives, then, rational beings had a
tripartite nature of body, soul and spirit.319 It is true that Origen will speak at times of
rational creatures as “incorporeal in respect of their proper nature”320, but in such cases
he is either speaking about the incorporeal soul (which he views as the most essential part
of the person), or by his own admission he is simply using “incorporeal” according to a
more popular and colloquial sense of the word as meaning something like “invisible” or
“not earthly”.321
Thus, at this first stage of cosmic history all tripartite beings were one with God,
created to live and rejoice and contemplate God, not as a necessary part of their nature
but as an accidental feature given their close proximity to God. God created them with
the capability to do good or evil so that through their own free choice they would

316

PArch 2.2.2: “logical reasoning compels us to believe that, while the original creation was of
rational beings [rationabiles naturas], it is only in idea and thought that a material substance is separable
from them, and that though this substance seems to have been produced for them or after them, yet never
have they lived or do they live without it; for we shall be right in believing that life without a body
[incorporea] is found in the Trinity alone” (Butterworth 81; SC 252, 248).
317
PArch 1.8.3 (SC 252, 228).
318
PArch 2.2.2 (SC 252, 248).
319
On this highly debated and controversial claim, see the discussion in Chapter 2 (especially
n192 and n193).
320
PArch 1.7.1: “quae omnes secundum propriam naturam incorporeae sunt, sed et per hoc
ipsum, quod incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt” (Butterworth 59; SC 252, 208).
321
E.g. PArch 1.7.1: All things were made through Christ “whether they are 'visible', that is
corporeal, or 'invisible' (inuisibilia) which I take to be none other than the incorporeal and spiritual powers”
(Butterworth 59; SC 252, 208). Origen also distinguishes a technical definition from a more common
definition of “incorporeal” in PArch praef 8: “Now [a daemon's] body is by nature a fine substance and thin
like air, and on this account most people think and speak of it as incorporeal; but the Savior had a body
which was solid and capable of being handled. It is customary for everything which is not like this to be
termed incorporeal by the more simple and uneducated of men...” (Butterworth 5-6; SC 252, 86).
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persevere in perfect goodness and make it their own. This “perennial choir of praise” was
the pre-existent heavenly Church.322

2) Falling Away From Union With God
Stage two represents one of the most inexplicable phases of Origen's cosmic
history. Due to a mysterious slacking of fervor, which Origen describes as a weariness or
laziness in preserving the good, all of the Intelligences (except for one – Jesus) fall from
their original perfect station with God into varying degrees of evil.323 It is unclear why
the Intelligences grew lazy and turned away from the good, and it is equally unclear why
they did so in diverse ways, given the fact that God had created them without initial
diversity.324 As each mind departed from God they descended into evil and became souls
(Greek – ψυχή, Latin – anima).325 The degree of evil they fell into dictated the degree of
movement away from the good.326 The degree of evil also corresponded to a change in
the makeup of their corporeal bodies (since diversity can only be reflected in diverse
bodies).327 The material that bodies are composed of, “which is so great and wonderful as
to be sufficient for all the bodies in the world” is a created thing which stands at “the call
and service of the Creator in all things for the fashioning of whatever forms [formas] and
322

John A. McGuckin, "Origen of Alexandria on the Mystery of the Pre-existent Church,"
International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 6, no. 3 (2006): 211.
323
PArch 2.9.2: “sed desidia et laboris taedium in seruando bono et auersio ac neglegentia
meliorum initium dedit recedendi a bono” (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 354); Parch 2.9.6 (SC 252, 366). On
Jesus' soul, see M. Eichinger, Die Verklärung Christi bei Origenes (Vienna: Herder, 1969), 89-90.
324
On this point, cf. Boys-Stones, "Human Autonomy and Divine Revelation in Origen," 495-96.
Boys-Stones notes that when Origen sought to give an answer to the inexplicable mystery of why people
are born into diverse stations, that Origen ends up pushing the inexplicable mystery back one level to an
inexplicable Fall.
325
PArch 2.8.3: “Ex quibus omnibus illud uidetur ostendi, quod mens de statu ac dignitate sua
declinans, effecta uel nuncupata est anima ; quae si reparata fuerit et correcta, redit in hoc, ut sit mens”
(Butterworth 125; SC 252, 348).
326
PArch 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348).
327
PArch 2.1.4: In this passage Origen finds it necessary to discuss the bodily nature given that
“the diversity of the world cannot exist apart from bodies” (Butterworth 78; SC 252, 240).
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species [species] he wished.”328 Bodies which were once glorious experienced a form of
“cooling” as they departed from participation in God's “fire”.329 It should be noted that
this cooling and alteration of bodies took place before God created the material heavens
and earth. The resulting diversity that emerges from the first fall is not the new material
world, for that has not been created yet; rather, this diversity provides God with the
blueprint of the world he is about to create.

3) Creation of Heaven and Earth and Placement of Souls According to Merit
Once souls had descended into varying degrees of evil with the corresponding
alterations to their ethereal bodies, God created a material world in which to train and
rehabilitate the fallen souls. The diversity of the first fall became God's blueprint for the
complex arrangement of creatures into this material world:
From this source, it appears, the Creator of all things obtained certain
seeds [semina] and causes of variety and diversity, in order that, according
to the diversity of minds, that is, of rational beings . . . he might create a
world that was various and diverse.330
The merit accrued and lost in the first fall dictated each creature’s position in the new
world, but on this point Origen allows for an exception: some souls were brought to even
lower stations than what they deserved, “even against their will,” so that they might “be
of service to the whole world.”331 While this does, in some sense, undercut Origen's usual
insistence on God's perfect justice, this idea fits with another recurrent theme in Origen's
thought – namely that the Church is ‘in it together.’ The restoration is not simply a
328

PArch 2.1.4 (Butterworth 79; SC 252, 242).
PArch 2.8.3: “Sicut ergo deus ignis est, et angeli flamma ignis, et sancti quique apiritu feruent
: ita e contrario hi, qui deciderunt a dilectione dei, sine dubio refrixisse in caritate eius ac frigidi effecti
esse dicendi sunt” (Butterworth 123; SC 252, 344).
330
PArch 2.9.2 (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 356).
331
PArch 3.5.4 (Butterworth 240-41; SC 268, 226). Cf. PArch 2.9.7 (SC 252, 368-370).
329
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project about individuals where God finds a way to reunite with each recalcitrant soul on
a one-to-one basis – rather, all of creation will be involved in the pedagogical restoration,
with those in the front ranks educating and encouraging those in the lower ranks, until
every soul has been restored.332
Thus, God created the material heaven and earth as an act of secondary
creation.333 The material world became a temporary feature of history through which God
abruptly halted the descent of souls into evil, and then placed them into a penal hospital –
“penal” in the sense that God is just and so human sufferings and struggles in this life
correspond to past transgressions, and “hospital” in the sense that the purpose of any
suffering and punishment is restorative and pedagogical rather than punitive and
vindictive. The diversity of primordial sins became the foundation for a new universe334
full of diversity, as some souls were placed in positions of greater difficulty or misery
than others. While it is true that each soul was placed into its own unique position within
the new ecosystem according to a complicated hierarchy of merit, Origen does
distinguish between three broad categories or classes of beings within the new
arrangement. There are the “supercelestial beings” (planets and stars) with bodies of a
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E.g. PArch 2.1.2 (SC 252, 238). The distinction between the personal and the collective aspects
of the final restoration will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.
333
Origen interprets Genesis 1:1 (“God made the heaven and earth”) both literally and
allegorically. In its historical sense it refers to the material heavens (or material firmament) and to the
material earth – e.g. PArch 2.11.6-7 (Butterworth 152-153; SC 252, 406-412) and PArch 3.5.1 (Butterworth
237-238; SC 268, 218-220). But Origen also interprets Genesis 1:1 allegorically to refer to the primordial
creation of minds and bodily matter – e.g. PArch 2.9.1 (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 352-354): “These then
[minds and bodily matter] are the objects which we must believe were created by God in the beginning, that
is, before everything else. And it is this truth which we may suppose to be indicated also in that beginning
which Moses somewhat obscurely introduces when he says, ‘In the beginning God made the heaven and
the earth’. For it is certain that these words refer not to the ‘firmament’ nor to the ‘dry land’, but to that
heaven and earth from which the names of the ones we see were afterwards borrowed.” Cf. Martens,
"Origen's Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the Opening Chapters of Genesis," 525-28.
334
The term universe here is meant to highlight that when Origen speaks about the new material
world, he is including the heavens, “or any places that exist anywhere” – PArch 2.9.3 (Butterworth 131; SC
252, 356).
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finer quality.335 There are those souls who become human beings who are made to live on
earth in earthly bodies.336 And then there are the “invisible powers” (inuisibiles uirtutes),
which include both helpful powers who God entrusts to manage things on Earth (angels),
along with nefarious powers who occupy a lower station (demons).337 Although invisible,
these powers retain corporeal bodies, but of an aerial or ethereal nature.338 All nonrational entities such as plants and animals are merely contingent things339 – they were
created on Earth without having any sort of pre-existent life, and thus are a relatively
unimportant feature of cosmic history for Origen.340
335

PArch 2.9.3: “esse supercaelestia” (Butterworth 131; SC 252, 356). For more on this common
view in antiquity see Alan B. Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991).
336
PArch 2.9.3 (SC 252, 358).
337
PArch 2.9.3 (SC 252, 358).
338
PArch praef 8 (SC 252, 86). Origen calls their bodies “incorporeal” but only in the sense of
being invisible and non-earthly; the bodies are nevertheless material.
339
Everything that providence made in the material world (including irrational animals) is solely
for the benefit of God’s rational creatures: e.g. Cels IV.75-78 (Chadwick 243-246; SC 136, 370-380).
340
PArch 2.9.3: “As for dumb animals and birds and creatures that live in water, it seems
superfluous to inquire about them, since it is certain that they should be regarded as of contingent and not
primary importance” (Butterworth 132; SC 252, 358). This seems to conflict with First Principles 1.8.4 in
Koetschau’s edition (specifically, a Greek fragment included by Koetschau) which discusses how rational
beings might descend far enough to lose their reason and be born again as an irrational animal (or even of a
plant!). This fragment is from Gregory of Nyssa who does not explicitly name Origen as the author.
Koetschau identifies it as Origen largely because of Jerome’s testimony that Origen had taught a similar
view (see Butterworth 72n8). However, this fragment should be considered suspect for a number of
reasons. First, it insinuates that rational beings can lose their rationality. Origen explicitly denies this
possibility elsewhere in First Principles – e.g. 1.8.3 (SC 252, 226-228). Cf. the discussion on the
permanency of rationality above in Chapter 2. Second, this passage states that those beings who become
irrational animals and plants may rise back up through stages to rational life once again. Yet, Origen
believes that the movement of souls (whether ascending or descending) only occurs through rational
choice. It would appear to be impossible for an irrational animal's soul to begin ascending once its reason
was extinguished, for the principle by which ascent is possible would no longer exist. If we compare this
suspect passage to the more genuine comment by Origen at PArch 1.6.3 (SC 252, 202), we can see his
thought more clearly. Here Origen raises the possibility (for the reader to judge) that the devil's long
wickedness might turn into a sort of necessary nature. But it is clear that Origen himself is not convinced
by this possibility when he says a few lines later that in his opinion “every rational nature [unamquamque
rationabilem naturam] can, in the process of passing from one order to another, travel through each order
to all the rest . . . with the use of its power of free will” – PArch 1.6.3 (Butterworth 57, emphasis added; SC
252, 204). In all probability, the suggestion that the devil's wickedness might turn into a type of nature is
probably an alteration by Rufinus who wanted to defend Origen by leaving the salvation of the devil as an
open question. Ultimately, there does not seem to be any persuasive reason to believe that Origen taught the
transmigration of rational souls into animals. Origen concludes his discussion on this topic in PArch 1.8.4
by saying that such an opinion “ought certainly not to be accepted” (Butterworth 74; SC 252, 232).
Koetschau incorrectly attributes this warning to Rufinus, declaring that what Rufinus' text says “is precisely
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What led Origen to affirm the pre-existence of souls and so affirm the material
world as a secondary creation? What was his motivation for doing so? One temptation is
to point to Platonism.341 It is true that Origen paints a picture that has certain similarities
to the famous Myth of Er in Republic 10.342 However, a more likely influence for Origen
was Philo. Philo had previously written that some souls had descended to earth to become
bound in human bodies, but who also had the possibility to ascend and return once more.

the opposite of what Origen wrote” (74n3). In effect, Koetschau gives primacy to an anonymous fragment
that does not sound like Origen over one that both sounds like Origen and is stated to have come from him.
Further corroborating evidence may be found elsewhere in Origen’s corpus. By the time Origen wrote
Contra Celsum he was firmly against the idea that souls could be placed into animal bodies. A remark by
Celsus leads Origen to scoff: “This view is even worse than the myth of transmigration [μετενσωμάτωσιν],
that the soul falls from the vaults of heaven and descends as far as irrational animals, not merely the tame
but even those which are very wild” – Cels I.20.12-19 (Chadwick 21; SC 132, 126). That this is preserved
in the Greek lends support to the reliability of Rufinus’ translation on this point. In their commentary of the
fragments often associated with First Principles, Crouzel and Simonetti investigated this passage and have
also concluded that Koetschau was wrong to include it – (SC 253, 119-125, especially 124). The integrity
of the argument at this point in editions of First Principles would be better served by relegating this
fragment to an appendix. I sympathize with the suggestion by Ronnie Rombs that any new English
translation of First Principles should put all such dubious fragments in an appendix (especially those from
unfriendly witnesses), and only leave the Greek in the main text when it comes from the Philocalia –
Ronnie J. Rombs, "A Note on the Status of Origen's De Principiis in English," Vigiliae Christianae 61, no.
1 (2007).
Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre
Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations
of Contra Celsum are from: Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum.
341
In his provocatively titled book Origen against Plato, Mark Edwards tried to overturn the longstanding view that Origen relied heavily upon Platonism. His book has many strengths, especially his
analysis of Origen’s views on the transmigration of souls into other animal and human bodies, but Edwards
goes too far in trying to argue that Origen did not believe in the pre-existence of souls altogether (except in
a sort of technical in utero sense) – Edwards, Origen Against Plato: 91f. Edwards interprets Origen's
remarks about the soul growing bored and defecting away from God to lower modes of existence as a
picturesque description of the moral life of the soul in a normal human life, as if they are simply “the trials
of the soul on earth as it tries to persevere in the life of faith” (92). Those passages where Origen explicitly
affirms pre-existence in a previous world Edwards dismisses as not genuine to Origen (91). Edwards
overstates his case, for there is simply too much evidence that Origen affirmed a pre-existent life before the
creation of the material world, a life which is responsible for the diversity in the current world – e.g. PArch
2.1.3 (SC 252, 240); 2.8.3 (SC 252, 344-346); 2.8.4 (SC 252, 348); 3.3.5 (SC 268, 194); Cels V.29 (SC
147, 86-88). Similarly, Marguerite Harl had previously suggested that the pre-existence Origen refers to is
simply the existence of beings in God's foreknowledge, but before their actual creation – Harl, "La
préexistence des âmes dans l'œuvre d'Origène," 253. A full treatment of this debate in scholarship is not
possible here, but for a helpful orientation, see Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 158f.
342
Plato, Republic 10.614-10.621. (Citations of Plato use Stephanus pagination).
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Philo also mentions angelic beings who were never tempted to descend to an earthly
life.343
At the same time, we must remember that even if Origen was inspired to some
degree by Platonism on this point (or more likely Platonism as filtered through Philo) his
motivation for this belief was different from Plato's. After all, as Crouzel has noted, we
do not see any real interest in the Forms or Ideas in Origen’s conception of the preexistence.344 In fact, in one place he outright disavows such a notion.345 Origen differs
from Platonist teaching yet again by not teaching any sort of necessary dualism. Thus,
there is no necessary link between sin and earthly embodiment (after all, the worst
sinners bypassed earth completely and became demons).346 The creation of a material
world to hospitalize sinners was a free decision made by God. Even though Origen was
influenced by Philo on this point, this does not explain Origen’s motivation for using this
concept, given that Origen was willing to reject Greek philosophy just as readily as he
343

E.g. Philo, De Somniis 1,138-140. Gerald Bostock argues that Philo was Origen’s most
influential source on this point, but he cautions that this does not mean that Origen derived this doctrine
solely from Greek philosophy. Rather, Philo was influenced by Jewish teachings as well, such as the idea
of the pre-existence of the Messiah and of the patriarchs which can be found in apocryphal writings such as
Enoch 70.4 and 2 Enoch 23.5: “Origen does not base his doctrine of pre-existence on Plato but on Philo and
on an interpretation of the Bible inspired by Judaism” – Gerald Bostock, "The Sources of Origen’s
Doctrine of Pre-Existence," in Origeniana Quarta: Internationalen Origenskongresses, ed. Lothar Lies
(Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 262. Although Origen rarely mentions Philo’s name (which is
unsurprising since Origen rarely mentions any of his sources), David Runia’s important monograph reveals
that Origen was significantly influenced by Philo’s writings and methods – Runia, Philo in Early Christian
Literature: A Survey: 157-83. Even so, Runia is careful to say that Philo’s contributions do not affect the
overall structure of Origen’s thought (164). Runia also notes that Origen scholars hold widely divergent
points of view regarding the precise nature of Origen’s debt to Philo, and that this disagreement probably
stems from a larger (and prior) disagreement over whether to categorize Origen as primarily a philosopher
or a man of the Church (169f). Cf. Thümmel, "Philon und Origenes."; Rogers, Didymus the Blind and the
Alexandrian Christian Reception of Philo: 31-34; 166-71.
344
Crouzel, Origen: 207-09.
345
PArch 2.3.6: “We have already said that it is difficult to explain this other world [that Jesus
refers to when he says he is not of this world]; and for this reason, that if we did so, there would be a risk of
giving some men the impression that we were affirming the existence of certain imaginary forms
[imagines] which the Greeks call 'ideas' [ἰδέας]. For it is certainly foreign to our mode of reasoning to
speak of an incorporeal world that exists solely in the mind's fancy or the unsubstantial region of thought;
and how men could affirm that the Savior came from thence or that the saints will go thither I do not see”
(Butterworth 90; SC 252, 266).
346
Crouzel, Origen: 215.
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was to appropriate it. We saw a clear example of this in our discussion of Origen's
alterations to Stoic psychology in chapter 2. Thus, after asking what possible sources
might lie behind Origen’s doctrine of pre-existence, the more important question is to ask
why Origen included this concept in his theology.
Origen's main motivation may be seen all throughout his discussions of preexistence souls, and that is to insist, contra the gnostics, that even though God is
responsible for arranging souls in a diverse way on Earth, this was based on a prior
diversity which God was not responsible for.347 By making this argument Origen believes
he can rule out any injustice on God's part. He can also rule out chance (fortuita),
multiple creators (diuersi creatores), and diverse natures (diuersae naturae).348 Origen
admits that this is mysterious teaching which the Church has not ruled on decisively,349
but the Bible touches on the nature of this “secret” (arcani) when it speaks about Jacob
and Esau.350 Origen uses the brothers as a test-case for his hypothesis. When Scripture
says that God loved Jacob and hated Esau before they were born and before they had any
opportunity to do either good or evil, Origen insists that this is only referring to Jacob and
Esau’s moral actions in their earthly lives. The diversity of merit that each accrued in
their primordial lives did, in fact, determine the way God later treated Jacob and Esau in
their earthly lives.351

347

PArch 2.9.6: “Et haec extitit, sicut et antea iam diximus, inter rationabiles creaturas causa
diuersitatis, non ex conditoris uoluntate uel iudicio orinem trahens sed propriae libertatis arbitrio” (SC
252, 364-366).
348
PArch 2.9.6 (Butterworth 134-35; SC 252, 366).
349
PArch praef 5 (SC 252, 84).
350
PArch 2.9.7 (Butterworth 135; SC 252, 366).
351
PArch 2.9.7: “As, therefore, when the scriptures are examined with much diligence in regard to
Esau and Jacob, it is found that there is 'no unrighteousness with God' in its being said of them, before they
were born or had done anything, in this life of course [in hac scilicet uita], that 'the elder should serve the
younger', and as it is found that there is no unrighteousness in the fact that Jacob supplanted his brother
even in the womb, provided we believe that by reason of his merits in some previous life Jacob had
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Origen considered everything in Greek philosophy to be fair game if it could be
used to strengthen Christian theology, and as long as it did not contradict the Church's
Rule of Faith.352 Origen found that Philo’s notion of pre-existent souls provided a
convenient way to discredit the views of Marcionites and Valentinians; thus, Origen's
goal was that of theodicy. Practically every time he spoke of this doctrine he explicitly
used it to defend God from charges of unfairness or injustice for people who were born
into unequal stations or who were born with unequal intellects and characters.353
Origen may have had one additional (although similar) motivation for adopting
this view given his familiarity with Stoic psychology. His doctrine of pre-existent souls,
whose past sins determined their starting station in life, was a way to bypass a
problematic feature of Stoic teaching – character determinism. In the previous chapter,
we saw that Origen could have avoided the dangers of character determinism by adopting
Alexander of Aphrodisias' indeterminist notion of choice, but this would have taken away
God's ability to make definitive plans for the future. Instead, Origen followed Stoic lines
of thought by insisting that all choices derive from one's character. Souls make choices
based on what their current character and intellect deem to be most reasonable at that
specific moment. But this opened Origen up to the same difficulty found in the Stoic
system – namely, that we do not appear to have direct control over our own natures.354 If
deserved to be loved by God to such an extent as to be worthy of being preferred to his brother...”
(Butterworth 135, emphasis added; SC 252, 368).
352
Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2 on this point.
353
E.g. PArch 2.9.5 (SC 252, 361-362), where Origen uses the teaching of pre-existence to rule
out the gnostic teaching that there is a diversity in the natures of souls. Again, in PArch 2.9.6-8 Origen uses
pre-existence to defend the justice of God. PArch 2.9.8: “Herein is displayed in its completeness the
principle of impartiality, when the inequality of circumstances preserves an equality of reward for merit [In
quo profecto omnis ratio aequitatis ostenditur, dum inaequalitas rerum retributionis meritorum seruat
aequitatem]” (Butterworth 137; SC 252, 372).
354
To be clear, although the Platonists rejected the Stoic view of providence, this does not mean
they understood moral autonomy to require indeterminate choice. That appears to be an innovation by
Alexander of Aphrodisias – cf. Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception," 146-56. Also cf. George Boys-
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our choices directly follow from our intellect and character, and if we had no power over
the starting point of our intellect and character, then this appears to depict our moral
choices as ultimately products of something external to us (whatever it was that created
our initial dispositions). To be sure, our choices would spring from inside of us, yet that
internal motion would itself be predetermined by an external cause. Origen must have
recognized the similarities between this view and the gnostic view of fixed constitutions,
given that his entire literary career demonstrates a great sensitivity to this topic. Thus, in
order to reconcile the Stoic model of choice with his fundamental theological principles –
the justice and goodness of God – Origen found himself needing to make this additional
Platonic (or Philonic) alteration to the Stoic scheme: the pre-existence of souls.

Stones, "'Middle' Platonists on Fate and Human Autonomy," Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies II,
no. 94: Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC - 200 AD (2007). Boys-Stones makes a convincing argument
in this article that 'Middle' Platonist authors shared the same view as the Stoics regarding the determinism
of prior causation (including character determinism): “There is, in general, no evidence that any Platonist of
the period had any desire to deny the General Causal Principle in their efforts to save human autonomy.
Our evidence is only that they did not believe it could be done on Stoic premises” (440, emphasis in
original). Platonist authors only seemed to differ in regards to where the initial deterministic causal chain
originated – Stoics said God, while Platonists said God along with random matter (440f). This difference
would prevent Platonists from agreeing with the Stoic belief that everything that happens is planned and
intended by God, given the fact that random matter was equally responsible in beginning the causal chain
(442).
It should be noted that there are still disagreements between scholars on these points. A recent
article that illustrates the scholarly debate over what Stoics thought of “Fate” (versus free will) is: Susan
Sauvé Meyer, "Chain of Causes: What is Stoic Fate?," in God and Cosmos in Stoicism, ed. Ricardo Salles
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). In this article Meyer disagrees with both Bobzien and BoysStones who interpret the Stoic “chain of causes” (fate) as a temporal sequence of cause and effect stretching
into the past. Instead, Meyer insists that the Stoics viewed the “chain of causes” as the sympathetic
interrelationship of all corporeal causes – a “mutual causal relationship” – and that this chain is something
that exists in the present moment, and does not primarily refer to a cause and effect chain that stretches into
the past and future. Thus, she concludes, opponents of Stoicism were not worried about “alternative
possibilities” or “determinism” (88). I find Meyer most convincing when she argues that the “chain of
causes” (or fate) encompasses the atemporal and immediate interrelationship between all causes in the
cosmos, understood through the Stoic notion of “sympathy.” However, this does not seem to undercut the
arguments by Bobzien and Boys-Stones which assert that the chain of causes also has a temporal aspect.
After all, Meyer admits that Stoics also discuss “antecedent causes” quite frequently (85-87), which does
denote a temporal aspect. More importantly, I disagree with Meyer’s claim that opponents of Stoicism were
not concerned with alternative possibilities. The discussion of Alexander of Aphrodisias in Chapter 2
shows this statement to be an overreach.
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Origen's adoption of this Platonic doctrine was strategic, for Origen found himself
with an urgent and biblical question of theodicy: Is God just or not? One could answer in
the way of Marcion and state that the reason people are born into unequal situations of
misery is the fault of a bad and capricious deity. The gnostic answer was to say that
people have different stations in life based on different fundamental constitutions. Origen
rejected both of these options, as well as the similar Stoic view. Origen only had one
deity to ascribe causes to, and this deity must be both good and fair; this deity created all
with the same nature. Also, Origen could not merely appeal to Scripture, for his
opponents were quick to make similar appeals to the same holy texts. Therefore, the
theological move that made the most sense to Origen was to adopt the idea of a
primordial fall, and this became a central feature of his theodicy.

4) Moral Progress (Part 1): Initial Repentance and the Pursuit of Virtue
The goal for all rational creatures is to turn away from sin and grow in the virtues,
both in the earthly life and in the life to come. This is the moral quest. The final goal of
the quest is reunion with God which will only be achieved after a long period of continual
ascent in and towards goodness. The ascent is powered by the soul choosing to turn away
from the desires of the flesh and instead aligning with the desires of the spirit. Because a
person's free choice is always dependent on their intellect and character, the main way
God cooperates with rational creatures during this time is by strengthening their reason
and disciplining their character. God does this by employing a wide swath of pedagogical
strategies, the most important of which is facilitated by the work of Jesus Christ through

123

his Incarnation, death, and Resurrection.355 Christ’s atonement makes possible the
justification of each sinner, which is a crucial element in the moral quest.356 Christ also
frees us from the devil who was holding us; Christ’s blood was the price that was
demanded.357 The moral quest may be described as a pedagogical quest guided by the
Logos himself,358 and so Origen views soteriology as pedagogical soteriology.359
355

The role of Jesus’ Incarnation, death, and Resurrection in Origen’s thought is complicated,
given that he never systematically addresses it in his extant writings. The various titles or aspects (ἐπίνοια)
of Jesus that Origen lists in ComJn 1.52-57 (SC 120, 88-90) are the various ways that Jesus meets the
current condition of fallen souls in order to heal them – cf. Cels II.64.1-5 (SC 132, 435); PArch 1.2.1-13
(SC 252, 110-142). Each individual soul needs a specific type of help from God, and Jesus applies the
various cures in a plethora of ways. For a sampling of texts where Origen speaks about the effects of
Christ’s Incarnation, death, and Resurrection, see Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 108-52.
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on John (by book and section) are from the most recent critical
edition: Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Unless otherwise noted, English translations from
ComJn are from Ronald Heine’s 2 volume set: Heine, Commentary on the Gospel According to John,
Books 1-10; Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 13-32.
356
Origen understands the justification of the sinner to be a requirement for salvation. According
to Origen, the two factors in our justification are our faith and Christ’s blood. Origen insists that “neither
does our faith justify us apart from the blood of Christ nor does the blood of Christ justify us apart from our
faith. Of the two, however, the blood of Christ justifies us much more than our faith” – ComRm IV.11.6670 (Scheck 1.298; Bammel 352). The moment Jesus died on the cross he reconciled “men to God through
his blood, provided that they keep the covenant of reconciliation inviolate by sinning no longer” – ComRm
IV.12.68-71 (Scheck 1.301; Bammel 357). Jesus’ death was the “beginning of reconciliation. His
resurrection and life, however, conferred salvation to believers” – ComRm IV.12.72-74 (Scheck 1.301;
Bammel 357). Finally, Jesus’ death on the cross was more than a payment to the Devil; it is also a powerful
teaching tool, for “he gave men an example which teaches us to resist sins even to the point of death” –
ComRm IV.12.66-68 (Scheck 1.301; Bammel 357). There has been considerable scholarly debate on how
to best understand Origen’s view of “faith and works” in the process of justification. Important
contributions to this question include: Harnack, History of Dogma, 2: 321f; Boyd, "Origen on Pharaoh's
hardened heart: a study of Justification and Election in St. Paul and Origen."; M. F. Wiles, The Divine
Apostle: The Interpretation of St Paul’s Epistles in the Early Church (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1967), 105-16; T. Heither, Translatio Religionis: Die Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem
Kommentar zum Römerbrief, Bonner Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte (Cologne: Böhlau, 1990), 238ff;
Caroline P. Hammond Bammel, "Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen," The Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 47, no. 2 (1996); Thomas P. Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The
Legacy of Origen's Commentary on Romans (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 1362. Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical
edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 1,
2, 3. All English translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2-volume work: Scheck,
Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the
Romans Books 6-10.
357
ComRm II.9 (Scheck 1.161; Bammel 172).
358
PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44; SC 268, 232-234): “But this subjection will be accomplished
through certain means and courses of discipline and periods of time… by word [verbo], by reason, by
teaching, by the exhortation to better things, by the best methods of education, and also by such merited
and appropriate threatenings…” Origen begins his list with “word” (Rufinus translates λογος as verbo
here). Origen is referring to the Word, the Son of God. A few lines later Origen explicitly refers to the
“Word of God” (uerbum dei) as the agent in charge of the task of pedagogical soteriology.
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I will be brief here, for although Origen has a great deal to say about defeating
bodily passions and pursuing virtue, much of it is not directly relevant to the scope of this
study. During the discussion in Chapter 2 on Origen's tripartite anthropology I
highlighted the importance of human free choice and its general role in the moral quest.
In Chapter 5, I will focus on how God arranges and cooperates with human choices (in
this world and the next) in order to ensure a final restoration. Much more could be said on
this topic given that practically all of Origen's theology revolves around it. Yet, in
keeping with my narrower focus on the way God's providence interacts with human
moral autonomy, I conclude this section by noting that for Origen the moral quest of
returning to God begins in one’s earthly life, but it does not end there. The degree of
progress (or regress) in this life is important, but from the perspective of cosmic history
one’s earthly life is brief, and therefore any progress made here is only a fraction of the
overall distance the soul needs to travel.360

5) Moral Progress (Part 2): Bodily Death, Resurrection, Purification and Ascent
Death and Resurrection:
Origen understands the second and longer part of the moral quest to begin after
one's earthly life ends. We can subdivide this next stage even further by first examining
Origen's views of Death and Resurrection, and then his views on Purification and Ascent.

359

This is perhaps the most well-known feature of Origen’s theology – for discussion of Origen’s
pedagogical soteriology, cf. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum
Platonismus; Karen Jo Torjesen, "Pedagogical Soteriology from Clement to Origen," in Origeniana Quarta
4, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1985); Jacobsen, Christ-The Teacher of Salvation: A Study
on Origen's Christology and Soteriology.
360
Cf. ComRm X.10 (Scheck 2.275-276; Bammel 813): “And now, we shall nonetheless say that
Paul and if there are those who are like him are said to be perfect in comparison with others; but no human
being can be called or be perfect in comparison with the highest knowledge or to the perfection that exists
among the heavenly orders.”
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For Origen, death is only the end of one's earthly body and is the beginning of a new
stage of existence, for “things which were made by God for the purpose of permanent
existence cannot suffer a destruction of their substance [substantialem uero
interitum].”361 The Resurrection that occurs after death is a transformation in the
substance of the earthly body into something ethereal and invisible, yet not
incorporeal.362 The resurrected body is not the same as the old rotted body, even if they
are linked by a certain “life-principle” that preserves a consistent bodily essence.363 Souls
must continue to have bodies in the afterlife because it is the body which allows for
movement. But our bodies must also be suited to the nature of the environment we are in,
and so after death when we are in the “purer, ethereal and heavenly regions” (αἰθερίους
καί οὐρανός τόπους), our bodies must be likewise.364 Just as in the previous stages of
cosmic history, God grants new bodies in the Resurrection in accordance with a person's
merit.365 The new ethereal bodies will continue to change by degrees according to the

361

PArch 3.6.5 (Butterworth 251; SC 268, 244). Origen rules out annihilationism here.
Origen’s view of the resurrection body is one of the most hotly debated aspects of Origen’s
theology. For example, Charles Hill argues that Origen believes in an intermediate period after death and
before resurrection where souls exist without bodies – Charles Hill, Regnum Caelorum: Patterns of
Millennial Thought in Early Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001), 176-89,
especially 81-84. On the other hand, Mark Edwards insists that Origen envisions no such intermediate state,
and no incorporeal existence for individuals whatsoever – Mark J. Edwards, "Origen's Two Resurrections,"
Journal of Theological Studies 46 (1995). However, I and many other scholars follow Crouzel’s argument
that in Origen the resurrected beings have an ethereal body that is closely linked with their earthly body –
Crouzel, "L'Apocatastase chez Origène." Daley has written a helpful orientation on the main contours of
this debate – Brian Daley, "Resurrection," in The Westminster Handbook to Origen, ed. John McGuckin
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). Cf. A. Le Boulluec, "De la croissance selon les
stoïciens à la résurrection selon Origène," Revue des Études Grecques 88 (1975); Watson, "Souls and
bodies in Origen's Peri Archon."; Brian Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic
Eschatology (New York: Cambridge University, 1991), 51-56; Hennessey, "Origen of Alexandria: The
Fate of the Soul and the Body after Death."; Edwards, "Origen's Two Resurrections."; John David Dawson,
"Spiritual Bodies," in Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001); Somos, "Origenian apocatastasis revisited?." Cf. discussion on this debate above in
n193.
363
PArch 2.10.3: “Ita namque etiam nostra corpora uelut granum cadere in terram putanda sunt ;
quibus insita ratio ea, quae substantiam continet corporalem…” (Butterworth 141; SC 252, 380).
364
Cels VII.32.20 (SC 150, 86).
365
Cels V.19.1-5 (SC 147, 58); PArch 2.10.2 (SC 252, 378).
362
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progress or regress of each soul through long periods of time until all rational souls have
been restored to God.366 This continuation of the moral quest does not take place in some
other realm, but instead it takes place in the very same material heavens and earth in
which other people continue to live out their earthly lives.367 Origen did not believe in
reincarnation, or that individuals who had died would once again be born into new
bodies.368
Purification and Punishment:
Resurrection bodies are sufficiently incorruptible that they cannot be dissolved by
fiery punishments.369 This is important because immediately following the Resurrection

366

PArch 3.6.7: “The bodily nature, however, admits of a change in substance [substantialem
recipit permutationem], so that God the Artificer of all things, in whatever work of design or construction
or restoration he may wish to engage, has at hand the service of this material for all purposes, and can
transform and transfer it into whatever forms and species he desires, as the merits of things demand”
(Butterworth 253; SC 268, 250).
367
Resurrected creatures continue to live (and rise upwards through) the “heavens” – PArch 2.10.3
(Butterworth 141; SC 252, 380). PArch 2.11.6: “We may speak in some such way also about the abode in
the air. I think that the saints as they depart from this life will remain in some place situated on the earth,
which the scripture calls ‘paradise’. This will be a place of instruction and, so to speak, a lecture room or
school for souls in which they may be taught about all they had seen on earth and may also receive some
indications of what is to follow in the future” (Butterworth 152; SC 252, 408).
368
Origen refers to this concept as metensomatoseos (“transmigration”). When commenting on
John the Baptist in ComJn 6.64f, Origen notes that some people try to defend the doctrine of
“transmigration” (μετενσωματώσεως) by saying that John’s soul is actually Elijah’s re-born (Heine 186; SC
157, 176). In ComJn 6.66 Origen insists that someone who belongs to the Church (τις ἐκκλησιαστικὸς) must
repudiate the doctrine of μετενσωματώσεως and call it false (Heine 186; SC 157, 176). Given that we have
here Origen’s explicit denial of this doctrine, preserved in the Greek, it is probably safe to conclude with
Edwards that “We may take it as a rule, then, that a single soul can experience only a single human life” –
Edwards, Origen Against Plato: 99. At the same time, however, Origen appears to suggest at least a
hypothetical possibility of a future falling away after the apocatastasis, which could result in another
earthly life for souls who need to be rehabilitated again – cf. PArch 2.3.4 where Origen says that if future
falls were to occur, that future cycles would not be identical to previous ones as the Stoic believed “…but
worlds may exist that are diverse, having variations by no means slight, so that for certain clear causes the
condition of one may be better, while another for different causes may be worse, and another intermediate.
What may be the number or measure of these worlds I confess I do not know; but I would willingly learn, if
any man can show me” (Butterworth 88; SC 252, 260). Such an eventuality would not be an example of
metensomatoeos, but it would mean that a soul could (hypothetically) experience more than one earthly life.
As such, I would correct Edwards’ statement by saying that Origen believes a soul can experience only a
single human life per each cycle of salvation-history (in case there is more than one cycle), with each cycle
leading to a restoration. (I will advance the argument in Chapter 4, however, that Origen viewed the
apocatastasis to be permanent).
369
PArch 2.10.3 (SC 252, 382).
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is a time of purifying punishments. Taking his cue from Isaiah 50:11, Origen says that
when scripture speaks of eternal370 fire it is a fire that belongs to the sinner:
These words seem to indicate that every sinner kindles for himself the
flame of his own fire [quod unusquisque peccatorum flammam sibi ipse
proprii ignis], and is not plunged into a fire which has been previously
kindled by some one else or which existed before him . . . when the soul
has gathered within itself a multitude of evil deeds and an abundance of
sins, at the requisite time [conpetenti tempore] the whole mass of evil
boils up into punishment and is kindled into penalties; at which time the
mind or conscience, bringing to memory [memoriam] through divine
power [diuinam uirtutem] all things the signs and forms of which it had
impressed upon itself at the moment of sinning, will see exposed before its
eyes a kind of history of its evil deeds [historiam quandam scelerum
suorum ante oculos uidebit expositam], of every foul and disgraceful act
and all unholy conduct. Then the conscience is harassed and pricked by its
own stings, and becomes an accuser and witness against itself.371
Here we see Origen's understanding of post-Resurrection punishment as an extension of
individual memory, which is enabled or heightened in intensity by God’s power. Having
to experience shameful and painful memories of one's past sins is a just punishment, for
the memories are quite literally of the person's own making.372 Nevertheless, at the same
time God's providence is responsible for this process in at least two ways. First, God
himself came up with this plan of purification and this role for memory in his strategic
planning of salvation-history. Second, the actual process of the purifying pain is induced
370

Origen believes that “eternal” (αἰώνιος / aeterna) has several different meanings, including the
designation of a long (but finite) length of time. E.g. ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.16; Bammel 477-8).
371
PArch 2.10.4 (Butterworth 141-42; SC 252, 384). Cf. ComRm II.5 (Scheck 1.121; Bammel
122): “We have already repeatedly said concerning wrath that anyone who is struck in his soul by the
awareness of sin is someone tormented by wrath.” ComMatt 10.2: “[In the last days when God’s angels
gather all things that cause a stumbling block to souls which they will cast into the burning furnace of fire],
then those who become conscious that they have received the seeds of the evil one in themselves, because
of their having been asleep, shall wail and, as it were, be angry against themselves.” – (Patrick 415; SC
162, 146-8). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Matthew are from the most recent critical edition:
Robert Girod, Origène: Commentaire sur l'Évangile selon Matthieu, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les
Éditions du cerf, 1970). English translations are from: John Patrick, "Origen's Commentary on the Gospel
of Matthew," in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Allan Menzies (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1896;
reprint 1999).
372
Origen frequently emphasizes that punishment is distributed in a way that perfectly accords
with God’s justice, e.g. PArch 2.9.8: God arranges the universe “on the principles of a most impartial
retribution [aequissima retribution]” (Butterworth 137; SC 252, 372).
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by God at the “requisite time” (conpetenti tempore) and through the “divine power”
(diuinam uirtutem).373 To those who might doubt whether memory could be that
powerful, Origen suggests they look at well-known examples of people whose memories
of grief, or lust, or regret are so intense and painful that the person is willing to take his
own life rather than continue experiencing it.374 The theme of punishment through
memory might also help to explain Origen's comments elsewhere about Jesus restoring
his people to a point where they may “forget” (ἀμνηστίαν) the sins that they have
previously committed.375
Despite the severity of punishments that each soul will face in varying degrees,
Origen insists that God is our great and loving physician. And as our physician, these
punishments are not vindictive, but rather they serve as medicine. Just as a surgeon in
severe cases needs to cut with the knife or burn with fire to get at the underlying disease,
so God also administers strong and painful medicine, not simply as a judgment, but also
as a tool for healing.376 Thus, Origen calls punishments in the afterlife “penal remedies”
(poenalibus curis), which helpfully depicts their dual nature as both just judgments and
restorative medicine.377 Origen understands divine punishment to work in this way in all

373

Cf. Cels V.15, where Origen describes God’s punishments as purifying, beneficent, and
strategically applied (SC 147, 51-52).
374
PArch 2.10.5 (SC 252, 384-386).
375
Cels V.32.6 (Chadwick 288; SC 147, 94). Origen held that through water baptism God would
forgive (and forget) the sins committed before baptism, while any sins committed after baptism (or all sins
for people who were never baptized) will need to be purified in the afterlife. All of those who sin after
baptism will need to be baptized in fire – HomJer 2.3.1-22 (SC 232, 246). Citations from Origen’s
Homilies on Jeremiah are from the most recent critical edition (including volume and page): Pierre Nautin,
Origène: Homélies sur Jérémie, 2 vols., vol. 1, 2, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1976).
Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are from John Clark Smith, Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah
and 1 Kings 28, FOTC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998).
376
PArch 2.10.6 (SC 252, 386-388).
377
PArch 2.10.6: “...God our physician, in his desire to wash away the ills of our souls, which they
have brought on themselves through a variety of sins and crimes, makes use of penal remedies of a similar
sort, even to the infliction of a punishment of fire on those who have lost their soul's health” (Butterworth
143; SC 252, 388).
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cases, including those instances where God exercises judgments on people during their
earthly lives. This understanding, therefore, serves as an interpretive principle for Origen
when he exegetes thorny passages in Scripture where God is described as abandoning
people or giving them up to their sins. God’s strategy of abandonment might seem
counterintuitive: how does letting people sin even more produce the desired result? After
all, Origen knows that the more one sins the easier it is to keep sinning, so why should
allowing an increase in sin lead to a greater likelihood of repentance? The answer for
Origen lies in the importance of a soul’s self-awareness of its own broken condition. By
allowing people to wallow in sin they will finally reach a point where they become aware
of it and begin to hate their sin.378
In fact, every temptation should lead to greater self-awareness, for by examining
the things we are tempted by we gain knowledge of what we are like. In this way
temptations are good things, for they reveal the secret things of the heart if people pay
attention to them.379 When people do not discipline themselves to pay attention to their
temptations, then God allows them to become fully saturated in evil and misery, so that
they may finally arrive at self-awareness. At this point a person begins to hate what they
crave, even as they continue to crave it.380 God will sometimes even allow the evil to
continue for such a long period that it becomes incurable by one's own efforts.381 Only

378

Cels V.32.15: God gives certain people over to their sins “in order that by being sated with sin
they might hate it…” (Chadwick 289; SC 147, 94). PArch 3.1.17, Greek: “[When God abandons sinners,]
he helps them by not helping them [βοηθῶν αὐτοῖς οὐ βοηθεῖ τούτου αὐτοῖς λυσιτελοῦντος]” (Butterworth
191; SC 268, 102).
379
PEuch 29.17 (GCS II, 391.24-29). Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the BerlinLeipzig critical edition (GCS), and are listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II), page number,
and line number: Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet. Unless otherwise noted,
English translations are from Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book
IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers.
380
PEuch 29.14 (GCS II, 389.1-25).
381
PEuch 29.13 (GCS II, 388.3-12).

130

then will God enter with his remedy, for if he had applied the remedy any earlier the
person would not have understood the evil they were engaging in and it would have led to
greater failings in the future. God's remedy comes in the form of a beneficent healing fire,
not to be confused with the fiery punishment people experience of their own doing. God's
fire frees them “from all the filth and blood by which they had been so stained and
defiled that they could not even think of being saved from their own destruction.”382 By
delaying the healing remedy, God ensures that the patient desires it, for God does not
want goodness to belong to anyone by necessity but only willingly.383 When the person
reaches their limits and begins to hate their sin, God steps in to heal the person. This is a
painful process, but it is not punishment; it is simply a medicine of purification that is
painful in its application.384 Thus, there are two types of pain people experience in the
afterlife, both of which Origen describes as a type of metaphorical “fire”, and yet only
one is a punishment; the other is healing. People will suffer these “fires” in varying
degrees according to their works.385 Both are designed as necessary parts of the process
by which God restores all souls to himself.386
382

PEuch 29.15 (Greer 159; GCS II, 390.14-17).
PEuch 29.15 (Greer 160; GCS II, 390-391).
384
PEuch 29.15: “But in the fire and the prison they do not receive ‘the due penalty of their error,’
but they gain a beneficence for cleansing them of the evils in their error [ἐν δὲ τῶ πυρὶ καὶ τῆ φυλακῆ
ἀντιμισθίαν τῆς πλάνης ἀλλ᾿ εὐεργεσίαν ἐπὶ καθάρσει τῶν ἐν τῆ πλάνη κακῶν μετὰ σωτηρίων λαμβάνοντες
πόνων]” (Greer 159; GCS II, 390.13-14).
385
HomJer 12.3.9-14: “He who is about to punish spares no one. Not even if someone were called
a prophet, he has sins, and will not be filled when the threats are spoken. Not even if someone were called a
priest and believed that he had a stature of a more honorable name among the people does God spare him
to the point that he does not punish him who has sinned” (Smith 114-115 italics in original; SC 238, 20).
386
Cf. HomNum 27.10.3: “For just as physicians put bitter [substances] in medicines with a view
to the health and healing of those who are sick, so also the physician of our souls, with a view to our
salvation, has willed that we suffer the bitterness of this life in various temptations, knowing that the end of
this bitterness gains the sweetness of salvation for our soul” (Scheck 177; SC 461, 315). Because
punishments are medicinal and pedagogical, Origen understands all punishments to be temporary rather
than eternal. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Numbers are from the newest critical edition: Louis
Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur les Nombres, 3 vols., vol. 1, 2, 3, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les
Éditions du Cerf, 1996-1999). English translations are from Thomas P. Scheck, Homilies on Numbers:
Origen, trans. Thomas Scheck, Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009).
383
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Ascent:
Once people die, and once they receive their new bodies and are purified by God,
the moral quest continues.387 God's purifying fire and the painful memory of past sins
spur the soul upward level by level. Individuals continue to exist in the material world –
only now they live in the air above the earth, which scripture calls paradise
(paradisum).388 For example, people who died in the flood did not get taken out of the
heavens and earth, but instead got moved out of the earthly regions and into the air.389
The initial starting place (or “stage” or “mansion”) each soul finds itself in corresponds to
how much progress was made in the person’s earthly life. Those who make greater
progress in their earthly lives benefit by resuming their moral quest with a higher
advantage.390 In essence, this abode in the air functions as a “school for souls” (schola
animarum), where all are to be instructed about God's providence;391 each Mind's
intelligence will grow as it learns why certain events happened on earth, how God has a
plan for everything, and also about future things to come.392

387
Origen knows that people only make varying degrees of progress in life, and so the moral quest
or the ascent back to God must continue after death. This raises a question: what is the purpose of the
earthly stage of life if it is not sufficient for restoring us to God, no matter how hard we try? That is to say,
clearly the moral quest does not seem to logically require an earthly existence, since the majority of the
quest takes place after the soul's earthly existence. Why bother with the intermediate step at all? The
answer for Origen seems to be that there is something about bodily temptations on earth (even morally
neutral temptations like the need to eat and drink) which impose a unique training opportunity for the soul.
By training ourselves to turn away from unhealthy bodily desires, we begin to train ourselves to turn away
from improper mental desires. E.g. PArch 3.6.8: “It seems to me, therefore, that as in this earth the law was
a kind of schoolmaster to those who by it were appointed to be led to Christ and to be instructed and trained
in order that after their training in the law they might be able with greater facility to receive the more
perfect precepts of Christ...” (Butterworth 254; SC 268, 252).
388
PArch 2.11.6 (Butterworth 152; SC 252, 408). Cf. Philo De Somniis 1,138-141.
389
Cels VI.59.5-14 (SC 147, 324-326).
390
PArch 2.3.7 (Butterworth 93-94; SC 252, 272-274); HomNum 1.3 (Scheck 4-5; SC 415, 40-48).
391
PArch 2.11.6 (Butterworth 152; SC 252, 408).
392
PArch 2.11.6-7 (SC 252, 407-412). PArch 2.11.5: “He will learn the judgement of divine
providence [diuinae prouidentiae] about each individual thing; about things which happen to men, that they
happen not by chance or accident, but by a reason so carefully thought out, and so high above us, that it
does not overlook even the number of hairs on our head” (Butterworth 151; SC 252, 406). This passage
insinuates that everything apart from human choice happens by divine providence. Thus, all of salvation-
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Before the coming of Christ there was a limit in how high souls were able to
ascend. Certainly, Old Testament saints like Abraham and Samuel would have risen
higher than those who had died with many sins. Yet, there was a terminus ad quem, for
no one could pass the fiery swords of the cherubim who guarded the Tree of Life. All had
to wait until the coming of Jesus Christ who opened up the passage through the fire; with
Christ’s work accomplished the barrier has been lifted.393 Henceforth, continual
pedagogy will facilitate the soul's upward progress past the planets and through the
heavens;394 the soul learns about each level that it passes through as it follows after the
trailblazer Jesus Christ who was the first to ascend in order to show the way.395 But this
will take place over many ages, with some individuals achieving the goal before
others.396 In a homily on Numbers 33 Origen links the exodus of the Israelites with the
soul's ascent to God.397 He identifies forty-two stages the Israelites passed through on
their way to the Promised Land and Origen suggests that the soul will similarly travel

history – indeed, the entire history of the universe – can be divided into the categories of either God’s
providence or human moral autonomy.
393
Hom1R (1S) V.9.36-10.13: “In fact, before the sojourn of my Lord Jesus Christ, it was
impossible for someone to come near to where the Tree of Life was . . . So Patriarchs and Prophets and
everyone wait for the coming of my Lord Jesus Christ, in order that he might open up the way . . . [but now
after Christ] we pass through, and we have something further” (Smith 331-333; SC 328, 204-206). Origen
preached from the Septuagint (1 Kings 28), but modern bibles label this as 1 Samuel 28, as does the
Sources Chrétiennes title. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on 1 Kings (1 Samuel) are from the critical
edition by Pierre Nautin and Marie-Thérèse Nautin, Origène: Homélies sur Samuel, Sources Chrétiennes
(Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1986). English translations are from Smith, Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah
and 1 Kings 28.
394
PArch 1.6.3 (SC 252, 202-204).
395
HomNum 27.3.1-2: “Thus the one who ascends, ascends with him who descended from there to
us, so that he can reach the place from which that one descended…come now and let us begin to ascend
through the things by which Christ descended…” (Scheck 171; SC 461, 282-286). The language used by
Origen here is reminiscent of the Ascension of Isaiah.
396
The fact that some souls arrive at their destination before others is an important point that will
be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
397
Origen finds a double spiritual meaning in the exodus, both representing the soul's ascent to
God after death, as well as representing the sinner's turning away from the pagan life to the Christian life in
the life before death, HomNum 27.2.2 (Scheck 170; SC 461, 280).
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through forty-two stages after death.398 Perhaps, suggests Origen, Jesus Christ will be the
doorway both in and out of each stage.399 Temptation must be resisted at each subsequent
stage so that the soul does not relapse, yet it becomes easier to resist them at each stage.
In Origen's words:
[The soul], when it is about to ascend to heaven after the resurrection,
neither suddenly nor unseasonably, ascends to the heights, but is led
through “many stages,” through which it is enlightened stage by stage, and
it always receives an increase of splendor, illumined at each stage by the
light of wisdom, until it reaches the Father himself.400
While the intellectual power of the mind advances, the person's body grows more and
more spiritual until it develops into the glory of a “spiritual body” (spiritalis corporis).401
The entire process is governed by God's providential oversight to the advantage of each
individual soul, so that all may arrive at their final destination of rest (requiem).402

Conclusion
This brief overview of Origen’s vision of salvation-history provides the necessary
backdrop and context for my analysis of Origen’s universalism, to which we now turn.
This chapter has demonstrated that at every stage of salvation-history divine providence
instructs, guides, and enforces the direction of history towards one specific end: the
eventual restoration of every fallen soul. The next chapter will demonstrate that Origen
believed this telos has been predetermined by God.

398

HomNum 27.3.1 (Scheck 171; SC 461, 284). Cf. ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.14-15; Bammel 475):
“…after someone has been set free from sin, he must, first of all, serve righteousness and all the virtues
together, so that from there he might ascend, by means of progress, to the point that he becomes a slave to
God…there is an order in the level of advancement and there are degrees within the virtues.”
399
HomNum 27.2.3 (Scheck 170; SC 461, 280).
400
HomNum 27.6.1 (Scheck 173; SC 461, 296).
401
PArch 3.6.6 (Butterworth 252; SC 268, 246).
402
HomNum 27.4.1 (Scheck 171; SC 461, 288).
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CHAPTER FOUR
APOCATASTASIS
Introduction and Scope
In this chapter I will examine the often-debated final stage of Origen’s cosmic
history. My examination will be focused in the following ways: Origen was not the first
nor the last ancient writer to make use of the theme of apocatastasis403 or the various
elements that often relate to the idea of universal salvation.404 However, it is outside the
403

Origen used the actual term ἀποκατάστασις infrequently, even though he frequently talks about
the concept of a final restoration in other ways. Origen uses the term itself in the following places: ComJn
1.91 (Heine 52; SC 120, 106); PArch 3.1.15-19 (Greek – Butterworth 188; SC 268, 92), where Origen does
not use the term eschatologically, but to refer to the “restoration of sight [ἀποκατάστασιν τῆς ὁράσεωσ]”;
HomJer 14.18.17-29: commenting on Jeremiah 15:19 (“If you will return, I will also restore you”), Origen
writes, “These words again are said to each person whom God exhorts to “return” to him. But for me there
seems to be evident here a mystery in I will restore you. No one is restored to a certain place unless he was
once there, but the restoration [ἀποκατάστασις] is to one’s own home . . . Thus he says here to us who turn
away that if we return, he will restore us [ἀποκατάστασει]” (Smith 155-56; SC 238, 108-110). Rufinus
frequently translates Origen’s Greek with the expressions restituere (e.g. PArch 2.1.1, SC 252, 236) and
consummatio (e.g. PArch 1.6.1, SC 252, 194).
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on John (by book and section) are from the most recent
critical edition: Blanc, Origène: Commentaire sur Saint Jean. Unless otherwise noted, English translations
from ComJn are from Ronald Heine’s 2 volume set: Heine, Commentary on the Gospel According to John,
Books 1-10; Commentary on the Gospel According to John, Books 13-32. The most recent critical edition
of First Principles is by Crouzel and Simonetti, Origèn: Traité des Principes. Citations will list SC volume
and page (for additional information see the bibliography). Unless otherwise noted, all English translations
from Peri Archon are from Butterworth, Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the De
principiis. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Jeremiah are from the most recent critical edition
(including volume and page): Nautin, Origène: Homélies sur Jérémie, 1, 2. Unless otherwise noted, all
English translations are from Smith, Origen: Homilies on Jeremiah and 1 Kings 28.
404
The term “ἀποκατάστασις” is only found once in the New Testament (Acts 3:21), but is found
in several pre-Christian sources. An early notion of apocatastasis is found in Stoicism, pertaining to the
idea of the return (ἀποκατάστασις) of the planets to their rightful places, which issues forth a conflagration
that returns the cosmos back to its primal element (fire), after which follows the rebirth of all existing
things – see Maria-Barbara Von Stritzky, "Die Bedeutung der Phaidrosinterpretation für die
Apokatastasislehre des Origenes," Vigiliae Christianae 31, no. 4 (1977). Von Stritzky also examines
parallels between Origen and various Platonists, including Plotinus. On Origen and the Stoic view of
apocatastasis, cf. Edward Moore, Origen of Alexandria and St. Maximus the Confessor: An Analysis and
Critical Evaluation of Their Eschatological Doctrines (Boca Raton, FL: Dissertation.com, 2004), 25.
Origen explicitly rejected the Stoic notion on the basis that repeating world cycles, which were identical
down to every detail, would constitute a rejection of moral autonomy – e.g. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260);
Cels IV.67-68 (SC 136, 348-352). Platonists believed that souls were immortal and lived on without the
body after death. However, this would not be an individualized life, but rather souls would be subsumed in
the World Soul from which they came given that matter was the source of all differentiation. But Platonists
did not assume that all souls would enjoy this end, for many would continually be reincarnated in different
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scope of this study to trace the conceptual history of this topic, if such an undertaking is
even possible.405 It must be stressed, however, that “universal salvation” does not mean
one thing in the abstract. Different authors who claim to believe in universal salvation
understand this concept to entail varying features. It is not my goal to sort through such
issues here, as interesting as they may be.406 Neither will I expound on the many facets of
Origen’s eschatology in general. Instead, my examination of Origen's understanding of

bodies – cf. Blosser, Become Like the Angels: 223-29. At any rate, Philo was convinced that not many
people would attain such a blessed end – see Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim I, 16, as cited in ibid.,
227n30. Clement of Alexandria should be considered one of Origen's most important sources on the topic
of universal salvation, for Clement appears to have held a similar view concerning the necessity of all souls
finally being reunited with God. His language resembles Origen’s (e.g. Strom. 2.2, 7.2, 10.56; Fragments
from Cassiodorus 1.3). Andrew Itter notes that when Clement employs the actual term ἀποκατάστασις, he
uses it to describe the restoration of the gnostic elect rather than of the whole universe. Yet, Clement also
seems to imply that the restoration of the whole will be facilitated by the restoration of the gnostic –
Andrew Itter, Esoteric Teaching in the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria, vol. 97, Supplements to
Vigiliae Christianae (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2009), 200. Cf. A. Méhat, "« Apocatastase » :
Origène, Clément d’Alexandrie, Act. 3, 21," Vigiliae Christianae 10 (1956); Ilaria Ramelli, "Origen,
Bardaisan, and the Origin of Universal Salvation," Harvard Theological Review 102, no. 2 (2009). Outside
of Alexandria, however, the predominant view was of non-universal salvation and, by implication, an
eternal Hell – e.g. Justin Martyr, First Apology 8, 12, 21, 52. Second Clement 6.7, 17.7; Tertullian, Apology
18.3, 44.12-13; Irenaeus, Haer. 1.10.1, 4.28.2.
Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre
Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations
of Contra Celsum are from: Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum.
405
This was recently attempted by Ilaria L. E. Ramelli in her large monograph – Ramelli, The
Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: a critical assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena. One
commends her courage at tackling such a large topic; in her own words, “My analysis will extend to the
whole of the Patristic age, from the New Testament - and indeed the whole of the Bible . . . to John the Scot
Eriugena, whose thought was nourished by the best of Greek Patristics” (2). Cf. the critical review of her
book by Michael McClymond, "Origenes Vindicatus vel Rufinus Redivivus? A Review of Ilaria Ramelli's
The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis (2013)," Theological Studies 76, no. 4 (2015). An outdated history
of Universalism, (yet still helpful for the breadth of texts it covers), is Hosea Ballou, Ancient History of
Universalism (Boston: Universalist Publishing House, 1872).
406
So, for example, even the staunch defender of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, who also affirmed a
form of universal salvation, nevertheless differs from Origen regarding the doctrine of the final state in key
details. Morwenna Ludlow has written a very helpful monograph on Gregory’s universalism: Morwenna
Ludlow, Universal salvation: eschatology in the thought of Gregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), see especially 77-112. Ludlow does not spend much time comparing
Gregory to Origen, but my sense is that while Gregory is clearly indebted to Origen on this topic, he
nevertheless argues for it in different ways. Gregory also denies the pre-existence of souls which had
formed an important context for Origen’s universalism. Thus, when I refer to “apocatastasis” or “universal
salvation”, the reader should understand that I am only speaking of Origen's view of the universality of
salvation (and its accompanying features), and I am not intending to give definition to the umbrella term
“universalism” itself, for this would artificially restrict many of the eschatological doctrines found in other
Patristic authors. For a standard work analyzing the various eschatological beliefs in Patristic authors, see
Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic Eschatology.
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universal salvation primarily concerns questions of its predetermined or foreordained
character. Did Origen believe in a final restoration of all souls, or only for some? Is this
final restoration something Origen merely hoped for, or did he believe it to be an
infallible fact? Once achieved, is it permanent, or will there be never-ending cycles of fall
and restoration? While various other details about Origen's view of the final state may be
discussed along the way, my focal point will be on the degree to which Origen's
eschatology may be described as a species of determinism (in the sense of a teleological
predetermination that is unalterable by human moral autonomy).407
My reasons for exploring Origen's universalism from this angle are twofold: first,
disagreements in contemporary scholarship on this specific point are numerous, and that
alone makes this aspect of God's providence interesting to investigate. But more
importantly, the central argument of my project (developed in the next chapter) relies on
a particular understanding of Origen's view of the apocatastasis, and thus it must be
properly defended here given the wide diversity of scholarly opinions. Specifically, in
this chapter I will argue that although Origen is hesitant to speak of his views on
universal salvation for pastoral, pedagogical, and defensive reasons, that he nevertheless
believes in a definite, guided, pre-arranged, and permanent final restoration of all souls to
God. As such, I will further argue that the apocatastasis constitutes a form of teleological
foreordination or unalterable certainty in Origen's theology. If true, this means that the
entirety of God’s providence in Origen’s theology functions as salvific grace. Each of
these points will need to be defended. I will begin by examining Origen's teachings on

407

It is also not my intention here to judge the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of Origen’s views. It is
sufficient to note that as far as Origen was concerned, many matters of eschatology had not yet been settled
by the Church and therefore could be appropriately explored – PArch praef 5-7 (SC 252, 82-84). As for the
term “determinism”, I realize this is a modern label and I will address this point in greater detail below.
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the subject – both those places in his corpus where he affirms a universal restoration and
those places where he seems to contradict it.

Origen's Conflicting Statements Regarding a Final Restoration
Throughout his writings, Origen makes statements which appear to contradict one
another. At times, he clearly states that God will save all souls in a final restoration so
that the end will be like the beginning. However, at other times he suggests that some
wicked souls, such as the devil, might not ever be saved. Some of Origen's clearest
affirmations of universal salvation are found in First Principles. Here Origen asserts that
the end of the world will come when every soul has paid the penalties for its sins, and
then “the goodness of God will restore [reuocet] his entire creation to one end [unum
finem], even his enemies being conquered and subdued.”408 As some are liable to
misunderstand what “subdued” (subditis) means in this context,409 Origen explicitly
defines this subjection as something positive and restorative:
If therefore that subjection by which the Son of God should also be
understood to be salutary and useful; so that, just as when the Son is said
to be subjected to the Father the perfect restoration of the entire creation is
announced [perfecta uniuersae creaturae restitution], so when his enemies
are said to be subjected to the Son of God we are to understand this to
involve the salvation of those subjected and the restoration of those that
have been lost.410
The last enemy that will be subdued in this restorative way is death (Mors) itself. Death
(or the devil) will be destroyed, for there cannot be any sadness or evil at the final end.
But this final enemy is only “destroyed” in a very qualified sense:
408
PArch 1.6.1 (Butterworth 52; SC 252, 194-196). Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor. 15:26 is a
cornerstone text for his understanding of universal salvation. Cf. ComJn 6.296-297 (SC 157, 354-356).
409
PArch 3.5.7: “But the heretics, not understanding, I cannot tell why, the apostle’s meaning
contained in these words, deprecate using the term subjection [subiectionis] in regard to the Son…”
(Butterworth 243; SC 268, 230).
410
PArch 3.5.7 (Butterworth 243; SC 268, 232).
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For the destruction of the last enemy must be understood in this way, not
that its substance [substantia] which was made by God shall perish, but
that the hostile purpose and will [ut propositum et voluntas inimical]
which proceeded not from God but from itself will come to an end. It will
be destroyed, therefore, not in the sense of ceasing to exist, but of being no
longer an enemy and no longer death. For to the Almighty nothing is
impossible, nor is anything beyond the reach of cure by its Maker.411
The reason that the devil will be the final enemy is because the devil was originally the
first enemy. In one sense, Origen states that everyone who chooses to live an evil life is a
“Satan,” but among these, the “Adversary” is the first rational being who fell from the
pure contemplation of God,412 and the one who appears to have fallen the furthest in
wickedness.413 It is significant that Origen singles out the worst sinner when stressing the
salvation of all souls, for by emphasizing that not even the devil himself is beyond God's
restorative grace, then certainly everyone will be saved.
Origen reminds his readers that this “subjection” will not take place by force but
through the exercise of each creature's free choices as they ascend back to God, and
therefore this will occur over a long and complicated process of divine education,
rewards, threats, and punishments.414 It will happen in stages and by degrees, with some
arriving first and some arriving later, until the very last enemy is restored to God and can
no longer be called an enemy.415 Then the end must be like the beginning and in the final
“consummation and restitution” (consummatione ac restitutione) God will be all in all.416

411

PArch 3.6.5 (Butterworth 250-51; SC 268, 244).
Cels VI.44.22-24: “Ὁ δ᾿ Ἑβραίων διαλέκτῳ Σατᾶν καὶ ἑλληνικώτερον ὑπό τινων ὀνομασθεὶς
Σατανᾶς μεταλαμβανόμενος εἰς ἑλλάδα φωνήν ἐστιν ἀντικείμενος” (Chadwick 361; SC 147, 288).
413
PArch 1.5.5 (SC 252, 188-192).
414
PArch 3.5.8 (SC 268, 232).
415
PArch 3.6.6 (SC 268, 244).
416
PArch 3.6.9 (Butterworth 254; SC 268, 252); Cf. PArch 1.6.2 (SC 252, 196).
412
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Many passages in First Principles reflect Origen's belief in the final salvation of
all fallen souls,417 but this view is also found throughout Origen's other writings, albeit
sometimes less explicitly. In his Commentary on John Origen repeats his assertion that in
the “so-called restoration” (ἀποκαταστάσει) when all enemies are subjected to God, the
last enemy to be destroyed will be death, and there will no longer be any enemies.418 And
again, he affirms that although the whole world was once an enemy to God, God in Christ
is reconciling the whole world back to himself – not all at once, but by stages, until Death
itself is overcome.419 When replying to Celsus Origen declares that God's providence
cares for the universe, both as a whole and to each individual part: “providence will never
abandon the universe. For even if some part of it becomes very bad because the rational
being sins, God arranges to purify it, and after a time to turn the whole world back to
Himself.”420 God does this through the Logos:
But we believe that at some time the Logos will have overcome the entire
rational nature, and will have remodeled every soul to his own perfection,
when each individual simply by the exercise of his freedom will choose
what the Logos wills and will be in that state which he has chosen. And
we hold that just as it is unlikely that some of the consequences of
physical diseases and wounds would be too hard for any medical art, so
also it is unlikely in the case of souls that any of the consequences of evil
would be incapable of being cured by the rational and supreme God. For
since the Logos and the healing power within him are more powerful than
any evils in the soul, he applies this power to each individual according to
God's will, and the treatment is the abolition of evil.421

417

Lisa Holliday disagrees that Origen's view in First Principles is this straight forward –
Holliday, "Will Satan Be Saved? Reconsidering Origen's Theory of Volition in Peri Archon." Holliday’s
argument, however, fails to account for the permanence of each soul's spiritual desires, and it fails to
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In his Commentary on Romans Origen likewise affirms that God's love will draw all
things to himself such that God will be all in all, and every soul will be so suffused by
love for God and neighbor that a soul's freedom of choice will never again choose to
depart from this union.422
While a strong thread of universal salvation runs all throughout Origen's writings,
there are also a few places where Origen appears to deny its reality. Speaking in a homily
on Jeremiah 18, Origen warns that in the present life we are like clay which can be
refashioned by God to rid us of our evil, but that at the end of this life we pass through
fire which hardens our clay. During that time if our clay is crushed because of evil, it will
not be remade.423 Origen is not afraid to talk about the eternal fire (ignem aeternum) that
awaits the Devil and his minions.424 He will say that although others might enjoy
conversion at the end of the age when all Israel will be saved, for Satan “there will not be
any conversion at the end of the age.”425 Origen's starkest rejection of a universal
salvation can be found in his “Letter to Friends in Alexandria,” which he wrote around
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232AD after his banishment from Alexandria by Bishop Demetrius.426 In this letter
Origen responds to critics who claim he taught that the Devil would be saved:
Let them pay heed, who do not wish to pay attention to the precept:
"slanderers will not possess the kingdom of God." According to them, I
say that the father of malice and perdition, and of those who are excluded
from the kingdom of God, that is, the devil, will be saved. Not even a
deranged and manifestly insane person can say this.427
In the same letter Origen expands this thought by asserting that all sinners (whether guilty
of large sins or lesser ones) will be excluded from the Kingdom of God.428
Given the divergence of Origen’s statements, it is not surprising that scholars
have arrived at different conclusions when trying to make sense of Origen’s belief
concerning a final restoration. In the last century especially, the doctrine that was once
widely attributed to Origen began to be questioned and re-examined, perhaps as part of
the (so-called) modern effort to rehabilitate Origen's name and distance him from the
anathemas of the Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople in 543.429 Some follow
Henri Crouzel who concluded that universal salvation is merely a great hope for Origen
rather than a statement of fact.430 A similar position is to say that Origen believed in the
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universal offer of salvation rather than in the certainty of universal salvation.431 Others
say that Origen believed in universal salvation for all except for the devil and his
demons.432 Another position is to argue that Origen never believed in universal salvation
in the first place,433 while a few admit that Origen may have once held such a view but
that he changed his mind or softened his stance in his later years.434 Still others remain
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convinced that Origen did consistently hold to a belief in universal salvation.435 Perhaps
the best illustration of the contemporary uncertainty on this question can be found by
looking at various entries in The Westminster Handbook to Origen: in writing the article
on “Apokatastasis”, Frederick Norris concludes that Origen did not believe the devil
would be saved and therefore he did not teach the strongest form of universalism.436
Norris adds that Origen purposefully kept his options open without coming down on
either exclusive salvation or universal salvation.437 Elizabeth Dively, on the other hand,
writing the entry on “Universalism,” concludes that Origen did believe in a final and
infallible universal salvation which necessarily includes the devil.438 Similarly, writing
the article on “Demonology” Fiona Thompson argues that Origen believed that God will
save everyone in the end, including the devil and his minions.439 Clearly, the case has not
been made for a single position to the satisfaction of all parties.
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However, in recent years two important Origen scholars, Tom Greggs440 and
Mark Scott,441 have made a convincing case that Origen was (and remained) committed
to a belief in universal salvation. Their analyses demonstrate that the various ways Origen
speaks of the final destiny of rational souls is logically consistent and coherent. Greggs
argues that what appears to be contradictory statements made by Origen can be explained
by examining the different genres they are found within and the different audiences
Origen was speaking to. A common theme found in Origen’s writings pertains to the
strategic and cautious pedagogy of the Church's mysteries.442 It is well-known that
Origen often distinguishes between wise Christians and simple Christians – the simple
are those who are not able to safely understand the deeper truths of Christianity. For
example, at one place in his Romans commentary Origen compares 1 Corinthians 15:22
(“For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive”) with Romans 5:12
(“Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death through sin, and
so death spread to all men because all sinned -- for sin...”).443 Origen asks why Paul was
not willing to finish the phrase in the Romans passage with the statement: “so in Christ
all will be alive”. Origen concludes that Paul's reason was strategic: Paul pretends not to
finish the statement because he “wanted to show by this that the present time is one of
effort and work, in which merits may be procured through good conduct.”444 In other
words, Paul did not want simple Christians to hear that their salvation had already been
440
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predetermined by God, for this would encourage laziness in their moral quest in the hereand-now. Origen explains:
For it is a custom of the Apostle Paul, when he is disclosing anything
about the kindness of God in his ineffable goodness, in turn to roughen up,
as it were, at least in some measure because of certain negligent hearers,
what he said and to put some fear into those who are remiss . . . [Paul was]
afraid for them, lest any of them, “despising the riches of God's goodness
and patience and forbearance by their own hard and impenitent heart,
should store up wrath for themselves on the day of the righteous judgment
of God” . . . Paul is thus acting as a wise steward of the word [prudens
dispensator uerbi]. And when he comes to the passages in which he has to
speak about God's goodness, he expresses these things in a somewhat
concealed [occultius] and obscure [obscurious] way for the sake of certain
lazy people...445
Paul purposefully obscures his teaching on universalism at this point in order to prevent
lazy Christians from slacking in enthusiasm for moral improvement. In other words,
Origen understands Paul to write with pedagogical and pastoral strategy. Greggs views
this as the “hermeneutical key” to unlocking Origen's own views on universal salvation
given his sometimes contradictory remarks.446 I believe Greggs is correct, for it is a
common occurrence for Origen himself to back away from teaching the full implication
of certain doctrines because such things could be misused by the simple.447 Origen is
trying to emulate Paul in this regard by similarly being a “wise steward of the word.”448
A few examples of similar cautious remarks by Origen will bring this into sharper focus.
When asked about the nature of the human soul while standing in front of a diverse
audience, Origen responded in a guarded way:
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And since we have come to a mystical subject, I appeal to you not to make
me guilty on your account of casting pearls before swine and holy things
to the dogs . . . I am worried about speaking; I am worried about not
speaking. For the sake of the worthy, I want to speak so as not to be guilty
of defrauding of the Word those able to hear it. Because of the unworthy, I
hesitate to speak, for the reasons mentioned...449
Perhaps the most common theological topic where Origen shows this reticence to say
everything he believes about a subject is when he is speaking about Hell and divine
punishment in the afterlife, and whether these punishments are temporary rather than
eternal. For instance, when speaking of God's punishment in Contra Celsum Origen
writes:
The Logos, accommodating himself to what is appropriate to the masses
who will read the Bible, wisely utters threatening words with a hidden
meaning to frighten people who cannot in any other way turn from the
flood of iniquities. Even so, however, the observant person will find an
indication of the end for which the threats and pains are inflicted on those
who suffer . . . But we have been compelled to hint at truths which are not
suitable for the simple-minded believers who need elementary words
which come down to their own level . . . Probably, just as some words are
suitable for use with children and are appropriate for their tender age, in
order to exhort them to be better, because they are still very young, so also
. . . the ordinary interpretation of punishments is suitable because they
have not the capacity for any other means of conversion and of repentance
from many evils, except that of fear and the suggestion of punishment.450
Origen will frequently pull-back from offering a full explanation as to how God's
punishments are finite and temporary (as they must be if all are to be restored). And his
reasons are pastoral – those who are weak or young in their faith must not be encouraged
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to use the deep mercies of God as an excuse to continue in sin.451 Mark Scott gives a very
helpful overview of Origen's pedagogical and pastoral strategies in this regard, especially
as it pertains to the difficult topic of Hell and punishment in the afterlife.452 Origen
always seems to write with two types of readers in mind: the simple believers who need
the fear of God's wrath to resist temptations, and the spiritually advanced Christians who
no longer need fear as a motivator, but are able to safely plumb the depths of God's
mysteries and mercies. After all, Origen was well-acquainted with both types of
Christians through his teaching and preaching duties. Eusebius informs us that Origen
decided to turn over instruction of beginner students to an associate, so that he could
devote himself to teaching the advanced.453 Yet, even while teaching the advanced, he
was preparing homilies to preach to average Christians.
The above explanation goes far in explaining many of Origen's conflicting
statements (especially those dealing with Hell and punishments), but it does not fully
explain Origen's explicit denial that he taught the salvation of the devil. On this point, the
451
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best explanation was highlighted by Ronald Heine, and then later expanded by Mark
Scott. In the introduction of his translation of Origen's Commentary on John, Heine
discusses Origen's comments regarding the devil. Although some believed that the devil
was not a creation by God, Origen insists that “insofar as he is the devil, he is not a
creation of God, but to the extent that it falls to the devil 'to be,' being made [εἶναι,
γενητὸς ὤν], since there is no creator except our God, he is a creation of God.”454 In other
words, the word “devil” (διαβόλός) is a label that does not denote a substance created by
God, but which reflects the evil actions pursued by one particular substance. The original
good soul that was Lucifer became known as the devil because of his choices. Later in
the commentary when Origen turns to John 13:3 – “the Father has given all things into
his hands”, Origen links the “all things” with the “all who will be made alive in Christ” of
1 Corinthians 15:22.455 Thus, says Heine, Origen understands “all things” to include
God's enemies and the devil himself.456 Heine concludes that the proper way to
understand how the devil will be restored to God is to keep in mind Origen's important
distinction between the word “devil” – a label which simply denotes evil actions with no
substance of its own – and the rational soul who was created by God that began to carry
that label. Thus, Heine suggests that
[Origen] may have argued that insofar as he is the devil, he is destroyed,
as are also all the other evil powers, but insofar as he has being, that being,
properly changed through ages of disciplinary chastisement in which he is
'treated as he deserves,' will finally be restored to its original state.457
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Mark Scott follows Heine's interpretation of Origen on this point, noting that this
view corresponds to many other fundamentals of Origen's theology. God upholds the
existence and being of his creatures but takes steps to eradicate their diseases. Universal
salvation requires the eradication of all sin on both an individual and a cosmic level. The
devil qua devil will not be saved – indeed, cannot be saved – for evil cannot be preserved
and joined to God. But the soul who is sometimes called the devil can and will be healed
by God, even while the “devil” aspect will be destroyed and cease to exist.458 Such a view
is already envisioned by Origen in First Principles when he writes:
For the destruction of the last enemy must be understood in this way, not
that its substance which was made by God shall perish, but that the hostile
purpose and will which proceeded not from God but from itself will come
to an end. It will be destroyed, therefore, not in the sense of ceasing to
exist, but of being no longer an enemy and no longer death.459
And Origen continues to employ this interpretation late in his career within his
Commentary on Romans.460 Given this view, Origen would feel justified in denying that
the “devil” will be saved, for to say otherwise would be to suggest that enemies of God
will reach salvation even while remaining actively aligned against God. Origen would
find such a teaching not only repulsive, but also dangerous, given that simple Christians
would inevitably conclude that their own sins are not obstacles to their salvation. Origen,
the pastor, recognizes how disastrous this view could be for the health of the soul. After
all, even though Origen might understand divine punishment to be temporary rather than
eternal, he recognizes it as excruciatingly painful and urges his listeners to do everything
in their power to avoid it.
458
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The evidence firmly points to the fact that Origen believed in a final restoration of
all souls. Not only does he explicitly affirm this in various writings at both the beginning
and end of his career, but there are also good reasons for those occasional statements
which appear to contradict this belief.461 However, it is also important to recognize that
this understanding of Origen's eschatology does not simply rest on a series of proof-texts
plucked from his writings; rather, Origen's entire theological system (all six stages of
cosmic history) attests to this belief as well.462 We have seen that Origen believes divine
providence always acts in strategic ways to rehabilitate every soul, whether through
embodiment on Earth, or through rewards, or through punishments. Punishments are
always temporary and must be remedial. That punishments are restorative is something
Origen is even willing to admit when speaking to the “simple” Christians sitting in the
pews. For example, in a homily on Jeremiah 13 Origen states that God's punishments are
for the good of the one being punished, for “it is necessary that you a sinner, attended by
God, taste something more bitter so that, once disciplined, you may be saved.”463 And
again:
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at ibid., 234-39. Cf. Chênevert, L’ Église dans le commentaire d’Origène sur le Cantique des Cantiques.
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on the Canticle of Canticles are from the newest critical edition: Luc
Brésard, Henri Crouzel, and Marcel Borret, Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques, 2 vols., vol. 1, 2,
Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1991-1992).
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HomJer 12.3.54-55 (Smith 116; SC 238, 22).
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And just as when you punish the servant or son who is punished by you
but do not want simply to torment him, rather it is in order that you
convert him by pains, so God, too, disciplines by the pains from sufferings
those who have not been converted to the Word, who have not been
cured.464
Given that Origen rules out annihilationism,465 the fact that punishments are non-eternal
in his system appears to logically necessitate that the apocatastasis must occur in the
future.466 As mentioned above, Origen does sometimes speak of “eternal” punishment
(αἰώνιος / aeterna). However, Origen understands “eternal” to have several possible
meanings, including merely the designation of a long stretch of time.467
Throughout his life Origen maintained his belief in an ultimate and final
restoration of all rational souls back to God. Because Scripture declares it, Origen affirms
this view as a fact about the future, and not simply as a hope or speculation. Nor was
Origen inconsistent on this teaching as some have claimed, but rather he viewed himself
as a “wise steward of the word”, tailoring his message to his audience for the best
possible effect. For Origen, it is a fact about the future that all souls must be restored to
God in the end, for evil is “nothing” (οὐδέν) and God will not allow it to be eternal.468
Even God's enemies will be subdued and destroyed, but only in the technical sense of
destroying their ongoing status of “enemy”. Origen tried to refrain from speaking too
464

HomJer 12.3.55-59 (Smith 116; SC 238, 22).
E.g. PArch 3.6.5: “but things which were made by God for the purpose of permanent existence
cannot suffer a destruction of their substance. Those things which in the opinion of the common people are
believed to perish have not really perished, as the principles of our faith and of the truth alike agree”
(Butterworth 251; SC 268, 244-246).
466
Clement of Alexandria's view of divine punishment is very similar in this respect, lending
further credibility that he, like Origen, believed in the final salvation of all rational souls (e.g. Strom. 6.6,
7.3).
467
“Now concerning eternal [aeterna] life…In the Scriptures “eternity” [aeternitas] is sometimes
recorded because the end is not known, but sometimes because the time period designated does not have an
end in the present age, though it does end in the future. Sometimes a period of time or even the length of
one man’s life may be designated as eternity…” – ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.16; Bammel 477-8). Cf. Horn,
"Ignis Aeternus. Une interprétation morale du feu éternel chez Origéne."; Crouzel, "L’Hadès et la Géhènne
selon Origène," 300; Ramelli, "Αὶώνιος and αἰών in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa."
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ComJn 2.99 (Heine 118; SC 120, 270). Cf. PArch 3.6.2 (SC 268, 238).
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openly about this doctrine for fear that some would misunderstand it and abuse it. History
proves that Origen was right to worry, for despite his caution some of his opponents
concluded that Origen taught the salvation of the devil qua devil, a mischaracterization
which appalled Origen. Although Origen believed all souls would one day be restored,
this would only happen through the proper stages of the moral quest, both in this life and
in the life to come.

The Question of the (Im)Permanency of the Apocatastasis
One further aspect of the apocatastasis needs to be explored, and that pertains to
whether Origen understood it to be a permanent state, or whether he allowed for the
possibility of future falls and future restorations. The confusion arises because in various
places Origen appears to affirm both options.469 For example, in First Principles 1.3.8
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Origen’s two ways of speaking about this topic have led one scholar, Stefan Svendsen, to argue
that Origen somehow held both positions at the same time. Svendsen argues that Origen alternated between
teaching the permanence of the apocatastasis and teaching the possibility of future falls. Thus, according to
Svendsen, Origen holds “mutually incompatible” positions which are both central to his theology.
Svendsen concludes by stating that this “question pinpoints an insoluble tension in Origen’s otherwise
highly coherent and rational theological worldview” – Stefan Nordgaard Svendsen, "Origen and the
Possibility of Future Falls," in Essays in Naturalism and Christian Semantics, ed. Engberg-Pedersen T. and
N.H. Gregersen, Publikationer fra det teologiske fakultet (København: Centre for Naturalism & Christian
Semantics, University of Copenhagen, 2010), 114. Svendsen makes at least two errors which lead him to
this conclusion: first, he places too much weight on a passage from Justinian, an unfriendly witness who
distorts Origen’s more nuanced position (105). Second, Svendsen seems to confuse Origen’s teaching –
that souls may possibly fall back into the sins they have left behind – with the notion that souls may
possibly fall into sin after the final restoration. Origen regularly teaches the former (for souls may rise and
fall in the ongoing moral quest to reach the final stage), but it is less clear if Origen teaches the latter. For
example, Svendsen appears to misinterpret On Prayer 29.14 because of this confusion. Here Origen
describes the possibility of a soul falling back into the same sin that God had earlier delivered it from.
Svendsen assumes that Origen is speaking about the potential for a soul to fall away after the final
restoration has taken place, but Origen is not speaking of that here. Instead, Origen is simply talking about
the ongoing ascent of the soul as it eradicates sin and pursues God. Origen is warning his readers that even
if you completely eradicate a particular sin (given that God causes you to start hating it) and you begin
making progress in the virtues towards God, that if you are not careful it is quite possible that you may
begin to desire that sin once again (causing another fall into sin). The context of On Prayer 29.14 affirms
this (see especially 29.13 on how God administers punishments in such a way that souls, now freed from
sin, may progress with better speed and surety). Finally, Svendsen does not seem to realize that Origen
discussed two distinct stages of the final restoration – only one of which allowed for the possibility of
future falls. I discuss these points below.
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Origen writes that when souls finally attain to the “holy and blessed life” (sanctam et
beatam uitam), “we ought so to continue that no satiety [satietas] of that blessing may
ever possess us”.470 Origen then remarks:
But if at any time satiety [satietas] should possess the heart of one of those
who have come to occupy the perfect and highest stage, I do not think that
such a one will be removed and fall from his place all of a sudden. Rather
must he decline by slow degrees, so that it may sometimes happen, when a
slight fall has occurred, that the man quickly recovers and returns to
himself. A fall does not therefore involve utter ruin, but a man may retrace
his mind on that which through negligence had slipped from his grasp.471
In another place Origen speaks about those who think the bodily nature will be destroyed
when all are restored to God. The difficulty with this view, he suggests, is that the bodily
nature would have to be re-created if souls once again fell away from God:
It will be seen to be a necessity that, if bodily nature were to be destroyed,
it must be restored and created a second time. For it is apparently possible
that rational creatures, who are never deprived of the power of free-will
[liberi facultas arbitrii], may once again be subject to certain movements.
This power is granted them by God lest, if they held their position for ever
irremovably, they might forget that they had been placed in that final state
of blessedness by the grace of God and not by their own goodness.472
At times, Origen also speaks of multiple worlds and ages. There have been many ages
before the current one, and there will be many more after it.473 God has also created many
worlds, although Origen admits not knowing how many there have been.474 Along with
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PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164).
PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164).
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PArch 2.3.3 (Butterworth 87; SC 252, 258).
473
E.g. PArch 2.3.5: “But after the present age, which is said to have been made for the
consummation of other ages [consummation saeculorum], there will yet be further ‘ages to come’; for we
learn this plainly from Paul himself when he says, ‘that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding
riches of his grace in kindness towards us’…I think, therefore, that the indications of this statement point to
many ages” (Butterworth 88-89; SC 252, 262). Cf. PArch 3.5.3: “God did not begin to work for the first
time when he made this visible world, but that just as after the dissolution of this world there will be
another one, so also we believe that there were others before this one existed” (Butterworth 238-9; SC 268,
223).
474
PArch 2.3.4: “but worlds may exist that are diverse, having variations by no means slight, so
that for certain clear causes the condition of one may be better, while another for different causes may be
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these passages we may mention several Greek fragments by the ‘unfriendly witnesses’
Justinian and Jerome who accuse Origen of teaching that future falls will take place after
the restoration of all things.475 On the basis of this evidence, many scholars have
concluded that Origen did not believe in a permanent apocatastasis, but that there would
be unending cycles of fall and restoration.476
On the other hand, there are places where Origen writes as if the apocatastasis
will be permanent. After writing that there will be multiple “ages”, Origen states his
belief that there is something greater than the ages, and that when the universe reaches its
perfect end, the consummation of all things, then things will no longer be in an age.477

worse, and another intermediate. What may be the number or measure of these worlds I confess I do not
know; but I would willingly learn, if any man can show me” (Butterworth 88; SC 268, 260).
475
Justinian: Ep ad Menam, fr. 16 and fr. 20, and Jerome: Ep 124 ad Avitum 5 and 10. These are
cited in Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic Eschatology: 237n28.
476
For example, the 19th century historian Augustus Neander argued that Origen never had a final
end in view, but that there would always be recurring falls and restorations. Neander criticized Origen on
this point for overly emphasizing creaturely freedom: “in the case of Origen, this doctrine [of apocatastasis]
lost its full meaning by reason of the consequences which he was pleased to connect with it. His theory
concerning the necessary mutability of will in created beings led him to infer that evil, ever germinating
afresh, would still continue to render necessary new processes of purification and new worlds destined for
the restoration of fallen beings . . . Into such a comfortless system was this profound thinker betrayed by
carrying through with rigid consistency his one-sided notion of the creature’s freedom and mutability, and
thus marring the full conception of redemption” – Neander, General History of the Christian Religion and
Church, Vol. 2: 404-05. Hugh Ross Mackintosh also understood Origen to believe in additional falls after
the restoration – Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future: the Christian doctrine of eternal life
(New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), 198n3. Einar Molland suggested that although Origen spoke of
multiple falls in First Principles, that he may have changed his mind by the time he wrote Commentary on
Romans – Molland, The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology: 163-64. Chadwick wrote
that the logic of Origen’s theology made future falls possible: “…it was precisely this point [the free will of
rational beings] which led Origen to postulate the possibility, if not the necessity, of a cycle of worlds” –
Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," 41. Chadwick also (tentatively) disagreed with Molland’s
suggestion because he believed that places in Contra Celsus (a late work just like the Romans commentary)
implied evil might again resurface after the final consummation (e.g. Cels IV.69 and VI.20) – ibid., 42-43. I
think Chadwick is wrong here – the two passages in Contra Celsus only show Origen’s reluctance to enter
into a discussion about the possibility of evil in the final state. This hesitation would accord just as well
with my argument (below) that Origen envisioned a 2-stage apocatastasis, where evil may occur in the first
stage but not in the latter. It is understandable that Origen would display a reluctance to bring up this
tangential topic, for it would require him to outline a substantial argument to ensure that he would not be
misunderstood. More recently, Edward Moore has written that “the idea of repeated falls away from God is
a corollary of Origen’s firm position on the absolute freedom of the will of souls” – Moore, Origen of
Alexandria and St. Maximus the Confessor: An Analysis and Critical Evaluation of Their Eschatological
Doctrines: 171. I disagree with Moore for reasons which will become clear.
477
PArch 2.3.5 (Butterworth 89; SC 252, 262).
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God will simply be all in all. At that time “all consciousness of evil [will have] departed”
because “evil nowhere exists.”478 All rational minds “will no longer be conscious of
anything besides or other than God, but will think God and see God and hold God and
God will be the mode and measure of its every movement.”479 Origen’s most explicit
declaration of the permanency of the apocatastasis is found in his Romans commentary,
for he pointedly asks and answers the very question under discussion:
We certainly do not deny that free will [liberum arbitrium] always will
remain in rational creatures, but we affirm that the power of the cross of
Christ and of his death which he undertook at the end of the ages is so
great that it suffices for the healing and restoration not only of the present
and the future but also for the past ages...Now precisely what it is that
would restrain the freedom of will in the future ages to keep it from falling
again into sin, the Apostle teaches us with a brief statement, saying, 'Love
never falls away.' For this is why love is said to be greater than faith and
hope, because it will be the only thing through which it will no longer be
possible to sin. For if the soul shall have ascended to this state of
perfection, so that it loves God with all its heart and with all its mind and
with all its strength, and loves its neighbor as itself, what room will there
be for sin?…[And if neither life, nor death, nor angels, nor powers can
separate us from the love of God] how much more impossible shall it be
for the freedom of the will [libertas arbitrii] to separate us from his
love!480
Here we must highlight an important point: if the all-encompassing love experienced in
the consummation will prevent any future falls, then Origen must not think that the end
will be the same as the beginning, because the beginning state of rational creatures
478

PArch 3.6.3 (Butterworth 248; SC 268, 241).
PArch 3.6.3 (Butterworth 248; SC 268, 241).
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ComRm V.10.187-202, 215-222 (Scheck 1.375-7; Bammel 450-452). Origen’s argument here
is reminiscent of an earlier one in First Principles where he attempted to explain how Jesus was able to
have genuine moral autonomy: “But if the above argument, that there exists in Christ a rational soul, should
seem to anyone to constitute a difficulty, on the ground that in the course of our discussion we have often
shown that souls are by their nature capable of good and evil, we shall resolve the difficulty in the
following manner” – PArch 2.6.5 (Butterworth 112; SC 252, 318-320). Origen’s answer is that the soul of
Christ so loved righteousness, that eventually “all susceptibility to change or alteration was destroyed, and
what formerly depended upon the will [arbitrio] was by the influence of long custom [usus] changed into
nature [naturam]. Thus we must believe that there did exist in Christ a human and rational soul, and yet not
suppose that it had any susceptibility to or possibility of sin” – ibid. As this discussion will demonstrate,
Origen believes the same thing will happen to all rational souls, but only after they have clung to
righteousness in the blessed state for a sufficient duration.
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allowed for a fall. At most, we can say that Origen believes the end is like the beginning,
but not identical to it. A few lines later Origen affirms this point using Lucifer as an
illustration:
[Lucifer] was able to fall with respect to the kindness of the Son of God
before he could be bound by chains of love [caritatis uinculis
stringeretur]. But after the love of God shall have begun to be shed abroad
in the hearts of everyone through the Holy Spirit, what the Apostle has
declared will become settled, “Love never falls away.”481
It turns out that the end will be better than the beginning for this very reason – the
rational nature will no longer ever choose to fall away from beatitude. This is an explicit
affirmation of a permanent apocatastasis. Contrary to those who have suggested that
Origen changed his mind on this point between the writing of First Principles and
Commentary on Romans,482 I believe there are clues in First Principles to suggest that
Origen already believed in a permanent final state in the earlier work. A major clue is that
in First Principles Origen likewise insinuates that the end will be better than the
beginning, rather than identical to it. This emerges when he distinguishes between the
image and likeness of God:
Now the fact that [Moses] said, ‘He made him in the image of God’, and
was silent about the likeness, points to nothing else but this, that man
received the honour of God’s image [imaginis] in his first creation,
whereas the perfection of God’s likeness [similitudinis] was reserved for
him at the consummation [consummatione].483
Origen bases this exegesis on the fact that Genesis 1:26-28 first says “Let us make man in
our own image and likeness”, but then Genesis goes on to say, “And God made man; in
the image of God made he him.” According to Origen, this reveals that although both the
likeness and image are planned for humanity, humanity was initially only created with
481

ComRm V.10.227-233 (Scheck 1.377; Bammel 452-3).
See above, notes 434 and 469.
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the image.484 Origen clarifies that the Image of God is God’s reason (the logos),485 which
all rational creatures have, but the likeness of God means that one has attained perfection
(perfectio).486 In the blessedness of the first creation, creatures enjoyed only the
potentiality for likeness of God, but in the final consummation creatures will enjoy a
fully-realized likeness of God.487 The same distinction Origen draws here in First
Principles is found in his later Romans commentary in the same language:
This is perhaps the case, in that, when it was proposed that he become the
image and likeness [imaginem et similitudinem] of God, that man was
indeed made in the image of God in the beginning, but the likeness was
postponed so that he might first trust in God and thus become like him and
might himself hear that everyone who trusts in him becomes like him.488
Thus, Origen remained consistent in his belief that the end would be better than the
beginning (and not identical to it), given that souls will reach a point where they will
become perfect in love, something that was only given to them as a potentiality in their
first creation. My contention is that this idea – the postponement of the similitudinem –
serves as the exegetical underpinning of Origen’s assertion in the Romans commentary
that Lucifer fell from God before he could be bound by “chains of love.” In other words,
I believe that in the Romans commentary the fulfillment of the similitudinem serves as
the exegetical foundation for Origen’s insistence there that the apocatastasis is
permanent. If this is true, it makes it unlikely that Origen’s remarks in ComRm V.10
about a permanent final state are a modification from his earlier position in First
484

PArch 3.6.1 (Butterworth 245; SC 268, 236). Origen also gives this interpretation of Genesis
1:26-28 in Cels IV.30 (Chadwick 205; SC 136, 254) and ComRm IV.5.158-165 (Scheck 1.264; Bammel
307). Cf. Henri Crouzel, Thèologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956).
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given to him in the beginning through the honour of the ‘image’, he should in the end through the
accomplishment of these works obtain for himself the perfect ‘likeness’” (Butterworth 245; SC 268, 236).
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Principles, for the exegetical underpinning was already solidly in place in the earlier
work. How can never-ending falls occur when the end is described as categorically better
than the beginning?
But if Origen did believe that the final consummation would be permanent, even
as early as First Principles, then how are we to explain the passages already mentioned
where Origen talks about the possibility of falling away from the blessed state because of
satiety (satietas), and how do we explain Origen’s frequent assertions of multiple ages
and worlds?489 The answer to this riddle, I argue, is that Origen has a “2-stage”
understanding of the final consummation: the first stage is personal while the second
stage is collective, and it is not always clear which stage he is referring to in a given
passage.490 The first stage occurs whenever an individual person completes their
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E.g. PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164); PArch 2.3.3 (Butterworth 87; SC 252, 258).
This idea has been proposed before in a general sense. As early as 1901 Fairweather mentioned
it in passing without further analysis: “At last, having passed through all gradations, and being purged from
every defilement, the soul rises in the pure ether to God, and passes into the heavens as a follower of Him
who has said ‘I will that where I am there ye may be also’. In this way many may reach the kingdom of
God before the final consummation of the world” – Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology 204
(italics added). Fairweather does not talk about this in conjunction with the question of whether or not the
apocatastasis is permanent. More recently, Celia Rabinowitz has explored this idea in greater depth. What I
am calling a “2-stage apocatastasis” she describes as “two currents” in Origen’s writing: future/cosmic and
present/individual – Celia E. Rabinowitz, "Personal and Cosmic Salvation in Origen," Vigiliae Christianae
38 (1984): 319. I agree with Rabinowitz’s general point that Origen distinguished between personal and
collective (or cosmic) salvation, and that personal salvation takes place before the final collective salvation
(321). However, I disagree with her conclusion that the apocatastasis is a restoration to an identical state as
in the beginning (321). As I have argued, Origen envisions the apocatastasis to be a return to something
better than the beginning, given that souls gain the “likeness” of God. Thus, Rabinowitz is incorrect in
asserting that the apocatastasis “implies a cyclical interpretation of history” (321). A further weakness of
her essay is that she does not seem to recognize that Origen links an individual’s personal salvation with
subjection to Christ, and the collective salvation with subjection to the Father (I discuss this point below).
Overall, my main disagreement with her is that I believe Origen’s idea of a “2-stage” apocatastasis is the
key for reconciling his statements about multiple falls with his statements about a permanent apocatastasis.
Given her comments on Origen’s “cyclical” interpretation of history, Rabinowitz believes in repeated and
unending falls. More recently, Tzamalikos recognized these two stages in Origen’s eschatology and has
offered a helpful analysis of them – Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology: 264ff.
Tzamalikos has offered an argument similar to my own in that creatures who arrive at the first stage (what
he labels “eternal life”) can fall from this condition, but that once Christ himself subjects himself to the
Father, no further falls will occur (265). Like Tzamalikos, I also believe that the transition from subjection
to the Son to subjection to the Father is the principal demarcation of stages 1 and 2 (see below). Much of
Tzamalikos’ argument is wrapped up in his larger argument about how rational creatures will be subsumed
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ascension and is reunited with Jesus in the blessed realm. Origen describes this
momentous event happening at separate times for each person, with some arriving earlier
and some later.491 But there is a difference between a few souls arriving at their final
salvation, and the moment when all souls have arrived; there is a sense in which the souls
who arrive into salvation first are nevertheless lacking something, in that they must wait
with expectation and impatience for those who will arrive later.492 Stage 2 only occurs
when the last soul has successfully been restored, so that God is not merely all-in-several,
but “all-in-all”. Yet, the difference between the first and second stages is not merely one
of arithmetic, for there is a fundamental change that occurs at this point. Arrival at the
first stage is described as reunion with Christ. The inauguration of the second stage,
however, occurs when Jesus hands over all that which is his, and with the rest of creation
willingly subjects himself to God the Father. In First Principles 3.6.9 we see Origen
distinguishing both stages within the final consummation:
This, then, is how we must suppose that events happen in the
consummation and restitution of all things [consummation ac restitution
omnium], namely, that souls, advancing and ascending little by little in due
in the “timeless life” of God in the final state, which I do not intend to interact with here. Overall, however,
I agree with Tzamalikos’ main point that there are two stages of the “end”, and that rational creatures are
able to fall away from God only in the first stage. While we arrive at similar conclusions, however, the
argument I develop here does not stem from nor rely on a certain conception of time in the final state. That
is to say, our conclusions are similar, but we reached them by different methods.
491
PArch 3.6.6: “[Being given a spiritual body will not happen all of a sudden], but gradually and
by degrees, during the lapse of infinite and immeasurable ages, seeing that the improvement and correction
will be realised slowly and separately in each individual person. Some will take the lead and hasten with
swifter speed to the highest goal, others will follow them at a close interval, while others will be left far
behind; and so the process will go on through the innumerable ranks of those who are making progress and
becoming reconciled to God from their state of enmity, until it reaches even to the last enemy, who is called
death, in order that he, too, may be destroyed and remain an enemy no longer” (Butterworth 251-2; SC 268,
246-8). Cf. the discussion of the moral ascent in the afterlife in Chapter 3.
492
E.g. HomLev 7.2: “Nor have the apostles too yet received their joy; but they too are waiting for
me to become a sharer in their joy. Nor do the saints themselves immediately receive the full reward of
their merits; they too wait for us, even though we are slow and lazy. For they do not have full joy as long as
they grieve for our errant ways and mourn our sins.” – Translation in: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Origen:
Spirit and Fire, a Thematic Anthology of His Writings, trans. Robert J. Daley (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1984; translation of German publication in 1956), 312.
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measure and order, first attain to that other earth493 and the instruction that
is in it, and are there prepared for those better precepts to which nothing
can ever be added. For in the place of ‘stewards’ and ‘governors’ Christ
the Lord, who is King of all, will himself take over the kingdom; that is,
he himself will instruct those who are able to receive him in his character
of wisdom, after their preliminary training in the holy virtues, and [Christ]
will reign in them until such time as he subjects them to the Father who
subjected all things to him; or in other words, when they have been
rendered capable of receiving God, then God will be to them ‘all in all.’494
Again, in First Principles 3.6.6 Origen describes people arriving at the “highest goal”
(summa) faster than others, with Death arriving last of all. Origen then goes on to say:
“When therefore all rational souls have been restored to a condition like this [the summa
just referred to], then also the nature of this body of ours will develop into the glory of a
‘spiritual body’.”495 In one sense, Origen describes individual restorations to God to be
part of the final consummation and restitution, for he describes the “highest goal” or
“summa” as an event taking place in the consummation. But in another sense, the final
final consummation occurs as a secondary event which follows when the very last enemy
is restored. And it is at that moment where Jesus subjects himself (and all those with him)
to the Father, just as all rational souls had previously become subject to Christ. Thus,
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In PArch 3.6.8 Origen is discussing the “heaven and earth” that was created in the first
creation: “Now if we interpret correctly the passage which Moses writes in the forefront of his book
namely, ‘On the beginning God made the heaven and the earth’, as referring to the beginning of the entire
creation, it is appropriate that the end and consummation of all things should consist of a return to this
beginning” (Butterworth 253; SC 268, 252). It is to this first creation (this first “earth”), then, that Origen is
referring to at this point in PArch 3.6.9. Cf. Chapter 3, n333 for Origen’s interpretation of the phrase
“heaven and earth.”
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PArch 3.6.9 (Butterworth 254, emphasis added; SC 268, 252-254). Cf. ComRm VI.5 (Scheck 2.
14-15; Bammel 475): “…after someone has been set free from sin, he must, first of all, serve righteousness
and all the virtues together, so that from there he might ascend, by means of progress, to the point that he
becomes a slave to God. I grant that servitude to righteousness is servitude to God. For Christ is
righteousness, and to serve Christ is to serve God. Nevertheless, there is an order in the levels of
advancement and there are degrees within the virtues. And this is the reason that Christ is said to
reign…until the fullness of the virtues is accomplished in each individual; but when the measure of
perfection has been fulfilled, at that time it is said that he hands over ‘the kingdom of God, even the
Father,’ so that now ‘God might be all in all.’”
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PArch 3.6.6 (Butterworth 252, emphasis added; SC 268, 246).
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subjection to Christ denotes the first stage of salvation, while subjection to the Father
denotes the final stage of salvation:
[At the consummation of the age], by his including in himself all those
whom he subjected to the Father and who through him come to salvation,
he himself with them and in them is also said to be ‘subjected’ to the
Father, when ‘all things’ shall ‘subsist in him’ and he shall be the ‘head of
all things’ and in him shall be the ‘fullness’ of those who obtain salvation.
This then is what the apostle says of him: ‘When all things have been
subjected unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subjected unto him
that did subject all things unto him, that God may be all in all.496
With these two stages in mind, I will suggest an answer to the riddle that has so puzzled
scholars. When we understand that Origen’s teaching of the “highest goal” (summa) in
the consummation actually represents stage 1 rather than stage 2, we can begin to make
sense of the passage used by scholars to argue that Origen believes in a contingent and
impermanent apocatastasis. As mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, First
Principles 1.3.8 reads:
But if at any time satiety should possess the heart of one of those who
have come to occupy the perfect and highest stage [summo perfectoque
constiterunt gradu], I do not think that such a one will be removed and fall
from his place all of a sudden. Rather must he decline by slow
degrees…497
Summo (from summos) is a synonym of summa. When Origen suggests here that souls
may fall away from the “highest goal (or stage),” it is essential to remember that Origen
will later define this “highest stage” as subjection to Christ (in First Principles 3.6.6).
Thus, Origen is speaking here about the possibility of minor falls occurring during stage
1 of the consummation, and not stage 2. That is to say, some individual souls who have
arrived at the highest stage in the consummation and who have been subjected to Jesus,
496

PArch 3.5.6 (Butterworth 242-3; SC 268, 230), emphasis added to highlight the temporal
sequence. Cf. ComMatt 10.3 (SC 162, 148-152). Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Matthew are
from the most recent critical edition: Girod, Origène: Commentaire sur l'Évangile selon Matthieu.
497
PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164).
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temporarily retain the possibility to fall away again (albeit slightly) while they wait for
the rest of the souls to arrive. Stage 1 is not the final end, for Christ must reign in them
until they have been “rendered capable of receiving God.”498 They must persevere at this
highest stage until they (and all others) enter a phase where they will never fall away
again. Origen’s Romans commentary describes this final phase as being bound by
“chains of love,” while in First Principles 2.11.7 Origen describes it as two levels of
perfection. It is worth quoting this passage at length:
And so the rational being, growing at each successive stage…advances as
a mind already perfect to perfect knowledge [iam perfecta perducitur]…
And it attains perfection, first that perfection by which it rises to this
condition, and secondly that by which it remains therein [potiturque
perfectione, primo illa, qua in id ascendit, secundo qua permanet], while
it has for the food on which it feeds the problems of the meaning of things
and the nature of their causes. For as in this bodily life of ours we grew
first of all bodily in that which we now are, the increase being supplied in
our early years merely by a sufficiency of food, whereas after the process
of growth has reached its limit we use food not in order to grow but as a
means of preserving life within us; so, too, I think that the mind, when it
has come to perfection, still feeds on appropriate and suitable food in a
measure which can neither admit of want nor of superfluity. But in all
respects this food must be understood to be the contemplation and
understanding of God, and its measures to be those that are appropriate
and suitable to this nature which has been made and created. These
measures will rightly be observed by every one of those who are
beginning to ‘see God’…499
This passage not only distinguishes between stage 1 and stage 2 of the consummation,
but it is also clarifies why Origen felt comfortable describing stage 1 of the
consummation as the “highest goal” (summa). After all, it is natural to ask: why is stage 1
the highest goal if stage 2 is even better? The answer is that the difference between stage
1 and 2 is not one of distance. In terms of distance (i.e. the soul’s ascent towards God
through a series of stages or spheres), stage 1 denotes the highest and final destination.
498
499

PArch 3.6.9 (Butterworth 254; SC 268, 254).
PArch 2.11.7 (Butterworth 153-154, emphasis added; SC 252, 412).
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This is also why Origen has no problem calling stage 1 “perfection.” The transition to
stage 2 is not a transition of movement or ascent; rather, the transition is all about
persevering in this highest plane by persevering in perfection of the virtues. By
persevering at the highest and final stage the soul eventually undergoes a type of
transformation, which Origen describes in First Principles 2.11.7 as a change from one
type of perfection (perfectione) to another.500

500

In 2011 Sebastian Guly argued that Origen did not understand the apocatastasis to be a
homogenous experience for all the souls involved. Although Guly affirms Origen’s universalism, he
believes that Origen teaches that among souls there will be a hierarchy within the apocatastasis – Guly,
"The Salvation of the Devil and the Kingdom of God in Origen's Letter to Certain Close Friends in
Alexandria." Guly appears to be pursuing an argument similar to the one developed by Bigg (although
perhaps unconsciously so, given that he does not mention Bigg) – see Bigg, The Christian Platonists of
Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year 1886: 233-34; 93. Guly’s is a curious argument, and I
am not aware of any scholars who follow his view (nor am I even aware of scholars who discuss his view).
Essentially, Guly believes that Origen speaks of the “Kingdom of Christ” or “Kingdom of the Father” as
universal Kingdoms, but that Origen understands “Kingdom of God” or “the “Kingdom of the Heavens” to
be non-universal in membership. I have a number of concerns as to the way Guly develops this argument. I
mention it at this point because I believe the common-denominator behind most of the problems in Guly’s
presentation stem from his misunderstanding of the two stages of the apocatastasis as I have outlined them
here. For example, regarding souls who stand higher than other souls in the ascent and who teach and rule
over souls who are yet further down in their quest to reunite with Christ, Guly believes this indicates that
some will experience the beatitude in a more restricted way (205-206). But the passages that Guly cites are
clearly referring to the fact that some souls arrive at their final destination quicker than other souls, and thus
they (temporarily) stand in a position of pedagogical authority over souls who are slower. If we must speak
of a “hierarchy,” then the hierarchy is merely one of speed – that is, some souls will experience beatitude
longer, which is not the same thing as suggesting that some souls will experience beatitude differently.
There is a hierarchy of souls, but only a temporary one – the distinguishing factor is not between souls who
reach beatitude with different states of virtue, but rather souls who reach perfect beatitude faster than
others. But even this claim is not without its problems, for Origen does not speak about the highest level of
beatitude beginning at different times for each soul. Stage 1 may begin at different times for each soul, but
Stage 2 (the highest perfection) begins for all in the same moment when Christ subjects himself to the
Father.
Guly makes a similar mistake in his interpretation of First Principles 2.3.7 (210). Here Origen
speaks of a new heaven and earth which take the place of the current heaven and earth. After they die, those
who made the most progress in their earthly lives will be placed into the next heaven, while those who
made less progress will be placed into the next earth. So far there is nothing surprising here, for Origen
always insists that a soul’s progress in life will determine its starting point in the afterlife. Guly, however,
assumes that Origen is speaking of a static condition when he describes this demarcation. But Origen does
not speak this way. In fact, even in the very same text Guly cites Origen goes on to affirm: “In this way,
therefore, there seems to be opened a road for the progress of saints from that earth to those heavens, so
that they would appear not so much to remain permanently in that earth as to dwell there in the hope of
passing on, when they have made the requisite progress, to the inheritance of the ‘kingdom of heaven’” –
PArch 2.3.7 (Butterworth 94; SC 252, 274). My hunch is that Guly is led to the wrong conclusion because
he prioritizes Origen’s statements regarding permanent punishments that sometimes arise in his homilies,
and he feels that in this way he can reconcile them with Origen’s universalism (see especially 207-212;
219). As we have seen, however, Origen frequently hides his doctrine of universal salvation in his homilies
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With the preceding elements defined, I may now reconstruct Origen’s view of the
final consummation. At varying speeds, all souls must ascend from the earth through the
heavens by means of a series of stages or intervals. At each stage, creatures increase in
knowledge and in the virtues as they follow after Christ who leads the way. Souls arrive
at the highest and final stage when they reach moral perfection – which Origen also
describes as subjection to Christ, given that Christ is the plenitude of virtues.501 The souls
who arrive at this highest stage must persevere there, and must discipline themselves so
that they do not fall away from this initial perfection. Although sin has ceased, Origen
allows that stage 1 may involve a number of mini-falls – somehow caused by satietas –
but even so he does not imagine that any falls at this point would be as drastic as the
initial Fall.502 Finally, once the last soul (Death) also arrives at the final stage and once all

because he is afraid simple Christians would abuse this truth. Guly also inaccurately points to different
levels of punishment in the afterlife as evidence of different levels of beatitude (219), but here he again
conflates a genuine Origenist teaching with something not taught by Origen. Origen did believe in different
levels of punishment in the afterlife – including the possibility of a punishment such as abandonment where
intellectual life is all but snuffed out. However, these are all temporary punishments, which means that the
divergent modes of experiencing intellectual life by souls will be temporary as well. Most of Guly’s
mistakes can be traced to an inaccurate understanding of the various stages that occur within the
apocatastasis. There will be distinctions between levels of punishment, between the speeds at which souls
attain their final reunion with Christ, and between the initial starting placements in the moral quest that
souls enjoy after death. But none of these distinctions are static or permanent. Our discussion above of the
“image and likeness” reinforces this notion. All souls were originally alike (no diversity), for all were
created in the image of God. However, no souls originally had the likeness (which is perfection). Origen
tells us that one day all souls will have the likeness added to the image once the apocatastasis begins. If this
is true, then it does not seem possible to argue that souls were originally identical in their experience of
goodness when they only shared the “image” in common, but that when they share both the image and
likeness in common they will no longer be the same but will have different experiences of beatitude.
501
Cf. ComRm VI.5.64-77 (Scheck 2.14-15; Bammel 475): “…after someone has been set free
from sin, he must, first of all, serve righteousness and all the virtues together, so that from there he might
ascend, by means of progress, to the point that he becomes a slave to God. I grant that servitude to
righteousness is servitude to God…Nevertheless, there is an order in the levels of advancement and there
are degrees within the virtues. And this is the reason Christ is said to reign, certainly according to this, that
he is righteousness, until the fullness of the virtues is accomplished in each individual; but when the
measure of perfection has been fulfilled, at that time it is said that he hands over “the kingdom to God, even
the Father,” so that now “God might be all in all.” Origen frequently describes Christ as all of the virtues,
and so states that serving Christ means the soul must be serving all the virtues – e.g. ComRm VI.11 (Scheck
2.45; Bammel 520-521) and PArch 4.4.10 (Butterworth 327; SC 268, 426-428).
502
PArch 1.3.8 (Butterworth 39; SC 252, 164): “I do not think that such a one will be removed and
fall from his place all of a sudden. Rather must he decline by slow degrees...” The reason for this is because
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souls have sufficiently persevered in their perfection so as to be permanently transformed
(or “bound by chains of love”), then Christ will give everything over to the Father; only
then will Christ truly be called “Solomon”, for there will be eternal peace when God is all
in all.503 At this point all possibility of multiple ages disappears into something “greater
than the ages”, which is “no longer in an age”;504 no more falls can take place, for perfect
love prevents the possibility despite the ongoing presence of moral autonomy.
This conclusion does leave us with one final puzzle. Chapter 2 demonstrated that
Origen had two requirements for genuine moral autonomy: first, the assent (choice) must
be performed by the soul and not an agent external to the soul, and second, the soul must
have the capability for binary possibilities (movement towards or away from the good).
However, we have found an exception to this general rule when looking at the final stage
of the apocatastasis, for once souls are within this state Origen appears to deny the
possibility of binary movement. In fact, Origen may have allowed for an exception to be
made at both extremes of the moral ladder, for he speaks in a similar way of those who
reach the utter bottom stratum of evil. Origen describes the condition of the worst sinners
in the following way: “God in such cases will reasonably overlook the evil as it increases
to a certain point, even disregarding it when it progresses so far in them as to become

Origen understands moral progress and moral regress to have momentum. In the case of moral progress,
Origen believes that the closer one gets to God, the easier it is to obey, for afflictions and temptations begin
to pale in comparison to the glory of God’s righteousness – e.g. Cels 6.20 (Chadwick 333; SC 147, 228230). The same is also true in reverse. The further one aligns with sin and wickedness the harder it is to
escape it, for persistent sinfulness turns into habit which is even harder to resist – e.g. Cels 3.69 (Chadwick
174; SC 136, 158.16).
503
ComCt prol. (SC 375, 160): “Cum vero ad perfectionem omnium ventum fuerit et sponsa ei
perfecta, omnis dumtaxat rationalis creatura, iungetur, quia pacificavit per sanguinem suum non solum
quae in terris sunt, sed et quae in caelis, tunc Solomon tantummodo dicitur, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et
Patri, cum evacuaverit omnem principatum et potestam. Oportet enim eum regnare, donec ponat inimicos
suos sub pedibus suis et novissimus inimicus destruatur mors. Et ita pacificatis omnibus Patrique subiectis,
cum erit iam Deus omnia in omnibus, Solomon tantummodo, id est solum pacificus, nominabitur.”
504
PArch 2.3.5 (Butterworth 89; SC 252, 260-2).
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incurable.”505 Only then can God heal certain sinners in a lasting way. Admittedly,
Origen is not entirely clear on this point. For instance, regarding sinners who descend to a
state which may be called “incurable”, it is unclear whether Origen means that the spirit
aspect of the person no longer sends positive desires to the soul, or whether Origen means
to say that the body’s desires reach a point of strength (and habit) which so overshadows
the spirit’s desires, that the soul will never choose the spirit’s desires even if they remain
present. Regardless, I am not convinced that Origen’s two exceptions at the extreme
“poles” of the moral life threaten his standard arguments for moral autonomy in any
irrevocable or irretrievable way. The primary reason for this is that whether the soul finds
itself in the incurable state or in the incorruptible state, the soul has voluntarily chosen to
enter such a condition. By way of analogy, if a man was locked into a room by an outside
agent, his freedom would be violated. But if he voluntarily locked himself inside the
room and threw away the key, no such violation appears to have taken place. Both the
souls who enter bliss to be “wrapped in chains of love” and the souls who become
incurable in evil reach this state through their own exercise of moral autonomy.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that these situations appear to be the exceptions as to
how Origen normally envisions moral autonomy to function. Thus, on the one hand, he
desires to affirm the ongoing reality of moral autonomy within the apocatastasis; yet on
the other hand, Origen’s very language – “chains of love” – reveals his awareness that the
situation may not be as straightforward compared to every other moment of the soul’s
moral history.
505
PEuch 29.13 (GCS II, 388.5-10). Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the BerlinLeipzig critical edition (GCS), and are listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II), page number,
and line number: Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet. Unless otherwise noted,
English translations are from Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book
IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers.
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So far in this chapter I have argued that Origen believed in universal salvation for
every rational being, a destiny which will be achieved in the apocatastasis, and I have
also argued that Origen viewed the apocatastasis (once fully completed) to be a
permanent state. This analysis raises two significant implications for Origen’s theology.
The first implication is that Origen’s universalism introduces teleological
predetermination or inevitability into his system – that is, Origen believes in an outcome
that not only relies on creaturely free choice to find its fulfillment, but which also cannot
be stopped by any exercise of that free choice. The second implication is that Origen’s
universalism radicalizes the role of God’s grace in cosmic history. In the remainder of
this chapter I will discuss each of these topics in turn.

Universalism as Teleological Predetermination
We have seen that Origen understood the future fulfillment of the apocatastasis to
be fixed; he knew it to be a fact about the future.506 The testimony of Scripture on this
point (especially 1 Corinthians 15:22) as well as the logic of Origen’s theological system
makes this eschatological event a certainty for him. God will win in the end. God will
infallibly bring about a final restoration in which every rational soul freely chooses to
exercise their moral autonomy to permanently join with God. The infallibility of this
future event raises an interesting, yet confusing matter: this destiny meticulously depends
on creatures using their freedom of choice correctly. Yet, at the same time this destiny
cannot be thwarted by the moral autonomy of any creature given that it is a fixed and

506

Even if my above argument about the permanency of the apocatastasis is incorrect in that
Origen does allow for repeated falls after each restoration, it does not change the fact that God
predetermines the reunion(s).
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certain future event.507 While it is true that in any individual moment of choice sinful
creatures may use their freedom of choice to resist God’s healing efforts, it is also true
that no creature has the freedom of choice in regard to one’s final destiny. Thus, Origen’s
view sets a hard limit on the extent of moral autonomy.508
We know that Origen was aware that universal salvation entails teleological
certainty and foreordination, for he almost always goes on the defensive after mentioning
it. For example, in First Principles 3.5.6-7 Origen is careful to insist that the fixed
outcome of salvation he just finished affirming poses no threat to the integrity of moral
autonomy. Origen makes a distinction between his version of teleological foreordination
and coercion:
But this subjection [subiectio] will be accomplished through certain means
and courses of discipline and periods of time; that is, the whole world will
not become subject to God by the pressure of some necessity [necessitate
aliqua] that compels it into subjection, nor by the use of force [per uim],
but by word, by reason, by teaching, by the exhortation to better things, by
the best methods of education, and also by such merited and appropriate
threatenings as are justly held over the heads of those who contemptuously

507
In some sense, phrases such as “teleological inevitability” or predetermination can be thought
of as a nuanced form of “determinism.” I hesitate to call it such only because the term “determinism”
means different things to different people. Determinism is often understood as requiring that all events are
fixed and causally predetermined. If so, Origen’s view cannot be described as deterministic, given that he
only believes one event to be fixed – each person’s final destiny. I believe that a case could be made that
Origen’s view constitutes a form of “teleological determinism”, but only if that is carefully defined. At any
rate, Origen never describes his views in this way given that the term “determinism” is a recent label. The
OED traces it back to a work from 1846 – "determinism, n.." http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/51252
(accessed April 05, 2017). Despite its recent provenance, however, philosophers recognize that
deterministic thought interested philosophers since early antiquity – cf. Frede, "Stoic Determinism," 180.
Frede identifies the most common “determinisms” which usually are labeled as “physical determinism,”
“ethical determinism,” “logical determinism,” and “teleological determinism.” She notes that these four
types are already present in Aristotle (180). Again, while Origen’s thought is not deterministic regarding
the first three categories, I believe he could fairly be described as a teleological determinist. Cf. Taylor,
"Determinism, A Historical Survey."
508
It may be helpful to contrast Origen with someone like Irenaeus on this point. Like Origen,
Irenaeus believed that God’s light shines on everyone, and that God’s light will never enslave anyone by
necessity (Haer. 4.39.3). However, Irenaeus believes that the rejection of “necessity” implies that sinners
retain the power to resist God permanently (Haer. 4.39.4). Origen does not understand the rejection of
“necessity” to require this additional power to self-determine one’s final destiny. Cf. Chapter 5 on how
Origen understands the language of “necessity”.
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neglect to care for their own salvation and advantage and their spiritual
health.509
Here Origen states that the final subjection of the whole world will take place, but that
this predetermined event will not be a forced event from the perspective of each soul’s
ability to make decisions. While each soul’s final destiny is fixed, this destiny must not
be understood as divorced from the free choices of each soul in the interim, for indeed the
predetermined telos will only occur through creatures exercising their moral autonomy in
the correct way. The reason Origen goes on the defensive here is because he was
constantly on guard against specific types of deterministic thought which he found
incompatible with moral autonomy; he does not want his readers to think he is suggesting
a determinism of this type (and he knows it may sound like he is). These heretical
determinisms include those surveyed in Chapter 2: gnostic fixed-nature determinism
(where certain people are saved by nature regardless of choice), simplistic Christian
predestinarianism (where salvation is determined by the arbitrary mercies of God with no
respect to a person’s choice), Stoic character determinism (a system where almost no one
is able to become morally virtuous because of the defects in their character, a character
which originally derives from a cause external to themselves and not from their own
choice), and various forms of astral fatalism510 and “Idle-Argument” fatalism511 (where
one’s future is fated to occur without respect to one’s present choices). In all of these
509

PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44; SC 268, 232).
E.g. Phil 23.1.9-15: “…many who are supposed to have embraced the Faith are distracted at the
thought that human affairs may be governed by necessity, and cannot possibly be otherwise than is ruled by
the stars in their different groupings. And a consequence of this opinion is the complete destruction of Free
Will [ἐφ ἡμῖν]; and a further result is that praise and blame are unmeaning…” (Lewis 173; SC 226, 132).
Citations from the Philocalia 21-27 are from the critical edition by Junod (listed by chapter, section, and
line): Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre. English translations are by Lewis, The
Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of
Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea.
511
Cels II.20.27-29 (Chadwick 85; SC 132, 338). For more on the “Idle-Argument” cf. Chapter 2,
n176.
510
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cases the common denominator that Origen rejects is not that they each represent some
form of predeterminism or divine foreordination. Rather, Origen rejects these because he
understands them to be incompatible with his notion of moral autonomy, and
incompatible with the concept of moral culpability (praise and blame). For Origen, praise
and blame only make sense in a context where the soul has the ability to choose between
competing good and bad inclinations, and then experience the consequences of these selfdetermining choices. The various determinisms listed above fail to meet this criterion, for
in each of these one’s moral choices are insufficient or malformed in some way. In the
case of gnostic and Stoic determinism, the moral choice is ultimately predetermined by a
foreign power, and so cannot accurately be called ours. In the case of Christian
predestinarianism and astral determinism, one’s choices might be real, but they have no
self-determining power – they are not linked with the individual’s outcome. That is to
say, one can try one’s best to be morally good, and yet fail to find salvation if not fated to
do so or not chosen by God’s arbitrary mercy. Or, one can be as evil as possible, and yet
still find salvation if fated to do so or if chosen by God’s random mercy. For Origen, in
all of these cases moral autonomy is malformed or denied. However, Origen envisions
his own teleological foreordination as being actuated through the free decisions made by
moral agents, and not in spite of them.512
The fact that Origen understood his eschatology to be a predetermined event is
also the reason why he was so reticent to speak of it to ordinary Christians. Origen spent
much of his career trying to dismantle the popular forms of determinism which were
incompatible with moral autonomy. Given that ordinary Christians were being tempted
512

Cf. Cels IV.3: Origen notes here that even if it were possible for God, through his divine
power, to make it so that people would not sin, this would not be appropriate, “for if you take away the
element of free will from virtue, you also destroy its essence” (Chadwick 186; SC 136, 194).
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from all sides, Origen felt the wisest course was to keep his eschatological view hidden
from all but the wise. Origen was convinced that if understood correctly, his version of
universal salvation did not threaten moral accountability. But at the same time, Origen
did not think it was worth the risk to teach it openly.513 And as we mentioned above,
Origen’s fears came true, for his nuanced understanding of the relationship between
providence and human free choice was misunderstood by his opponents who claimed that
he taught the salvation of the devil qua devil. They believed that Origen taught that God
was automatically and mechanically going to save someone as wicked as the devil. This
is moral fatalism, for if the devil’s deeds have no self-determining power, then the devil’s
future fate is entirely divorced from his deeds. His opponents became convinced that
Origen’s predetermined soteriology rendered the moral quest obsolete.
Although Origen himself was adamant that universal salvation did not require the
coercion of moral autonomy, this of course begs the question: exactly how does Origen
think it is possible for God to achieve this predetermined outcome of cosmic history,
which is completely facilitated through the free and contingent decisions of creatures, yet
without God somehow coercing those who might choose to consistently resist him? If
there is no coercion, why is there not at least a hypothetical possibility that the final
restoration might never take place? What gives Origen the ability to state universalism as
a fact about the future? Is Origen incoherent here, as some scholars have understood him
to be? Does he simply assert the truth of creaturely free choice and the truth of infallible

513
Cf. Phil 23.10.23-28: “For the knowledge of the future makes us relax in the struggle against
wickedness, and the apparent certainty of wickedness enervates us, and the result is that because we do not
wrestle against sin we soon become subject to it. And at the same time it would be an obstacle in the way of
a man’s becoming good and upright, if the knowledge that he will certainly some day be good reached him
beforehand” (Lewis 183; SC 226, 162-164).
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providence without realizing the ostensible logical incongruity of these two positions?514
In fact, Origen did have a solution to these questions, and that solution is the subject of
the next chapter.

Providence as Saving Grace
Origen’s predetermined soteriology has another significant implication. The fact
that God will infallibly save everyone means that the entirety of divine providence –
literally everything that God does – may be described as saving grace. While other
Christian authors may hold a distinction between God’s providential activities and God’s
more targeted gifts of grace in his plan to redeem sinners, Origen does not.515 When
properly understood, Origen’s theological categories of providence and grace collapse
into the same aspect of God, or what I am calling providential-grace. As such, everything
becomes grace. This helps to explain why Benjamin Drewery never found a formal or
comprehensive definition of grace (charis) in Origen’s writings when he went looking for

514

It is important to note that there is no intrinsic incompatibility between a deterministic
worldview and belief in moral autonomy (or “free will”). After all, most determinists (then and now)
concurrently believe in some version of human free will; that is, most determinists are compatibilists.
“Determinism” and “free will” are not definitional opposites. Nevertheless, I frame the question in this way
for an important reason: Origen himself normally discussed various deterministic views as prima facie at
odds with moral accountability, praise and blame. In some ways, Origen is an early example of someone
discussing these issues from the perspective of the “free will problem” – that is, an intuition held by some
that determinism and moral accountability are not logically compatible. Other viewpoints, such as
Stoicism, had no such intuitions. Therefore, given Origen’s own leanings in this regard it is appropriate to
ask how Origen reconciled his predetermined eschatological views with his belief in moral accountability.
515
Origen does distinguish God’s will from God’s providence. While nothing happens outside of
God’s providence, the category of God’s will is narrower: “…nothing happens in heaven or earth without
his providence; not, without his will. For many things happen without his will; nothing without his
providence. For providence is that by which he attends to and manages and makes provision for the things
which happen. But his will is that by which he wishes something or does not wish it” – HomGen 3.2 (Heine
89; SC 7bis, 114-116). Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Genesis are from the revised version (1976 –
SC 7bis) of Doutreleau’s original critical edition (1944 – SC 7): Louis Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur
la Genèse, Sources Chrétiennes (Paris: Les Éditions du cerf, 1976). English translations are from Heine,
Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus.
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it.516 We may distinguish between two general types of God’s providential-grace in
Origen’s system – grace which cooperates with individual moral autonomy, and grace
which does not.
One type of God’s providential-grace is a cooperative grace, and this is witnessed
in the unfolding of salvation-history. When minds fell away from God, God enacted a
strategic plan of redemption which would unfold through cosmic history, and the
unfolding of this history requires the constant cooperation between divine and creaturely
volition. Everything that God does in cosmic history is geared toward teaching souls to
come home in the most effective way possible, “for in no other way can the soul reach
the perfection of knowledge [scientiae perfectionem] except by being inspired with the
truth of the divine wisdom.”517 Each soul must choose to make the ascent to God, but no
soul is able to do so by oneself – only through the indwelling of the Lord and his constant
help is such a thing possible.518 Since human nature is unable to find God on its own,
God responds to all of our efforts, even the most feeble ones, with a great deal of
assistance: “And He is found by those who, after doing what they can, admit that they
need Him, and shows Himself to those whom He judges it right to appear.”519 Then
God’s knowledge arises in the soul by a certain divine grace (θείᾳ τινὶ χάριτι), or a certain
sort of divine inspiration (ἐνθουσιασμοῦ).520 And throughout the long cosmic history,
through a variety of means individually tailored to match the diverse needs of fallen
516

Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 17. Drewery found his task challenging: “but my
difficulty has been that no single feature of Origen’s thought is ultimately irrelevant to my quest” – ibid.,
200.
517
PArch 4.2.7 (Butterworth 283; SC 268, 328).
518
In PArch 3.2.5 Origen describes the many limitations of human nature, and he declares that the
only way we can persevere in the contest is because God gives us his uirtutem [Butterworth – “power”] to
work in us and speak through us (Butterworth 219; SC 268, 176).
519
Cels VII.42.32 (Chadwick 430-31; SC 150, 114). The expression “after doing what they can” is
“τὸ παρ᾿ αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν”. Cf. Cels IV.50 (Chadwick 225; SC 136, 312-314); PEuch 29.19 (GCS II, 393.1).
520
Cels VII.44.7-9 (Chadwick 432; SC 150, 116).
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souls, God’s grace successfully motivates each soul to ascend back home to God’s side.
Since each soul’s needs are different, the remedies must be different as well. For
instance, while mercy and patience will be effective if administered to one soul, that same
mercy shown to another soul will simply increase its intransigence.521 We simply do not
come to God in the same way, but each one comes according to one’s proper ability.522
This is why Origen emphasized the many titles of Jesus in his Commentary on John, for
each of his titles describes a different way Jesus motivates souls of varying stations.523 It
is a central theme in Origen’s theology that God’s grace meets sinners where they are,
and supplies the instruction and motivation needed for their present condition.524
Another reason that God’s grace cooperates with sinners in unequal ways is
because God prefers to dispense saving grace in a way that accords with his justice. Thus,
it is not merely the case that God’s grace feels pleasant to one person and unpleasant to
another because God knows what sort of grace is needed motivate them. God also makes
this decision based on what each person deserves: “For we must believe that God rules
and arranges the universe by judgment at all times.”525 Similarly, instead of preventing
creatures from making evil choices, God’s providential plan incorporates all evil choices

521

Origen uses this example when discussing why God intentionally acted in such a way so that
Pharaoh’s heart would be hardened, PArch 3.1.16-17. PArch 3.1.17 Greek: “In dealing with such persons,
therefore, the eternal God, the perceiver of secret things, who knows all things before they come to be, in
his goodness refrains from sending them the quicker help and, if I may say so, helps them by not helping
them, since this course is for their profit” (Butterworth 191; SC 268, 100-102). Irenaeus, on the other hand,
explains that God abandoned Pharaoh because God foreknew that Pharaoh would not believe. For Irenaeus,
God’s abandonment is strictly punishment and not saving grace – Haer. 4.29.1-2.
522
HomGen 1.7 (Heine 56; SC 7bis, 42): “But all who see are not equally enlightened by Christ,
but individuals are enlightened according to the measure in which they are able to receive the power of the
light . . . We do not, however, all come to him in the same way, but each one ‘according to his ability’”. Cf.
Cels II.64.1-5 (SC 132, 434).
523
ComJn 1.52-57 (SC 120, 88-90).
524
Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus: 6970.
525
PArch 2.9.8 (Butterworth 136; SC 252, 370).
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into his singular plan of grace.526 Thus, God’s providential plan of universal salvation
does not just cooperate with and rely on an individual’s good choices, but also an
individual’s evil choices. The providential plan is one of grace, but it is a grace that does
not contradict God’s inherent fairness and justice.527
Despite the unequal way that God’s grace is experienced by his creatures, it must
be remembered that all of God’s actions are acts of saving grace. For example, unlike
many other Christian theologians of the early Church Origen understands even the
torments of Hell to be saving grace – Hell itself is a “penal remedy”, a strategy of
providential-grace to bring the beloved back to God’s side. For “in [God’s] gracious
compassion he provides for all and exhorts all to be cured by whatever remedies they
may, and incites them to salvation.”528 It further reinforces the fact that all such acts of
God are acts of salvific grace when we know that the end has been predetermined, and
cannot fail to come to pass. This is a radical conception of divine grace. It is a grace
which permeates everything, and which cannot be separated from God’s other acts of
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HomNum 14.2.1 (Scheck 80; SC 442, 164-166): “In the meantime we ourselves say that by a
certain dispensation [dispensatione] and by the wisdom of God, things in this world are arranged in such a
way that absolutely nothing escapes God’s purposes, whether it is evil or good. But let us explain what we
are saying more clearly. God did not make evil; yet, though he was able to prohibit its being invented by
others, he does not prohibit it, but he uses it for necessary causes [necessarias causas] with those very ones
who are its source”. Citations from Origen’s Homilies on Numbers are from the newest critical edition:
Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur les Nombres, 1, 2, 3. English translations are from Scheck, Homilies on
Numbers: Origen.
527
Although every action by God reflects his grace and his justice, Origen gives the greater
emphasis to God’s grace. A recurring theme in Origen is that although God treats with us fairly and
punishes us when we deserve it, our punishments are never commensurate with our actions. God holds
back on account of his mercy – e.g. ComRm III.5.204-243 (Bammel 245-247). Similarly, although God
treats us fairly in the dispensing of his grace by giving more to those who merit it, at the same time the
grace that God gives is similarly never commensurate with whatever merit preceded it. Instead, it is always
much greater – e.g. Origen’s discussion of gifts, wages, and merits in ComRm IV.1.153-249 (Bammel 277282). Thus, God’s providence could never be described as a type of karma system. A better way to describe
Origen’s view is that God will never treat his creatures less than fairly, but he almost always treats his
creatures with something much better than perfect fairness.
528
PArch 2.9.7 (Butterworth 136; SC 252, 370).
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providence. All pronoia is charis in Origen’s system.529 Although this is technically a
cooperative effort, God does the greater share: “our perfection does not come to pass
without our doing anything, and yet it is not completed as a result of our efforts, but God
performs the greater part of it.”530 And so even though the moral autonomy of souls is
necessarily involved, Origen believes it is appropriate to attribute all of salvation to God,
as “the efforts of God’s providence are very much in excess” of our own contributions.531
If the first type of divine grace is cooperative, the second type of God’s
providential-grace is one that God enacts unilaterally. Two important examples of this
type of grace are God’s choice to create, and God’s sovereign plan to restore what he had
created.
Origen describes God’s first act of creation as grace. Origen departs from
Platonism on this point by his insistence that the material world is not co-eternal with
God, but rather was created ex nihilo by God as an act of volition.532 Therefore, existence
itself is due to the grace of God, rather than to any sort of necessity as was believed by
most Platonists.533 Origen writes: “Plainly it is a gift of God that we exist; it is the grace
529

Drewery comes to a similar conclusion: “I have dealt at length with Origen’s doctrine of
Providence because it seems to me that for him πρόνοια and οἰκονομία are χάρις, when the work of God
the Father is especially under consideration, and more particularly when Origen looks at the philosophical
implications of his theology . . .” – Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace: 106. Drewery again
remarks, “The definition of Grace...which the numerous references of Origen seem to suggest is all the
more impressive because he never consciously formulates it. It underlies not only his overt use of χάρις, but
a whole range of most illuminating ‘grace-words’ or synonyms, and justifies us in seeking the true content
of Grace in Origen in his whole presentation of the work of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for us and
within us” (201).
530
PArch 3.1.19 Greek (Butterworth 199; SC 268, 120).
531
PArch 3.1.19 Greek (Butterworth 199; SC 268, 122).
532
PArch 1.3.3 (SC 252, 146-148); 2.1.5 (SC 252, 244); ComRm IV.5.183-189 (Bammel 308309).
533
ComRm X.38.1-10 (Scheck 2.303-304; Bammel 850): “The grace of God and the grace of our
Lord Jesus Christ should be taken to be one and the same grace. For just as the Father gives life to whom he
wills and the Son gives life to whom he wills...so also the grace that the Father gives, this the Son also
gives. One should know, of course, that all that human beings have from God is grace. For they have
nothing as a debt...Therefore, whatever he who was not and is has, by receiving it from him who always
was and is and will be forever, is of grace”. Tzamalikos points out that there were a minority of Platonists
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[gratia] of the Creator who willed us to exist.”534 Besides giving the gift of existence,
God also gifted moral autonomy itself, so that the goodness that minds enjoyed at their
first creation as pure gift might become their own when they persevered in it.535 For
Origen, the creation of immortal and rational minds was an unmerited and undeserved
gift of God’s grace, which did not entail any creaturely cooperation.536
The second place where God’s saving grace does not cooperate with the moral
autonomy of his creatures is in the construction of God’s providential plan of salvation.
That is to say, even though all of cosmic history unfolds as the cooperation between God
and his creatures, the original plan or telos of cosmic history is something that God
decided unilaterally.537 God’s decision to plan and then actuate in time an infallible
universal salvation for all souls is a stunning gift which reflects God’s deep love and
mercy – a gift so marvelous, in fact, that Origen decides only the wise are discerning
enough to be told of it, for others would no doubt take advantage of it.538 God’s creatures
had no say in this divine decision. Instead, this prior decision by God to enact a
who did believe in a beginning to the universe such as Plutarch and Atticus – Tzamalikos, Origen:
Cosmology and Ontology of Time: 122. Tzamalikos also notes that Philo’s position on this point is unclear,
given that in Philo we see both statements that creation out of nothing is impossible (e.g. De Aeternitatae
Mundi 2.5; De Specialibus Legibus 1.266), as well as statements condemning the view that the cosmos has
always existed (e.g. de Orificio Mundi 7) – Philo references cited in ibid., 143.
534
ComRm IV.5.13-18 (Scheck 1.259; Bammel 300).
535
PArch 2.9.2: “For the Creator granted to the minds created by him the power of free and
voluntary movement [Voluntarios enim et liberos], in order that the good that was in them might become
their own, since it was preserved by their own free will [id uoluntate] (Butterworth 130; SC 252, 354).
536
On the other hand, God’s second creation (what I label stage three of cosmic history) does rely
on each individual’s moral autonomy, given that the God stations each individual according to their prior
merit.
537
Winrich Löhr has made the suggestive remark (but without any further explanation on his part)
that Clement and Origen’s anti-gnostic stance led them to stress the divine pedagogy of the soul, and that
this position led them to “adopt a synergistic stance – but it is a very sophisticated synergism that deserves
serious attention even from those theological quarters that would normally feel more at home with
Augustine’s views” – Löhr, "Gnostic Determinism Reconsidered," 386. Löhr appears to sense where the
logic of Origen’s thought leads, but he seems hesitant to characterize it as a form of determinism given
Origen’s emphasis on moral autonomy.
538
Origen notes that when Paul wants to disclose anything about the kindness and ineffable
goodness of God, especially on this point, Paul first “roughens” it up so that lazy Christians will not abuse
it – ComRm V.1.85-97 (Scheck 1.306; Bammel 363).
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foreordained and inescapable universal salvation becomes the matrix, or the arena in
which God and creatures will eventually cooperate in the unfolding of salvation.539 As
much as Origen values moral autonomy, he does not understand it to have any role in
God’s prior decision to save everyone. If I may be forgiven for anachronism, Origen’s
understanding on this point might be characterized as God electing for salvation, in
advance, the entire race of fallen souls.540
To summarize, Origen’s conception of providence-grace is vast. In his system,
there is no chance. Rather, providential-grace is responsible for the entire ordering of the
539

On this point, we may contrast Origen’s view with the Christian predestinarian view Origen
illustrates in PEuch 5.1-6 (GCS II, 308-311). Both Origen’s view and the predestinarian view may be
characterized as deterministic grace soteriologies, given that in Origen’s view everyone is saved by this
deterministic grace, while in the predestinarian view only some are saved by grace. The main difference
between these two views is in how God achieves the predetermined end. The predestinarian view divorces
the individual’s final salvation from any notion of merit, and from the moral progress in general (similar to
a naïve view of fate), while Origen’s view explicitly does not.
540
Origen does not (and would not) use the term “predestination” in this context because
predestination is a term used in Scripture in a way that differentiates between two groups of people – those
who God has chosen and those he has not. Thus, Origen will interpret the biblical passages speaking about
predestination to refer not to matters of ultimate salvation (since universal salvation necessarily denotes a
singular group) but rather to God treating people differently in their earthly lives according to prior causes.
In ComRm VII.5-7.7 (Scheck 2.83-92; Bammel 582-593) Origen discusses those whom God has foreknown
(praescitt) and predestined (praedestinauit). He states that Paul meant that “those who are foreknown by
God are those upon whom God had placed his own love and affection because he knew what sort of
persons they were,” and on this basis he predestined them (Scheck 2.89; Bammel 590). Thus, Origen
understands predestination to rely on foreseen merits, rather than a prior decision by God to save people
which was not informed by future merits. In addition, Origen would refrain from using the language of
“predestination” to describe the apocatastasis because naïve Christian predestinarians had already made
such terminology problematic for him.
Neither does Origen use the term “election” to describe universal salvation However, there does
not seem to me to be any inherent conceptual disagreement with Origen’s view of universal salvation and
later views of election, unless one insists that all notions of election must require the particular Augustinian
element of God compelling the will by his immediate healing of the will – which I see no reason to do. If
one sets the issue regarding terminology aside, and if one does not insist that the concepts of election or
predestination always require the presence of a separate reprobate group (as it seems to in Scripture), then I
would argue that Origen’s universalism is a form of universal predestination or universal election. Origen
understands God to have decided, in advance and without recourse to individual merit, to infallibly elect
everyone who exists for a future salvation, even though God need not have done so. If my readers find my
anachronistic borrowing of future concepts of predestination unhelpful, they should feel free to disregard
the comparison here. But such a comparison might be helpful for some to better understand the
predetermined nature of Origen’s soteriology. N.B.: some contemporary Reformed theologians use the
concept of predestination to refer to more than simply God’s prior decision to save certain people, and they
broaden it to describe God’s deterministic plan to regulate all of life, including the entirety of human
choices. I am not using predestination (or election) in this broader way, but simply as a term to describe
God’s infallible decision over the ultimate fate of certain persons.
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world and its administration, which includes everything that ever happens to people in the
world. For the most part God’s creatures are currently blind to the inner mysteries and
depth of divine providence, but after we have been restored to God we will “learn more
clearly the reasons for all things that happen on earth.”541 There is a hidden and divine
purpose for all things, no matter how big or small, and part of the pedagogical journey in
the afterlife is to gradually attain knowledge of all of God’s hidden purposes. This
includes things that might appear unimportant to us now, such as learning God’s purpose
in creating diversity among animals, and it also includes things of larger import, such as
learning God’s purpose in creating a diversity of human races.542 Even these details are
part of God’s plan of saving grace, for Origen believes that everything that exists is part
of God’s single plan of salvific grace. Each soul will be instructed on these matters until,
He will learn the judgment of divine providence about each individual
thing; about things which happen to men, that they happen not by chance
or accident but by a reason so carefully thought out, and so high above us,
that it does not overlook even the number of the hairs of our head, and that
not of the saints only but probably of all men.543
In all things, God’s providence works per a strategic plan to achieve the final restoration
of every rational soul. For Origen, everything is saving grace.544
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PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404).
PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 150; SC 252, 404).
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PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 151; SC 252, 406).
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The fact that everything can be thought of as salvific grace is probably why Origen sometimes
seems to not give enough emphasis or priority to certain watershed moments in the Christian journey, such
as the events of conversion or justification. While Origen does view these events as necessary and
important stages in the soul’s ascent to God, it is also true that Origen does not prioritize them above other
stages of the ascent to God as much as many other theologians do. For an examination of the loose and
various ways Origen speaks about conversion, see Smith, "Conversion in Origen." For a helpful discussion
of Origen’s view of justification, see Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The Legacy of
Origen's Commentary on Romans.
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Conclusion
Origen’s view of God’s providence and God’s plan of salvation (οἰκονομία) is
remarkable in its scope. The beginning of the plan lies in the timeless life of the Triune
God who from all eternity planned to create and then to bless morally autonomous
creatures. Even before he creates God knows that his creatures will fall away, and thus
God also designs a plan, in advance, which will eventually restore all souls back to
himself. The two key features of God’s plan are its infallibility and its ability to operate
in such a way that does not violate creaturely moral autonomy. Thus, even before
creating a single rational Mind God has already decreed that none will perish or
successfully persist in evil. God’s plan of universal salvation thus acts as a teleological
certainty – a teleological predetermination – which governs and overshadows the entire
unfolding of cosmic history.
God’s preplanning of universal salvation and God’s subsequent act of creation are
examples of God’s unilateral grace – no creatures cooperated with nor merited these
blessings. Everything that occurs afterwards, however, proceeds through the interaction
of God’s providence and individual free choice. The interaction between these two
volitions constitutes the unfolding of God’s plan of redemption in history. Origen gives
God’s providence greater priority and emphasis, however, and we can easily see why:
given that every detail of cosmic history takes place in the comforting shadow of a fixed
eschatological universal salvation, everything that God does is part of the divine plan to
realize that end. Thus, all providential activities down to the last detail – including Hell
itself – are instances of saving grace. Understanding this both radicalizes our
understanding of Origen’s theology of grace, and nuances our understanding of Origen’s
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view of moral autonomy. Origen may insist on the integrity of moral autonomy in any
isolated moment of free choice, but moral autonomy does not have the power to choose
to resist God forever. There is a sense in which Origen limits the scope of moral
autonomy when compared to other writers – moral autonomy is self-determinative in the
moment, and yet moral autonomy does not enjoy a permanent power for selfdetermination.
The above analysis raises challenging questions about Origen’s understanding of
freedom of choice. Specifically, we are left wondering how God can infallibly achieve
the apocatastasis without violating moral autonomy in the process, for by all appearances
it seems we must admit at least a hypothetical ability for a rational soul to choose to resist
God forever. But if any such possibility is allowed, then God’s plans to save everyone are
not truly infallible and foreordained. Was Origen aware of this awkwardness? In the next
chapter, we will synthesize Origen’s understanding of freedom of choice (as outlined in
chapter 2) with his understanding of providence-grace. There I will demonstrate that
Origen recognized the paradoxical quality of his soteriology, and that he provided a
solution for it in the form of a special kind of divine foreknowledge.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GOD’S PROVIDENTIAL ARRANGEMENT OF
FUTURE VOLUNTARY POSSIBILITIES
Introduction and Method
Chapter 1 demonstrated the confusion within current scholarship on the following
point: Origen declares that God will ensure universal salvation, yet each moment of
choice is determined by the soul alone.545 Chapter 2 then outlined Origen’s understanding
of moral autonomy or freedom of choice. Here it was disclosed that for moral autonomy
to be genuine (for a choice to be free) the soul alone must give or withhold assent to the
competing impulsive desires originating from the person’s spirit aspect and flesh aspect.
As long as the soul has rational power over binary differentiation (good and evil), and as
long as the soul performs the assent rather than an agent outside of the soul, moral
autonomy is upheld. Chapters 3 and 4 mapped out Origen’s pedagogical soteriology.
545
I also pointed out that scholarship has also been confused on the related question of how moral
autonomy can be preserved once “inside” a final and permanent restoration, given that moral autonomy
appears to necessitate at least the possibility to sin. It is interesting that Origen’s answer to this related
question is very different when compared to his explanation of moral autonomy’s role in reaching the
apocatastasis. In Chapter 4 we showed that Origen’s belief in a permanent apocatastasis does not conflict
with moral autonomy, but only because Origen appears to change the definition and function of moral
autonomy when it is performed within the apocatastasis. In the same way that the soul of Jesus became so
habituated to righteousness, that finally his “susceptibility to change was destroyed”, so too, the
fundamental nature of glorified saints is altered by their continuous union with God – PArch 2.6.5
(Butterworth 112; SC 252, 318-320). We may remember that Origen requires moral autonomy to allow for
binary possibilities – e.g. PArch 3.1.3 (Butterworth 160; SC 268, 24). Thus, in this case Origen “solves” the
proposed contradiction between moral autonomy and a permanent apocatastasis by simply redefining the
very concept of moral autonomy such that the troublesome requirement of “ability to sin” is absent. This
solution, however, does not solve the primary question as to how God can infallibly ensure that morally
autonomous creatures will arrive at the apocatastasis in the first place. Origen only redefines moral
autonomy post-arrival to the apocatastasis, and so the tension between God’s foreordination and creaturely
free choice remains an important question to be answered in all instances leading up to the final restoration.
This question is the focus of this chapter.
Citations from Peri Archon are from the most recent critical edition by Crouzel and Simonetti,
Origèn: Traité des Principes. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations are from Butterworth,
Origen: On first principles: being Koetschau's text of the De principiis.
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Chapter 3 outlined Origen’s stages of cosmic salvation-history and emphasized that
throughout every stage divine providence instructs, guides, and enforces the direction of
history towards a specific end. At the same time, however, Origen insists that the moral
quest requires voluntary choices (genuine moral autonomy) at every moment in the
ascent towards that end. Chapter 4 investigated the nature of the end – the apocatastasis.
Here I argued that Origen believed in a definitive and permanent universal restoration of
all rational souls, even though Origen often hid this teaching for pastoral and pedagogical
reasons. In Chapter 4 I made two secondary arguments that are important to repeat here.
First, Origen’s universalism radicalizes Origen’s conception of divine grace. This is
because every divine action – even the consignment of a soul to punishment in Hell – is
an aspect of God’s saving grace; every moment of a soul’s life features into God’s unique
plan of salvation for that soul. Second, Origen’s universalism is an example of divine
foreordination and unalterable certainty in Origen’s theology. And it is this point which
begs the question: whence comes Origen’s confidence in a foreordained and unalterable
universal salvation if every stage of the moral ascent requires genuine freedom of choice?
Chapter 5 answers this final question. This chapter’s argument may be
summarized as follows: Origen understands the scope of God’s foreknowledge to include
the knowledge of how each rational soul would freely choose in any hypothetical state of
affairs. This means that God can manufacture external circumstances in such a way that
guarantees a soul will freely respond in the way God wants it too. Thus, by using such
knowledge in his original planning of salvation-history, God was able to preselect which
free choices would be performed in history. At the same time, however, moral autonomy
(as Origen defines it) is protected and upheld in the moment of choice. Therefore, given
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God’s foreordained plan of universal salvation, God preselects only those choices which
God foreknows will eventually and infallibly lead to a future apocatastasis.
Because Origen typically hides his doctrine of universal salvation for pastoral
reasons, it is not possible to point to one specific passage in his writings to demonstrate
the truth of this argument. Instead, Origen’s viewpoint must be extrapolated and teased
forth from various hints he left in his writings.546 It is my goal to introduce and analyze a
series of passages which, collectively, showcase my argument. I will begin by analyzing
passages that establish Origen’s general principles regarding this topic. We will see that
these general principles bring into sharp focus questions concerning language of
necessity and divine foreordination. Origen’s answers to such questions will be drawn
from his discussions on the nature of divine foreknowledge. With these elements in place,
I will discuss two final passages which tie these themes together and provide an apt
illustration of my central argument – namely, that God manufacturers the necessary
conditions which he foreknows will lead to a soul’s voluntary repentance and eventual
beatitude.

546

At this point, it is important to reaffirm that I am not forcing a solution upon Origen. It may
look like I am doing so given that I am, admittedly, extrapolating what Origen believed, a belief Origen
himself never states explicitly in his extant writings. However, on the topic of how God achieves a
foreordained universal salvation without violating moral autonomy, we know the reason why Origen was
unwilling to discuss the topic publicly. Chapter 4 demonstrated that Origen went out of his way to avoid
speaking about universal salvation for pastoral reasons alone. Apparently, Origen did not feel it necessary
or even important to pass along his belief through his writings. For assorted reasons, however, Chapter 1
demonstrated that modern scholarship is fascinated by the very teaching Origen chose to leave unwritten.
My contention in this chapter is that Origen did work out a specific way in which moral autonomy is
upheld in the context of a foreordained universalism, and that even though Origen was too wary to entrust
his view into writing in an explicit way, that a close reading of his corpus grants us sufficient clues to
reconstruct it.
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God’s Ordering of Salvation-History
Cels 6.57, Chadwick 373 (SC 147, 320-22)547
[Celsus wonders why God cannot persuade everyone, and Origen replies
that] The persuasion of a man is similar to the relationships which are
called ‘reciprocal’ [ὡσπερεὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀντιπεπονθότων ἐστίν], like a
man who has his hair cut who is active in that he offers himself to the
barber. Because of this there is need not only for the action of the one who
persuades but also for submission, so to speak, to the one who persuades
or for acceptance of what he says. That is why we may not say that people
who are unconvinced fail to be persuaded because God is incapable of
convincing them. The reason is rather that they do not accept [μὴ
δέχεσθαι] God’s persuasive words . . . even if the persuasive words are
given by God, yet the act of assent to them is not caused by God [τό γε
πείθεσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπὸ θεοῦ], is clearly taught by Paul when he says:
‘The persuasion is not from him who calls you.’
This text highlights two helpful introductory points. First, it demonstrates that Origen
understands salvation to require a subjective component. Salvation may be planned by
God, initiated by God, made possible by the redemptive workings of God, and
encouraged by God, but at the same time it requires voluntary assent (a reciprocal
response) by each creature. Despite everything that God does, restoration will not happen
apart from voluntary submission to the will of God.548
If the first point is that an assent is necessary, the second point to notice is that
God does not directly cause the assent. Origen’s moral psychology has no room for a
willing (that is, an assent) that is somehow directly manufactured by God. This also rules
out fixed natures, for if one’s nature programs (predetermines) one’s assent, then the
creator of that fixed nature would be the direct cause of the assent. Origen will sometimes
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Citations of Contra Celsum are from the most recent critical edition by Borret, Origène: Contre
Celse - Introduction, Texte Critique, Traduction et Notes. Unless otherwise noted, any English translations
of Contra Celsum are from: Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum.
548
Cf. PArch 3.5.6 (Butterworth 242; SC 268, 228): “[Jesus took the form of a servant and became
obedient even unto death] in order to teach them obedience who could in no other way obtain salvation
except through obedience.”
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go so far as to describe God compelling, pressing and extorting a person’s assent,549 but
Origen remains firm on the point that each rational creature retains ultimate control over
their choice at the moment of choice.550 Reaching the apocatastasis requires the voluntary
faith, repentance, conversion, and ascent to holiness by each creature – all of which falls
under the purview of each soul’s moral autonomy.
PArch 2.1.2, Butterworth 77 (SC 252, 236-238)
But God who, by the unspeakable skill of his wisdom [ineffabilem
sapientiae suae artem], transforms and restores all things [transformans ac
reparans profectum], whatever their condition [quae quoquomodo fiunt],
to some useful purpose and the common advantage of all [ad utile aliquid
et ad communem omnium], recalls these very creatures, so different from
each other in mental quality, to one harmony of work and endeavor; so
that, diverse though the motions of their souls may be, they nevertheless
combine to make up the fulness and perfection of a single world, the very
variety of minds tending to one end, perfection [ut diuresis licet motibus
animorum, unius tamen mundi plenitudinem perfectionemque
consumment, atque ad unum perfectionis finem uarietas ipsa mentium
tendat]. For there is one power [Vna namque uirtus est] which binds and
holds together all the diversity of the world and guides the various motions
to the accomplishment of one task [quae omnem mundi diuersitatem
constringit et continent atque in unum opus uarious agit motus], lest so
immense a work as the world should be dissolved by the conflict of souls.
It is for this reason, we think, that God, the parent of all things, in
providing for the salvation of his entire creation [salute uniuersarum
creaturarum suarum] through the unspeakable plan of his word and
wisdom, has so ordered everything [per ineffabilem uerbi sui ac sapientiae
rationem ita haec singular dispensasse] that each spirit or soul, or
whatever else rational existences ought to be called, should not be
compelled by force against its free choice to any action except that to
which the motion of its own mind lead it, – for in that case the power of
free choice would seem to be taken from them, [non contra arbitrii
libertatem ui in aliud quam motus mentis suae ageret cogerentur, et per
hoc adimi ab his uideretur liberi facultas arbitrii] which would certainly
alter the quality of their nature itself – and at the same time that the
549

These terms will be discussed below in the discussion of PArch 3.5.8.
We may also note that this text argues against Ramelli’s proposed solution of “ethical
intellectualism” (see above, Chapter 1). Origen’s argument here presupposes that moral choices are not
wholly caused by the act of God granting true knowledge. If receiving true knowledge did automatically
precipitate the correct choice, then it would be true to say that the only reason people do not convert is
because God was unable to persuade them of the truth (but this is the opposite of Origen’s argument in this
text).
550
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motions of their wills [diuersi motus propositi] should work suitably and
usefully together to produce the harmony of a single world . . .
In this passage Origen affirms God’s plan to bring restoration to all creatures (God
“transforms and restores all things…providing for the salvation of his entire creation”).551
Additionally, we read that this restoration necessarily involves the motion of their souls
(motibus animorum), guided by God, by which Origen has in mind individual choices
concerning repentance, conversion, and the rejection of sin. Origen is aware that a
foreordained universal salvation – one which logically requires that all creatures
eventually make the correct choices – appears to threaten moral autonomy. Thus, even
though he acknowledges that God guides the exercise of moral autonomy, Origen
immediately stresses that despite how this may sound, no soul will be forced to choose
the way God wants it to. Each soul will only act in ways that its own inclinations
motivate it to act.
The last sentence in the passage is significant, for here Origen mentions God’s
arrangement or ordering (dispensasse) of creaturely moral autonomy. God has a plan to
restore every soul. Every soul has its own motions or choices. God’s plan, therefore,
entails that he orders and arranges the free choices of each soul in such a way as to form a
unified whole and to ensure a future apocatastasis (“in providing for the salvation of his
551
“omnium transformans ac reparans profectum… salute uniuersarum creaturarum suarum.”
Rufinus typically uses the verb form restituere “to restore” (and its variations) when translating Origen’s
comments about universal salvation – e.g. PArch 2.1.1, (SC 252, 236). Rufinus also uses consummatio –
e.g. PArch 1.6.1 (SC 252, 194). This passage is admittedly more ambiguous, yet its construction and
structure clearly echo places where Origen is more explicit: e.g. PArch 1.6.1 where Origen says that “the
goodness of God will restore [reuocet] his entire creation to one end [unum finem], even his enemies being
conquered and subdued” (Butterworth 52; SC 252, 194). Our passage here in PArch 2.1.2 has a similar
structure, for Origen repeats that the “wisdom of God” will “transform and restore all things” … “to one
end, perfection.” Another parallel passage is PArch 3.5.7 where Origen depicts universal salvation as the
“perfect restoration of the entire creation [perfecta uniuersae creaturae restitution]” (Butterworth 243; SC
268, 232). The places where Origen explicitly affirms universal salvation signal to the reader what Origen
has in mind in passages such as PArch 2.1.2 where he speaks with more ambiguity. For more on the
terminology Origen uses when speaking about universal salvation, see Chapter 4.
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entire creation . . . [God] has ordered everything . . . that the motion of their wills should
. . . produce the harmony of a single world”). To be clear, God does not arrange the free
choices of creatures in a way that would force them to do something they would not
otherwise choose to do. But although creatures exercise free choice, God uses an
unspeakably complex plan of arrangement of these free choices so that, when combined,
the full set of free choices results in God’s foreordained universal salvation. Origen does
not reveal how this process works in this passage, but it is important to see that he grants
divine providence a certain measure of authority and control over creaturely moral
autonomy. We will have to explore further to discover what Origen means by God’s
“arrangement” and “ordering” of moral autonomy. A similar passage is found in Book 3
of First Principles:
PArch 3.5.8, Butterworth 243-44 (SC 268, 232-234)
But this subjection will be accomplished through certain means and
courses of discipline and periods of time; that is, the whole world [omnis
mundus] will not become subject to God [subiectionem] by the pressure of
some necessity [necessitate] that compels [cogente] it into subjection, nor
by the use of force [uim], but by word, by reason, by teaching, by the
exhortation to better things, by the best methods of education, and also by
such merited and appropriate threatenings552 as are justly held over the
heads of those who contemptuously neglect to care for their own salvation
and advantage and their spiritual health . . . But how, consistently with the
preservation of free will [arbitrii libertate] in all rational creatures, each
person ought to be dealt with, that is, who they are whom the Word of
God discovers to be prepared and capable and so instructs; who they are
whom he puts off for a time; who they are from whom the word is utterly
hidden and who are destined to be far away from the hearing of it; who
again they are that despise the word when it is declared and preached to
552

Here Origen lists all of the various strategies God employs in God’s pedagogical soteriology.
Without repeating our discussion of God’s pedagogical soteriology from Chapter 3, it is worth noting here
that the first term in Origen’s list is the most important, and it is what enables the rest of the list to function.
The word here is verbo, which is Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s original Greek λογος. While it is true that
God persuades using words – words of revelation, words of his prophets, and the words of the didaskaloi –
the most appropriate sense of “word” here is, of course, the Word, the Son of God. A few lines later Origen
explicitly refers to the “Word of God” (uerbum dei) as the agent in charge of the task of pedagogical
soteriology.
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them and consequently are visited with God’s corrections and
chastisements553 and pressed into salvation and whose conversion is as it
were compelled and extorted [perurgeat ad salutem conversionemque
eorum quodammodo exigat et extorqueat]; who they are for whom God
even provides special occasions for salvation, so that sometimes a man has
obtained an assured salvation when his faith was revealed by a mere
answer; from what causes [causis] or on what occasions these things
happen, or what the divine wisdom sees as it looks into these men [in his
intro inspiciens] or what movements of theirs [motus propositi] will lead
God to arrange all these things thus [eorum uidens haec uniuersa
dispenset], is known to God alone and to his only-begotten Son,554 through
whom all things were created and restored [reparata]…
In this passage Origen outlines the various pedagogical tools God employs throughout
salvation-history to achieve the final restoration of all rational creatures. Because every
creature uses their freedom of choice in a unique way, God must use individualized
methods to meet their individual needs in order to facilitate their successful return to
beatitude. We are assured that none of God’s methods violate moral autonomy, yet even
so Origen’s language here is unusually striking. Phrases such as “pressed into salvation
and whose conversion is as it were compelled and extorted” is as strident language as
Origen will ever use to describe a voluntary conversion process.555 Such language and
imagery are unusual for Origen because he is normally on the defensive against
553

Once again Origen’s words demonstrate that “ethical intellectualism” is not a complete
description of Origen’s moral psychology. Sometimes those who know the truth must be further
incentivized before they will convert – thus, Origen refers to a variety of semi-rational means of
persuasion, such as punishments, fear, etc.
554
Here Origen emphasizes that only God knows the specific mechanics of how each person will
be restored to salvation without violating moral autonomy. However, it would be incorrect to interpret this
text as if Origen were insisting that we cannot know, in general, how moral autonomy is preserved in the
context of a foreordained universal salvation. As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, Origen does believe he
knows how moral autonomy can be upheld. Instead, Origen is stating that on an individual level, there is no
way for us to know in advance how God will achieve the restoration of this or that sinner (let alone
ourselves). Only God is able to look inside a sinner (intro inspiciens) and then make a customized plan of
salvation. Origen admits that there is no way for creatures to be privy to that level of information until after
the fact.
555
Another rare example may be found in Cels I.46 (Chadwick 42; SC 132, 196): “Even if Celsus,
or the Jew that he introduced, ridicule what I am about to say, nevertheless it shall be said that many have
come to Christianity as it were in spite of themselves, some spirit having turned their mind suddenly from
hating the gospel to dying for it by means of a vision by day or by night. We have known many instances
like this.” Doubtless, Origen is thinking of the apostle Paul here as the greatest example of this
phenomenon.
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heterodox determinisms, especially determinisms related to the topics of faith and
conversion. As such, we must be careful not to read more into Origen’s statements here
than is warranted. Even with the forceful language Origen is careful to begin and end this
passage with a strong affirmation of moral autonomy.
As in the last passage, here Origen writes about God’s prior arrangement
(dispenset) of creaturely free moral choices in the unfolding of salvation-history (“what
movements of theirs will lead God to arrange all these things thus”). The reason that God
needs to plan the unfolding of salvation-history in advance is because of the diversity
among creatures. The same sermon that will move one sinner to conversion will instead
move another sinner to further intransigence. Similarly, preaching to one sinner early in
life will ensure his quick conversion, but preaching to another sinner early in life will
have the opposite effect. Because of the diversity in moral psychology among God’s
creatures, God must know the appropriate moment to apply the correct methods. Each
instance of divine pedagogy and divine grace is applied in precisely the correct time and
place and degree to ensure its efficacy. God looks into sinners (intro inspiciens) in order
to discover what customized plan of action will result in their voluntary repentance. What
must be emphasized is that God does this internal examination of each creature’s moral
autonomy beforehand. That is to say, God acquires this information through his
foreknowledge, and then on the basis of that information God proceeds to arrange and
construct his detailed plan of salvation-history.
At this point, important questions begin to emerge as to the nature of God’s prior
arrangement of creaturely free choice. What is God arranging specifically? What type of
foreknowledge does this require? Furthermore, to what extent does God’s arrangement
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govern moral autonomy and place limits upon it? How is God able to actively arrange the
free choices of his creatures without imposing necessity, compulsion, or force upon them
(necessitate, cogente, uim), for Origen disavows all three in this passage? The answers to
these related questions may be gleaned by investigating Origen’s understanding of the
concept of “necessity” and Origen’s understanding of divine foreknowledge.

Origen and Language of “Necessity”
One of Origen’s most important discussions of foreknowledge is found in
Philocalia 23,556 where he argues that although God has foreknowledge, such
foreknowledge does not entail the type of future necessity that contradicts moral
responsibility.557 Origen admits that many of the Greeks believed that the notion of divine
foreknowledge imposes necessity on all events, and that consequently they felt they must
reject the idea of divine foreknowledge altogether:
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This section of the Philocalia was originally from Origen’s Commentary on Genesis, now lost.
A parallel treatment of divine foreknowledge by Origen along with his corresponding
discussion about language of “necessity” is found in Cels II.20 (Chadwick 84-87; SC 132, 336-345). This is
important for it establishes continuity in Origen’s thought from the beginning of his writing career to the
end. Origen has another discussion about divine foreknowledge in ComRm III.7.5-6 (Scheck 2.83-92;
Bammel 582-593). However, this discussion is different in that Origen does not treat foreknowledge in the
philosophical way that he does in Philocalia 23 and Cels II.20. Rather, in this discussion Origen defines
foreknowledge as “to receive in affection and to unite with oneself” based on the Scriptural euphemism of
“to know” (as in “the man knew his wife”) – ComRm VII.6.35-101 (Scheck 2.88-91; Bammel 589-592).
Though they are different the two discussions are not contradictory. Origen believed that Paul used the term
“foreknowledge” at this point in the epistle according to Old Testament custom, and not according to the
technical sense used in Greek philosophy. Additionally, Origen does mention the philosophical definition
of foreknowledge at one point in this discussion – see ComRm VII.6.85-89 (Scheck 2.90; Bammel 591). It
appears that confusion on this passage in the Romans commentary led Charles Bigg to incorrectly
conclude: “Origen, in fact, held that man is free in such a sense that God Himself cannot foresee what he
may choose to do” – Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria: Being the Bampton Lectures of the Year
1886: 244.
Citations from Origen’s Commentary on Romans (along with page numbers) are from the critical
edition by Bammel, Der Römerbriefkommentar des Origenes: kritische Ausgabe der Übersetzung Rufins, 1,
2, 3. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations (listed by volume and page) are from Scheck’s 2volume work: Scheck, Origen: Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans Books 1-5; Origen: Commentary
on the Epistle to the Romans Books 6-10.
557
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[These Greeks] tell us that if God from everlasting knows that a certain
person will be unjust, and will do certain unjust deeds, and if the
knowledge of God be infallible [ἀφευδὴς], and if he that is foreseen to
have such a character will certainly [πάντως] be unjust and will do these
unjust deeds, his injustice is necessitated [κατηνάγκασται], and it will be
impossible [ἀδύνατον] for his conduct to be other than what God knew it
would be. But if his conduct could not be different, and no one is to be
blamed for not doing impossibilities, it is no use for us to accuse the unjust
. . . and they say that consistently with God’s foreknowledge our Free Will
[ἐφ ἡμῖν] cannot be possibly maintained.558
Although Origen disagrees with this claim, it is important to remember that Origen does
agree with the idea that if a person’s conduct could not have been otherwise, then that
person should not be praised or blamed. By its very nature moral autonomy requires
various possibilities of expression.559 These alternate possibilities stem from Origen’s
belief that the soul is always faced with multiple (and competing) rational inclinations
and motivations which originate from the person’s spirit and body. The soul stands

558

Phil 23.7 (Lewis 180; SC 226, 152-154). Citations from this section of the Philocalia are from
the most recent critical edition by Junod, Origène: Philocalie 21-27. Sur le libre arbitre. Unless otherwise
noted, all English translations are by Lewis, The Philocalia of Origen: A compilation of selected passages
from Origen's works made by St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St. Basil of Caesarea.
Here Origen is wading into an already well-established Greek debate regarding divine
foreknowledge and (what is called by contemporary scholars) the issue of “logical determinism.” Questions
pertaining to logical determinism have to do with whether or not statements about the future have truth
value in the present – e.g. if it is raining today, then was it true yesterday to say that today would be rainy?
If so then the future appears fixed by logical implication of the truth value of the language we use – cf. R. J.
Hankinson, "Determinism and indeterminism," in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed.
Keimpe Algra, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 516-17. This debate was often highly
technical and often hinged on the proper and improper use of tensed language itself. For analysis on the
arguments for and against logical determinism, see Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame:
Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 91-103. Questions
regarding God’s foreknowledge of future events are one variation of this larger debate. The troubling
conclusions regarding logical determinism led some, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, to reject divine
foreknowledge altogether (De fato 30) – cf. Bugár, "Where does Free Will come from?," 625. Origen
upholds logical determinism (in the form of infallible divine foreknowledge), but he denies that this entails
causal determinism. Instead, as we will see below, Origen insists that divine foreknowledge does not cause
future events, but rather future events cause God’s foreknowledge of them.
559
E.g. Cels V.21 (Chadwick 280; SC 147, 66): “While as for us who say that the universe is
cared for by God in accordance with the conditions of the free will of each man, and that as far as possible
it is always being led on to be better, and who know that the nature of our free will is to admit various
possibilities (for it cannot achieve the entirely unchangeable nature of God)…”. Also PArch 1.5.2
(Butterworth 44; SC 252, 176): “Every rational creature is therefore susceptible of praise and blame; of
praise, if in accordance with the reason which he has in him he advances to better things; of blame, if he
departs from the rule and course of what is right…”
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midway between the other two aspects of the person and must choose between them.560
Therefore, at any moment of choice both virtue and vice are viable options which the
agent could assent to. Moral praise requires that the person could have chosen incorrectly
instead, and moral blame requires that the person could have chosen correctly instead.561
Like the Greeks he mentions here, Origen believes that an absence of alternative
possibilities would introduce an unacceptable force of necessity on a person’s ability to
make free moral choices. Such necessity would constitute a denial of moral autonomy
and it would destroy any possibility for moral culpability. Where Origen disagrees,
however, is with the claim that infallible divine foreknowledge leads to this type of
necessity. Throughout Philocalia 23 Origen insists that the future event causes God to
have foreknowledge of it, rather than that God’s foreknowledge causes the event.562
Origen uses Judas Iscariot as an illustration to make his point about alternative
possibilities. Origen states that in the case of Judas “no blame would have attached to him
if he had of necessity [ἐπαναγκὲς] been a traitor, and if it had not been possible for him to
be like the other Apostles.”563 A point of confusion, however, stems from the ambiguous
and imprecise nature of language with the terms such as “necessity”, “certainly”, etc.
(this is true in Greek as well as in English). Trying to wade into the language difficulty,
Origen states:
560
PArch 2.8.4: “…it appears as if the soul were some kind of medium [medium] between the
weak flesh [carnem infirmam] and the willing spirit [spiritum promptum]” (Butterworth 127-128; SC 242,
348).
561
This is Origen’s primary argument throughout PArch 3.1 (SC 268, 16-254).
562
Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 156): “…we shall make a still stronger statement, nevertheless
true, that the future event is the cause of God’s peculiar knowledge concerning it.” This appears to be the
typical view of divine foreknowledge by theologians in the early Church – e.g. Tatian remarks in Oratio ad
Graecos VII (ANF 2.67-68): “And the power of the Logos, having in itself a faculty to foresee future
events, not as fated, but as taking place by the choice of free agents, foretold from time to time the issues of
things to come” – "Tatian's Address to the Greeks," in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian,
Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, ANF
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994).
563
Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 158).
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For if any one interprets the words certainly will be [πάντως ἔσται –
“surely, doubtless, certainly”] in the sense that what is foreknown will of
necessity be [ἀνάγκην εἶναι – “compulsory, forced”], we do not agree with
them; for we shall not say that, because it was foreknown that Judas would
be a traitor, there was any necessity [ἀνάγκη] for Judas to be a traitor.564
A bit later Origen draws the same distinction between “certainly” and “by necessity” but
uses the related verb form καταναγκάζω (“to compel”) instead of ἀνάγκη: “Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ
πάντως ἀκούει ἀντὶ τοῦ κατηναγκασμένως.”565 Origen also uses the adverb form:
ἐπαναγκὲς (“necessarily”).566 All the terms he uses for necessity are meant to convey
compulsion and force, which is the physical imagery Origen has in mind when he states:
“though God knows before that a man will sin, He does not put a finger on him when he
does sin.”567 We are to imagine, then, that whatever happens necessarily, or out of
compulsion, would be akin to God laying a finger on a man to force him to choose. Thus,
one of Origen’s main points is to draw attention to the distinction between a choice which
will certainly (infallibly) occur, and a choice which will necessarily occur because of
force. The latter category presupposes and contains the former, in that choices brought
about by divine compulsion will also certainly happen. But the former category does not
automatically entail the latter, for just because something will certainly happen does not
require that it will happen by force. In Origen’s words:
If any one will explain the “certainly will be” as only meaning that some
particular events will occur, but that things might have turned out
differently, we assent to this as true; for God cannot possibly lie; and when
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Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 156). Cf. Cels II.20 (Chadwick 86; SC 132, 344): “If by
assuredly [πάντως] he means ‘necessarily’ [κατηναγκασμένως], we will not grant that to him; for it was also
possible for it not to happen. But if by assuredly he means simply that ‘it will come to pass’ (and nothing
prevents that from being true, even if it is possible for it not to happen), then my position is in no way
affected.” Origen uses the same technical vocabulary to make this distinction in both the earlier work and
the later work.
565
Phil 23.13 (Lewis 186; SC 226, 172).
566
Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 158).
567
Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 156).
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things may possibly happen or not happen, we may contemplate either
contingency [φρονῆσαι τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι].568
We are told that a “necessary” choice is problematic because it is a forced choice.
But what does Origen mean by forced? We may use Origen’s discussions concerning
moral autonomy found in other texts to clarify this point. Origen believes that there are
two specific features that must be present for a choice to be free rather than forced. First,
the assent to the choice must come from the rational soul and not from outside of the
rational soul.569 Second, in the moment of choice the soul must be adjudicating between
multiple rational impressions, so as to allow for multiple possibilities or outcomes (good
and evil).570 Origen departs from Stoicism in regards to this second point.571 Thus, a

568

Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181; SC 226, 159). Origen has a similar discussion between the idea of an
infallible future occurrence and a necessary future occurrence in Phil 25.2 (Lewis 210-211; SC 226, 218222), which is from his Commentary on Romans Book 1. At one place in this passage Origen admits the
complexity of the topic when he says: “The subject of possibilities, however, belongs to the science of the
skilled logician; so that if a man will cleanse the eye of his mind, he may thus be able to follow the subtle
arguments, and may understand how, even in the course of ordinary events, there is nothing to prevent the
possibility of a given circumstance issuing many ways, though, in fact, there will be only one out of the
many, and that not necessitated” (Lewis 211; SC 226, 220-222).
569
Two places Origen makes this distinction are in PArch 3.1.2-3 and PEuch 6.1-2. In PEuch
Origen demarcates rational living beings (that is, those with moral autonomy) from other living and nonliving things by stating that their motion is a motion “through” themselves (δἰ αὐτῶν) (GCS II, 312).
Therefore, Origen states that those Christians who deny moral autonomy believe that “since we are in no
way moved by ourselves but by something moving outside ourselves, we may be said to do what we
suppose we are doing only because of that external cause” (Greer 93; GCS II, 312). For analysis of the
similarities and differences between the parallel passages in PArch and PEuch, see Van Der Eijk,
"Origenes' Verteidigung des freien Willens in de Oratione 6, 1-2."; Hahm, "A Neglected Stoic Argument
for Human Responsibility."
Citations from Origen’s On Prayer are from the Berlin-Leipzig critical edition (GCS), and are
listed in the format of Origenes Werke volume (II) and page number: Koetschau, Buch V-VIII gegen
Celsus, Die Schrift vom Gebet. Unless otherwise noted, English translations are from Greer, Origen: An
Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer, First Principles: Book IV, Prologue to the Commentary on the Song of
Songs, Homily XXVII on Numbers.
570
E.g. PArch 3.1.3 (Butterworth 160; SC 268, 24): “To be subject, then, to a particular external
impression which gives rise to such or such an image is admittedly not one of the things lying within our
power [ἐφ ἡμῖν]; but to decide to use what has happened either in this way or in that is the work of nothing
else but the reason within us, which, as the alternatives appear, either influences us towards the impulses
that incite to what is good and seemly or else turns aside to the reverse.” Origen understands the competing
rational impressions (or desires) to originate from the person’s body and spirit, and the soul must choose
between them at each moment of choice. There are only two definite times this feature of moral psychology
is not a necessary requirement for a choice to be free, and they are in the peculiar cases of the final state of
beatitude and the moral autonomy of Jesus (cf. PArch 2.6.5-6, SC 252, 318 and PArch 3.6.3, SC 268, 240242). In the final state, for example, Origen modifies his normal rules by suggesting that the soul will no
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choice is free and not forced if the soul is the one making the motion (its own assent to its
impression/desire) instead of another agent, and if the soul had alternative
impressions/desires it may have followed instead.
Where does universal salvation fit into this discussion? Some events πάντως ἔσται
– that is, they certainly will come to pass, they surely will come to pass, and they
doubtless will come to pass. And yet such events will not ἀνάγκην εἶναι – that is, they
will not certainly come to pass through coercion or force. In Origen’s theology, universal
salvation is an example of an event that will certainly and infallibly occur, and yet it will
not occur by necessity or force.572 People will πάντως voluntarily choose to submit to
God, but not by ἀνάγκην.
But here we must press further. Origen does not view the apocatastasis as an
accidental feature of salvation-history. We may imagine a sense in which it might have
been. That is, God might have foreseen that all souls will return to him as a matter of
coincidence or good-fortune, without God in any way predetermining and then enforcing
this outcome. After all, this is how Origen describes Judas’ choice: Judas’ treachery was
“certain” to occur but need not have occurred if Judas had chosen differently. In the same
longer receive any sinful or incorrect desires, since God will be all in all. That these are the exceptions to
his normal rule can be seen in Origen’s careful explanation as to how Jesus could be said to possess moral
autonomy: “But if the above argument, that there exists in Christ a rational soul, should seem to anyone to
constitute a difficulty, on the grounds that in the course of our discussion we have often shown that souls
are by their nature capable of good and evil, we shall resolve the difficulty in the following manner…”
(PArch 2.6.5, Butterworth 112; SC 252, 318).
571
The Stoics understood there to be alternate possibilities in the sense of physical capabilities – a
man who chooses to run away from an attacker had the physical capability to stand and fight, even if it is
also true that the man would never have chosen to do so given his character and intellect at the moment of
choice. The Stoics believed, therefore, that in every successive world-cycle, each person would act in
exactly the same ways, and history would repeat itself over and over. Origen believed this idea threatened
moral autonomy – cf. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260). Origen believed moral autonomy requires more than
just a physical capability, in that it must also possess a mental (or dispositional) capability.
572
E.g. Cels VIII.72 (Chadwick 507; SC 150, 340): “But we believe that at some time the Logos
will have overcome the entire rational nature, and will have remodelled every soul to his own perfection,
when each individual simply by the exercise of his freedom will choose what the Logos wills and will be in
that state which he has chosen.”
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way, it might have been the case that not all souls were predetermined to return to God,
but through his foreknowledge God happened to discover, as it were, that this would be
the outcome. In such a scenario, there would be no apparent conflict between
universalism and freedom of choice, for God would have foreseen but not foreordained
the outcome (just as God did with the choice of Judas). But is this what Origen means
when he writes about the apocatastasis? No, Origen describes it as something more.
Origen writes about universal salvation as something which was planned by God from
the very beginning – before creation itself. Thus, we must recognize a further subdivision
within the category of “certain events”. Origen described “certain” events as events
which will infallibly occur, but not through force. All of Origen’s examples of such
events in Philocalia 23 relate to events that might have been otherwise, such as Judas’
betrayal. But the apocatastasis is foreordained by God. There is no question as to whether
it will occur or not, since God decided it would occur. And so even though it does not
happen through force, it takes on a stronger sense of “certainly will happen” than the sin
of Judas. The alternate possibility (a failed apocatastasis) is no possibility at all. How can
we account for the difference between two events, both of which will “certainly” occur
(and neither by force), but at the same time only one might not have occurred? The
answer to that question can be found in Origen’s multilayered understanding of God’s
foreknowledge, to which we now turn.

God’s Three Types of Foreknowledge
As already mentioned, Origen’s main point in Philocalia 23 is to rescue divine
foreknowledge from those who insisted that infallible foreknowledge logically introduces

198

“necessity,” which in turn begets fatalism. Throughout his discussion Origen alludes to
three types or aspects of God’s foreknowledge.573 The first type of foreknowledge Origen
speaks about (or the first way he speaks about foreknowledge) is a simple foreknowledge
of what will happen in the future – that is, God knows everything that will eventually
come to pass:
When God planned the creation of the world, inasmuch as there is nothing
without a cause, His thoughts traversed the whole course of the future, and
He saw that when a certain thing takes place another follows . . . and going
on thus to the end of all things He knows what will be, but is not at all the
cause of the occurrence of any particular event.574
God has this knowledge simply because of who he is; Origen understands such
knowledge to be part of the definition of the idea of God.575 Simple foreknowledge is not
to be confused with any notion of providential planning; instead, Origen describes this
type of foreknowledge as predictive. Origen gives an example of a man who is hurrying
along upon a slippery surface. Observers have foreknowledge that the man will slip due
to his own negligence, but the observers are not on that account responsible for the man
slipping, for they did not plan or intend for it to occur. Instead, they observed that it
would occur. Importantly, Origen expands this illustration to say that just as people can
foresee the action of the man slipping, God can foresee a person’s choices (whether
sinful or righteous), on account of God having foreseen what the person will be like.576
Yet, it is the future choice which causes God’s foreknowledge and not the other way
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Origen never explicitly states that there are three types of foreknowledge, even though it is
clear that he speaks about foreknowledge in several ways – this numbering is mine.
574
Phil 23.8 (Lewis 180; SC 226, 154-156).
575
Phil 23.4 (Lewis 176; SC 226, 142): “That God knows long before every detail of the future, is,
apart from Scripture, from the very conception of God clear to him who understands the power and
excellence of the Divine understanding.”
576
Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181, SC 226, 156): “[Origen gives the example of the man who will slip, and
then says] just so, we must understand that God having foreseen what every one will be like, also perceives
the causes of his being what he is, and that he will commit these sins, or do these righteous deeds.”
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around, given that God “does not put a finger on him when he does sin.”577 Thus, the first
type of divine foreknowledge Origen speaks about is simple knowledge of what will
happen in the future, a knowledge made possible through God’s awareness of all causes
(since everything that happens, happens due to a cause). Origen describes this type of
foreknowledge as something static, in that it is merely predictive. As such, he insists that
simple foreknowledge cannot pose a threat to moral autonomy.578
The second type of foreknowledge Origen describes is God’s foreknowledge of a
person’s capabilities or possibilities. As just mentioned, Origen initially speaks of divine
foreknowledge as God’s simple awareness of what will happen in the future (be it a
choice or an action), but when Origen begins to differentiate “necessity” from
“certainty,” he is led to expand the range of God’s foreknowledge. In his illustration of
Judas, for example, it becomes apparent that God does not simply have foreknowledge of
what Judas will choose, but God also has foreknowledge of what Judas might have
chosen differently:
If it is possible for Judas to be an Apostle like Peter, it is possible for God
to think of Judas continuing an Apostle as Peter did. If it is possible for
Judas to be a traitor, it is possible for God to contemplate his becoming a
traitor. And if Judas proves to be a traitor, God by his foreknowledge of
the two aforesaid possibilities (only one of which can be realised),
inasmuch as His foreknowledge is true, will know before that Judas is
going to be a traitor; but though God knows this, it might have been
otherwise; and the knowledge of God would say, “It is possible for Judas
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Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181, SC 226, 156): “…we shall make a still stronger statement, nevertheless
true, that the future event is the cause of God’s peculiar knowledge concerning it.” Cf. Cels II.20
(Chadwick 85; SC 132, 336-338).
578
On Origen’s understanding, not only does simple foreknowledge not pose a threat to moral
autonomy, but by itself it would be unable to exert any sort of providential control over salvation-history.
At the very least, simple foreknowledge would have no ability to plan certain outcomes for contingent
events, and as such simple foreknowledge is not a sufficient foundation for Origen’s universalism. Cf. a
related argument in John Sanders, "Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control than
the Openness of God," Faith and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1997).
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to do this, but also possible for him to do the opposite; but of the two
things possible I know that he will do this one.”579
Thus, God has foreknowledge of all of a person’s future possibilities, whether or not
those possibilities are ever realized in history (and most will not be). God foreknew that
Judas was going to have the capability of loyalty as well as of treachery. But then
afterwards in God’s foreknowledge (at least logically, if not temporally “afterwards”),
God also foreknew which of the possibilities (ἐνδεχομένων) Judas was going to choose.
So here we see Origen distinguishing between two moments or levels or logical stages of
divine foreknowledge: if simple foreknowledge is God knowing what will happen, then
the second type of foreknowledge is God knowing what could have happened differently.
We may note that God’s foreknowledge of what could have happened differently
contains significantly more information than his foreknowledge of will happen, given that
there are many things that people could choose to do but end up not. Most possible
choices will never become actualized on the future timeline of choices and events. The
reason Origen believes this second type of divine foreknowledge is necessary for God to
possess (and so Origen’s purpose in distinguishing it), is because it protects the notion
that free choices must have alternate possibilities towards good or evil, which as we
stated, is one of the conditions Origen requires for genuine moral autonomy.580
579

Phil 23.9 (Lewis 181-182, SC 226, 158).
It is worth asking the question: what does alternate “possibility” or “capability” mean for
Origen? Something has “possibility” or “capability”, according to Origen, if no external power was
coercing someone to choose one way, and if their nature allows it (Origen uses an example of a man who
does not have the capability to fly). In the case of a sinful action, then, God ‘did not have his finger on him’
in his moment of choice, and therefore he had the possibility to do otherwise. And similarly, although man
does not have the capability to fly, he does have the capability to choose either to sin or not. Thus, a natural
ability according to the nature of one’s species is one component which Origen requires in defining
“alternate possibilities”, and he shares this in common with the Stoics. However, Origen requires more than
a purely physical capability to do otherwise, for physical capability alone would appear to result in
something like Stoic character-determinism, a notion which Origen explicitly rejects. He believed that the
Stoic notion of repeating world cycles, cycles which were identical down to every detail, would constitute a
rejection of moral autonomy – e.g. PArch 2.3.4 (SC 252, 258-260); Cels IV.67-68 (SC 136, 348-352).
580
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Logically speaking, God’s foreknowledge of future possibilities comes before
God’s foreknowledge of the actual future timeline. That is, God first knows what could
happen, and then God knows what will happen. But how is God able to go from knowing
future possibilities to future realities? If Jesus foreknows that Judas could choose either A
or B, then what gives Jesus the additional ability to know that Judas is going to choose B?
The answer, according to Origen, is that Jesus knew the current makeup of Judas’

Unlike the Stoics, Origen believes that the soul must also have the emotional or dispositional capability to
do otherwise. This capability is grounded in his understanding of the competing rational desires issuing
from spirit and body. One way Origen benefits from this adaptation of Stoic moral psychology is that it
allows him to make souls responsible for the very beginning of their dispositions and characters in a way
that Stoics typically could not. This is best illustrated by the first Fall away from God. Origen is explicit
that there was no initial diversity among creatures in God’s first creation – PArch 2.9.6 (SC 252, 364). And
yet, creatures with identical intellects and identical dispositions fell away in varying degrees from God.
This could not happen on the typical Stoic view of character-determinism, for if souls were truly identical
in regards to their characters and dispositions, they would always make identical choices.
Despite the fact that Origen broadens the Stoic notion of alternative capabilities, it is important to
see that Origen never gives the soul absolute “possibility to do otherwise” in the sense of Alexander of
Aphrodisias, for even if the soul has the capability over binary options, these options are still inexorably
tied to the disposition’s two distinct impression generators (spirit and body). The soul does not have some
sort of mystical, abstract power of choice that allows it to transcend beyond the bounds set by its own
character and disposition. In other words, the parameters of the soul’s choice continue to be set by the
(automatic) impressions coming from spirit and body. The difference between Origen and the Stoics is that
the Stoics were locked into making choices on the basis of one impulsive-impression, while Origen’s soul
is locked into making choices on the basis of two impulsive-impressions (one of which is guaranteed to
always be virtuous). Unlike Alexander, Origen never insists that “the possibility to do otherwise” entails
that if a person were to make the same choice over again, with the exact same character and intellect, then
the person must have the capability to choose other than what the person’s disposition (broadly speaking)
prompts him to choose (what we might call “absolute power to the contrary”). In a way, Origen finds
himself midway between these two positions in that Origen does allow that if time could be rewound, a
person could choose differently that what they had chosen. Yet at the same time, a person can never choose
differently than what his disposition is prompting him to choose, and so Origen does not follow Alexander
on this point (cf. discussion above in Chapter 2). For more on how Alexander strengthens the concept of
“possibility to do otherwise” (and how he appears to be alone in requiring absolute power to the contrary),
see Bobzien, "The Inadvertent Conception."
It is also important to note that unlike Alexander, Origen’s acknowledgement of a general capacity
for different future possibilities does not mean that the person’s choice is random or has the same
likelihood either way. In one sense Origen admits that people have “equal abilities” (ἰσοστάσιον τῶν
δυνάμεων) to do one thing or the other (Phil 23.10, Lewis 183; SC 226, 162). But for Origen that simply
means that each choice will be equally unforced. Origen does not insist on “equal abilities” in the sense that
the chance of one outcome occurring is equal to any other outcome, for this would divorce people’s choices
from their current intellect and character. That would insinuate that a virtuous person has as much chance
of sinning as a person habituated to sin, and such a notion goes against large swaths of Origen’s teaching
on moral psychology. Even here, Origen is careful to say that the one who chooses to sin is able to resist it,
but does not resist it because he “inclines” (ἐπιρρέπει) to pleasure (Phil 23.9, Lewis 182; SC 226, 160).
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disposition in that future moment, and therefore Jesus foreknew which choice Judas’
disposition would lead him to make:
[Jesus] knew what was in man; and seeing the traitor’s detestable
character [μοχθηρὸν ἦθος], and also what through avarice and through
want of a right and steadfast regard for the Master he would dare to
do…581
According to Origen’s logic here, God’s foreknowledge of what will happen in the future
depends on God knowing how a person’s character or disposition will inevitably lead him
to act in a given moment of choice.582 God foreknew that Judas had the capability to
choose correctly (i.e. there was no external force acting upon his assent-faculty, and his
spirit would be sending an appropriate impression or desire to the soul to motivate it to
make the correct choice). God also foreknew that Judas would nevertheless choose
incorrectly. And God was able to foreknow which possibility Judas would follow because
he was able to deduce what the character of Judas’ moral psychology would be like in
that future moment. By this, I interpret Origen to mean here – for he does not say this
explicitly – that although God foresaw that Judas would have a desire to act righteously,
that God also foresaw that that the desire coming from Judas’ body would be much
stronger than the desire coming from Judas’ spirit. Thus, God could see that Judas’ soul
would end up aligning with the stronger of his two rational desires.583
581
Phil 23.13 (Lewis 186-187; SC 226, 174). Cf. Cels II.20 (Chadwick 87; SC 132, 344): “For it
does not follow from the fact that Jesus correctly predicted the actions of the traitor and of the one who
denied him, that he was responsible for their impiety and wicked conduct. He saw his evil state of mind
[μοχθηρὸν ἦθος], since according to our scriptures ‘he knew what was in man’ [John 2:25], and perceived
what he would venture to do as a result of his love of money and lack of the firm loyalty which he ought to
have had towards his master…”
582
E.g. Phil 23.8 (Lewis 181, SC 226, 156): “[Origen gives the example of the man who will slip,
and then says] just so, we must understand that God having foreseen what every one will be like, also
perceives the causes of his being what he is, and that he will commit these sins, or do these righteous
deeds.”
583
Cf. ComRm VII.6.97-101 (Scheck 2.91; Bammel 591-92): “For surely Judas had it within his
power [potestate] to become like Peter and John had he wanted to; but instead he chose the desire
[cupiditatem] for money rather than the honor of the apostolic society.”
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This is a significant step to make for the following reason. Once Origen makes
this the basis on which divine foreknowledge is possible, (that is, God’s foreknowledge is
grounded on God’s ability to deduce what people will choose on the basis of what their
future dispositions and rationality look like), then Origen opens the door for God to have
a third type of foreknowledge.584 If God knows what will happen in the future because
God knows how a person with a specific character or disposition will choose, then God
must also know how that same disposition would choose in any hypothetical or
imaginary scenario. Thus, God foreknows what each person will freely choose in the
future (type 1); he foreknows the various alternative possibilities that each person could
have freely chosen in that future if they had wanted to (type 2); and finally, God
foreknows what each person would freely choose if they were in a different set of
circumstances altogether, a set of circumstances they will never actually be faced with
(type 3). In the discussion below, I have labeled this third type “God’s foreknowledge of
hypothetical voluntary possibilities.” We must now examine this third type of divine
foreknowledge more closely.

Foreknowledge of Hypothetical Voluntary Possibilities
God possesses more than a simple foreknowledge of what the future timeline will
look like, and he knows more than what alternative possibilities each person will have in
the making of that timeline. God has additional knowledge, a type of unrealized
foreknowledge, where God knows what could happen in the future provided that

584

In Cels IV.92 (Chadwick 257; SC 136, 414) Origen also speaks about simple foreknowledge as
a predictive skill, rather than something grounded on a particular concept of time.
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circumstances were altogether different from what they will be. I will use Judas as an
example:
Type 1) From the beginning of time, God foreknew that on Friday, Judas will choose
to betray Jesus.
Type 2) From the beginning of time, God also foreknew that on Friday Judas had the
possibility of remaining loyal in addition to the possibility of being
treacherous.
Type 3) From the beginning of time, God additionally foreknew how Judas would
have freely acted if the situation had happened on a Thursday, or if it had
happened after Jesus gave Judas a more explicit warning, or if it had
happened after Judas was instructed by better teachers while growing up (etc.
ad infinitum).
Today, this third aspect of divine foreknowledge is commonly referred to as
God’s middle knowledge, or God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom. It is God’s knowledge of how creatures would freely respond in any given
hypothetical state of affairs. As far as I am aware, today it is universally held that the 15th
century Spanish Jesuit priest Luis de Molina first described and attributed middle
knowledge to God.585 Middle knowledge (or Molinism) is described in the following way
in modern philosophy:
In addition to his natural knowledge (knowledge of necessary truths over
which he has no control) and his free knowledge (knowledge of contingent
truths over which he does have control), God also knows counterfactuals
of [creaturely] freedom – conditionals specifying, for any free creature
who might exist and any set of circumstances in which that creature might
be placed and left free, what that creature would freely do if placed in
those circumstances. Such conditionals would be contingent (since,
585

Luis de Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia,
praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia (1595): On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia,
trans. A. J. (of part 4) Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). Linda Zagzebski’s remarks
recount the standard narrative regarding Molina as the originator of the concept of middle knowledge:
“Molina developed the idea of divine scientia media, or middle knowledge, to explain how God can secure
infallible knowledge of contingent future human acts. The idea is that God knows what any possible free
creature would freely choose in any possible circumstance. By combining his knowledge of the
circumstances he has willed to create with his middle knowledge, God can know the entire future,
including that part of it consisting of free human acts.” – Linda Zagzebski, "Foreknowledge and Human
Freedom," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion: Second Edition, ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper,
Philip Quinn (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 475-76.
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according to libertarianism, free beings are not necessitated to act in a
certain way by the circumstances in effect when they freely act), but
would not be under God’s control (since it is not up to God how one of his
creatures would freely act); hence, God’s knowledge of such truths would
be neither natural nor free, but lie in the middle between these two. Given
his knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom, God could tailor every
action relating to his free creatures so that God achieves each desired
goal by putting those creatures into situations in which God sees they will
freely act in such a way as to realize those ends.586
Strictly speaking, this knowledge is not foreknowledge, given that the vast majority of
this knowledge pertains to choices and behaviors that will never come to pass in the
actual future. If God knows what Judas would freely choose to eat for breakfast if he
lived in Paris during World War II, in what sense does this describe foreknowledge given
the fact that it does not take place in any real future? Nevertheless, I will continue to call
it foreknowledge for two reasons: first, whenever Origen alludes to this type of divine
knowledge, it is either in the context of his discussions of God’s foreknowledge, or he
describes it as something like foreknowledge. And second, Origen envisions God
exercising this knowledge in the primordial past, before creation, as part of God’s preplanning of salvation-history. Before creation, God used his knowledge of the
counterfactuals of human free choice by imagining and canvassing through all possible
future realities. Thus, along with the preceding disclaimer I will designate this as a type
of divine foreknowledge in the discussion below.
Origen uses several illustrations which reveal that God has this third type of
foreknowledge (or “middle knowledge”).587 For example, Origen recounts how in Luke
2:34 Jesus denounces the cities of Chorazin and Bethsaida by saying “for if the mighty
586
Thomas P. Flint, "Providence," in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion: Second Edition, ed.
Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, Philip Quinn (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 333 (italics added).
587
I must reiterate that nowhere does Origen introduce this knowledge of God as a “third type” of
divine foreknowledge. The numbering and the division is mine. Nevertheless, I believe the distinction is a
helpful one and an appropriate description of Origen’s thought.
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works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would have
repented long ago.”588 Jesus had knowledge that in the hypothetical situation where he
performed mighty works in Tyre and Sidon, that the people there would have freely
chosen to repent. But the mighty works never took place in Tyre and Sidon, and so we
are not dealing with God’s foreknowledge of alternate possibilities (type 2). Instead, this
reveals God’s knowledge of (what moderns call) counterfactual freedom.589 Another
example can be found in Contra Celsus where Origen states that by a miraculous divine
grace God gives knowledge of himself “to those who by God’s foreknowledge have been
previously determined, because they would live lives worthy of Him after He was made
known to them.”590 In other words, God has foreknowledge of who would choose to live
worthy lives after having been instructed about God and similarly God has
foreknowledge of those who would not. This knowledge leads God to give his grace to
those who he foreknows would make proper use of it. But this means that God had to first
imagine a hypothetical world in which he had revealed himself to people who (he
foresees) did not respond correctly in certain hypothetical futures. And on the basis of
knowing how creatures would freely respond in those imaginary futures, God then
actuates the real future where such people are intentionally not given instruction about
him.

588

Phil 27.11 (Lewis, 235; SC 226, 306).
If God had done mighty works in Tyre and Sidon and the people repented, God would have
had (type 2) foreknowledge concerning the possibility that they would not have repented. Or, if the people
had not repented, God would have had (type 2) foreknowledge concerning the possibility that they would
have repented. But in this example, the mighty works were never performed in the first place. Origen
speaks in a similar way about God’s foreknowledge concerning the people in Tyre and Sidon in PArch
3.1.17 Greek (Butterworth 192-195; SC 268, 104-110).
590
Cels VII.44 (Chadwick 432; SC 150, 118).
589
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Origen most often alludes to this third type of divine knowledge, however, when
he is speaking about God’s remarkable healing or sanctifying strategies for sinners. For
example, Origen writes:
The Word of God is a physician of the soul, and uses the most diverse,
suitable, and seasonable methods of healing the sick; and of these methods
of healings, some more, some less, give pain and torment to those who are
under treatment; and the remedies, moreover, seem unsuitable, some times
not; and further they act speedily or slowly; and are sometimes applied
when the patients have had their fill of sin, or when, so to speak they have
only touched it . . . [Thus, some souls] are more slowly healed, because, if
they were soon rid of their sufferings, they would think little of falling a
second time into the same evils. The God who designed them knows all
their different constitutions, and, for that He is an expert in the art of
healing, it is for Him alone to say what is best to be done for each, and
when.591
God administers healing to each sinner not simply in accordance with what each sinner
deserves (though he does do that), but God also administers healing according to what
will be most effective.592 But in order for God to administer this sort of individualized
care, God must be aware of how each sinner would hypothetically respond to any given
plan of treatment. The goal of God’s healing is always voluntary repentance, which
requires a free moral choice. Therefore, Origen believes that God knows, in advance,
which healing treatments will result in a successful outcome (the patient making the
morally correct choice to repent), and which healing treatments will not have a successful
591

Phil 27.4 (Lewis 228, emphasis added; SC 226, 278-280).
Another example can be found in ComRm IX.3 (Scheck 2.206; Bammel 729): Here Origen
notes that God gives grace for three reasons – sometimes God gives grace as a response to some effort on
our part, sometimes God gives grace simply because “it will benefit”, and sometimes the Spirit simply
allots grace where he wills to. Speaking about the second kind of grace, where God gives grace for that
which benefits, Origen states that “…it can also come to pass that even if the measure of faith in someone
is great enough to merit receiving a higher grace, if the Holy Spirit, when it looks into the future, judges
that it will not benefit the recipient, he inevitably apportions it to each one as he wills and as is beneficial.
After all, we observe that many have received the grace of teaching or exhorting the people and, having
become puffed up because of this and having turned to arrogance, have fallen into the judgment of the
devil” (emphasis mine). Origen describes the Holy Spirit looking into the future and judging that a certain
grace will not benefit the recipient. Yet, Origen cannot mean that the Holy Spirit looks into what is
technically the future, for it turns out to be only a hypothetical future, one which never resolves into an
actual future.
592
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outcome (the patient making a morally evil choice and refusing to repent). This is
knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom – God foreknows how the
creature would freely respond to a set of circumstances that could potentially occur in a
possible future. This allows God to discover, as it were, that healing one person slowly
would eventually result in success, while healing another person at the same speed would
only make them worse. And so, based on this knowledge God heals one person slowly
and another with great alacrity.593
How does God possess this third type of foreknowledge of what people would
freely do in any given hypothetical situation? Here it is important to remember the
mechanism by which Origen understands God to have even simple foreknowledge. The
mechanism is not that God is outside of time (or timeless), and on that account he has
knowledge of all events as if they were always present to God in his timelessness.594 If
that were the case, then God’s simple foreknowledge would not need to stem from his
predictive powers, but from his timeless, observational powers. If God knows the entire
future timeline because he is eternally present at all points in the timeline, then no
predictive powers would be needed. If this were true, however, it could not account for
God’s middle knowledge, for it is not possible to observe a hypothetical event (given that
the event never occurs in history); this explanation would not clarify how God has the
additional knowledge of hypothetical contingent choices. Instead, as we have shown
above in the example of Judas, Origen grounds God’s simple foreknowledge on God’s
593

The clearest example from Origen that demonstrates divine knowledge of the counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom is found in Origen’s exegesis of Pharaoh’s hardened heart. This will be discussed
below. Cf. Chapter 3 for analysis of God’s strategic use of punishments (including abandonment). God’s
main purpose in administering punishment is to lead the sinner to genuine self-awareness, and sometimes
God must allow the sinner to increase in evil and misery in order for the sinner to reach the critical point
where introspection takes place.
594
This is all the more important to recognize given that Origen did believe in God’s timelessness.
For a defense of this position, see Tzamalikos, Origen: Cosmology and Ontology of Time: 21-38.
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ability to deduce what people will choose on the basis of what their future disposition and
character will look like. As such, God has simple foreknowledge because of his
predictive powers – powers which God possesses given God’s comprehensive knowledge
of his creatures, including their characters, habits, rationality, and so on.595 God knows
each individual so intimately that God knows what each one will freely choose in every
future situation. But, this same ability allows God to have a third type of knowledge; God
also knows what each person would freely choose in any hypothetical or imaginary
future.596

595

Koch had also recognized that Origen believed divine foreknowledge was made possible by
God’s awareness of each creature’s character and intellect: “Gott hat ein so umfassendes und
durchgreifendes Wissen von seinem Geschöpf, dass er im voraus weiss, wie jeder Einzelne seine Freiheit
benutzen will; von diesem Wissen aus richtet er seine Vorsehungslenkung ein, sodass dieselbe genau den
freien Handlungen der Menschen entspricht, und jedem Einzelnen gerade die Erziehung zuteil wird,
welcher er bedarf” – Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum
Platonismus: 288. However, Koch only recognized the first two types of divine foreknowledge in Origen’s
theology – foreknowledge of future free actions, as well as foreknowledge of alternate possibilities (115116). E.g.: “Selbst löst er die Schwierigkeit, indem er anschaulich darstellt, wie Gottes Verfahren gewesen
ist: am Anfang der Schöpfung musterte er jedes der kommenden Geschöpfe, sah, dass sie in jener Situation
so handeln würden, und wenn dies geschah, so tun würden. Also weiss er, was geschehen wird, ohne aber
die Ursache zu sein, so wie einer, der sieht, dass ein anderer unbesonnen und eigenwillig einen glatten und
gefährlichen Weg einschlägt, darum nicht an seinem Fall schuld ist, weil er im voraus eingesehen hat, dass
der Betreffende fallen muss” (116). Because he does not recognize the third type, Koch describes God
more as a reactor to future free choices, rather than as an architect of future free choices. This also
prohibits Koch from explaining precisely how Origen can believe in a guaranteed universal salvation, for
there is nothing about God’s providential reaction to foreseen choices which could guarantee everyone’s
eventual repentance. Koch must instead rely on the fact that all creatures are rational, and God should
therefore be able to persuade every one of the truth. Hence, he calls Origen an “optimist” – “Dass die
Erziehung wirklich gelingen wird, dass die Menschen – und dasselbe gilt den übrigen λογικὰ ζῷα – nicht
beharren werden, Gott zu trotzen und sich fortzuwenden, sondern dass sie aus eigenem, freiem Willen
zuletzt das Gute wählen werden, davon ist Origenes überzeugt. Er ist entschieden Optimist. Dies hängt
damit zusammen, dass das Geschöpf nicht nur frei, sondern zugleich vernünftig, λογικόν ist, dass es am
Logos Anteil hat” (32).
596
We should remember that Origen is able to hold this view because he does not follow
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ view of moral autonomy. Alexander had said that genuine moral autonomy
requires the absolute capability to act otherwise than how one acted – which can only be possible if one’s
choices are not caused by one’s character and intellect. That is to say, Alexander insisted that a choice
could never be fully predictable, because a choice is not dictated by the person’s current disposition and
rationality. He insisted that a person could even choose to act in ways that do not seem reasonable to him.
Of course, this view appears to make divine foreknowledge of future contingent events impossible, and so
Alexander insisted that although God might foreknow that it is possible for an agent to do a thing or not do
it, God cannot know if the agent will do it or not – R. W. Sharples, "Alexander of Aphrodisias, de fato:
some parallels," The Classical Quarterly 28, no. 2 (1978): 261. Origen does not agree with this. One’s
choices always stem from the current makeup of one’s rational character, habits, intellect and disposition.
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Now that I have distinguished between the three types of divine foreknowledge
that Origen attributes to God, I can explain how these categories allow him to solve the
so-called paradox between God’s infallible plan to save everyone, and the fact that
salvation requires an unforced and voluntary consent from each person. We saw in
Chapter 1 that many scholars have concluded that Origen lapses into inconsistency on
this point. Many others have declared that Origen’s universalism logically undercuts his
teaching on moral autonomy, and so on those grounds they feel justified in declaring that
Origen must not have believed in a certain universal salvation at all. On the contrary,
Origen’s teachings regarding universalism and moral autonomy fit together smoothly
once filtered through Origen’s understanding of the three types of divine foreknowledge
(especially the 3rd type – God’s so-called middle knowledge).

Synthesis: God Preselects and Prearranges Only the Set of Free Choices
That Leads to the Apocatastasis
Origen teaches that God constructed and ordered a plan of salvation-history
before the creation of any souls. As such, Origen’s universalism is not a historical
accident, but it is an event foreordained by God, which God then infallibly actuates in
history. God’s foreknowledge was not static (it was not merely God’s observation or
prediction of what would take place), but it played an active role. As I pointed out in
Chapter 3, in a certain sense God’s foreknowledge can be called dynamic and strategic.597
This needs to be clarified. We may recall that Origen believes that at “no time
whatever was God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence [neque conditor neque

Thus, if God has comprehensive knowledge of a soul’s character, God can foreknow with certainty how
such a soul would react.
597
See above Chapter 3, 109-110.
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beneficus neque prouidens].”598 The interesting consequence of this view is that a “prefiguration” and “pre-formation” of creatures has always existed in the Wisdom of God,
even from all eternity, for only in this way may God timelessly be “Creator.”599
Additionally, Origen says that there was “no moment whatever when that power was not
engaged in acts of well-doing [benefica bene faceret].”600 Thus, Origen leads us to the
remarkable idea that from all eternity and before any creation, God was “always
dispensing his blessings among [his pre-formed creatures] by doing them good in
accordance with their condition and deserts.”601 Given that the creatures did not yet exist
outside of God’s own mind (Wisdom), in what way could God be blessing them? The
answer is that God was actively dispensing blessings upon all rational souls through his
foreknowledge and planning. The first blessing God bestowed on his pre-formed
creatures was his plan to eventually create them in the first place.602 God’s second
blessing for his creatures was his decision to foreordain their future salvation (his
unilateral decision to not let them perish).603 The third blessing God bestowed upon them
was his strategic arrangement of their moral autonomy in such a way that his decision
would infallibly be realized.
Origen describes this primordial activity with active verbs that are best
transmitted into English as God’s “ordering”, “fashioning,” “planning”, “arranging,” and
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PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170).
PArch 1.4.5 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 172). Cf. PArch 1.2.2-3 (Butterworth 16; SC 252, 112-

116).
600

PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170).
PArch 1.4.3 (Butterworth 42; SC 252, 170).
602
ComRm IV.5.13-18 (Scheck 1.259; Bammel 300): “Plainly it is a gift of God that we exist; it is
the grace [gratia] of the Creator who willed us to exist.”
603
Origen believed that if God had left creatures alone all would have perished – PArch 3.5.6
(Butterworth 242; SC 268, 228): “…so in the last times, when the end of the world was near at hand and
the whole human race was hastening towards its final destruction [ultimam perditionem]…”
601
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“governing.”604 The ordering and arranging that was taking place in God’s
foreknowledge was centered upon God’s infallible decision to restore every sinful
creature. Since God would never violate moral autonomy, God’s unspeakable wisdom
had to concoct a complex plan for a future timeline which would result in the
foreordained apocatastasis. This helps to illuminate the ideas expressed in the passages
we have reviewed above. For example:
God, the parent of all things, in providing for the salvation of his entire
creation through the unspeakable plan of his word and wisdom, has so
ordered everything that each spirit or soul, or whatever else rational
existences ought to be called, should not be compelled by force against its
free choice to any action except that to which the motion of its own mind
lead it…605
And again:
…or what the divine wisdom sees as it looks into these men or what
movements of theirs will lead God to arrange all these things thus, is
known to God alone and to his only-begotten Son, through whom all
things were created and restored…606
When Origen speaks about the divine wisdom looking at the character and moral
psychology of each creature, Origen is envisioning this taking place in God’s
foreknowledge before each creature is alive. God not only foreknew each of them, but he
also foreknew their contingent choices.607 God foreknew that every creature would
choose to fall away from him,608 and so God foreordained a plan to save each one by
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Terms already mentioned above are: διοίκησιν; κατατεταχέναι; dispenset (or dispensasse). At
Phil 23.10 Origen also uses οἰκονομῶν (referring to God’s οἰκονομία): “Thus it is that God Who ordereth
[οἰκονομῶν] all things for the best, with good reason hides the future from our eyes” (Lewis 183; SC 226,
162).
605
PArch 2.1.2 (Butterworth 77, emphasis added; SC 252, 236-238).
606
PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44, emphasis added; SC 268, 232-234).
607
Cf. PArch 1.2.3 (Butterworth 16; SC 252, 114): “[wisdom] fashions beforehand and contains
within herself the species and causes of the entire creation…”
608
E.g. PArch 4.4.8 (Butterworth 325; SC 268, 422): “…since, then, as we have said, rational
nature is changeable and convertible, so of necessity God had foreknowledge of the differences that were to
arise among souls or spiritual powers…”
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using his intimate knowledge of each one’s moral psychology. And here is where God’s
third type of knowledge comes into focus. In his foreknowledge God imagined all of the
possible hypothetical situations in which his creatures could find themselves throughout
history. Because God has knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God
knew how each of his not-yet-created creatures would freely respond to any one of a
near-infinite state of affairs. God’s Wisdom canvassed through a near-infinite amount of
possible future timelines, and on the basis of this knowledge, God then constructed a
specific universe and timeline that would feature exactly the arrangement that would be
successful for each soul. For example, perhaps 99.9% of possible futures for the man
named Saul would lead to an outcome where Saul chooses to remain God’s enemy
forever. But God figured out the one scenario which he knew would infallibly result in
Saul freely choosing to repent, and therefore God included those variables into his
primordial plan of salvation.609 As a result, Saul would be forced to confront the

609

Origen never speculates as to how many different arrangements might include the salvation of
all people, but he clearly thinks that in many cases God must find ways to overcome incredible feats of
stubbornness by practically dragging people (albeit voluntarily) into the Kingdom of Heaven. This is why
Origen will occasionally use stark language, such as when he refers to people who must be “pressed into
salvation and whose conversion is as it were compelled and extorted” – PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 243-44;
SC 268, 232-234). But this also leads to a follow-up question: why must there be at least one possible
future arrangement for each creature, in which they will reach the apocatastasis through their free choices?
In other words, why is it not possible that God might discover that in the case of some individuals (e.g. the
devil) there is no possible future circumstances or possible future timeline in which they will choose to
repent, given how far they fell in the first fall? After all, this would coincide with Origen’s Stoic
framework, for the Stoics acknowledged that moral progress for an utterly vicious character might be
impossible (under Stoic character-determinism). I believe two answers may be offered here. The first
answer to this question lies in the fact that Origen superimposed a tripartite anthropology onto the Stoic
mechanism of choice. More specifically, Origen taught that the positive desires/impressions which
originate from the spiritual aspect of the person is a permanent feature of every person’s personality. It
cannot be tainted nor convicted: ComRm II.7.48-52: “And so I perceive here such great freedom [of
conscience] that indeed it is constantly rejoicing and exulting in good works but is never convicted of evil
deeds [Quia ergo tantam eius uideo libertatem quae in bonis quidem gestis gaudeat semper et exultet, in
malis uero non]” (Scheck 2.133; Bammel 137). Thus, no matter how vicious a character might become,
there is at least some part of the agent which desires to make the correct choice. God is able to find those
situations where (with God’s external assistance) the motivating power of the spirit’s desires outweigh the
motivating power of the body’s desires, even if in the majority of cases the agent’s bodily impressions are
more powerful. A second possible answer is this: Origen insinuates that God has the capability of creating
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conditions necessary to elicit voluntary repentance. To be clear, God does not force Saul
to make the choice, but God does manipulate Saul into the position where he will make
the free choice.610
Clearly, this means that God exercises a certain measure of control over moral
autonomy, at least in the sense that God gets to make the final choice of each person’s
destiny out of the near-infinite possible destinies they could have otherwise arrived at.
God gets to choose which arrangement to actualize and which ones to ignore. But
although God enjoys this control over moral autonomy, it is nevertheless true that God
does not violate moral autonomy at any given moment of choice – in every instance that a
person exercises their moral autonomy in actual history, it is based on their own rational
impressions and the motion of their own soul (their assent). God does not force anyone to
make their choices in the moments when they make them, but God does insist upon a
particular future timeline to the exclusion of all others. Only the possible free choices
God’s foreknowledge preselects get included into his arrangement of salvation-history,
and are therefore actuated in history. All other possible free choices are set aside, never to
be actualized.
The amount of complexity involved in the arrangement to save an individual soul
is staggering. And this is exponentially so when one considers that God will only actuate

any number of creatures that he wants, yet God decided to only create the amount of creatures which could
be sufficiently governed by his providence (see the discussion immediately following).
610
Origen is explicit on the point that moral autonomy cannot claim any control over prior causes
and situations – e.g. Phil 23.11 (Lewis 184; SC 226, 164-66): “That, however, many things for which we
are responsible are caused by a multitude of things for which we are not responsible, even we will allow; if
they had not occurred, the things I mean for which we are not responsible, certain things for which we are
responsible would not have been done; but they have been done in consequence of precedent events for
which we are not responsible, though it was possible for us on the basis of the past to have acted otherwise
than we did. If any one would have our Free Will detached from everything else, so as to make our
voluntary choices independent of the changes and chances of life, he has forgotten that he is a part of the
world, and subject to limitations as a member of society and a participant in the general environment.”
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a future timeline which will save every rational soul. So, for example, out of a billion,
billion possible futures for the soul named Saul, perhaps in only four-hundred of these
would Saul ever repent and be saved. Perhaps in all the other possible futures Saul would
choose to remain an enemy of God forever. But God cannot simply actuate any one of
those four-hundred possible arrangements, because God must also ensure every other
soul’s salvation as well. Indeed, there might even be only one future timeline in which
every soul will repent and ascend to God through their free choice(s). Such complexity
explains Origen’s frequent descriptions of the “unspeakable skill of God’s Wisdom,” and
the “unspeakable skill of his plan” when God “binds and holds together all the diversity
of the world and guides the various motions to the accomplishment of one task.”611 This
might also help explain Origen’s curious teaching concerning the limits of divine
Providence in First Principles 2.9.1. In the Latin, Rufinus tones down Origen’s remarks
about providence when he says that “in the beginning God made as large a number of
rational and intelligent beings . . . as he foresaw would be sufficient.”612 But in the Greek
Origen states:
In the beginning, as we contemplate it, God created by an act of his will as
large a number of intelligent beings as he could control. For we must
maintain that even the power of God is finite, and we must not, under
pretext of praising him, lose sight of his limitations. For if the divine
power were infinite, of necessity it could not even understand itself, since
the infinite is by its nature incomprehensible. He made therefore just as
many as he could grasp and keep in hand and subject to his providence.613
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PArch 2.1.2 (Butterworth 77; SC 252, 236-238).
PArch 2.9.1 (Butterworth 129; SC 252, 352).
613
PArch 2.9.1 Greek (Butterworth 129, emphasis mine). The passage comes from a Greek
fragment, identified in the Butterworth edition as: Frag. 24 Koetschau, from Justinian Ep. Ad Mennam
(Mansi IX. 489 and 525) – Butterworth 129n1. Unlike some other passages from Justinian, this one sounds
authentic to Origen.
612
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Origen justifies any limitation on God’s power by suggesting that infinite power is
illogical (an argument found elsewhere in Greek philosophy).614 However, Origen brings
up the topic of God’s limitations specifically in his discussion of God’s providential
control of rational creatures (which, for Origen, is identical with God’s universal plan of
salvation). This is merely a suggestion, but if I am correct then Rufinus had no cause to
be embarrassed by Origen’s mention of God’s limitation here, and this is because any
limitation is self-imposed. Theoretically, God could have created more rational souls, but
it could be that if there were too many then there would be no hypothetical future
timeline which would guarantee a voluntary salvation for everyone. Each introduction of
a new rational soul into the equation would make it that much more difficult to discover a
possible future where the interactions between each soul and God (as well as between
each soul and other souls) successfully reaches the apocatastasis. Thus, God’s limitation
may be nothing more than God’s decision to only create souls that he knew he could
infallibly bring to salvation.
Now that we have a better understanding of Origen’s view of divine
foreknowledge and how it takes an active role in arranging creaturely moral autonomy,
we will look at two final passages which illustrate and tie together many of features we
have already discussed. The first comes from Origen’s treatise on prayer:
PEuch 6.3 and 7, Greer 94, 96-97 (GCS II, 313.1-15; 316.4-8)
[Prior to this passage Origen defends the notion of moral autonomy, praise
and blame, against fatalists and predestinarians.] If then our freedom [ἐφ
ἡμῖν] is preserved, however vast the number of inclinations [ἀπονεύσεις] it
has to virtue or to vice and, again, to what is becoming or to what is
unbecoming, it [our ἐφ ἡμῖν], along with everything else from creation and
from the foundation of the world (cf. Rom. 1:20), will be known to God
614

Origen also elaborates upon God’s limitations in a philosophical or logical sense in Cels III.70
(Chadwick 175; SC 136, 158-160).
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before it comes to be for what sort of freedom it will be [πρὶν γένηται, τῷ
θεῷ ἔγνωσται . . . ὁποῖον ἔσται]. And among all the things God foreordains
in accordance with what He has seen concerning each deed of our freedom
[ἑκάστου ἔργου ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν], there has been foreordained according to merit
[ἀξίαν] for each motion of our freedom [ἑκάτῳ κινήματι τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν]
what will meet it from providence and still cohere with the chain of future
events. And so, God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of everything that
will come to be, even of our freedom when we are made active by our own
impulse [ὁρμὴν]. For even if we entertain the supposition that God does
not know what will come to be, we do not for this reason lose the power of
acting in different ways and of willing [θελήσειν] certain things. But if God
takes the order for the governance of the universe from His
foreknowledge, then all the more is our individual freedom useful for the
ordering of the world [πλέον δὲ απὸ τῆς προγνώσεως γίνεται τὸ κατάταξιν
λαμβάνειν εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς διοίκησιν χρειώδη τῇ τοῦ κόσμου καταστάσει
τὸ ἑκάστου ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν]… (PEuch 7) Now that we have said that God uses
the freedom [ἐφ ἡμῖν] of each of us on earth and has ordered
[κατατεταχέναι]615 our freedom aright for some benefit to those on earth.
We must suppose that the same conclusion applies to the freedom of the
sun, the moon, and the stars…616
It is typical for Origen to say that God foreknows our free choices. But in this passage
Origen goes further. He says that even our inclinations are foreknown by God, regardless
of whether we end up assenting to them or not – our ἀπονεύσεις are known by God
before all creation for “what sort of freedom it will be.” This means that God foreknows
our possible free choices as well as our actual free choices. God chooses to arrange a
particular order of the future timeline on the basis of his foreknowledge of individual
freedom (ἐφ ἡμῖν). Specifically, God bases his arrangement of the future around two
ideas. First, the arrangement is based around individual merit (ἀξίαν). For example,
rewards and punishments are both motivating tools that can bring people to voluntary
repentance. But God does not distribute these in a purely utilitarian manner; God prefers

615
616

Or “has appointed/arranged” or even “has governed” (perfect, active, infinitive of κατατάσσω).
Italics added for emphasis.
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to mete out pedagogical methods on the basis of what people deserve. God is not only
good, he is also just.617
And second, God bases his arrangement around his goal of universal salvation.
Admittedly, in this text the concept is not mentioned explicitly: Origen uses the more
cautious remark that God “uses the individual freedom [ἐφ ἡμῖν] of each of us on earth
and has ordered [κατατεταχέναι] our freedom aright for some benefit to those on earth.”
Of course, the most important benefit that providence is supervising for those on earth is
their final salvation, as Origen states in many other places. To understand why Origen is
not more explicit in this passage we must remember the context of the discussion at this
point in On Prayer. Leading up to this passage, Origen has been arguing against Christian
fatalists and Christian predestinarians. We may remember from our analysis of this
faction in Chapter 2 that the Christian predestinarians taught that one’s final salvation
was necessitated by God, and that God’s decision could not be altered by anything his
creatures might do (that is to say, they preached a form of fatalism). As such, any
discussions about God’s foreordained universal salvation here by Origen would have
complicated his arguments and confused his readers. It would have been counterproductive to his main argument, as he would have found himself needing to divert the
topic into a lengthy discussion about the difference between events that will certainly
happen, and events that will happen by necessity. For these reasons, Origen chose not to
draw attention to universal salvation in this passage, and yet he used theological

617
PArch 2.9.6 (Butterworth 134; SC 252, 364-66): “This, as we have said before, was the cause
of the diversity among rational creatures, a cause that takes its origin not from the will or judgment of the
Creator, but from the decision of the creature’s own freedom. God, however, who then felt it just to arrange
his creation according to merit, gathered the diversities of minds into the harmony of a single world…”
Similarly, Origen writes that “the variety of arrangement has been instituted by God as a result of previous
causes arising from free will” – PArch 3.5.5 (Butterworth 242, SC 268, 228).
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shorthand, as it were, to allude to the idea: God orders the possible uses of our freedom
for the benefit of the world.
The final passage I would like to bring forward is arguably the most powerful
illustration and demonstration of my argument. Origen’s description of how God plans to
save Pharaoh ties together the different threads we have discussed in this chapter. The
following passage from First Principles is part of Origen’s larger explanation as to how
we should understand God’s hardening of Pharaoh’s heart:
PArch 3.1.13-14 (Greek), Butterworth 181-82, 185 (SC 268; 76-86)
The man who is abandoned is abandoned therefore by the divine
judgment, and towards certain sinners God is longsuffering, not without
reason, but because in regard to the immortality of the soul and the eternal
world it will be to their advantage that they should not be helped quickly
to salvation but should be brought to it more slowly after having
experienced many ills . . . In the same way [as a physician] God, who
knows the secrets of the heart [τὰ κρύφια τῆς χαρδίας] and foreknows the
future, perhaps in his longsuffering allows the hidden evil to remain while
he draws it out by means of external circumstances, with the objective of
purifying him who owing to carelessness has received into himself the
seeds of sin, that having vomited them out when they come to the surface
the sinner, even though he has proceeded far in evil deeds, may in the end
be able to obtain purification after his evil life and be renewed. For God
deals with souls not in view of fifty years, so to speak, of our life here, but
in view of the endless world . . . (3.1.14) For souls are, so to speak,
innumerable, and their habits are innumerable, and equally so are their
movements, their purposes, their inclinations and their impulses, of which
there is only one perfect superintendent [ὧν εἷς μόνος οἰκονόμος ἄριστος],
who has full knowledge both of the times and the appropriate aids and the
paths and the ways, namely, the God and Father of the universe.618
This is one of the clearest examples Origen gives of God’s knowledge of the
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. God does not simply foreknow what Pharaoh will
do in the future. Nor does God merely foreknow the things Pharaoh could have done
differently at any point in his future (e.g. God’s foreknowledge that Pharaoh could have
618

Italics added for emphasis.
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repented after each subsequent plague). God also foreknows how Pharaoh would freely
respond in any hypothetical and unrealized scenario. We may draw this conclusion by
looking at the logic behind God’s strategy to save Pharaoh: “it will be to their advantage
that they should not be helped quickly to salvation…”619 When God was determining how
to infallibly bring Pharaoh to repentance, God looked at a near-infinite amount of
possible strategies he could employ. God saw what the outcome would be if Pharaoh was
brought to repentance early, and what the outcome would be if Pharaoh was brought to
repentance late (and presumably at all points in-between). God discovered through his
“middle knowledge” that if Pharaoh was brought to repentance too early it would result
in a future timeline where Pharaoh would not make the necessary sequence of choices to
be saved in the end. Because of Pharaoh’s unique disposition, motives and impressions,
God foresaw that in order to bring about Pharaoh’s voluntary and lasting repentance, he
must first abandon Pharaoh for a time. It is true that God knew that abandoning Pharaoh
in this instance would motivate Pharaoh to commit even greater sin in the short-term.
Nevertheless, only through this abandonment would Pharaoh eventually reach a
disposition where he would freely choose to repent and be saved in a lasting way.620 For
Pharaoh, this moment would occur after his death in the afterlife.621 Consequently, before
all creation when God was arranging his plan, God included within his economy of
619

Cf. PEuch 29.16 (Greer 160; GCS II,391.5-10): “Set beside this the question whether God
hardened Pharaoh’s heart so that he might be able to say what he did when no longer hardened, ‘The Lord
is in the right, and I and my people are in the wrong’. Nevertheless, he needed to be hardened still more and
suffer still more, lest by ceasing from the hardening too quickly he should despise the hardening as an evil
and deserve to be hardened many times more.”
620
PArch 3.1.17 (Butterworth 191-192; SC 268, 102-104): “…they had not yet fulfilled the
appropriate time in which to be themselves abandoned by the divine superintendence and to be filled more
and more with the particular evils whose seeds they had sown and then afterwards to be called to a more
enduring repentance, such as would prevent them from quickly falling again into the sins into which they
had previously fallen…”
621
We must remember that Origen places special importance on the continuation of the moral
quest in the afterlife (cf. Chapter 3).
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salvation the specific set of future circumstances that God knew would infallibly lead to
Pharaoh’s free decision to repent at a specific point in the future. And God similarly
made sure that Pharaoh was never given the opportunity to perform the sequence of free
choices that would lead to Pharaoh’s ultimate destruction.
When God’s strategy is understood, it is clear that God’s abandonment of Pharaoh
is both punishment and grace. We may recall from the above passage in On Prayer that
Origen believes God bases his foreordained arrangement of salvation-history on two
things: merit and universal salvation. Both aspects are illuminated here in the example of
Pharaoh. Pharaoh merited God’s abandonment – it was a commensurate punishment for
his sin (“abandoned therefore by the divine judgment”). But at the same time, even this
punishment was tailor-designed by God to infallibly and unswervingly lead to Pharaoh’s
free choice to repent and be saved at a specific moment in Pharaoh’s future. Thus, God’s
abandonment of Pharaoh is a feature of saving grace in Origen’s theology. It was a
necessary part of Pharaoh’s conversion story, for without this manner of “healing”
Pharaoh would not have reached the apocatastasis. In Origen’s words:
In dealing with such persons, therefore, the eternal God, the perceiver of
secret things, who knows all things before they come to be, in his
goodness refrains from sending them the quicker help and, if I may say so,
helps them by not helping them, since this course is for their profit.622
God’s abandonment was foreordained grace.623 In a manner of speaking it is true that
God “caused” Pharaoh to sin, but only in the sense that God set up a situation which he
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PArch 3.1.17 Greek (Butterworth 191; SC 268, 100-102).
Origen explicitly describes radical strategies such as abandonment and even the hiding of his
word from people as part of God’s plan of grace and salvation. E.g. PArch 3.5.8 (Butterworth 244; SC 268,
234): “But how, consistently with the preservation of free will in all rational creatures, each person ought to
be dealt with, that is…who they are from whom the word is utterly hidden and who are destined [dispenset]
to be far away from the hearing of it…” (emphasis mine). Also PArch 3.1.17 Greek (Butterworth 191; SC
268, 102): “[Those who] were foreseen by the Saviour, according to our supposition, as being not likely to
prove steadfast in their conversion, if they were to hear more explicitly the message that was spoken. They
623
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foreknew would increase Pharaoh’s (temporary) obstinacy. Pharaoh’s choice was still his
own. God makes use of evil choices in his arrangement so that even they will directly
contribute to the soul’s eventual restoration.624
This understanding of God’s active role in the superintendence of creaturely
moral autonomy reinforces our claim in the last chapter that everything that God does
through his providence should be recognized as grace – that is, according to Origen
everything that God does is a divine gift that facilitates our healing and salvation. This
includes teaching and rewards, as well as threats and punishments. It is the answer to the
question of human suffering, par excellence.625 God does not use these pedagogical tools
simply because people deserve them; God uses them because he has foreordained a
specific plan of salvation (customized down to an individual level) by which God
infallibly enforces his decision to save every soul. This is the unspeakable plan of God’s
love and God’s Wisdom. It is unspeakable in scope and in complexity. It reaches all
were therefore destined [ᾠκονομῆσθαι] by the Lord not to hear the deeper teachings more clearly, less after
having quickly turned and been healed by obtaining forgiveness they should despise the wounds of their
wickedness as being slight and easy of cure and should very quickly fall into them again.”
624
Cf. Cels IV.70 (Chadwick 239; SC 136, 356): “I will say that while God preserves the free will
[ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν] of each man He makes use of the evil of bad men for the ordering of the whole, making them
useful to the universe; yet such a man is none the less guilty, and as such he has been appointed to perform
a function which is repulsive to the individual but beneficial to the whole.” HomNum 14.2.1 (Scheck 80;
SC 442, 164-166): “In the meantime we ourselves say that by a certain dispensation [dispensatione] and by
the wisdom of God, things in this world are arranged in such a way that absolutely nothing escapes God’s
purposes, whether it is evil or good. But let us explain what we are saying more clearly. God did not make
evil; yet, though he was able to prohibit its being invented by others, he does not prohibit it, but he uses it
for necessary causes [necessarias causas] with those very ones who are its source.” Citations from
Origen’s Homilies on Numbers are from the newest critical edition: Doutreleau, Origène: Homélies sur les
Nombres, 1, 2, 3. English translations are from Scheck, Homilies on Numbers: Origen.
625
I wish to qualify my remark here. The Stoic answer to individual suffering is that God's
Providence directed the world in the best possible way for the whole, and that this sometimes has ill effects
(such as suffering) for individuals. God was able to use and incorporate these individual evils for the good
of the whole – Chadwick, "Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa," 38. Origen uses a similar argument when
defending providence: “But evils which are few in comparison with the orderly arrangement of the universe
have been the consequence of the works which were His primary intention, just as spiral shavings and
sawdust are a consequence of the primary works of a carpenter…” – Cels VI.55 (Chadwick 372; SC 147,
318). While most suffering appears to be an intentional part of the providential plan to save each sinner,
Origen does leave a bit of room for some undeserved suffering as well that arises as a consequence of the
way the whole arrangement stands together.
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things, includes all things, and intertwines all things into one complete plan of grace. And
Origen believes that it is God’s goal to gradually reveal this unspeakable plan to his
creatures so that one day they might finally realize that everything has been about grace
the entire time:
[When each soul is ascending towards God after death] He will learn the
judgment of divine providence about each individual thing; about things
which happen to men, that they happen not by chance or accident, but by a
reason so carefully thought out, and so high above us, that it does not
overlook even the number of hairs of our head, and that not of the saints
only but probably of all men.626

Conclusion
Origen frequently describes God as the supremely wise doctor who is in charge of
restoring all people back to perfect health. By necessity and design, doctors always
administer their healing arts on an individual and personalized basis. Every disease is
different, and so every cure must be different; the cure that works for one person might
act as poison pill for another. God knows in advance which cure each person needs.
When we put this Origenistic metaphor into the language of moral autonomy, we see that
God foreknows how each soul’s disposition and character would freely respond to any
hypothetical situation. In the primordial past God used this knowledge to discover what
situations and stimuli would cause each soul to respond in the correct way such that they
would eventually reach complete restoration. God then actuated a future timeline that
made his prearrangement a reality. At every moment of choice moral autonomy is
upheld, given that the soul makes the choice in the presence of competing rational
desires, and God does not make the choice on the soul’s behalf. At the same time,
626

PArch 2.11.5 (Butterworth 151; SC 252, 406).
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however, God does unswervingly bring about the situation which the soul needs to make
the correct choice. This foreordained healing strategy is made explicit by Origen when he
explains the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. God knew in advance that the only way
Pharaoh would freely repent and be saved in a lasting way would be to experience a
season of abandonment by God. Therefore, the very same God who loved Pharaoh more
than any other, also intentionally manipulated Pharaoh’s circumstances so that Pharaoh
would fall deeper into temporary sin – much as doctors might cause temporary harm to
patients when they know it will result in a complete healing.
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CONCLUSION
AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH
A large segment of modern scholarship on Origen has done him a disservice by
insisting that Origen’s universalism undercuts his teachings on moral autonomy. At best,
those few scholars who have tried to defend both aspects of Origen’s theology do not
appear to understand how they fit together in Origen’s thought. Ramelli and Tzamalikos
are outlier examples of scholars who have argued for specific solutions, but they are the
wrong solutions. Origen was aware of the potential threat to moral autonomy (in the form
of moral fatalism) posed by an infallible and foreordained universal salvation. This was
the reason he chose to hide this teaching from most of his students and readers. But
Origen believed he had a solution which relied on a nuanced understanding of God’s
foreknowledge. Because freedom of choice depends on a person’s character, disposition
and intellect in the moment of choice, Origen believed that God is able to foreknow each
person’s future free choices. On the same basis, Origen believed that God must also be
able to foreknow how a person would freely choose to respond in any hypothetical state
of affairs, whether or not those affairs ever come to pass in history. Thus, through his
imaginative foreknowledge (or “middle knowledge”) God discovered what situation each
future soul needed to find itself in so that it would freely accept God’s instruction and
advance towards beatitude. Based on his collective foreknowledge regarding every soul,
God prearranged and fashioned a future timeline of salvation-history in which each soul
would inescapably find itself in the exact conditions necessary for their voluntary
repentance and ascent to beatitude. This is what grounds Origen’s confidence in God’s
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ability to infallibly achieve universal salvation, despite the fact that salvation is dependent
upon the contingent choices of creatures. This is what elevates Origen’s belief in
universal salvation beyond a mere hope or naïve optimism.
There are several implications of this research. First, and most importantly, this
research fixes the incorrect narrative found in scholarship today that Origen’s doctrines of
divine providence and human moral autonomy stand opposed, contradictory or
inconsistent. Similarly, this research critiques those scholars who have redefined Origen’s
universalism as merely his “hope” that all might eventually be saved – a redefinition that
has typically gone hand-in-hand with the view that Origen was inconsistent or
contradictory on these points.
A second implication of this research is that it allows for better nuance for
scholars who wish to parade Origen as the quintessential theologian of “free will” in the
early church. This research should temper and refine some of the more sweeping claims,
for I have demonstrated that Origen understands God to exercise a measure of control and
authority over human moral autonomy that seems to have gone unrealized. After all, God
makes a unilateral decision, in advance, as to which of the possible free choices of his
creatures he will allow to come into existence, and which of the possible free choices he
will not allow to be performed. God necessarily rejects the overwhelming majority of the
free decisions his creatures could have or would have made, given that most of these are
inappropriate or ill-suited for inclusion into God’s best possible arrangement. Once
understood, this nuanced view calls into question claims like that of B. Darrell Jackson.
Jackson wrote that the following Platonic description of divine providence “could have
been written by Origen”:
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. . . seeing that a soul in its successive conjunction first with one body and
then with another, runs the whole gamut of change through its own action
or that of some other soul, no labor is left for the mover of pieces but this –
to shift the character that is becoming better to a better place, and that
which is getting worse to a worser, each according to its due, that each
may meet with its proper doom.627
Such a static description of God’s oversight of creaturely moral autonomy is wrong.
Ironically, Jackson’s view is both too optimistic and too pessimistic: it is too optimistic
because Origen does not believe that souls are able to progress without constant divine
aid, and it is too pessimistic for this description would allow the possibility for some
souls to be in a state of flux forever, and never arrive back to God.
More recently, Alfons Fürst has similarly portrayed Origen’s teachings on free
choice as if God is merely a bystander who must continually react to his creature’s
choices without any ability to foreordain outcomes.628 Mark Scott also grants too much
power to Origen’s view of moral autonomy with his remarkable claim that each soul
627

Jackson, "Sources of Origen's Doctrine of Freedom," 16-17 (italics mine). Jackson identifies
the text as: “903d, trans. from Plato, The Collected Dialogues, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns
(eds.) (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961), p. 1459.”
628
Fürst writes: “In Origen’s radical concept of freedom, freedom is not simply an anthropological
reality, but the signature of creation as a whole . . . According to the actions following from the decisions of
our free will, history will develop, and the universe will go on in as many worlds as necessary according to
our decisions. God will wait until the last creature uses his freedom according to his true essence (i.e., in a
good manner, and not a bad one), and all saints, the prophets and apostles, will wait as well until the last
sinner has turned to God. Thus, all depends on how we act, and by this, our freedom and God’s freedom are
ensured . . . According to Origen, man is neither drawn by fate nor by God’s will” – Alfons Fürst, "Origen's
Legacy to Modern Thinking about Freedom and Autonomy," in Origeniana Undecima: Origen and
Origenism in the History of Western Thought, ed. Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum
Theologicarum Lovaniensium (Leuven: Peeters, 2016), 9. Such a view makes God out to be some sort of
cosmic bystander, and insinuates that God does not want to infringe upon creaturely self-determination in
any way whatsoever. This view does not appreciate that Origen understands God to set hard limits on his
creatures in regard to their own self-determination. God sets these limits on moral freedom because of his
love and grace. There are outcomes that God will simply not allow. Therefore, God uses his providence to
insist upon a certain end – which is precisely the reason Origen states that God arranges the entirety of
salvation-history before he ever creates the world. God’s arrangement and governance is not done “on the
fly”, in a moment-by-moment basis, but has been foreordained from the beginning of time, for only in this
way could God ensure the outcome he wants. To be sure, God’s end is achieved using the free and
contingent choices of his creatures, but these are the free choices which God has chosen in advance to
allow his creatures to perform. This does not mean God made them choose what they did, but God made
them experience the types of experiences which he knew would produce the choices he had originally
planned for them to make.
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retains control over its own destiny.629 These scholars fail to realize that nowhere does
Origen state that moral autonomy has such an abstract power in its purview or field of
operations. Origen understands choice to be an assent to a received inclination or
impression towards a specific action. As such, it makes no sense to speak of an
impression for a particular destiny. No such impression or desire could be presented to
the soul, and the soul could never assent to something so abstract and hidden in the future
(there would be no proposed action to assent to, and no subsequent impulse which would
terminate at such an end).630 Origen understands creatures to only have freedom of choice
in a moment-by-moment basis, in the existential moment of choice. While it is true that
certain modern libertarian definitions of “freedom of the will” include the requirement
that one has control over one’s destiny, it is a mistake to ascribe this to Origen. Any
notion that souls might have their own superintendent ability over the collective telos of
their own choices is not only foreign to Origen’s arguments for moral autonomy, but also
at odds with the role and privilege Origen ascribes to God’s providence alone. Any soul
629
Scott writes that Origen “consistently maintains in his writings the freedom of every rational
being, including the Devil, to choose its eternal destiny” – Scott, Journey Back to God: Origen on the
Problem of Evil: 136 (italics mine). Jennifer Heckart similarly claims that Origen’s doctrine of free will
entails that “we are the masters of our fate and the captains of our souls” – Heckart, "Sympathy for the
Devil? Origen and the end," 59. While it is true that the soul is the “captain” of our choices, it is not true
that we are masters of our own fate. Rather, the master of our fate is none other than the one who has
predetermined it.
630
The soul might believe (correctly or incorrectly) that its choice is directed towards a particular
outcome or destiny. But this is not the same thing as choosing the destiny itself in the moment of choice.
Modern philosophers will sometimes critique the notion of universalism for this same reason – e.g. writing
about universalism Michael Murray remarks: “[Universalism appears to] infringe on a certain important
feature of creaturely freedom since it entails that one's choices have no effect on the outworking of one's
destiny...That is, while it allows human beings to make choices, including choices that are relevant for soulmaking, it does not allow outcomes to vary accordingly, since those who choose to develop characters
which are self-directed and not God-directed are summarily transformed. More broadly we might say that
one can choose to cultivate a morally vicious character, but in the end one cannot have such a character” –
Murray, "Three Versions of Universalism," 58-59. In C. S. Lewis’ popular book The Great Divorce, the
narrator finds George MacDonald in heaven and reminds him that he had been a universalist while on
earth. MacDonald states that he has changed his mind. The problem with universalism, Lewis’ MacDonald
now advises, is that it removes freedom – C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (New York: Macmillian, 1946),
124-25. What Murray and Lewis describe as an apparent “infringement” of creaturely freedom, Origen
understands to be grace.
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may be free to sin and reject God in the moment. But nowhere does Origen grant to the
soul the power to reject God forever. Logically, that is not the sort of choice that can even
be made in the moment.
A third implication of this research is related to the second. If the narrative
regarding Origen’s view of moral autonomy needs to be refined and toned down in some
cases, then the narrative regarding Origen’s view of divine providence might need to be
similarly strengthened. To complicate matters further, Chapter 4 demonstrated that divine
providence is essentially the same thing as saving grace in Origen’s theology. 631
Everything that God does to his creatures, be it reward or punishment or teaching or
abandonment, is an essential aspect of God’s plan of salvation for the soul it is directed
towards. To describe Origen’s view anachronistically by about a hundred years, we could
reasonably say that everything divine providence does is part of God’s “effective call” for
each soul who has been foreordained and “elected” for salvation. Since there is no soul
who has not been foreordained for salvation, there does not appear to be any role for
providence outside of salvific grace.632 This strengthening of the concept of grace in
Origen’s theology will affect any description of “grace vs. free will” in Origen’s
thinking.633

631
This analysis confirms the results of Benjamin Drewery’s detailed study on Origen’s use and
definition of God’s grace (charis). Drewery never found a formal definition of charis in Origen’s writings,
given that Origen speaks about grace in such diverse ways – Drewery, Origen and the Doctrine of Grace:
17; 201. In Drewery’s own words: “but my difficulty has been that no single feature of Origen’s thought is
ultimately irrelevant to my quest” (200). This led Drewery to conclude that for Origen “πρόνοια and
οἰκονομία are χάρις” (106, italics in original).
632
One might wonder if God’s providential care over animals and other non-rational entities might
qualify as an exercise of God’s power not directly related to grace. However, Origen views the creation of
this world (with everything therein) as God’s reaction to sin. That is to say, the entire reason for the
creation of the material world, and everything in it, is God’s opening salvo in his plan to facilitate each
soul’s ascent back to God. It may not be clear how animals and plants factor into the plan of salvation, but
on Origen’s view they must.
633
In a short article I. T. Holdcroft offered some conclusions regarding Origen’s doctrine of grace
based on Origen’s treatment of the “Parable of the Pounds” (Luke 19:11-27). Holdcroft takes issue with the
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A fourth implication of this research is that it contributes to the ongoing debate as
to how to understand Origen’s doctrine of justification by faith, a doctrine which is
necessarily interconnected with the themes of freedom of choice and God’s saving
grace.634 In his Commentary on Romans Origen frequently finds himself trying to explain
how justification does or does not relate to faith and works. Over the years scholars have
disagreed over how to best characterize Origen.635 A big reason for the ongoing debate is
that Origen seems to speak in diverse ways throughout the Romans commentary.
critical edition’s interpretation of Origen at this point in the commentary. On the Sources Chrétiennes
reading, Origen describes grace as something happening throughout the entire process, for it implies that it
was by God’s grace that the pound was multiplied. Conversely, Holdcroft believes the best reading of the
Greek is that Origen believed that grace was found in the beginning and at the end of the process. He
writes: “The Greek fragments help to provide the answer to the question whether God’s grace covers the
whole process from beginning to end, or only the final gift of the pound taken from the one who failed to
make a profit . . . [Holdcroft concludes that] The grace lay in the initial giving of the pound, and in the final
unexpected gesture of generosity on the Lord’s part.” From this Holdcroft extrapolates about Origen’s
doctrine of grace in general: “This is not to imply that Origen is unconscious of what we owe to divine
generosity – after all, the beginning of the process as well as the final consummation has its origin in the
benevolence of God – but to point out that somewhere between these points he leaves a gap to be filled by
human effort” – I. T. Holdcroft, "The Parable of the Pounds and Origen's Doctrine of Grace," The Journal
of Theological Studies 24, no. 2 (1973): 503-04. I mention this only because this short article appears to be
quoted surprisingly often when scholars wish to give a shorthand description of the way Origen views
God’s strategy of grace. That is to say, divine grace is described as something which starts and ends the
process, but which leaves the middle arena of moral autonomy and moral effort completely up to the
individual. This is an unfortunate and inadequate description of divine grace in Origen’s theology for many
reasons, one of which is that it does not account for the superintendent role that grace plays on the selection
and exercise of moral effort.
634
The role of justification in the 2nd and 3rd centuries is a neglected field of study. Despite the fact
that one of Origen’s principle tasks in his Commentary on Romans is unpacking the meaning of
“justification by faith,” some scholars disregard the 2nd and 3rd centuries as unimportant for this topic, or
they say that any notion of justification in the pre-Augustinian fathers is either nascent or under-developed.
So, for example, in his book on the history of justification Alister McGrath confidently states that
“Justification was simply not a theological issue in the pre-Augustinian tradition” – McGrath, Iustitia Dei:
33. McGrath is merely adopting the view popularized by the Reformed theologian T. F. Torrance which
stated that the Apostolic Fathers had abandoned the doctrine of justification in favor of a form of worksrighteousness – T. F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers (Eugene, OR: Wipf and
Stock Publishers, 1996 (originally published 1948)). Fortunately, there are signs that this popular narrative
is beginning to be challenged. Cf. D. H. Williams, "Justification by Faith: a Patristic Doctrine," The Journal
of Ecclesiastical History 57, no. 4 (2006); Brian J. Arnold, Justification in the Second Century, ed. Dale C.
Allison, Jr., et al., Studies of the Bible and its Reception (Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017).
635
Important scholarly contributions to this question include: Harnack, History of Dogma, 2: 321f;
Boyd, "Origen on Pharaoh's hardened heart: a study of Justification and Election in St. Paul and Origen.";
Wiles, The Divine Apostle: The Interpretation of St Paul’s Epistles in the Early Church: 105-16; Heither,
Translatio Religionis: Die Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem Kommentar zum Römerbrief: 238ff;
Bammel, "Justification by Faith in Augustine and Origen." The most recent treatment of this question is the
best one – Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The Legacy of Origen's Commentary on
Romans: 13-62.
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Sometimes Origen insists that justification is through faith alone apart from any works,
and he highlights the dying thief on the cross as a proof text.636 At other times, however,
Origen writes as if faith itself is a work that we are responsible for, and which merits a
divine response.637 The scholarly debate, therefore, has centered on the question of one’s
initial faith – the initium fidei. Does Origen believe the initium fidei is the soul’s
responsibility alone and that God only responds with saving grace after the soul takes this
crucial first step, or does Origen believe that even the initium fidei itself is a gift from
God? I do not propose to answer such questions here. However, as far as I can tell none
of the scholars who have written on Origen’s doctrine of justification situate this question
into the larger narrative of how God preselects and prearranges the free choices which
God wants to be performed by his creatures, which includes all such choices that relate to
faith. Thus, even if a person’s initial faith is the result of a free choice which merits a
divine response, at the same time it is also true that God had preselected and foreordained
that free choice, and then God further arranged the parameters of salvation-history such
that the person would inevitably and unavoidably find themselves in the situation where
they make this free choice instead of any other free choice. Of course, this does not fully
answer the many questions surrounding Origen’s teaching on justification, but it is a
necessary component that has been overlooked. This research recognizes that there is a
further layer operating behind the scenes which plays a key role in how (and why) a
person receives justification from God.

636
637

E.g. ComRm III.6 (Scheck 1.225-230; Bammel 247-252).
E.g. ComRm IX.3 (Scheck 2.207-208; Bammel 730-731).
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A fifth implication of this research is that it questions the popular narrative that
the early Church was “of one voice” regarding free will.638 Sweeping claims about “free
will” are not helpful, given that “free will” does not mean anything in the abstract.
Different authors argued that moral autonomy had different requirements, and the early
Church did not speak in a homogenous way on this topic. Moreover, those who voice this
popular narrative seem to hold the presupposition that free will is definitionally opposed
to determinism (as in, we are meant to understand: ‘the early church was of one voice in
upholding free will against determinism’). This is inaccurate. There were a variety of
viewpoints in antiquity that could be described as a type of determinism, given that
“determinism” is a modern word with puzzling flexibility.639 And many of these views
insisted on the reality of moral autonomy and moral culpability within their deterministic
framework. Determinism and “free will” were not necessarily either / or options, and
certainly not definitionally so.640 Our study of Origen reveals him to be yet another
illustration of the dangers of broad and sweeping narratives about the “early church”.
Origen emphasized moral autonomy, but at the same time Origen’s eschatology may be
viewed as its own form of teleological determinism (in the sense of a foreordained,
predetermined, and infallible outcome). The apocatastasis was not only unilaterally
638

E.g. Alister McGrath writes: “While it is true that the beginnings of a doctrine of grace may be
discerned during this early period, its generally optimistic estimation of the capacities of fallen humanity
has led at least some scholars to question whether it can be regarded as truly Christian in this respect. The
pre-Augustinian theological tradition is practically of one voice in asserting the freedom of the human will”
– McGrath, Iustitia Dei: 34.
639
“’Determinism’ is a term one often finds in discussions of the history of ideas, and yet is also
something of a vexed category, in part because of the different implications it carries in various scholarly
contexts” – Kathleen Gibbons, "Who Reads the Stars? Origen's Critique of Astrological Geography," in
The Routledge Handbook of Identity and the Environment in the Classical and Medieval Worlds, ed.
Rebecca Futo and Molly Jones-Lewis Kennedy (London: Routledge, 2015), 230.
640
Gibbons states the point succinctly: “...many of the authors in antiquity who understood human
actions as determined were not seeking to deny human choice, but to explain it” – ibid., 243. Cf. Ibid. 242:
“Here, I have aimed to argue that the problem of determinism in the context of the history of ancient
religions is something of a red herring...we can consider how debates about causation and volition were
more fine-grained than the simple binary of 'determinism vs. free will.'”
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foreordained by God, but God was also the one who infallibly actuated that outcome. In
the words of later authors, we might say that Origen believed that God elected the entire
human race for salvation. As we have shown in Chapter 2, it is true that throughout his
life Origen argued against a variety of deterministic viewpoints. But his arguments were
on a case-by-case basis, and he used different philosophical and exegetical arguments
against each one. He never argued against determinism qua determinism; rather, he only
argued against deterministic views which denied moral autonomy and resulted in
fatalism.641 Fatalism was Origen’s nemesis – not the idea of foreordained events.642
A sixth implication of this research concerns the curious case of 16th century
discussions on grace, providence, free will, and God’s foreknowledge. What is
commonly referred to today as God’s “middle knowledge” is said to originate with Luis
de Molina. Today, the view of middle knowledge (or Molinism) as a viable philosophical
and theological doctrine has been defended and popularized by well-known philosophers
such as Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig.643 While Molina’s account is not

641

To rephrase this in terminology more appropriate and faithful to Origen’s own language we
should say that Origen never argued against infallibly foreordained and “fixed” outcomes; rather, he only
argued against outcomes that were fixed in the future because of “necessity”, by which he meant that they
were fixed through the use of external force which overrides the operation of an agent’s own impressions
and assent.
642
Origen was so worried about fatalistic views that he also constantly worried about nonfatalistic teachings which could somehow be misconstrued as fatalistic. Again, this is why Origen kept his
teaching on the apocatastasis secret – not because his understanding of universalism entailed fatalism, but
because simple people would mischaracterize it as such. Origen felt like he was adopting God’s own
strategic pedagogy in this regard. Similarly, even though divine foreknowledge does not cause necessity,
God “who ordereth all things for the best, with good reason hides the future from our eyes. For the
knowledge of the future makes us relax in the struggle against wickedness, and the apparent certainty of
wickedness enervates us…” – Phil 23.10 (Lewis 183; SC 226, 162-164).
643
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); William Lane
Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez (New York:
Brill, 1988); Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience (New
York: Brill, 1990); Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1998); William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2000).
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identical with Origen’s,644 both develop the notion that God possesses a special type of
knowledge concerning the counterfactuals of human freedom, and both emphasize that
this knowledge is specifically what preserves moral autonomy in the context of divine
foreordination (in Origen’s case the foreordination is to universal salvation, while
Molina’s discussion centers around a particular view of predestination).645 Molina was
acquainted with Origen, for he does cite Origen’s Commentary on Romans in a few
places, but such mentions only seem to be used as evidence for the basic point that divine

644
Origen and Molina differ on how they construe moral autonomy, even if they both affirm
God’s knowledge of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Molina defended a type of libertarian
freedom, and it would be inaccurate and anachronistic to label Origen as a proponent of libertarian freedom
(i.e. Origen did not believe in the absolute ability to do otherwise in the typical libertarian sense). In fact,
for this very reason I would cautiously suggest that Origen’s view of middle knowledge appears to be more
logically coherent than some current forms of Molinism. For on Molinism, it is unclear what mechanism
gives God the ability to know what free creatures would do in any given hypothetical situation, given that
creatures have absolute power to the contrary. In other words, if a creature can choose to act even against
its own inclinations and rationality in the moment of choice (as libertarianism typically suggests), then even
a comprehensive and exhaustive knowledge of the person’s heart and mind would not be sufficient
information for God to be able to predict their choice. On Origen’s view, however, the moral agent always
chooses on the basis of their current disposition and rationality, and so a comprehensive knowledge of
one’s disposition would enable God to foreknow their free choices.
There is a second notable difference between the two systems. On Molinism, it is entirely possible
that some moral agents would not repent in any hypothetical future situation, what some modern
philosophers have dubbed “trans-world damnation” – cf. William Craig’s "'No Other Name': A Middle
Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ," Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989):
186. See also a response to Craig’s position – Raymond J. VanArragon, "Transworld Damnation and
Craig's Contentious Suggestion," Faith and Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2001). Origen’s tripartite anthropology
does not allow for the possibility that some people may reach a point where repentance is no longer
possible; Origen’s anthropology precludes such a notion because he believes that the untainted desires
originating from the spirit are permanent. There are always virtuous desires within every moral agent, even
for every individual choice. This means that God will always have recourse to some situation, no matter
how rare, by which to entice the soul to genuine repentance and salvation by tapping into these desires.
Thus, it is unsurprising that while Origen’s use of “middle knowledge” allows for universal salvation, many
modern proponents of “middle knowledge” affirm an eternal Hell.
645
For example, note the striking parallel between Craig’s description of Molinism with the
presentation of Origen’s theology outlined in this chapter: “It might seem that foreknowledge, explained in
this way, smacks of a divine “sting operation” – it could sound as though God manipulates people by
leading them into situations in which they are induced to act in a certain way, even if freely, and thus God
knows what they will do. Such an understanding is, however, needlessly unsympathetic. Two truths must
be kept in mind: (1) God is a gracious, loving God, not a manipulative tyrant. He loves his creatures and
wants the best for them. We may trust in the wisdom of his decision concerning which world to create. (2)
In the circumstances in which people find themselves, they are genuinely free to choose opposite courses of
action. That God knows what they will do in any set of circumstances does not mean that they are
compelled by the circumstances to do what they do. God does not determine their choice; they can choose
freely between alternate courses of action” – Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine
Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: 134.
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foreknowledge was not the cause of the foreknown events, but rather that the events were
the cause of the foreknowledge of them.646 Molina does not seem aware that Origen also
made use of a category of divine knowledge Molina calls “middle knowledge.” At any
rate, this analysis of Origen’s theology calls into question whether Molina was as original
as people claim him to be.

646

Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et
reprobatione concordia (1595): On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia: 180-82, §20-22; 84,
§29; 230-31, §23.
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